Prior to Japan's entry into World War II, the commands of the armed forces and the intelligence services of the Western democracies had only marginal and very vague information about the aircraft used by the air force of that island nation. New Japanese aircraft, appearing in reports from American advisers stationed with units of the Chinese Air Force, fighting for survival with the Japanese since 1937, were time and again identified by military and civilian aviation experts alike as inferior copies of Western types. And the Japanese themselves, of course, made no effort to dispel this impression.
American, British, and Dutch pilots first became convinced of the wrongness of these prejudices in late 1941 over Pearl Harbor, Malaya, and Sumatra.
Early in June 1942, a group of pilots, under the command of Capt. Frank T. McCoy and TSgt Francis Williams, the Material Section of the Directorate of Intelligence was established, with the task of identifying and cataloguing enemy aircraft. Initially, information was gathered mainly from reports by Allied pilots and ground troops from the front and by analysing the wreckage of downed aircraft. As the war progressed, this was augmented by knowledge gained from SIGINT and from direct tests of captured aircraft carried out by the Technical Air Intelligence Unit (TAIU).
For quick identification, each recorded aircraft was assigned a simple and easy to remember code name according to the following scheme:
Male names- fighter aircraft and reconnaissance seaplanes.
Female names - horizontal and stealth bomber aircraft, fighter aircraft, flying boats, reconnaissance aircraft and transplanes
Names by trees - training aircraft
Names after birds - gliders
The difficulty the Allies had in obtaining true intelligence and technical information on Japanese armaments was also reflected in the number of duplicate code names assigned and the inclusion of non-existent types in the list of Japanese aircraft.
In 1944, an organization was formed in Washington, D.C., under the umbrella of the U.S. Technical Intelligence Division. Army and Navy with British participation - the Technical Air Intelligence Center (TAIC). The latter was assigned responsibility for the collection, evaluation and exploitation of all information on the Japanese Air Force.
American, British, and Dutch pilots first became convinced of the wrongness of these prejudices in late 1941 over Pearl Harbor, Malaya, and Sumatra.
Early in June 1942, a group of pilots, under the command of Capt. Frank T. McCoy and TSgt Francis Williams, the Material Section of the Directorate of Intelligence was established, with the task of identifying and cataloguing enemy aircraft. Initially, information was gathered mainly from reports by Allied pilots and ground troops from the front and by analysing the wreckage of downed aircraft. As the war progressed, this was augmented by knowledge gained from SIGINT and from direct tests of captured aircraft carried out by the Technical Air Intelligence Unit (TAIU).
For quick identification, each recorded aircraft was assigned a simple and easy to remember code name according to the following scheme:
Male names- fighter aircraft and reconnaissance seaplanes.
Female names - horizontal and stealth bomber aircraft, fighter aircraft, flying boats, reconnaissance aircraft and transplanes
Names by trees - training aircraft
Names after birds - gliders
The difficulty the Allies had in obtaining true intelligence and technical information on Japanese armaments was also reflected in the number of duplicate code names assigned and the inclusion of non-existent types in the list of Japanese aircraft.
In 1944, an organization was formed in Washington, D.C., under the umbrella of the U.S. Technical Intelligence Division. Army and Navy with British participation - the Technical Air Intelligence Center (TAIC). The latter was assigned responsibility for the collection, evaluation and exploitation of all information on the Japanese Air Force.