Introduction
Panzer division of the wehrmacht have been one of the fundamental building blocks and the symbols of the German blitzkrieg, the so-called blitzkrieg. To this the modern way of warfare was set during the September fighting in Poland, but its peak it reached during the campaign against France and in the first half of the war with the Soviet union. After having the Germans go on the defensive and their methods have taken over the Allies, while the Germans, on the contrary they improved the combat in the defense. For the uninitiated observer was the advance of the German armies in France an unexpected shock, something totally new and revolutionary. But the Germans just came out of their military traditions, they were joined by the conveniences of modern techniques and given the opportunity to stand out commanders, who are on the thing we can look in a new way. Impressive results the deployment of the German tank divisions have been carefully studied, for example, in the United states, that these insights harness in the construction of their armored divisions, which had similar tasks.
The German panzer divisions accounted for in the time of its creation completely a new phenomenon entering into the area of military affairs. Not that in the meantime there were no tanks or tank units, but the current approach consisted in building a smaller military bodies, which should be part of the larger netankových units, mainly infantry divisions. Tank as such, should serve as protection and support of the infantry, indeed, their development and doctrinal anchor rested on the shoulders of the infantry, or in the case of light tanks at the cavalry, which has seen the compromise the way to their conservation. German pioneers but assumed something else. Dreamed of the emergence of highly mobile, self-operating tank divisions. You would have led a flanking assault forays into the weak points of the enemy defense. Here would be achieved through the concentration of forces to the immediate superiority, the break and the next reshuffle, and a fast move to the next appropriate point of the enemy line. The leadership of the mobile mechanized and motorized warfare in the forehead with tanks, supported by armored vehicles and self-propelled artillery, should bring a new dynamic to warfare, which could thus emerges from the slaughterhouse to the static trench warfare. The commander of this vševojskové formation should lead directly from the front line, have only the framework orders from their superiors and the ability to edit a specific procedure according to the specific development situation at the front. Improvisation and independent thinking was in direct contrast with the leadership of the so-called methodical war, which was the cornerstone of the French approach. Just the complexity and the slow pace of the decision-making process, the Germans wanted to avoid. Would like to also avoid having to wait for cumbersome towed artillery. Support them next to the self-propelled devices should provide mainly the air force, which have been regarded as mobile artillery sui generis.
the Tradition of the German military doctrine
From the heritage of the German military thinking since the time of Friedrich I. through Scharnhorsta, Clausewitz, through to Moltke and Schlieffena protruded two elements that were the basis of modern lightning war. Firstly, the principle of the destruction of the enemy forces and secondly on the principle of management of moving of the war. The ideal was a quick movement of the enemy to encircle in the boiler and subsequently destroy it. It was essential to choose the right place for the concentration of their own forces, which should surprisingly attack the weak point of the enemy defense. For the success of the operation it was necessary to have elaborate marching orders. Orders during the operation, it was necessary to pass as quickly as possible, and subordinate commanders had to be able to carry them out, albeit for other than the expected conditions. These subordinate commanders should receive from their superiors only framework orders with defining a clear goal and plenty of allocated forces. It should combine with detailed information of their own staff and their will to decide about the manner of execution of the mission. The aim of the procedure according to the changing situation, not according to šablonovitých solution. The German doctrine was aware that even the most detailed plan survives encounter with the enemy. Commanders therefore had to plan the further procedure, adjusted according to the actual situation on the battlefield. Each commander, therefore, received the assigned target and be on it, how it come true. It was assumed experienced, decisive and creative command cadres.
When in the second half of the 19th. century chief of the general staff von Moltke considered the strategic situation of Germany, which lay basically in the middle of Europe surrounded by real or potential enemies, came to the conclusion that they must prevent a war on two fronts, i.e. mainly at the same time waged war with France and Russia, in which not Germany, despite its still greater strength sufficient resources both material and human. A war on two fronts, Germany had avoided by first quickly knock out one enemy and then focus all the forces on the other, while counting on that the first throws forces to the west and then to the east. Moltke at the tactical level, counting with the leadership of the obkličovacích fights, but overall, his strategy of dealing with the problem of ever-increasing armies and the development of ever more powerful defences.
It seemed that the Schlieffen found a solution, when transferred encircling fight from the tactical to the operational level and at the same time, more relied on the railroad. The French army should be surrounded by one large maneuver and eliminated within a few weeks. In 1914, it all failed for different reasons, however, for the future development of the blitzkrieg is important mainly to the cumbersome nature of management processes in larger units and obsolescence of the tactical procedures of the lower units. Once the war in the West bogged down in the trenches, we were unable to find a way out and it all changed of ring roads on the frontal slaughterhouse. In some cases, have managed to achieve a breakthrough thanks to a variety of tactical or technical improvements, but it was only on the local achievements. This also applies to the tank, which has seen only limited success, and until the 1940s most people can't imagine its deployment in the manévrovém warfare at the operational level.
Seeckt and the interwar considerations
The germans in the interwar period, of course, engaged in it, how could it happen that the Schlieffen plan failed, and the moving war turned into trench. Hans von Seeckt insisted that the failure of the plan and the subsequent transition to the static form of warfare was not the result of superiority of defense over the weft, or a consequence of the introduction of new weapons and increase firepower, but still larger size of modern field armies. Those in its ranks had a huge amount of inexperienced and only partially trained soldiers, who were not able to carry out timely and properly the necessary maneuvers. Once was a big part of prvosledových units decimated in large-scale clashes, replacing it from the military point of view, less quality recruits. The army thus grew, but their quality has declined. The deployment of special commando units, consisting of carefully selected and trained soldiers, while proven, these formations managed to break through the enemy's defense, but on the overall condition of it changed nothing. These units were too few, were too spread out and there was no one who would be their breakthrough took advantage and expanded it. Lacked the ability to concentrate sufficient forces and rapid procedure a sufficiently large units. Seeckt saw in the development of a small core of mobile units composed of capable and well-trained team way to avoid a static war. His findings laid the theoretical basis is for the creation of panzer divisions.
While in France and in Great Britain tanks were included in the form of military hundred men each to infantry divisions, where they form their shield and support, or to purely tank units, the Germans came up with the concept of the combined divisions. This was supposed to be vševojskové formation composed of multiple types of units. Basis is comprised of tank and rifle regiments, which was a mechanized infantry. With that, how was the infantry element of the continuously enlarged at the expense of the tank, the increased flexibility of the panzer divisions. A similar process later passed an american armored division. Other parts of the division were self-propelled artillery, armored reconnaissance, tank destroyers, engineers, and support units. Panzer division could not achieve a breakthrough, but also its expansion. It was actually kind of a movable army in the small scale. The division could perform a wider range of tasks.
German commanders had the advantage in the tie technique, which challenges the technique of their opponents, which enabled them in moving war material advantage. Rapidly advancing tank division logically came about the support of heavy artillery, but the Germans found a compensation in the form of the air force. His troops were through close air support to provide ground units, fire support, therefore, function as a kind of airborne artillery. In these conditions, a panzer division is the perfect weapon moving war at the operational level.
Pioneers and their problems
Among the pioneers of the deployment of tanks in a new way belonged to general Oswald Lutz, the colonel Heinz Guderian, lieutenant colonel Walther von Reichenau or captain Wilhelm von Thoma. These visionaries had to deal with several problems. Secondly, most of the other commanders still lived in the historical imagination of a tank as a supportive resource corps, possibly faster version of a horse, both the German army was limited provisions of the treaty of Versailles, secondly, was not available needed a tank. Last but not least, wasn't the German industry ready for mass production of tanks in the necessary numbers. Similar theorists were also in the armies of other states, a number of states with the deployment of tanks experimenting, but anywhere there were no so convenient conditions as in Germany. The germans, moreover, have gained some experience in a secret tank school in the soviet Kazan.
When they came to power Adolf Hitler, who became a fan of tank warfare, they seized these visionaries a chance, and with the support of the highest political seats have started to transfer their vision into reality. Even so, but they dropped all the obstacles. Above all lacked a suitable tank. Training had to still rely on motor vehicles equipped with a "superstructure" of the cardboard paper in the shape of the tank or the various more or less experimental machines. Even at the time of the first division in 1935 were not available the estimated machine Panzer III and Panzer IV, but only their temporary replacement in the form of machines Panzer I and the Panzer II. However, German commanders could start to try to verify their theories in practice, thus far only on the parade ground. Not everything but it went smoothly. Still there's a lot of generals who failed to understand the needs of modern warfare. The cavalry in addition, to ensure part of the production of tank factories and create four lightweight division. Each of them had one section of light tanks.
From tank companies to the brigade combat vehicles
In 1928 she was planning the then Imperial branná power (Reichswehr) the establishment of a tank company in the horizon of three to five years. In October 1931 was established by Inspection of the automotive units (Inspection der Kraftfahrtruppen). At its head stood Oswald Lutz and the chief of staff was doing to him Heinz Guderian. The crew were undergoing secret training in the Soviet union. In November 1933 was established the Automotive instruction section hazy center (Kraftlehrkommando hazy center). In July 1934 was the Inspection of automotive units divided into two offices. One was the Headquarters of the automotive units (Kommandeur der Kraftfahrtruppen), the second Inspection of the motorization of the ground forces (Inspection für Heeresmotorisierung). The first institution was subordinated to the chief of staff of the land army and worked as a technical advisor. The second was subordinate to the General office of the ground forces (Allgemeine Heeresamt) and was in charge of organization and training. At the head of both offices stood Oswald Lutz. In October 1934, he was drawn to the proposal of the organization of the tank division. To 1. November of the same year was Automotive instruction section hazy center expanded and reorganized the Regiment fighting vehicles (Kampfwagen-Regiment 1) with two partitions. In February of 1935 was established a Brigade combat vehicles 1 (Kampfwagen-Brigade 1).
the First three panzer division
15. October 1935 was established the first three panzer divisions. 1. panzer division initially commanded by general of cavalry Maximilian von Weichs, 2. panzer division major general Heinz Guderian and 3. panzer division lieutenant general Ernst Feßmann. The division immediately began with the training, although they still had to contend with a lack of tanks. In February and march 1936 were the division entered into combat readiness in connection with the cast of the Rhine. In September 1937, took place the first large maneuvers with the participation of tank armies. Gradually also generating additional tank brigade, regiments and divisions.
Spain
At the end of the year 1936, the German commanders involved in the Spanish civil war. The first group led by lieutenant colonel von Thomou consisted of 32 tanks Pz.Kpfw. I and a few command tanks. The number of tanks gradually grew and then fluctuated between 100 to 150 tanks. Commanders who have been through the Spanish war, from the gift of the battlefield brought real combat experience. It wasn't for them there namely so much to take in practice could verify the possibility of concentrated masses of tanks, however there has been a need for such things as improving communication between the tank commander on the ground and support the air force in the air during the provision of direct air support.
Anschluss of Austria and occupation of the czechoslovak borderlands
General Guderian his 2. panzer division participated in the anschluss of Austria. When this action did not fall a single shot, commanders have offended during the two days of roughly 700 miles, but a third machine crashed due to technical problems. The cast of the Sudetenland again participated 1. panzer division.
the Establishment of the 4. and 5. panzer division
The supply of other tanks of the German plan, and the recovery of several hundreds of czechoslovak tanks allow the construction of additional tank brigades, regiments and divisions. This allowed to establish the other two panzer divisions. Led by the First commander of the 4. panzer division major general Georg-Hans Reinhardt and headed 5. panzer division stood a lieutenant general Heinrich von Vietinghoff-Scheel.
Organizational changes at the highest level in 1938
At the end of 1938 there was a connection to the Headquarters of the automotive units and Inspection of the motorization of the ground forces into the Inspection 6 (Inspection 6) in the framework of the General office of the ground forces. This office was in charge of the tank corps, the cavalry and motorization of ground forces. In December 1938 was established the function of Chief of fast troops at the headquarters of the ground forces (the Oberkommando des Heeres, OKH). The first office, which was headed after Lutzově retirement of major general Adolf von Schell, he was in charge of the construction of new units, the organization of units of fast troops, training and the replenishment of officers and ratings, the development of tanks and anti-tank guns and the purchase of fuel and lubricants. The second office, which was headed Guderian, developed the doctrine and tactics of deployment units rchlého troops.
Army corps (motorized)
Even the division but it wasn't a large enough formations for the implementation of a sufficient concentration of the forces on the selected point. This was necessary to combine several appropriate divisions to motorized corps, the so-called army corps (motorized). The first of these was XVI. army corps (motorized), which was set up in February 1938. Its first commander was lieutenant general Erich Hoepner. The corps was subordinate to all of the three former tank division. In April, followed by the emergence of XIV. army corps (motorized) general of the infantry Gustav Wietersheima in which were concentrated four infantry division (motorized). The next choir was in October, established XV. army corps (motorized) general of the infantry Hermann Hoth, which cover three lightweight division. These three corps were subordinated to the the Group headquarters of the ground troops 4 general Walther von Reichenaua.
In August 1939 he was established XIX. army corps (motorized), whose commander was appointed Heinz Guderian. The corps was subordinate to 2. panzer division and 4. lightweight division. Guderianova the existing position of the Chief of fast troops was repealed and replaced by Inspector general of fast troops (Inspekteur der Schnellen Truppen), which has become a lieutenant general , Georg Kühn. He had the knowledge, less competence, however, it was a pretty capable officer. In march 1939 began to take shape 10. panzer division lieutenant general Ferdinand Schaala. In the fall, the process still terminated, however, the division was deployed in the Polish campaign, though as a backup.
Poland
The true test of combat readiness of the crews and even the merits of the concept of mobile and mechanized warfare could be up to a real war. First up was Poland. However, even during the campaign against Poland are still followed by the method of combining tank, light, infantry (motorized) and pedestrian division. No choir had more than one tank division, the army should have a maximum of two, one of them no. Panzer division then formed the tip of the attack, the corps or the army.
At the time of the outbreak of the war six German tank divisions less striking power than the original schedule. Of the more than three thousand tanks, which the Germans had at that moment available, it was just 98 Panzer III and 211 Panzer IV. On the other hand, had quite a lot of trained crews, which during the occupation of Austria and the Czech lands tried in quazi combat conditions deployment in larger units.
Although therefore the Germans available panzer divisions combined, similarly to the infantry division (motorized) and the light division, by army corps (motorized), it was not the campaign against Poland in September 1939, the model deployment of modern mobile and concentrated armored, mechanized and motorized forces. Panzer division were divided among the different army corps, so they serve the role of offensive spikes.
the Period between Poland and France,
The Polish campaign, therefore, was rather a kind of half-step, but brought a variety of knowledge, which contributed to the further improvement of the situation in tank units. He showed, for example, there is a need to improve training, to teach officers more independence and initiative, to improve cooperation between the different branches of the armed forces, to improve the survey, a greater emphasis on the compliance with the marching orders and provide for a flexible regulation of transport at key transport nodes. All divisions should continue to develop monthly lead report on state of combat readiness, on the basis of which should be subject to further treatment training. In march 1940 she was in the OKH to the coordination of these matters established the functions of the General of fast troops (General der Schnellen Truppen beim Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres). Appointed to her was major general Wilhelm von Thoma. His task was to administer the army command report on the results of the deployment of the panzer divisions and advise on the training, tactics, organisation and weaponry. The officers, who proved to be unfit for the leadership of a new type of fight have been moved, and instead promoted non-commissioned officers, who have proven themselves. Company commanders have gone through special training courses in the schools of tank units. For this field exercise were available 1. and 10. tank division. Even the other division of evening the score and passing constant tests of readiness in the military training areas as it was Sennelager. Emphasis was placed on practicing overcoming water obstacles, where required the cooperation with the engineers. Improve with and staff work.
In October 1939, they were all panzer division moved to the West. At that time also occurred the establishment of other divisions. So arose 6. panzer division major general Werner Kempfa, 7. panzer division lieutenant general , Georg Stummeho and 8. panzer division major general Adolf Kuntzena. To them was added at the beginning of the year 1940 9. panzer division major general Alfred von Hubickiho.
the Campaign against France
Even the original plans for the campaign in the West were recorded with the same form of the deployment of armored and mechanized units as in the war against Poland. As well as for Schlieffena should be to advance on a broad front, with the only difference being that the head would act panzer division, but without their concentration. The question is whether this procedure would have brought Germany to win. The situation of France was so bad as to be under the impression of the future of the German victory in general considers. Found, but a number of commanders, who managed to force a change of plan. First, it should be in the north for the encirclement of large masses of enemy troops in northern France and in Belgium, and only subsequently should be to advance to the south against the rest of France. That was the initial encirclement achieved, should lead to the concentration of German panzer divisions on a narrow front to achieve a breakthrough in an unexpected place and its further utilization at the operational level, the rapid advance of armored, mechanized and motorized units to sea. So could a panzer division to move from the theoretically great guns on the real instrument of victory in modern war.
How, then, in practice, it looked like it modern plant tank divisions into the overall assembly of the troops? XXII. army corps (motorized) general Ewald von Kleist was temporarily extended to Kleistovu group, because she was subordinated to the three army corps - Wietersheimův XIV. army corps (motorized), Guderianův XIX. army corps (motorized) and new XXXXI. army corps (motorized) lieutenant general Georg-Hans Reinhardt. These congregations together have five tank divisions and three infantry divisions (motorizovanými). This strong thrusting tip should army Group to push through the Ardennes to the river Máse. North of this group operated as part of 4. army Hothův XV. army corps (motorized) with two tank divisions in the assembly. His task was to cross the meuse river at Dinantu. At the section long about one hundred miles so it should operate seven tank divisions. Not far from them to Belgium raced in the assembly 6. army of army Group B Hoepnerův XVI. army corps (motorized) two tank divisions. 18. army operating in the Netherlands should in the assembly of another panzer division. Each division according to the momentary needs transferred from the subordination of one choir to the subordination of another. To more reorganization took place before the second phase of the fighting on France. However, continues to maintain the concentration of the forces of tank and motorized divisions. Due to the early capitulation of France it is possible to say that the Germans deployment of concentrated armored and mechanized forces paid off. Doplňme that the group was among the 19. and 30. may extended Hothův choir and then also chorus Guderianův. Sometimes these groups are in the literature called also as the tank of the group, but this designation was introduced to the groups deployed as part of operation Barbarossa..
Panzer division of the wehrmacht have been one of the fundamental building blocks and the symbols of the German blitzkrieg, the so-called blitzkrieg. To this the modern way of warfare was set during the September fighting in Poland, but its peak it reached during the campaign against France and in the first half of the war with the Soviet union. After having the Germans go on the defensive and their methods have taken over the Allies, while the Germans, on the contrary they improved the combat in the defense. For the uninitiated observer was the advance of the German armies in France an unexpected shock, something totally new and revolutionary. But the Germans just came out of their military traditions, they were joined by the conveniences of modern techniques and given the opportunity to stand out commanders, who are on the thing we can look in a new way. Impressive results the deployment of the German tank divisions have been carefully studied, for example, in the United states, that these insights harness in the construction of their armored divisions, which had similar tasks.
The German panzer divisions accounted for in the time of its creation completely a new phenomenon entering into the area of military affairs. Not that in the meantime there were no tanks or tank units, but the current approach consisted in building a smaller military bodies, which should be part of the larger netankových units, mainly infantry divisions. Tank as such, should serve as protection and support of the infantry, indeed, their development and doctrinal anchor rested on the shoulders of the infantry, or in the case of light tanks at the cavalry, which has seen the compromise the way to their conservation. German pioneers but assumed something else. Dreamed of the emergence of highly mobile, self-operating tank divisions. You would have led a flanking assault forays into the weak points of the enemy defense. Here would be achieved through the concentration of forces to the immediate superiority, the break and the next reshuffle, and a fast move to the next appropriate point of the enemy line. The leadership of the mobile mechanized and motorized warfare in the forehead with tanks, supported by armored vehicles and self-propelled artillery, should bring a new dynamic to warfare, which could thus emerges from the slaughterhouse to the static trench warfare. The commander of this vševojskové formation should lead directly from the front line, have only the framework orders from their superiors and the ability to edit a specific procedure according to the specific development situation at the front. Improvisation and independent thinking was in direct contrast with the leadership of the so-called methodical war, which was the cornerstone of the French approach. Just the complexity and the slow pace of the decision-making process, the Germans wanted to avoid. Would like to also avoid having to wait for cumbersome towed artillery. Support them next to the self-propelled devices should provide mainly the air force, which have been regarded as mobile artillery sui generis.
the Tradition of the German military doctrine
From the heritage of the German military thinking since the time of Friedrich I. through Scharnhorsta, Clausewitz, through to Moltke and Schlieffena protruded two elements that were the basis of modern lightning war. Firstly, the principle of the destruction of the enemy forces and secondly on the principle of management of moving of the war. The ideal was a quick movement of the enemy to encircle in the boiler and subsequently destroy it. It was essential to choose the right place for the concentration of their own forces, which should surprisingly attack the weak point of the enemy defense. For the success of the operation it was necessary to have elaborate marching orders. Orders during the operation, it was necessary to pass as quickly as possible, and subordinate commanders had to be able to carry them out, albeit for other than the expected conditions. These subordinate commanders should receive from their superiors only framework orders with defining a clear goal and plenty of allocated forces. It should combine with detailed information of their own staff and their will to decide about the manner of execution of the mission. The aim of the procedure according to the changing situation, not according to šablonovitých solution. The German doctrine was aware that even the most detailed plan survives encounter with the enemy. Commanders therefore had to plan the further procedure, adjusted according to the actual situation on the battlefield. Each commander, therefore, received the assigned target and be on it, how it come true. It was assumed experienced, decisive and creative command cadres.
When in the second half of the 19th. century chief of the general staff von Moltke considered the strategic situation of Germany, which lay basically in the middle of Europe surrounded by real or potential enemies, came to the conclusion that they must prevent a war on two fronts, i.e. mainly at the same time waged war with France and Russia, in which not Germany, despite its still greater strength sufficient resources both material and human. A war on two fronts, Germany had avoided by first quickly knock out one enemy and then focus all the forces on the other, while counting on that the first throws forces to the west and then to the east. Moltke at the tactical level, counting with the leadership of the obkličovacích fights, but overall, his strategy of dealing with the problem of ever-increasing armies and the development of ever more powerful defences.
It seemed that the Schlieffen found a solution, when transferred encircling fight from the tactical to the operational level and at the same time, more relied on the railroad. The French army should be surrounded by one large maneuver and eliminated within a few weeks. In 1914, it all failed for different reasons, however, for the future development of the blitzkrieg is important mainly to the cumbersome nature of management processes in larger units and obsolescence of the tactical procedures of the lower units. Once the war in the West bogged down in the trenches, we were unable to find a way out and it all changed of ring roads on the frontal slaughterhouse. In some cases, have managed to achieve a breakthrough thanks to a variety of tactical or technical improvements, but it was only on the local achievements. This also applies to the tank, which has seen only limited success, and until the 1940s most people can't imagine its deployment in the manévrovém warfare at the operational level.
Seeckt and the interwar considerations
The germans in the interwar period, of course, engaged in it, how could it happen that the Schlieffen plan failed, and the moving war turned into trench. Hans von Seeckt insisted that the failure of the plan and the subsequent transition to the static form of warfare was not the result of superiority of defense over the weft, or a consequence of the introduction of new weapons and increase firepower, but still larger size of modern field armies. Those in its ranks had a huge amount of inexperienced and only partially trained soldiers, who were not able to carry out timely and properly the necessary maneuvers. Once was a big part of prvosledových units decimated in large-scale clashes, replacing it from the military point of view, less quality recruits. The army thus grew, but their quality has declined. The deployment of special commando units, consisting of carefully selected and trained soldiers, while proven, these formations managed to break through the enemy's defense, but on the overall condition of it changed nothing. These units were too few, were too spread out and there was no one who would be their breakthrough took advantage and expanded it. Lacked the ability to concentrate sufficient forces and rapid procedure a sufficiently large units. Seeckt saw in the development of a small core of mobile units composed of capable and well-trained team way to avoid a static war. His findings laid the theoretical basis is for the creation of panzer divisions.
While in France and in Great Britain tanks were included in the form of military hundred men each to infantry divisions, where they form their shield and support, or to purely tank units, the Germans came up with the concept of the combined divisions. This was supposed to be vševojskové formation composed of multiple types of units. Basis is comprised of tank and rifle regiments, which was a mechanized infantry. With that, how was the infantry element of the continuously enlarged at the expense of the tank, the increased flexibility of the panzer divisions. A similar process later passed an american armored division. Other parts of the division were self-propelled artillery, armored reconnaissance, tank destroyers, engineers, and support units. Panzer division could not achieve a breakthrough, but also its expansion. It was actually kind of a movable army in the small scale. The division could perform a wider range of tasks.
German commanders had the advantage in the tie technique, which challenges the technique of their opponents, which enabled them in moving war material advantage. Rapidly advancing tank division logically came about the support of heavy artillery, but the Germans found a compensation in the form of the air force. His troops were through close air support to provide ground units, fire support, therefore, function as a kind of airborne artillery. In these conditions, a panzer division is the perfect weapon moving war at the operational level.
Pioneers and their problems
Among the pioneers of the deployment of tanks in a new way belonged to general Oswald Lutz, the colonel Heinz Guderian, lieutenant colonel Walther von Reichenau or captain Wilhelm von Thoma. These visionaries had to deal with several problems. Secondly, most of the other commanders still lived in the historical imagination of a tank as a supportive resource corps, possibly faster version of a horse, both the German army was limited provisions of the treaty of Versailles, secondly, was not available needed a tank. Last but not least, wasn't the German industry ready for mass production of tanks in the necessary numbers. Similar theorists were also in the armies of other states, a number of states with the deployment of tanks experimenting, but anywhere there were no so convenient conditions as in Germany. The germans, moreover, have gained some experience in a secret tank school in the soviet Kazan.
When they came to power Adolf Hitler, who became a fan of tank warfare, they seized these visionaries a chance, and with the support of the highest political seats have started to transfer their vision into reality. Even so, but they dropped all the obstacles. Above all lacked a suitable tank. Training had to still rely on motor vehicles equipped with a "superstructure" of the cardboard paper in the shape of the tank or the various more or less experimental machines. Even at the time of the first division in 1935 were not available the estimated machine Panzer III and Panzer IV, but only their temporary replacement in the form of machines Panzer I and the Panzer II. However, German commanders could start to try to verify their theories in practice, thus far only on the parade ground. Not everything but it went smoothly. Still there's a lot of generals who failed to understand the needs of modern warfare. The cavalry in addition, to ensure part of the production of tank factories and create four lightweight division. Each of them had one section of light tanks.
From tank companies to the brigade combat vehicles
In 1928 she was planning the then Imperial branná power (Reichswehr) the establishment of a tank company in the horizon of three to five years. In October 1931 was established by Inspection of the automotive units (Inspection der Kraftfahrtruppen). At its head stood Oswald Lutz and the chief of staff was doing to him Heinz Guderian. The crew were undergoing secret training in the Soviet union. In November 1933 was established the Automotive instruction section hazy center (Kraftlehrkommando hazy center). In July 1934 was the Inspection of automotive units divided into two offices. One was the Headquarters of the automotive units (Kommandeur der Kraftfahrtruppen), the second Inspection of the motorization of the ground forces (Inspection für Heeresmotorisierung). The first institution was subordinated to the chief of staff of the land army and worked as a technical advisor. The second was subordinate to the General office of the ground forces (Allgemeine Heeresamt) and was in charge of organization and training. At the head of both offices stood Oswald Lutz. In October 1934, he was drawn to the proposal of the organization of the tank division. To 1. November of the same year was Automotive instruction section hazy center expanded and reorganized the Regiment fighting vehicles (Kampfwagen-Regiment 1) with two partitions. In February of 1935 was established a Brigade combat vehicles 1 (Kampfwagen-Brigade 1).
the First three panzer division
15. October 1935 was established the first three panzer divisions. 1. panzer division initially commanded by general of cavalry Maximilian von Weichs, 2. panzer division major general Heinz Guderian and 3. panzer division lieutenant general Ernst Feßmann. The division immediately began with the training, although they still had to contend with a lack of tanks. In February and march 1936 were the division entered into combat readiness in connection with the cast of the Rhine. In September 1937, took place the first large maneuvers with the participation of tank armies. Gradually also generating additional tank brigade, regiments and divisions.
Spain
At the end of the year 1936, the German commanders involved in the Spanish civil war. The first group led by lieutenant colonel von Thomou consisted of 32 tanks Pz.Kpfw. I and a few command tanks. The number of tanks gradually grew and then fluctuated between 100 to 150 tanks. Commanders who have been through the Spanish war, from the gift of the battlefield brought real combat experience. It wasn't for them there namely so much to take in practice could verify the possibility of concentrated masses of tanks, however there has been a need for such things as improving communication between the tank commander on the ground and support the air force in the air during the provision of direct air support.
Anschluss of Austria and occupation of the czechoslovak borderlands
General Guderian his 2. panzer division participated in the anschluss of Austria. When this action did not fall a single shot, commanders have offended during the two days of roughly 700 miles, but a third machine crashed due to technical problems. The cast of the Sudetenland again participated 1. panzer division.
the Establishment of the 4. and 5. panzer division
The supply of other tanks of the German plan, and the recovery of several hundreds of czechoslovak tanks allow the construction of additional tank brigades, regiments and divisions. This allowed to establish the other two panzer divisions. Led by the First commander of the 4. panzer division major general Georg-Hans Reinhardt and headed 5. panzer division stood a lieutenant general Heinrich von Vietinghoff-Scheel.
Organizational changes at the highest level in 1938
At the end of 1938 there was a connection to the Headquarters of the automotive units and Inspection of the motorization of the ground forces into the Inspection 6 (Inspection 6) in the framework of the General office of the ground forces. This office was in charge of the tank corps, the cavalry and motorization of ground forces. In December 1938 was established the function of Chief of fast troops at the headquarters of the ground forces (the Oberkommando des Heeres, OKH). The first office, which was headed after Lutzově retirement of major general Adolf von Schell, he was in charge of the construction of new units, the organization of units of fast troops, training and the replenishment of officers and ratings, the development of tanks and anti-tank guns and the purchase of fuel and lubricants. The second office, which was headed Guderian, developed the doctrine and tactics of deployment units rchlého troops.
Army corps (motorized)
Even the division but it wasn't a large enough formations for the implementation of a sufficient concentration of the forces on the selected point. This was necessary to combine several appropriate divisions to motorized corps, the so-called army corps (motorized). The first of these was XVI. army corps (motorized), which was set up in February 1938. Its first commander was lieutenant general Erich Hoepner. The corps was subordinate to all of the three former tank division. In April, followed by the emergence of XIV. army corps (motorized) general of the infantry Gustav Wietersheima in which were concentrated four infantry division (motorized). The next choir was in October, established XV. army corps (motorized) general of the infantry Hermann Hoth, which cover three lightweight division. These three corps were subordinated to the the Group headquarters of the ground troops 4 general Walther von Reichenaua.
In August 1939 he was established XIX. army corps (motorized), whose commander was appointed Heinz Guderian. The corps was subordinate to 2. panzer division and 4. lightweight division. Guderianova the existing position of the Chief of fast troops was repealed and replaced by Inspector general of fast troops (Inspekteur der Schnellen Truppen), which has become a lieutenant general , Georg Kühn. He had the knowledge, less competence, however, it was a pretty capable officer. In march 1939 began to take shape 10. panzer division lieutenant general Ferdinand Schaala. In the fall, the process still terminated, however, the division was deployed in the Polish campaign, though as a backup.
Poland
The true test of combat readiness of the crews and even the merits of the concept of mobile and mechanized warfare could be up to a real war. First up was Poland. However, even during the campaign against Poland are still followed by the method of combining tank, light, infantry (motorized) and pedestrian division. No choir had more than one tank division, the army should have a maximum of two, one of them no. Panzer division then formed the tip of the attack, the corps or the army.
At the time of the outbreak of the war six German tank divisions less striking power than the original schedule. Of the more than three thousand tanks, which the Germans had at that moment available, it was just 98 Panzer III and 211 Panzer IV. On the other hand, had quite a lot of trained crews, which during the occupation of Austria and the Czech lands tried in quazi combat conditions deployment in larger units.
Although therefore the Germans available panzer divisions combined, similarly to the infantry division (motorized) and the light division, by army corps (motorized), it was not the campaign against Poland in September 1939, the model deployment of modern mobile and concentrated armored, mechanized and motorized forces. Panzer division were divided among the different army corps, so they serve the role of offensive spikes.
the Period between Poland and France,
The Polish campaign, therefore, was rather a kind of half-step, but brought a variety of knowledge, which contributed to the further improvement of the situation in tank units. He showed, for example, there is a need to improve training, to teach officers more independence and initiative, to improve cooperation between the different branches of the armed forces, to improve the survey, a greater emphasis on the compliance with the marching orders and provide for a flexible regulation of transport at key transport nodes. All divisions should continue to develop monthly lead report on state of combat readiness, on the basis of which should be subject to further treatment training. In march 1940 she was in the OKH to the coordination of these matters established the functions of the General of fast troops (General der Schnellen Truppen beim Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres). Appointed to her was major general Wilhelm von Thoma. His task was to administer the army command report on the results of the deployment of the panzer divisions and advise on the training, tactics, organisation and weaponry. The officers, who proved to be unfit for the leadership of a new type of fight have been moved, and instead promoted non-commissioned officers, who have proven themselves. Company commanders have gone through special training courses in the schools of tank units. For this field exercise were available 1. and 10. tank division. Even the other division of evening the score and passing constant tests of readiness in the military training areas as it was Sennelager. Emphasis was placed on practicing overcoming water obstacles, where required the cooperation with the engineers. Improve with and staff work.
In October 1939, they were all panzer division moved to the West. At that time also occurred the establishment of other divisions. So arose 6. panzer division major general Werner Kempfa, 7. panzer division lieutenant general , Georg Stummeho and 8. panzer division major general Adolf Kuntzena. To them was added at the beginning of the year 1940 9. panzer division major general Alfred von Hubickiho.
the Campaign against France
Even the original plans for the campaign in the West were recorded with the same form of the deployment of armored and mechanized units as in the war against Poland. As well as for Schlieffena should be to advance on a broad front, with the only difference being that the head would act panzer division, but without their concentration. The question is whether this procedure would have brought Germany to win. The situation of France was so bad as to be under the impression of the future of the German victory in general considers. Found, but a number of commanders, who managed to force a change of plan. First, it should be in the north for the encirclement of large masses of enemy troops in northern France and in Belgium, and only subsequently should be to advance to the south against the rest of France. That was the initial encirclement achieved, should lead to the concentration of German panzer divisions on a narrow front to achieve a breakthrough in an unexpected place and its further utilization at the operational level, the rapid advance of armored, mechanized and motorized units to sea. So could a panzer division to move from the theoretically great guns on the real instrument of victory in modern war.
How, then, in practice, it looked like it modern plant tank divisions into the overall assembly of the troops? XXII. army corps (motorized) general Ewald von Kleist was temporarily extended to Kleistovu group, because she was subordinated to the three army corps - Wietersheimův XIV. army corps (motorized), Guderianův XIX. army corps (motorized) and new XXXXI. army corps (motorized) lieutenant general Georg-Hans Reinhardt. These congregations together have five tank divisions and three infantry divisions (motorizovanými). This strong thrusting tip should army Group to push through the Ardennes to the river Máse. North of this group operated as part of 4. army Hothův XV. army corps (motorized) with two tank divisions in the assembly. His task was to cross the meuse river at Dinantu. At the section long about one hundred miles so it should operate seven tank divisions. Not far from them to Belgium raced in the assembly 6. army of army Group B Hoepnerův XVI. army corps (motorized) two tank divisions. 18. army operating in the Netherlands should in the assembly of another panzer division. Each division according to the momentary needs transferred from the subordination of one choir to the subordination of another. To more reorganization took place before the second phase of the fighting on France. However, continues to maintain the concentration of the forces of tank and motorized divisions. Due to the early capitulation of France it is possible to say that the Germans deployment of concentrated armored and mechanized forces paid off. Doplňme that the group was among the 19. and 30. may extended Hothův choir and then also chorus Guderianův. Sometimes these groups are in the literature called also as the tank of the group, but this designation was introduced to the groups deployed as part of operation Barbarossa..