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Operace Neptune

Operation Neptune

     
Title:
Name:
Operation Neptune
Date:
Date:
06.06.1944-24.07.1944
theater of war / Phases:
Theatre of Operations / Phase:
the Western european theater of war
Location:
Location:
Normandy
GPS:
GPS:
00°00'00.00"N 00°00'00.00"E
Participants:
Belligerents:
 
Party A:
Side A:
United kingdom
The united states of america
Canada
Free French
...
Side B:
Side B:
Velkoněmecká empire
Commanders:
Commanders:
 
Party A:
Side A:
Dwight D. Eisenhower
Arthur Tedder
Bernard Law Montgomery
Trafford Leigh-Mallory
Bertram Ramsay
Side B:
Side B:
Gerd von Rundstedt
Erwin Rommel
Friedrich Hauser
Hans von Salmuth
Forces:
Strength:
 
the Forces of the party And:
Forces Side A:
-
Zobraz detail:
Show Detail:
 
Zobraz detail:
Show Detail:
-
Forces party B:
Forces Side B:
-
Zobraz detail:
Show Detail:
 
Zobraz detail:
Show Detail:
-
Losses:
Losses:
 
Loss of party A:
Losses Side AND:
-
Zobraz detail:
Show Detail:
 
Zobraz detail:
Show Detail:
-
Loss of party B:
Losses Side B:
-
Zobraz detail:
Show Detail:
 
Zobraz detail:
Show Detail:
-
Goals and result:
Objectives and Result:
 
Type of surgery, side And:
Type of Operation, Side A:
assault
Type of surgery, side B:
Type of Operation, Side B:
assault
Targets, the party And:
Objectives, Side A:
the Creation of a beachhead in Normandy - met
Objective, party B:
Objectives, Side B:
Prevent the creation of a beachhead in Normandy - incomplete
Result:
Result:
the victory of the party AND
Note:
Note:
Operation NEPTUNE was the code name for the allied landing in Normandy. It was a part of operation OVERLORD.
Source:
Sources:
Antony BEEVOR: D-Day. Battle for Normandy, Viking, 2009
Charles Perry STACEY: the Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War: Volume III. The Victory Campaign, The Operations in North-West Europe 1944-1945, 1960
Will FOWLER: Operation Overlord. The landing in Normandy: the first 24 hours, Otto publishing house, Prague, 2004
.
URL : https://www.valka.cz/Operace-Neptune-t125802#426907Version : 0
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CONTENT



- 1. Introduction
- 2. Theoretical preparation and exercises
--- 2.1 Decision-making on the opening of the second front
--- 2.2 the Situation of the German armed forces in France
--- 2.3 Planning OVERLORDu
--- 2.4 Plan operation NEPTUNE
--- 2.5 Exercise
--- 2.6 Logistical

- 3. Fighting and intelligence preparation of the
--- 3.1 the Activities of the French resistance movement
--- 3.2 Deceptive operation
--- 3.3 Air operations
--- 3.4 Naval operations

- 4. Landings
--- 4.1 DEADSTICK
--- 4.2 TONGA
--- 4.3 ALBANY+BOSTON

- 5. The beach
--- 5.1 SWORD
--- 5.2 JUNO
--- 5.3 GOLD
--- 5.4 OMAHA
--- 5.5 UTAH

- 6. The next procedure
--- 6.1 Connection of the beaches to one of the bridgehead
--- 6.2 the Battle of Caen
--- 6.3 the Situation in the middle of the beachhead
--- 6.4 Procedure at Cherbourg
--- 6.5 the Direction of the south to the line of the Lessay-Périers-St.-Lo

- 7. Conclusion
- 8. Overviews of the techniques, units and commanders
- 9. Used literature
- 10. Thanks

- Links
--- Overview of techniques
----- Ground
----- Air
----- Maritime
--- Overview of units
----- Ground
----- Air
----- Maritime
--- An overview of the commanders
----- Allies
----- The germans.
URL : https://www.valka.cz/Operace-Neptune-t125802#508963Version : 0
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1. INTRODUCTION[/heading:aaaaaa]

The Normandy landings, known as operation NEPTUNE, represents the initial phase of operation OVERLORD, whose goal was the liberation of northwest France, which should create the preconditions for the subsequent conquest of Germany. Allies 6. June 1944 conducted the largest military invasion from the sea in human history, thus fundamentally contributed to the defeat of nazi Germany.

This complex operation required the deployment of all components of the allied military machine. Not only all kinds of fighting part of the navy, air force, army and marine corps, or the intelligence and diverse ingredients, but also the security staff from meteorologists after the supply. In a number of cases it was necessary to develop completely new solutions, whether it was about planning, tactics, or of various technical innovations. Just so the Allies could think of a successful landing, the break of the "Atlantic wall", fast enough to build a strong beachhead and the subsequent breakthrough of him. It was a unique feat which had only a few prototypes in military history and has never been carried out against such strong and experienced enemy like nazi Germany - despite all the torn gashes - it was. Even the existing allied landing was directed against the peripheral válčištím or geographically isolated points..

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2.1 making a DECISION ABOUT OPENING a SECOND front IN FRANCE[/heading:aaaaaa]


Operation Barbarossa and the first plan for the invasion of France


The beginning of the war between nazi Germany and bolshevik Soviet union, which together hitherto rather work together, it wasn't a question of the invasion of the continent on the agenda. On the contrary, Britain had her hands full with a defense of its own empire. Shortly after this radical change of conditions in German-soviet relations, responded to the new situation the prime minister W. Churchill a proposal to land in France. But no one really took too seriously, was it completely out of the possibilities of Great Britain. In addition to expected the near collapse of Stalin's empire. That from the beginning of the invasion pushed, but Churchill he made it clear that it is not his country is ready as yet against the Hitler she fought alone and she has a lot of your own worries in north Africa and in the Atlantic. Britain may hold the promise of just initiating the naval operations in the Arctic. Soviet pressure him, moreover, did more to provoke the as of the USSR with the Germans cooperated, mainly in the economic sphere, and against the western powers led by the soviet press smear campaign. Indeed, about the nature of the soviet regime Churchill not an illusion, but with the USSR just shared the same enemy. However, british planners developed a plan for landing a ROUND-UP of the implementation of which should be considered in the event of an unexpected collapse of the German armed forces in the east. It was very limited plan, and even so was not feasible for lack of landing craft.

the First washington conference


The change of direction brought a japanese assault on the United states in December 1941. The U.S. became an open ally of Great Britain. Churchill immediately went to Washington for a conference code-named ARCADIA, which lasted from the end of December 1941 until mid January 1942. Along the way had prepared three memoranda - the first nastiňovalo plan for the euro-atlantic area (pushing out the Germans from north Africa, taking control of the Mediterranean and the preparation for a possible landing in Italy), the other for the pacific (only the detention of japanese in the process) and the third was envisaged with the invasion of Europe in 1943. By siphoning off German troops to the Mediterranean should the western Allies to help the eastern front. Inexperienced Americans basically accepted the british proposals. General Marshall prefer a direct blow against Germany, but the British peripheral strategy prevailed.

Us plans and negotiations with the Soviets


The situation on the front but does not develop according to the assumptions. The british offensive in Africa has failed and the Japanese were advancing steadily forward. It was necessary here to send reinforcements and push back the invasion of Africa (operation GYMNAST). Marshall still did not give up efforts to promote direct attack through France and left the planner in Eisenhower the Operating of the department to draw up plans of three operations: the concentration of american forces in Britain in the spring of 1943 (BOLERO), for the invasion of France in summer 1943 (ROUND-UP) and to a smaller landing already in 1942 (SLEDGEHAMMER) in the event of the collapse of Germany. that would have to be mainly british forces. In April 1942, about then Marshall acted in London. Year 1943 the British agreed, but with the year 1942 had a problem and called attention to the lack of vessels and a considerable risk of a crash. However, they didn't want Americans focused on the Pacific, and so the american proposals as a whole agreed. Roosevelt in the course of the london meeting invited to the USA, the soviet foreign minister fire bomb, who strongly insisted on opening a second front that would weaken the expected German summer offensive. Roosevelt and Marshall him landing in 1942, in principle, they promised, the general just pointed out the lack of vessels. It Molotov responded by accepting a reduction of supplies to the USSR, so he could be the shipping space used for the BOLERO. Communiqués from both meetings contain information that consensus has been reached concerning the urgent tasks connected with the creation of a second front in 1942. The british to the Soviets but in addition know that take it rather as a means of psychological warfare, which has to the West to tie as many German units, and that effort is devoted mainly to preparations for the landings in 1943. In addition, wrote the aide-mémoire stating that they carried out preparations for an invasion in 1942, but that is not possible in advance to say how the situation will develop, and it is therefore not possible to give no promise.

the Second washington conference


During may and June reached the British finally concluded that operation SLEDGEHAMMER is no chance of success, even her, necessarily limited the success of even forced the Germans to download even a single division from the eastern front. The allies would have been able to deploy a maximum of nine divisions, while the Germans in France had twenty-five. In June, therefore, acted Churchill and Brooke in Washington on the further procedure. The british suggested to refrain from the ROUND-UP and perform a GYMNAST. The americans resisted. Agreed on the confirmation of the preparations for a landing in western Europe in 1943. Future SLEDGEHAMMERu and the gymnast remained undecided, and disputes remain. The british criticized the Americans that they underestimate the logistical point of view, and you in turn by the British, that they want to use american troops to maintain their empire. Nedoceňovali also influence the slaughterhouse of the first world war in the reasoning of the British, their exhaustion from the previous years of heroic resistance against the Germans and the trauma of landing at the Dardanelles, which is essentially related to himself Churchill.

Operation TORCH


Churchill in July once again, the Americans informed the british of the opinion that operation SLEDGEHAMMER is according to them dead. American military leaders responded to the proposal to move the preferences from Europe to the Pacific. It refused to Roosevelt and seconded by Marshall, King, and Hopkins to London to agree a strategy for the rest of the year 1942. On the way gave them a clear instruction - if you do not pass SLEDGEHAMMER, it is necessary to find other place, where they will be during the year of 1942 to fight. How Churchill, Roosevelt needed to, for political reasons, some quick success. The british in the negotiations insisted firmly on his, and so the Americans finally agreed with the operations of the GYMNAST, which was meanwhile renamed the TORCH.

Moscow negotiations


Churchill in August, flew to Moscow to discuss the outcome of the negotiations of the western Allies personally informed Stalin. Stalin wasn't too pleased that the landing in France going up to the year 1943, but he had than to deal with it. The british prime minister he then described the advantages of profit along the north african coast for the subsequent attack on "the soft underbelly of Europe". Churchill on the way back, he stopped in Egypt, where he caught him the information about the failure of operation JUBILEE at Dieppe. It provoked and the debate about where best to invade Europe, but here the Americans had no intention to change anything. Great Britain had enough of the appropriate ports, led there air routes, put out by air to effectively promote the away team's ground forces in France and led this way the shortest way to Germany, without having to overcome great natural obstacles.

Plans for the year 1943


When 8. November 1942 the Allies landed in northwest Africa, was drawing to the end of the second battle of el-Alamejnu. It was the beginning of pushing out the Germans from Africa. In the meantime, but it started a debate about the strategic plans for the year 1943. While many american military officials were starting to be skeptical about the feasibility of the invasion of France in 1943, Churchill in her still believed, and approached as the attitude of the general Marshall. The british prime minister had to defend the mediterranean strategy against the american generals, and ROUND-UP to the british. Roosevelt at that time, on the contrary excited for the Mediterranean and, moreover, admitted the temporary restrictions BOLEROS in favor of the Pacific. But it partly concerned the British, who assured the, that it is not leaving Europe, and that it continues with a ROUND-Up counts. The Churchill proposed for August or September 1943 in the case, that by that time will be conquered by the whole coast of Africa, and completed a more extensive operation in the Mediterranean. The british generals began to worry about the National direction and at the end of December they have produced a report dealing with the next procedure. In her advise to lead the battle of the Atlantic, lead the bombing campaign against Germany and Italy, the support of the USSR, to invade Italy with a view to its elimination from the war and then with the support of Turkey to undertake the invasion of the Balkans. Under certain conditions, counted the document, as well as with the implementation of the ROUND-Up in August or September 1943, although it was considered unlikely. The american command at that time on the contrary, proposed as soon as possible to end the operations in the Mediterranean and to perform at the end of the summer large-scale landing in France.

January meeting in Casablanca


The allies in Africa did not progress fast enough and the Germans occupied the south of France. In the USSR at that time culminated the fighting on the eastern front. Roosevelt invited Churchill and Stalin at the hearing into Africa. Stalin but apologized, and so the conference was a SYMBOL of the us-british actions. Stalin just sent a letter, in which he gave, he expected the fulfillment of promises, thus opening a second front in 1943. Politicians have decided that they'll act the generals and assess up to their final proposals. The debates were sharp and passionate, however the British were again better prepared and could more or less impose their view. First of all, should be the invasion of Sicily, when it was already in the area concentrated so many forces. Continue it also the accumulation of forces in the Uk, taking into account the situation in the Pacific. Been considered with the strategic bombing of Germany. Mentioned was also the possibility of the invasion of France, but it wasn't clear commitment. Due to the other points was in principle clear, that is to her execution in 1943 unrealistic. To address the question of the supreme commander of the expeditionary force. Roosevelt proposed the Brita, however, Churchill he kept a neutral position, that the general should be most numerous, represented by the army, and the question for the time being has not been resolved. But he was at least appointed chief of staff of the supreme commander (COSSAC). In this function, was established the british general Morgan, who with his team, he immediately began working on the preparation of detailed plans for the invasion across the Channel. The conference also adopted the principle of unconditional surrender of Germany, thus the exclusion of the conclusion of a separate peace.

the Third washington conference


After Casablanca has increased the frequency of correspondence between the Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin. He pushed at the opening of a second front in 1943, while he mainly Churchill acquainted with the plans of the western Allies and the priority of the Mediterranean. In April, the british top brass finally came to the conclusion that the landing in France in 1943, is already impossible, because of the operation BOLERO was slowed down by partial re-routing of the american forces in the Pacific, and insisted the lack of landing craft - and thanks to the preparations for the allied landing in Sicily. The british therefore proposed to postpone the ROUND-Up for the year 1944, and in 1943 to focus on Sicily and Italy. Marshall with this view did not agree and saw that british power ambitions. He also had concerns that the ROUND-Up eventually, not occur even in 1944. To overcome the anglo-american contradictions was arranged the may meeting in Washington (TRIDENT). The british developed the mediterranean direction. After Sicily had proposed a crusade on Rome and then the attack on the Balkans or the Aegean islands. The americans were prepared this time as well, and refused further continuation of operations in the area beyond Sicily. Priority should have should have a BOLERO. The americans, who wanted to quickly eliminate the Germans and start to concentrate fully on the Japanese, in addition to the British totally open about what they think about british power interests, and delaying the final blow to Germany. The debate continued and finally an agreement was reached. The admit operation BOLERO absolute priority so that it can be completed in the spring of 1944. In April it completed the strategic bombing and 1. may well be the very the invasion. As far as the Mediterranean mentioned that the final report explicitly only Sicily, however, the landing in Italy was left as an option. The decision on the implementation of operation ROUND-UP in mid-1944, the already changed. There has been a shift to June and the renaming of the operation OVERLORD..
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2.2 the SITUATION of the GERMAN ARMED FORCES IN FRANCE[/heading:aaaaaa]

Organization of troops in the West


After the tehran conference the Germans were expecting the allied invasion at any time after February 1944, probably in the spring. Even during the moscow conference assembled the commander of the Main headquarters of the West field marshal von Rundstedt a report about the condition of German defensive possibilities in France. News it's been a long, honest, and pessimistic. The German armies were not to repel a possible invasion ready. Fortress Europe was closer to propaganda than to reality.

In preparation for the invasion of the USSR should be the group armies And, B and C in the spring of 1941 moved to the East. In France it was as a replacement for established Group of armies D. In addition, it was established the Main headquarters of the West (abbreviated OB West), which took over the management of all operations in the West. At that time it was also becoming clearer that the German the invasion of England was impracticable. Attention began to go to the south-east and east Europe. In the West they remained three armies - 7. and 15. the army occupied the coast from the Spanish border after Antwerp and 1. the army inland. The commander of the OB West von Witzleben ordered the inspection of the fortifications, the first of those on the Channel islands. You should, its value as an element of the defense of the coastal sea routes and as the only british territory under German control, but the dislocation 319. infantry division, enhanced by the greater amount of heavy weapons was quite unnecessary step, which would tie the numerous forces and means.

What defensive elements on the French mainland is concerned, was the end of the year 1941 built only seven position for the battery heavy coastal artillery between Calais and Boulogní, several of the smaller marine batteries and several habitats submarines. Work to ensure Organisation Todt, which focused primarily on building submarine bases in Brest, Lorient and St. Nazaire. The other structures have not the capacity nor the material. When he wanted to Witzleben at the end of the year to start the construction of permanent fortifications, not the army there are no available construction battalions. I had to at least informally talk with the navy to lease unused units. At the end of the year so Witzleben he ordered the armies, corps and divisions, to carry out the inspection of the fortifications along the coast and commenced the construction work. But the result was due to the limited amount of forces and means modest. With the actual construction Atlantic wall started in the spring of 1942. Time has changed the situation. The war entered the USA and in Moscow there was a large soviet counter offensive. Hopes for a quick war then vanished into thin air. In addition, it was into the future we must count on potential conflicts in the West. In march to command the OB West returned Rundstedt, who took on the responsibility for the defense of France and the Benelux. But the defect became apparent to the German system. Formally existed OKWbut the army, air force and navy operated more or less independently. Gradually the situation has developed so, that the OKH followed the operation in the USSR, while OKW the other. Talk about the unified management of the operations was illusory, the only central point was the person of Adolf Hitler, which was unsystematic and dysfunctional. But on the other hand, for him beneficial, as it reduced the chance of the creation of opposition power center. For the needs of the conduct of the war but it was hendikepující. It so happened that the full power to not even OB West and thus subordinate to the headquarters. The commanders of the armies, so they had to rely no informal contacts with the commander of the navy and the air force. The only advantage was that crew OKW led by general Jodl didn't have to worry about the eastern front, and had more space for the solution of questions connected with the other battlefield.

From a tactical point of view Hitler ordered to be built coastal defence elements and deployed troops to a possible invasion reflected already in the landing or shortly thereafter. Attention should be concentrated on the areas enabling extensive landing of enemy troops. Five days from the issuance of a warrant Hitler was shocked by the successful british raid on the St. Nazaire. It turned out that the German forces are not in France strong enough to prevent a similar british operations. Moreover, the allied force grew, while the German was eaten away by the eastern front. Hitler it but didn't want to admit it. Due to the lack of men for the defense of the west coast was missing about ten divisions, ordered by Hitler to build concrete bunkers with machine guns and anti-tank guns. The need for ensuring the defense stressed the british-canadian raid on the Dieppe in August 1942, which marked the onset of major amphibious operations. The defensive elements had to reckon with the allied domination in the air and at sea. Hitler ordered to build a thousand concrete points of reference, which would obsluhovalo 300 thousand men. Done should be to may 1943. The organization Todt, however, assumed that when it goes well, it will be by that time done to about 40 percent.

The ideal would be to have information about the allied intentions, but the German intelligence was not able to such information to deliver, not to mention the allied deceptive measure that the situation is further znepřehledňovaly. We worked mainly with guesses and rumors. In addition, the individual commanders přibarvovali to get the most out of the few available resources. Hitler's intuition also suggest each time a different area. However, the Germans had to prioritize the allocation of forces and means, and as the most vulnerable place of them came to the area between the Šeldou and the Seine. Here went the most concrete and much more units. The assumption that there's going to be an invasion, but it wasn't based on intelligence, but on cool reflection, that from here it is close to Germany and it is the narrowest part of the Channel. This part of the coast received additional importance thanks to the location inning stretch of the missiles V-1. Even here but not the German fortifications sufficient parameters, let alone in other parts, including Normandy. In this situation, when addition of the West Hitler showed no interest in the hope of success in the East, Rundstedt tried to get Hitler's attention. In October 1943 he wrote the above-mentioned report.

the Effect of the eastern front and the Mediterranean


The report Rundstedt about the Atlantic wall alluded to rather few. Missed while mentioning about the delays in construction, but devoted himself mainly to the combat value of the allocated troops, because that was more important than the concrete. Forts were important for the fight even propaganda, but not insurmountable. Could the invading forces to slow down and split up, do not stop. A victory could bring only a fast and powerful counterattack. But one of its division was generally in charge of a section of a length of 80 kilometers in 15. the army, over 200 kilometers in 7. the army, after 350 miles on the Atlantic coast. It was in addition weakened by division, which should generally only two regiments. Their amenities heavy weapons was weak and almost completely they lacked means of transportation. Due to the demands of the Mediterranean and especially the eastern front, the West became more of a training and doplňovacím centre than a real battlefield. Team these divisions often consisted of soldiers, who for various reasons could not be deployed on the eastern front. In September 1943 the chief of staff of OB WEST, general Blumentritt said that a year ago on the Atlantic wall were 22 infantry divisions, most of which had three regiments. In reserve then it was another six infantry divisions and seven quality tank divisions or a division of panzer grenadiers. Now, when the overall situation is still dangerous, it was on the wall crew, while 27 infantry divisions, but which usually had only two regiments. In reserve were six tank divisions or a division of panzer grenadiers, and seven divisions of infantry, three of which have been compiled only recently. German strength in the West, therefore, significantly decreased. And the acute needs of the eastern front neklesaly. Another appreciable loss in addition, they started to fight the western Allies. In addition, it was the need for an operation TORCH to occupy the rest of France, where it originated other potential invading the area, which only increased the demands on the force subordinate to OB WEST. After the fall of Italy was, moreover, necessary in parts of the south of France to replace Italian units. To this is then added the need to send additional troops to Italy and the Balkans.

Reinforcements have been looking everywhere for - board to younger and older baby boomers, recruited foreigners, in the service of the returning soldiers who have suffered permanent injury, for the guns were sent to the administrative files and were přisunovány units from Norway and Denmark. Conscripted were men who would not yet failed a health inspection, and reducing the time dedicated to healing. Combat value and the loyalty of some units was then at the very least debatable. In may 1944 had 7. the army in its assembly of 23 eastern infantry battalions. It was roughly a sixth of the rifle battalions. U * LAW LXXXIV. ward was the eastern 8 of the 42 battalions. However, overall, we can say that the combat value of the units decreased, rather the lack of people and especially equipment, than directly to the health team. The deteriorating quality of German units in the West had a greater impact on the defense of the beaches, there was a total of one, who sits in a bunker for a machine gun. The great problem this posed for the expected operations after the invasion, when it assumed the need for rapid maneuver to repel an alien invasion in the bud. On it but not the division at the time of drafting Rundstedtovy a report prepared. Strategic advances have been minimal, if of them could even talk.

Restoration of the defense potential of the West and the search for appropriate defensive tactics


Hitler Rundstedtovu had read the report and subsequently, in early November issued directive no. 51. In its compilation was based on how Runstedtovy news, so from the overall development on all fronts. Stated that it takes the threat in the East, but that in the West there was a new danger, which, moreover, is not delayed large distances from the center of Germany. Already not lead to further marginalization of the forces in favor of the other queues. On the contrary, should be strengthened, on the coast should be installed more artillery batteries, more anti-aircraft batteries, more tanks buried in the tower of the standings, laid more mines and so on. Strengthened should be and mobile backup, for the case of breaking through the outer defense ring. Armies should ensure the equipment of all tank divisions, and all divisions of the panzer grenadiers třiadevadesáti tanks Pzkfw. IV or assault guns and also anti-tank weapons, and even to the end of the year. Furthermore, it was forbidden to move armored units from the West without Hitler's express consent. OB WEST was to ensure the withdrawal of forces from less threatened parts of the coast to the backup. The air force and navy should strengthen its defensive elements. However, even though it was still at the end of November, ordered to OB WEST, to accelerate the reorganization of 60. the division of the panzer grenadiers and ensure its continuance to the east. And in December it was pushed back 10 thousand men year 1925, who were replaced by those who were previously intended for occupation tasks. Even the number of heavy weapons was lower than with the way orders are counted. The transfers continued even in 1944. The number of new members was at that time higher than the number of those, who were relegated. November 1943 was the beginning of a specific turnover concerning the condition and number of the forces in the West. The Symbol of this change was the arrival of marshal Rommel. The first he performed an inspection tour of the fortifications of the Atlantic wall, and then prepare an operational study for the deployment of forces in defense and counterattack. Had to deal with the mobility, concentration and combat readiness of all troops, but especially of the advances. He further suggest that force would be appropriate to move or allocate to other tasks, so could be built of sufficient strength for the leadership of a determined counterattack. Rommelův staff was directly subordinate to the OKW. Another factor associated with his appointment, he was a positive influence on the morale of the troops, who welcomed the appointment of the struggle of an experienced commander with a good reputation of a warrior. Suggest it also, that Hitler was at least partially abandoned the idea of the liquidation of the invasion right on the beaches and returned to the traditional German concept of mobile operations. The rate of this distance but is not clear. However, Rundstedt's so understood. Anyway emerged the question of how to fight in the new battle of France. Individual commanders have had on the matter different opinions. It was necessary to decide whether to lead a linear or defense in depth, whether the result of static or mobile operations, whether to try rather on the possession of territory or destruction of enemy forces - albeit at the cost of a temporary evacuation of part of the territory, relying more on concrete fortifications or the mobile armored advances. This was from a theoretical, doktrinálního point of view. In practice, there were borders not so sharp, only a few commanders are kept completely rigid positions, whether standing on any side. The doctrine had to often retreat to the real possibilities. Individual the commander can't simply assign to one or the other camp. The question was not settled definitively in the top military and vojenskopolitických floors, which is then transmitted to the lower levels of command. Commonly so there were compromises and mixing of different approaches, which concerned mainly the layout and the training of the troops.

Hitler on the upcoming matchup in the West looked like at the new opportunity to obtain a decisive victory after the defeats of 1943 waned chance to defeat the Soviet union. On the other hand, but refused to voluntarily vacate part of the territory for the acquisition of a strategic or tactical advantages, not only as regards France. Rejected such proposals on the evacuation of Norway and Denmark in the case of the invasion in France, or the retreat of the troops in Italy more to the north, in order to save a few divisions for the western and eastern front. Finally, properly or not to the withdrawal of troops from the less exposed parts of the coast. It is significant, that too did not address whether to build or at cultivating no permanent coastal fortifications, which odčerpávalo resources, but in what way will this line kept, what will be the ratio between the energy inserted into detention on the beaches and in the energy inserted into the counterattack led backup mobile units, where these have to be advance deployed, and how they are to be planted. Hitler believed that the line may be built so strong that the attempted landing will be within 24 hours thwarted. In this is in agreement with Rundstedtem. This approach confirmed and Dieppe, Sicily and Salerno. The enemy was most vulnerable at the moment of landing, and the flow advances to the line made maritime fire and the presence of fighter-bombers. In contrast to the fortified points of resistance have led quite well, but Allies they often escape and headed into the interior, to occupy the important elements of communication and the intersection. General Marnitz, who drew experience from Salerno, recommending that the invading forces broken already at the landing. You should be because of the dense network of fortified points forced to divide into smaller groups, which then should be neutralized by the backups, held close to the coast, but outside the range of naval guns. Rundstedt with the conclusions agreed, but added. Perfect defenses described so that there is a need to strike at the enemy ships. If he manages to land, it is necessary to perform counterattacks by local reserves. If he should succeed in this line of to break through, must encounter the defense in depth, which can hold him until then, before the Germans will be able to counterattack the choir and the army corps advances.

On the other hand, suggest a tank expert in the West, general Geyr von Schweppenburg download of mobile units from the coast, which is where they should stay just a division of the trench, which should be the enemy as long as possible to refrain from and cause him the greatest losses. Then had come a strong armored counterattack in the outback. General Sodenstern agreed, but added that one interesting observation. Due to the relative weakness of the German forces was to be the coast prevented just in time, before the will be determined by the center of gravity of the allied attack. The strategic reserve should be placed on both sides of the Seine northwest of Paris and on the upper Loire. Battleground should be the area between these rivers. Since allied air supremacy prevented by the more extensive German troop movements, should be Allies, forced to vmanévrování in this area by lines perpendicular to the coast, that the allied attack kanalizovaly. However, the variant, that would be all the money on the counter attack fully mobile advances, was never seriously considered. It seems that Rundstedt was counting on that to the main encounter occurs in the coastal area. Hesitated but on how much in this area rely on mobile counterattack. Problem seen in range of naval guns and allied air domination, which prevented freedom of movement. Moreover, he was aware that his mobile backups do not have the appropriate amount of manpower and resources. The conclusion was thus clear, it is necessary to take maximum advantage of the defensive potential water obstacles, i.e. the Channel. Rundstedt partially modified its opinion in November, after the release of Hitler's directive. If they were the promises contained in it are fulfilled, it was possible to count with a mobile counter-attack. Further recommend download after the invasion of the six infantry divisions of the areas of the dauntless attack. This division would have been subordinated to the two councils and then the same army. Equipped with would have been a sufficient number of vehicles. The existing backup in the form of tank divisions and divisions of the panzer grenadiers should be subordinated to the panzer corps. The whole thing should be subordinated to a special group of armies led by Rommel.

OKW oponovalo download of entire divisions and was recommended to download only the regimental combat group, that no part of the coast is left completely exposed. Another criticism came from the commander of the 15. the army of general Salmutha. He criticized the Rundstedtův proposal as opposed to all hitherto valid principles of the management of defense in the West. According to him, the assumed break outside of the defense and establishment of the bridgehead. According to him, the Allies would, if they could make a bridgehead to create, they were able to move as much of the forces that would soon have gained a numerical superiority over the Germans. Rundstedtem estimated the backup would take too long to collect, and their movement would be impeded by the allied air force, which would moreover, a considerable part of the forces of ruin still on the way. Probably, therefore, will not be able to be deployed in a compact whole, but piecemeal, which will be inefficient. According to Salmutha should be all the backup as close as possible to the coast and under the control of army headquarters. Rundstedtova answer points out that the Salmuth too relied on the correct judgment about the actual place of landing. Salmuth assumed that it will be hájená area, but Rundstedt argued that while this is likely, but not certain. To the impossibility of the concentration and movement Rundstedt in no way silent. Apparently believed that these difficulties will be overcome, although it was not at all clear how. Rundstedt and with it a whole host of other commanders assumed that the Atlantic wall could be breached, whether it will be powerful. Then it was necessary to consider how much power to allocate to local and how much to the strategic reserve. General Sodenstern pointed out that the impossibility of the creation of neprorazitelného fortress ring was tapping into the whole concept of the "Atlantic wall". In the case of his penetration became all the rest of it completely worthless. Rundstedt insisted that the determined resistance in the network of fortifications, held to the last man, the enemy will divide and weaken so much that his prorazivší the group will be able to be defeated before they get zkoncetrovat. Division head of the counter-attack should not be deployed piecemeal, but in compact units, in order to effectively challenge the wings of the allied forces. The commander of the * law lxxxiv. army corps general Marcks ' due to the weakness of its forces supported the same approach. Inspectors from the OKW told that even if he had twice as much force, as if that wasn't enough to create an impermeable dam against the invasion units. Instead of the monolithic concrete walls along the coast suggest the construction of many of the smaller field fortifications in depth, which did not have the allied forces to stop it, but to divide and slow down before the flow advances. Believed that it will be possible to build a backup of the mobile divisions in the strength of the corps for the coast, which will be able to be planted within 24 hours from the beginning of the invasion. OKW looked skeptically on the ability to perform a larger counterattack, due to allied air supremacy. However, Jodl and his staff agreed with the usefulness of defense in depth. After Rundstedtových repeated pleas of OKW in the summer of 1943 authorized the construction of a secondary defence line in the coastal zone, which should include elements applicable to the movement of the backups. So far, it started to build, rather vytipovávala appropriate places. The construction was ordered at the end of October 1943. It should ensure maximum flexibility. It was thus the end of the year, however, the discussion about the most appropriate way of defence still has not ended. In addition Rundstedtovy orders, which emphasise how the possession of coastal habitats, thus building a mobile advances, were on the one hand consistent, on the other hand, can be interpreted in favor of both approaches - support of them, have drawn both supporters of primarily static, so proponents of a primarily mobile defense.

Plan of the battle, so as expected the staff of OB WEST, had assumed four main stages: 1. fight with the allied forces, which are still on the ships, 2. fight on the beaches, 3. duel in the coastal zone between the local reserves, and the allied forces, which broke through the main defensive ring, 4. the decisive encounter, in which the German mobile backup will force the allied troops in the beachhead back into the sea. Based on this, ordered Rundstedt to intensify the program of construction works. Prefer should have the casemate for coastal and anti-tank artillery battery. At the same time he began to plan the formation of the central advances. But commanding these advances and lead the battle against invasive forces should marshal Rommel, who, with this plan a massive counter-attack in the current allied air superiority did not agree and considered pointless.

German strategy for 1944


The German strategy for the year 1944'd accepted the fact that on the eastern front cannot be in the current state to achieve a decisive victory, and the possibility that the western Allies during the year almost certainly take place the attempted invasion. This option represented as a serious danger, so the opportunity to turn the development. The defeat of the invasion force would probably mean for some period of peace in the West, and thus the possibility of displacement of up to fifty divisions in the East. The germans were aware of the superiority of the allied military potential and it was clear to them that their only chance to defeat the invasion force is their rapid defeat. It was therefore necessary to have in place the invasion of most of the forces, to come to a quick counterattack. To bet everything on a battle, whose place and time were fully in the enemy's hands, meant to ask the defense almost impossible thing. The germans lacked mobility and knowledge of allied intentions. Hitler could a hundred times to order the preparation of the western front in the crucial battle, but the funds just were missing. Since for various reasons it was not possible to download units from other battlefields, had to do it, that the West has been given priority in the allocation of new manpower and resources. In the case of the invasion of France should be in addition přisunuty three infantry divisions from Norway and Denmark, one infantry division, raketometný regiment and a corps headquarters from Italy, and four mobile infantry or hunting division of the Balkans. This would have intensified the concentration of forces. It would be possible just in case, the Allies would have carried out only one major attack. OKW but in January began to doubt whether the western Allies aren't going to yet one more invasion. The germans with a certain trepidation looked at it, that in Italy there has been a stalemate, but in the Mediterranean they are still concentrated numerous allied forces. This situation, they got a long-term unbearable and expected that these units will be in the near future somewhere deployed. When towards the end of January the Allies landed at Anzio, thought the Germans, he could be the first of a series of smaller strokes, which aimed to lure the north-west of France advances. Allied dithering on the beaches instead of fast forward like this option confirm, as if the goal wasn't profit, but to attract German forces. As for the possible side-strokes, they feared the Germans mainly strikes on the French mediterranean and atlantic coast. During February they were 19. the army awarded two new infantry division and the 9th. panzer division SS has been moved to Avignon as a military backup. 1. the army also received one new division. These concerns, moreover, greatly influenced the German defence planning. If the western Allies implemented the strategy of multiple of the current or successive strokes, could the Germans to weaken the seemingly fearless part of the coast for the purpose of concentration of forces, especially the backups. It would be additionally difficult to determine which strike is the main. For this reason, and because of the rapid developments in the Mediterranean and in the Soviet union, occurred at the beginning of 1944 to the fact that the plans were předělávány slowly every day and OKW in march left its comprehensive plan of defense. OKW main commanders of the individual válčišť informed, that the movements of units will be dictated by momentary needs, probably until after the show, where the main invaznímu strike. He was also drafted a new plan for the provision of certain units of the Reserve army, which should be from Germany přisunuty on the battlefield, which will be just under the major allied pressure. In the case of OB WEST reckoned with the arrival of one of the choral headquarters, two reinforced regiments of the panzer grenadiers, one reinforced infantry instruction regiment, combat groups of three infantry regiments as the germs of new divisions, a motorized artillery instruction regiment, five battalions of the provincial shooters and one raketometného instruction of the battalion. These diverse units full of newcomers were hardly a substitute for the eight reinforced divisions, with the initial plan. Although OKW formally left the intention to move in more reinforcements from other occupied territories, was in march 1944 the probability of the realization of this step practically zero. Moreover, admitting the possibility of more landings meant the strategic uncertainty that logically hinder the concentration of forces.

In march 1944 so was the German defense in the West, weakened the growing uncertainty about the allied intentions. But it was only one stone in the mosaic of German military difficulties. While in the West it was a threat, to the South and East directly about the real danger that had to be addressed immediately. Three months managed to keep the forces in the West, although before christmas have made the Soviets a large-scale offensive in Kiev, in January, they liberated Leningrad, the end of the month surrounded a large part of the German 8. the army at Čerkas and in February attacked the German 6. the army at Ukraine, in an attempt to clean up the crook of the Dnieper. Again came the call after the arrival of the divisions from the West. But there has been displacement of one infantry division from Norway, which was also replaced by a roughly equally strong, though nedoformovanou unit. Downsizing, therefore, was minimal. Three reinforced regiments, originally intended for inclusion in the backup OKW, were sent to the East. In the same month were from the eastern front seized three thousand soldiers with frostbite and exchanged for soldiers from the western front. Not so much but still wasn't about some major thinning units in France. But the problems in the East were not the only ones. At the end of January with the western Allies landed at Anzio. To their rebounding should serve fully motorized 715. infantry division, which was sent from France. Jodl asked Hitler about přisunutí 9. tank division of the SS, but he refused out of concern about the landing in southern France. The thus OB WEST didn't, however, the loss of 715. infantry division was not insignificant. And wasn't the last. In march, the Soviets launched another offensive and at the same time, concerns emerged regarding the further developments in Hungary. This necessitated the violation of Hitler's directive. The core of the occupying troops may have to form units from the Balkans and from the Reserve army, however, OB WEST had to send a Tank instruction division, one corps headquarters, several aa units and various support elements. Hungarian surgery went quickly and successfully. A panzer division could in may to go back. However, the two divisions of the Reserve army and two divisions from the Balkans had to be sent to the eastern front. One other was at the last minute saved from the same fate only thanks to the insistence of Hitler. Anyway, the amount of the strategic reserve, which would eventually be deployed against the invasion in the West, was very significantly reduced.

And it wasn't even the last suction forces. The soviet units still attacked. 9. march fell Umaň, 14. had to be cleared out of Kherson and the end of the month crossed the river Bug, Dniester and Prut. In Galicia was temporarily hemmed 1. tank army. It was imperative here to move that backup from anywhere. From Denmark was at the beginning of march moved 361. infantry division and replaced by a different, much less quality. In the same month met the same fate 349. infantry division, which in France replaced the weaker 331. infantry division from the Reserve army. Moreover, at this time had to 326. infantry division, 346. infantry division, 348. infantry division and 19. infantry division of the air force to surrender all of its assault cannon. It was first deployed in Romania and then divided between the various divisions on the eastern front. Probably the biggest draw more forces were pushed around II. the tank corps of the SS, which consisted of the with the 9. and 10. tank division of the SS, at the end of march. The corps was sent to help 1. the tank army. OB WEST now had only one fully mobile division - 21. the tank division. At the end of march so the forces OB WEST were again at a relatively low level. During the next few months, the situation on the eastern front at the time has stabilized, and in the West could be to the restoration forces. In mid-may there were four panzer divisions operational, though not quite dovybavené, and four others were in process of formation. At the end of the month in addition, from Hungary back Tank instruction division. 1. panzer division SS here in addition has been moved to the restocking. Přisunut was also XLVII. panzer corps headed by an experienced general Funckem. German forces in France again managed to increase, partly supply of new units, partially shifting units depleted on the eastern front. Part of the training units were also reorganized on the field. Rundstedt thus has mainly two types of divisions. Both the older divisions, which have undergone a fight and they lost their best men and technology, as well as new divisions, some of which had great combat value, but a large part was only partially trained and partially equipped.

Although it was the German army in the West in terms of quantity, quality and amenity of the units noticeably weaker than the assumption of the defense plans, it was still on the force that could hope to win. The allied air superiority could be offset by natural and artificial obstacles. To 1. June 1944 had Rundstedt available 58 combat divisions of which 33 were from the marker or backup, i.e. with a weaker combat potential. Of the remaining 25 were 24 divisions classified as capable of service in the East thanks to their relative mobility and relatively high stocks. It was about 13 infantry divisions, 2 airborne divisions, 9 tank divisions and one division of panzer grenadiers. 21. panzer division was not listed as fit for duty on the eastern front, mainly due to the large amount of captured equipment. Otherwise it was but a relatively strong division with great amenities heavy weapons. 7. the army, in whose area eventually had to be landing, had 14 divisions in four corps.

Fragmented command structure


Besides the problems with less than the planned power units there was still a problem with the non-existent unity on the command of these forces. Rundstedt was responsible for the defense of the entire area of France and the Benelux countries, but its powers do not nearly match up. First of all, he didn't have control over air and naval units. Four air corps in the area of the subject 3. air army marshal Sperrleho, which then was subject directly OKL. A similar situation prevailed in the case of naval forces. Group headquarters navy West admiral Kranckeho, which controlled the work of destroyers, torpedo boats and other smaller vessels operating from ports in Rundstedtově area of responsibility, subject to the right of OKM. This meant that Rundstedt could not Sperrlemu and Kranckemu to grant the orders, he is only to ask for assistance. However, air and naval forces were so few in number or so greatly attenuated that their deployment had a more fundamental effect on the course of the battle of Normandy.

More fundamental was the inconsistency in land-based units. This was partly normal and traditional. It concerned mainly the airborne divisions and units of anti-aircraft artillery, which administratively fall under the air force. Under the navy again fell part of the batteries of the coastal artillery. The navy additionally, the responsibilityofthe for the fight at sea, and thus also for the shooting of sea targets, even if they were carrying the invading forces. In practice, when the invasion seemed so, that this power has been delegated to the army. It was but basically about improvisation and so the whole thing had been in the hands of local commanders without coordination at a higher level. Rundstedt did not have full control over the security units, which provide for occupation duties and fall under the military headquarters France and Belgie-Northern France. You were directly subordinated to OKH, though they can be in order to repel an invasion from a tactical point of view, subordinated to OB WEST. The authority of OB WEST was also limited Rommelovou army Group for the specific use. Rommel first given the task to carry out an inspection of the western defense elements and preparation of a plan for a counterattack. In the end it was his command assigned the task of this counter-attack lead. Rommel and Rundstedt realized that it is impractical to make this crew was outside the standard command structure. Rundstedt therefore 30. December suggested that this group was renamed the Group of armies B and subordinated to OB WEST. Drive had 7. and 15. army and also units in the Netherlands. Hitler agreed, with the proviso that Rommelovo headquarters may at any time be deployed elsewhere. Army group B was to be set up to 15. January 1944. Rommel's subordination directly to the OKW that was terminated. Rommel did not have full control over the subordinate armies, since those in a number of things to address your issues directly with OB WEST. On the other hand, had Rommel in charge of the supervision on the strength of the structures throughout the West. In addition, it was the geographical integration of Rommel's staff rather than just a makeshift, as this headquarters was still taken as a kind of quasi backup command. Rommel's recommendations so enjoyed the special, though informal importance. Rommel had, as well as other generals, field marshals, the right to appeal directly to Hitler. It was important, in conjunction with his nature and qualities of the commander of OB WEST. Rommel was energetic and compelling, thanks to which usually managed to get Hitler's support. On the contrary, Rundstedt was more of a compromise nature and maybe even accept some of rommel's views. Anyway, he didn't seem to mind that the main responsibility for the potential failure of this falls mainly on rommel's head. Thus, we can conclude that Rommelův influence went beyond his formal powers, and accounted of him in the West in the time before the invasion of a dominant figure.

Even Rommel's position but was not without limitations. In November 1943 because Rundstedt set up a special staff, which was due to the planned protútoku command during this action the tank divisions. In the forefront Panzer group West stood general Geyr von Schweppenburg, who was in the time before the invasion to drive the training of tank units and advise the OB WEST on their future deployment. Geyr had to cooperate with the territorial commander and respect their requirements. But while Geyr wanted a panzer division to hold in reserve and deploy them in a coordinated manner during a large-scale counterattack, Rommel wanted them to be as close as possible to the coast. Their views are so vastly different. In march Rommel Hitler asked for an extension of its powers at the expense of Geyra, and Rundstedta. He wanted control over all the tank, motorizovanými and artillery units in the West and at least partial control even over 1. and 19. the army, which were yet subordinated directly to OB WEST. Due to rommel's task was his effort quite understandable. Hitler agreed to it. But Rundstedt protested and won the support of the operating staff of the OKW. Hitler then its previous decision changed, but not completely. 2., 21. and 116. panzer division should be transferred to the subordination of rommel's army Group B as her backup. For these divisions was now Geyr responsible only for the training. 1. panzer division of the SS, 12. panzer division SS, 17. the division of the panzer grenadiers and Tank instruction division have been kept as a strategic reserve OWK. Rundstedt then lost control of them, but that were not transferred to Rommel, but to the headquarters. Instead of greater unity of command to achieve even greater disunity.

The last big change before the invasion, in may the creation of army Group G, which was subordinated to the 1. and 19. the army and commanded her general Blaskowitz. This group of armies was in the lineup alongside those two armies and 9. the tank division, 11. the tank division and 2. the tank division of the SS. Its emergence was created by a counterbalance against rommel's army Group B. At the same time it eliminated the concept of Rommel's headquarters as a backup hq. The establishment of the Blaskowitzova the headquarters of Rundstedt at the same time defining their own position. Retain the position of chief commander in the battlefield with the appropriate powers, excluding the above restrictions. The commanders of groups of armies, however, announced that it will provide them with maximum freedom of decision-making in their sectors. Hits only if they fundamentally disagree, or if their step affecting the entire theater of war. He promised to pass on Hitler's directive, which would only dospecifikoval. Ironically, it came from Hitler or Rundstedta in the months before the landings, only a very few pokunů. Hitler was in East Prussia and dealt with the eastern front. It also seems that no clear and consistent view of the appropriate defense tactics. If the western front had, then rather to the details than the whole. Hitler's inability to issue consistent orders, respectively, any issue, and the vague division of powers between the Rundstedta and Rommel, meant that the West was without a single command. The defensive preparations of 1944 there were still more inconsistent, as Rommel and Rundstedt issue orders in specific things but as a whole defied, because on the whole both viewed differently.

Rommel to his new task he had enriched by the experience with desert fighting in north Africa. To France he arrived shortly before the outbreak of hostilities and assigned was the right for their guidance. Had a experience with a long preparatory period, not long-term preparation of plans, wasn't here when compared the ideal and the real strength and resources, when načrtával way of defence and if the local commanders had to fight for every regiment, who had to save them from sliding to a different theater of war. A theoretical approach to things, i.e. to outline the best plan and then finding the most appropriate means, he was not in his mission and he wasn't on it at the time, nor the time. On the basis of their african experience considered considerations about the possibility of a mass armored counterattack in the allied air domination, and in impaired quality of the German units in France for the foolish. Theoretically, it may look pretty, but practically, this according to him was impracticable. The only way according to him was the use of natural obstacles in the form of the sea and to replenish her fortifications, trenches, barbed wire, mines and other defensive elements and obstacles. According to him, it wasn't the best option, but the only possible option. As Rommel believed that the new battle of France will be decided on the beaches and in the coastal area during the first two days and nights, placed by far the greatest emphasis on the quality and quantity of the elements of the Atlantic wall. That should be the strongest in the field of 15. army in the Pas-de-Calais. This defensive belt should have a width of approximately five kilometers. The units here should be placed in a number of smaller zodolněných points. Between these points should be minefields and dense network of obstacles, which would have made it impossible for the allied forces the possibility of penetration.

Due to lack of time, manpower and resources to Rommel concentrated on the much simpler field fortifications than on the smaller number the strength of the complexes. His achievements were on the beaches of installed underwater obstacles. These consisted of tetrahedra and rozsocháčů, which were used in the outback as anti-tank obstacles and now have been moved to the beach. Added were belgian gates, and the zapíchnutými stakes. These elements should be the beach to protect the how to at low tide, so during high tide. A number of obstacles had to be have booby traps. Stakes left Rommel cannot be sticking even in areas where you might expect the landing of the gliders. These barriers should be equipped with mines. In the waters of the Canal had to be laid several permanent minefields, which had to be supplemented by other mines shozenými and laid just before the invasion. A certain number of min should also be thrown in the waters close to british ports. Obstacles slow the invading forces should be doraženy German troops waiting off the coast.

One of the main back rommel's problems was the lack of material and manpower. From what he got, received a turnover of the majority of the 15. the army at the expense of 7. army. Deployed were the construction battalions, the French workers and the forces from the East. And also members of combat units. Their working use was becoming more common and especially in the newer units, which was the majority, it negatively influenced on the level of training. The only exception were paradesantní unit, which from an administrative and training point of view fall under the air force. And Goering to their workload allowed only in the case of buildings, which would serve to their direct defense against air výsadkům. 5. paradesantní division was a relatively new unit, but 3. paradesantní division proved to be one of the best prepared. Certainly also thanks to the better ratio between the time spent in training and in work activities.

While Rommelův construction plan did not come across on the more substantial opposition, with a plan for dislocation of the units was worse. Rommel wanted the unit to gather close to the coast, which logically was based on the assumptions that the German troops do not have freedom of movement and that the battle will be determined during the first 48 hours. The strength of the units, which would be placed too far away, would be missed. Due to the fact that the basic element of the defense was the Atlantic wall, it was a pretty logical deduction. An opponent, for example, was the commander of the 19. army general Sodenstern, who feared the influence of concrete strength on the defensive tactics and the concentration of troops in a place where you'd expect the enemy strikes my greatest strength, likened to the laying of the head on the anvil under the kovářovo falling hammer. Supporters of the dislocation of the units near the coast should have a simple answer. First, there was no alternative, both the initial strike will be hard to get the strongest. On the contrary, they expected that will be the weakest and allied force will only grow with the way will be built and expanded a bridgehead. The third proposition was that the strength provide at least some protection from the incident with a hammer, while manévrující units will be exposed to thousands of very active hammers in the form of allied fighter-bombers. Rommel would reportedly also prefer to seduce maneuver battles, but he didn't believe that it is under existing conditions possible. Rundstedt, like Sodenstern, was more optimistic, probably because he didn't have personal experience with the power of the allied air force. Anyway Rommelův look at the thing did not share and tried to make it move as many units away from the coast to mobile advances.

The effort to incorporate an element of mobility to the defense plan was related with the ability to make relevant units of the mobile, and ensure their disaggregation and amenities so as to be able to separate management of combat activities. In the first half of the year Rundstedt tried to selected units to strengthen and provide them means of transport. In sector 7. army leave form mobile combat group in the form of a reinforced regiments of four infantry divisions in Brittany. It was a 265., 266., 275. and 353. infantry division, which had in the case of the invasion in Normandy to send out these quick formation to help to repel the invasion. 243. infantry division, which was located on the Cotentinu, should be from the division position type reorganized to the division of classical, partly motorized, partly equipped with bicycles. The reorganization may take place, but the motorization planned for may 1944 it has scarcely begun, so at the time of the invasion had been a division of the character rather positional. It should be noted that for mobile they were then referred to the German division equipped with bicycles and horse-drawn artillery and supply units with horses and goods vehicles. Mobile meant rather self-sufficient, than a fast moving. The germans then heavily lacked the means, that troops in the West to provide at least partial mobility. Rundstedtovy efforts on the delivery of the mobility of the marker divisions thus necessarily failed. Rundstedtovy efforts for the motorization of units went against rommel's efforts to burying every available soldier and cannons along the coast. That in February concluded that the advances are held in too great strength, and at too great a distance from the coast. It concerned mainly the 352. infantry division at St. Lo and 243. infantry division, near La Haye du Puits. Their divisional backups have been moved to the coast and both divisions should move to the north. 352. the artillery regiment was moved to the coast in the sector of 716. infantry division. 352. the division is de facto ceased to be a reserve unit and eventually took over the existing left part of the sector 716. division.

Hitler, whose view of the thing, probably thanks to rommel's influence, since the release of directive no. 51 changed, then wondered whether all the units with limited mobility, which were located in the area behind the coast, should not be integrated directly into the main line of defense. It would be as offensive midfield remained the only fully mobile division. General Jodl pointed out that excluding the three divisions are the rest of the unit extended so far that their artillery dostřelilo on the beach. According to him, was but the movement of entire divisions of the threat, because right on the coast there was not enough reinforced concrete covers. They would have to count only on field fortifications, which would, but she couldn't stand the air raids of allied bombers. Also would remove the last elements of the defense in depth that would be lacking for the repel air incursions. Move all units directly on the coast, therefore, was not accepted as a generally valid principle, however, Rommel continued to move its forces ever closer to the sea. In April, for example, had to move 21. the tank division from Rennes to Caen. Its battalions spread along the river Orne and the artillery at the coast. This division, therefore, could hardly be still considered as a mobile backup. The other two panzer divisions under rommel's command were deployed in favour of the 15. army. One between Rouen and Paris, the other near Amiens. In may, Rommel concluded that the movement of the units from the right wing towards the left into the invasion area would be impossible. He asked, therefore, to have been four divisions from a backup OKW placed close to the coast. Rundstedt but protested by the OKW with the fact that it would mean the deployment of advances before the outbreak of fighting. OKW gave him for the truth and rommel's request refused.

These four divisions, three tank divisions and one division of panzer grenadiers, rescued thanks to itervenci OKW, were the only mobile unit, which was in the West on the eve of the invasion can be considered as strategic reserve. Three of these were deployed close enough to the Normandy, so there could easily arrive, unless, of course, was not taken into account the factor of allied air superiority and the resulting activity of fighter-bombers. The fourth was located on the belgian-Dutch border.

The conflict between the Rundstedtem and Rommel on the appropriate defense strategy has not been finally resolved and has led to the dislocation of the units to the compromise places but they were not valid nor a single strategy. Number of units of the mobile deposit has been reduced below the necessary numbers for the leadership of the effective mass counterattack. These units were in addition excluded from the operational subordination of OB WEST and be subject to three different headquarters. The thought of the massive, decisive mobile counterattack was de facto thwarted, however, the units were also too far away to arrive in a few hours to the coast. Was lost their operating flexibility, without being remelted in the strengthening of the coastal defence line.

the German defense on the eve of the invasion


Scheduled date of completion of the construction of the winter construction program and the completion of the training of troops was established on 30. April 1944. The germans then completed the preparation to repel the invasion in the Pas-de-Calais. At the end of 1943, Hitler ordered the assembly of all available forces for the front line 15. the army and the right wing 7. army. Area 7. the army was still regarded as significantly less vulnerable. OB WEST was to release four divisions of coastal areas 7., 1. and 19. army. Three of them were allocated 15. army. 243. infantry division, which was removed from the coastal sector 7. the army was to remain in this army, but in the background. Of the four reinforced regiments, that in this theater of war arrived from the command of the troops, were three allocated 15. the army and one for the 709. infantry division 7. army. The reason for this was that the units on the east side of Cotentinu were not too strong and there was a certain possibility of an invasive strike.

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This option but it wasn't until the end of April the gate too seriously. German intelligence gave little credible information, and estimates of allied intentions were rather derived from logical assumptions than confirmed facts. And it's no wonder. The aerial survey was very limited because of the allied superiority, maritime exploration was limited from the logic of things and the number of German agents in Britain declined. And those remaining had their activity significantly more complex, because the English south coast was from the April closed area. Via Switzerland and Portugal while was news enough, but the credible was scarce. To build a comprehensive picture that wasn't enough not nearly. Allies, moreover, had a whole series of erroneous news games. The German high command, moreover, clung on a number of preconceived conclusions. In march 1944 began to be some change. Military leaders were essentially unified in their opinion that the invasion would take place in the Pas-de-Calais, however, Hitler began to flirt with the idea that the actual place might be Brittany and Cotentin. The basis there was no in-depth analysis, just the consideration that the weaker defense of these areas meant the easier the establishment of the bridgehead.

Reasoning about the dangers of the impending Normandy and Brittany supported the conclusions of the admiral Kranckeho. The 26. April reported that the last aerial photography confirmed activity in ports in the south east of England or in the mouth of the Thames. From this he reasoned that the area of Pas-de-Calais is not for the moment the threatened invasion. But even as the fact that the allied attacks against coastal batteries and radar stations were concentrated in the area between the Boulogní and the cherbourg peninsula. It was the same for the allied activities of the minesweepers and minonosek. And according to the strikes on the transport system Krancke reasoned that the invasion will occur somewhere between Boulogní and the cherbourg peninsula. The center of gravity assumed to Cotentinu, at the mouth of the Seine river or at the mouth of the Somme. The area of Pas-de-Calais assessed from the point of view of the invasion as possible. In the game, therefore Krancke left both areas, but turned their importance. The area, hitherto considered to be major, has made secondary and vice versa. Admiral his opinion he worked on during may with regard to the possibility of allied airborne landings. You expect to see in the surroundings of Le Havre and Cherbougu, which to him were as the primary invasion targets. Indeed, the allied bombers yet pay only a lesser extent. It is not clear whether Hitler responded on Kranckeho outlets, however, took place - ordered to strengthen the defense in Normandy. Rommel 6. may informed the headquarters of the 7. the army of the change of assumptions. It then ordered the transfer of parachute regiment and two separate battalions in the vicinity of Cherbourg and the south of Cotentinu. The place was přisunut and 506. tank battalion and the Assault battalion 7. army. The same orders were given and 91. infantry division, which was just on the way from Germany to Nantes, 101. positional raketometný regiment and 17. machine gun battalion. The goal was to stiffen defense against possible air výsadkům. Rommel nor Rundstedt after the amplification of defense Cotentinu against the action of the air nenavázaly orders to strengthen the defense of the peninsula from the sea. The proposal to move LXXIV. corps from Brittany to Normandy in case of disembarkation in the field * law lxxxiv. ward Rommel dismissed. Even Krancke your thesis somehow next not push. He also foresaw that the invasion will be preceded by powerful strikes on the coastal battery. Their number may grow, but the Germans judged as still inadequate. And the radar network performed at the end of may without too much trouble. Even Krancke, which in his estimate partly approached the actual allied intentions, believed that the danger of invasion is not acute, if there is any. Krancke was optimistic regarding the enemy intentions, even though they are very realistically evaluated the helplessness of their own forces. These were few in number and for security reasons, constantly hidden in the ports. The mining of the coast had again a few min. When there in may arrived the next delivery, he had discarded most of the minonosek. Zaminovávací program in most areas has not been completed or not even started.

Weak was and the situation as regards the fortification of the coastal batteries. You should be by the end of April all in the casemates, but so far not. In many cases, the work has only just took place and somewhere't even started yet. It was similar even with the batteries in subordination to ground troops. The reason for this was the lack of material and transportation difficulties. In the second line of defense, which had a defence to deliver on the depth, the situation was even worse. Due to the shortcomings of the went most of the available forces and means for the construction of the first line. Not even that but the first line of the power lead towards completion. As well as the construction of barriers that would prevent or complicate the landing of the gliders, lagged, has often been rather in the beginning. Also the obstacles on the beaches were not nearly completed. Krancke warned that the assumption that the Allies to land at high tide, does not at all confirm. While the obstacles were built for this status level. Attaching others were lengthy and ran into the same obstacles. The laying of the mines took place relatively quickly, but it to an ideal state far away. Asked was a tenth of the estimated amount. Even the concrete bunkers were not far from being completed, sometimes it was just concrete ceilings or field fortifications. The majority was not resistant to air attacks. Their deployment did not provide the mutual cover, it was more about the belt relatively distant points. General Horst Treusch von Buttlar-Brandenfels from the operations staff of the OKW after the tour of normandy coast, he warned that if the enemy penetrates through one point, there will be between the other two the gap in the length of three to four kilometers, you will be able to total of in peace progress forward. Leaving the plan on the second line contributed significantly to the allied success.

Rommel's inability to complete the Atlantic wall undoubtedly contributed to the overall inefficiency of the German defense against the allied invasion. More powerful val would be the anglo-american forces have caused more losses, but you would and so most likely overcome. The critical shortage of German defense was the inability to maneuver due to the vast allied superiority in the air. The German air force was defeated even before the start of the invasion, respectively, it was almost destroyed. At the time of the invasion was to the West in a state of Air force 3 400 fighter aircraft (number of aircraft for direct support was negligible and fighter machines had to meet the fighter and attack role). These machines were included at the II. fighter glee, respectively, at the 4. fighter division stationed in Métách and 5. fighter division exploded near Paris. However, the main task 4. the division was to face the raids of allied bombers. In the event of an invasion, should its pilots participate in duels over the invasion area, but that was due to the distance de facto impossible. A large part of the pilots were rookies with a minimum of flight hours, with no experience with flying over France and without the knowledge of the location of local airports. Even though it was pretty clear that the first hours of the invasion will be decisive, not the German air force is no detailed plan of how to face her. Indeed, due to the lack of forces and funds you could not afford to keep a backup intended for deployment against the alien forces. The situation of the air force was even worse than it was in the army. The result was that after the outbreak of the invasion was deployed about a hundred of machines, the presence of which is basically not shown. Ground troops had to off the invading forces face without aerial protection and support.
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2.3 PLANNING OVERLORDU[/heading:aaaaaa]

Quebecká conference


When the participants of the may talks in Washington disagreed, it was clear to them that a number of the decisions taken had a rather preliminary nature and will need to be reconsidered due to the developments on the fronts. At the end of July and beginning of August it was clear that in the case of the German submarine danger, there was a significant shift and the card began to turn, that the bombing offensive, which began to intensify, bears a certain fruit, that the allied landing in Sicily was successful and relatively fast, that Italy is still unstable member of the Axis, and that the Germans lost after the failure at Kursk on the eastern front the initiative. In the case of Italy with the Allies at first they couldn't decide what form and where to attack. It was considered to Sardinia or limited invasion in the southern part of the peninsula. Due to the smooth course of the operation HUSKY eventually decided to for extensive surgery in Naples. Eisenhower even managed to request another 60 thousand men, who originally were headed from the US to the Uk. Brits even wanted to send another 50 thousand men, but that american military leaders rejected it as too high risk for OVERLORD and operations in the Pacific. When in mid-August, gathered kombinovaní chiefs of staff in Quebec, their view of the situation could be significantly more optimistic than was the case in Washington. This condition on the other hand, called for the articulation of a clearer strategy about the strike in Europe.

Quebecká conference, unlike those in Casablanca and Washington, didn't receive any immediate decision. Already before the decision was made, that will follow the invasion of Naples. It was therefore time to discuss the european strategy. The americans this time much better prepared, to turn in professional debates outdone your normally much better prepared british counterparts, which assumed greater focus on the Mediterranean, which was not reconcilable with their eyes on the thing. The american side had itself had to clarify your position, because the navy was starting to doubt about the necessity of OVERLORDu due to the development in Europe. Army but managed to impose their view as binding approach for the american negotiators. The main was indeed general Marshall. He was deeply convinced that the right way is the OVERLORD, and the mediterranean variant did not consider it appropriate, however, it would be for him after all, more acceptable than no strategy, which would have resulted in a series of smaller, emergency ad-hoc operations, based on current opportunities, which was the approach preferred by the British. You argued that it is difficult to plan a big event that has to happen in a year, when it's hard to estimate the development in the horizon of the moon. To the americans it was all about achieving a clear agreement at the strategic level - of course, ideally, so that at its heart was the OVERLORD. Marshall insisted that without a clear framework was difficult to assess the appropriateness of the design of the smaller events. This contradiction was based on the available resources and experience of both countries. And british sources were logically less than the us, with the Uk a long time faced the German danger in itself. And even now, were its resources that it could allocate for the struggle on the continent, limited to some twenty divisions. On the eastern front on both sides of the fight significantly higher numbers of divisions. Therefore, the British then clung on as the weakening of the German army before the main invasion. They wanted to avoid, that should their division bled to death during the unsuccessful action, because they don't have what to replace. From this stemmed their caution, their peripheral strategy of weakening the Germans on the side válčištích and waiting for their weakening on the eastern front. But it was hard to predict when it comes to sufficient weakening. Indeed, it was not defined nor what it is sufficient weakening. Therefore, the British wanted to avoid the long-term plans and long ahead of the defined dates. Want with the maximum freedom of use of the occasion to the further weakening of the Germans as a preparation for the final blow. The ideal place to implement this approach, it was just the Mediterranean. It was indeed a place of their eminentního interest already from the 18. century.

America went to war while materially and organizationally unprepared, but with the knowledge of the great and undefeated power. Access of its representatives, therefore it was offensive. Plans before Pearl Harbor assumed the construction of 215 divisions. Plans for him, which allowed the possibility of the fall of the USSR, had an army with 10 million members, that can the Germans defeat the alone. The development of the fighting has not confirmed the necessity of such a large army, however, feel that it is, in the Americans stayed. With the way their military potential grew, they were becoming less patient and they wanted to use as soon as possible. And the Mediterranean them on it seemed inappropriate. Attempts to weaken the Germans on the main battlefields could easily weaken the allied forces. Due to the lack of shipping space, each division sent to the Mediterranean, weakening the projected main theater of war, as to move her from the Mediterranean to Britain would be the need for shipping space which could be used to supply other divisions of the united states. In addition, it was necessary to take into account the supply and protection, so the more force was in the Mediterranean, the more ships it had to operate. Americans are also, unlike the British, had feared that Franco would could threaten Gibraltar, and the western access to the Mediterranean sea, which they perceived as such a large, almost closed the lake. This concern is moved up to the end of 1943, when it was quite clear that the Germans for such an operation no longer have the free division. While the Americans perceived the Italian operation as a secondary operation in relation to the OVERLORDu, the British as a major step in the direction of the design options OVERLORDu. This gave a much higher importance, which would be reflected in greater allocation of forces. It would be the British konvenovalo, while the Americans threatened that in such a case, it would put a bigger emphasis on action in the Pacific. The british by the left to intimidate, however, foresee a greater decisiveness of u.s. negotiators. Military officials of the two states eventually agreed to the statement, which was based on the american approach, but his wording was not completely absolutely clear, since the organism allows certain increase of the forces in the Mediterranean, though it wouldn't process at all simple. However, the British were counting on the fact that, in the case that it would not be met on time conditions, which they perceived as key to the successful execution of the invasion, convened the hearing for its reconsideration. They have raised also the possibility of drawing up plans for the invasion of Norway. Overall, we can say that the British agreed to the principle of invasion across the Channel in 1944, but still had some doubts about its feasibility and timing. Both countries but are aware that they need each other. The british bases and american sources couldn't separate from each other.

In Quebec it was agreed to Morgan's preliminary plan OVERLORDu and he was saved, to work continued. It was also recommended to be expanded in relation to the number of deployed forces. Churchill demanded expansion of about 25 percent and adding a landing on the east side of the Cotentinu, with which Marshall agreed. Morgan received permission to exceed the limitations of the washington conference. Agreed, also the requirement of planners to plan a minor strike against the south of France, which was to prevent the movement here placed the German forces in Normandy. General Eisenhower, who at the time was in North Africa, was given the task to sketch a plan for implementation of such an operation, although he for this landing were not allocated any additional forces and resources. It turned out to be unrealistic and it was clear that will need to be assigned additional units. The south of France so it's like she's next opponent in the struggle for limited resources, but on the other hand, at least dampen the british efforts to expand the Italian operations or the opening of the next queue in the Balkans. Quebec so therefore did not bring a clear and potentially immutable definition of the european strategy. However, the OVERLORD passed through the debates unscathed.


the Question of the landing of vessels on the scene again


General Morgan began to explore the possibility of extending the attack immediately after the submission of the preliminary plan to the british chiefs of staffs, prior to quebeckou conferences. One of the first tasks, which commissioned his people, was to estimate the number of additional vessels that would be necessary to add, that they can be forces and means of the second sequence loaded in terms of the tactical and not from the standpoint of economy of space, which would allow their combat deployment already in D+1, and the number of vessels that would be needed to add for transporting the other assault division. The numbers got on the table 7. July 1943. And instantly became irrelevant. More than four dozens of vessels because in the meantime, the british navy moved to Scapa Flow in order to protect the network and other vessels had to be converted on the carrier means of fire support (i.e. guns and missiles) assault divisions, which had until the moment of landing an invasion force on the beaches to keep the defender out of their firing position. The lack of these vessels was critical, and the british chiefs of Morgan's prodding, to prepare a detailed report. The calculations were based on the deployment of three assault divisions. The Deficit was based on the 164 LCT and other 7 LCI(L), which should be converted on the command of the vessel. American officials were given to understand that some increased production will be possible, but doubted, whether there will be sufficient and timely enough. British production on it was as well, I missed especially the more experienced workers. Already existing program was siphoning a considerable amount of steel and not the will to convert others from other design programs. Only in the autumn ordered the Churchill allocation of additional resources at the expense of other programs. For now Morgan with this proposal failed.

When in Quebec, decided to seriously examine the possibility of the discontinuation of the four divisions in the first wave. Morgan had to draw up a feasibility study. COSSAC added a message at the end of September. In it it was stated that so far there are not enough forces on the tactical transport druhosledových divisions, which are, therefore, at this moment druhosledovými only by name and deployed will be able to be up with the delay and will not be able to provide immediate assistance to the assault divisions. Recommended therefore to allocate new vessels in these druhosledovým units, in order to be loaded based on the tactical needs. Recommend also to maintain a certain floating deposit. When this is fulfilled, it is possible to think about adding another prvosledové division. The current distribution of forces compared to the store, which has almost all the goods in the window and almost nothing else on the store. Morgan's calculations of the vessels, which were needed for the landing of two full druhosledových divisions in D+1, showed that the attack led by the three assault divisions are missing 251 LCT and for the offense, led by four assault divisions missing 389 LCT. For the attack of the four divisions plus missing another 150 LCT for support purposes. The attack of the four divisions would also extend the offensive line. To the east it couldn't, since the unit came into the bandwidth range of the guns of Le Havre. A shift to the west in turn meant landing in the area northwest of the mouth of the river Douve, and thus on the eastern side of the Cotentinu. While previously it Morgan welcomed the now pointed out on the German defensive measures in this area and had about the suitability of the landing at this place of doubt. The british chiefs of staff, however, still supported the strike, led by four assault divisions. The fourth should be american and should be deployed right on the Cotentinu. Not but indicates how to overcome the apparent difficulties. Yet while it wasn't definitively decided on the form of the strengthening of the invasion force, however, there was a general belief about the need to strengthen the initial strike. And it was clear that the will need to resolve the lack of landing craft. The main problem was to ensure a sufficient number of vessels, the question of their tactical deployment was being relegated.

In September he arrived in London to Donald Nelson, who presided over the american Board of war production. With Morgan acted on the requirements on the number of vessels. After negotiations sent by Nelson to his executive vice-president Charles Wilson, a cablegram, which stated that the LST and LCT were an extremely important tool for victory in Europe and that the estimates of their necessary amount have been heavily undervalued. It made no difference to the fact that there were surpluses of free marine engines and steel plates. Also the yard were still utilized structures of other types of vessels. Priorities change, and therefore orders had to be in addition made well in advance, as the production of large units, such as naval vessels, can't change from day to day. Some room to maneuver provided the fact that a large part of the construction program for the year 1944 to include smaller vessels and escort destroyers, for the production of which used largely the same yard, tools and components such as, where appropriate, for the LST and the LCT. The issue of changing the design of the programme was raised in Quebec. Admiral King said that tentatively explored the possibility of stopping production of the tank submarines and their replacement vyloďovacími vessels, which their production could according to first estimates, pick up about 25 percent. Planners reported that the increase in production will take effect after 1. April 1944. Other estimates then pointed to the possibility of further increase in certain types of landing craft, but with the decisions to the decision-makers were on time. In the meantime, they searched for reserves in the Mediterranean and in the training units. Experimented also with the possibilities of increasing the load capacity. Anyway, the situation regarding the vessels remained tense, however, was no longer so critical. Still, however, threatened the possibility of shipment of units according to tactical needs.

a Question of command


For the planners were the following months after the quebec conference full of frustrations. Order to review again the strength of the attack is built before the apparently unanswerable question of the number of landing vessels. But even harder was to execute the next command. He ordered to continue with the planning and preparations for OVERLORD. But, what does this mean? Its original task, i.e. to explore the possibility of conducting an invasion across the Channel in a certain size and at a specific date, Morgan has fulfilled. Continue planning would mean to develop a detailed tactical plan. However, it was not a task feasible with a small staff, which served as a mere embryo of the later headquarters of the supreme commander of the allied expeditionary force. It could just do the command with direct control of the operations, i.e. the headquarters of the corps, armies and groups of armies. Instructed from Quebec actually meant to initiate and coordinate the tactical planning. But that would require the executive powers. But Morgan was actually the chief of the planning group, i.e. without the command function. Plus, he had a relatively low rank. After a long period of time was but a sort of shadow commander. Kombinovaní chiefs of staff made him temporarily responsible for "performing the steps necessary to implement the" plans COSSACu until it established the supreme commander. Morgan had the support of the combined chiefs, but he couldn't make command decisions. But back then, it was necessary to make one important command decisions - how will be organized the command structure of ground forces during the attack on the beach and during the following stages of the battle of Normandy.

The basic principle was clear, and resulted from the conclusions adopted during the ARCADIA - each theater of war should be one of the main allied commanders. However, another structure has not been precisely defined. A preliminary plan OVERLORDu assumed the tactical mission task of the grouping in the strength of the army and composed of members of the armed forces of several states. It was, therefore, clear, that will have to be established a single headquarters for all ground units, which will be in charge during the landing phase. Functional cooperation was required since the aim was one thing in common the bridgehead and moreover expect, that the enemy will attempt to counterattack just to the contact points between units of different nationalities in the expectation that this will be a weak spot. Of military and political reasons it was necessary to take on landing involved american and british troops. Some experience offering landings at Salerno, where he was a british corps subordinate to the u.s. army. Planners but by way of the joint tactical headquarters to go didn't want to. They suggested that there was one american division deployed on the right flank of the attack and two british on the left. These three divisions then should odléhat the british commander of the army. Once on the continent, established one of the u.s. army, passed would command over all ground forces in the hands of the commander of the british army group, which would perform their operational management up to the cast of Brittany or the establishment of the american army group. The initial british command, it had its origin in the assumption that the main commander would be British and that the british commander will be easier due to the fact that they were setting out from british bases.

But planning is one thing and decision making second. Kombinovaní chiefs while the outline plan of OVERLORD accepted without changes, but that didn't mean that Morgan won with its proposal to the command structure. This issue was referred to the time after the appointment of the commander in chief. Morgan but insisted on a settlement of the question, since procrastination could jeopardise the timetable of the preparations. Moreover, it turns out that even faster is the need to resolve the establishment of the commander of the allied tactical air forces. The coordination of planning was commissioned by air marshal Leigh-Mallory, but the commander was not appointed. The british sent their proposals to the Americans with requests for comments. The americans but were reluctant to decide, since it was considered the thing that you should decide the commander in chief, to be appointed. In general, it was assumed that it will be American, and the main candidate was considered to be general Marshall. Thus, americans believed that will be enforced by their view of the thing. In this issue eventually, because there was another principal conflict. While the front of the british political and military leaders like encroaching to his commanders and to the relatively detailed things, the Americans to their commanders to provide the highest possible degree of autonomy. Their method consisted in entering the general constraints, and task, the commander was then, how it performs.

The americans did not agree with the fact that their division and smaller units should be subordinated to the british command. Also mind, that the british proposals from the commander in chief's operational control in the initial stages of the invasion. General devers was proposed that the divisions were controlled by british and american forces, which would have been subordinated to the chief commander through his forward command post. COSSAC argued that the main headquarters is not planned as a tactical headquarters, therefore, will not be equipped to address the detailed issues that normally deals with the headquarters of the army. The main commander also would have been difficult at the same time to drive all the hugely extensive surgery and a course of forward deployed ground forces on the beaches. The american side is still trying to carve out for the commander in chief at least some degree of direct control over the landings, however Deversův proposal was modified so that now counted with the army command, which should be american. The us Department of war was envisaged around with this organizational process: the away team on the beaches and their surroundings under the direct control of the commander in chief to drive the commander of the american 1. army, whose forces could consist of airborne units of the british corps, american corps and the canadian corps, with each corps had in the offensive stage of plant one division. Then, what would the individual councils were supplemented by the division of other sequences should be established, the british army headquarters. At the same time creating headquarters 21. the group of armies. The commander in chief would then ground troops drove through the army group, respectively, of the two armies. After the arrival of another american army should be american 1. a group of armies, which was to take over the management of all us forces. As regards the subsequent stages, not Morgan's reservations, but he still didn't seem that would be the commander in chief had the right to interfere in the course of landing. Besides, he really didn't understand what that actually Americans exactly represent. The solution, therefore, was that each other to explain what they mean. The best was illustrated by the landings at Salerno, where the commander in chief influenced the course of the landing of the change in the deployment of air force and navy.

Another contentious point was the inclusion of a strategic bomber of the air force. The americans suggested that he was the main commander from the point of view of air operations responsible for the whole area of Germany. The british however, argued that the subordination of the british Headquarters of bomber command air force and u.s. 8. the air army's main commander is impractical and unnecessary. Their operation should, according to them, continues to sponsor kombinovaní chiefs, who had only temporarily allocate the necessary part of the strategic forces for the needs of the general headquarters of the expeditionary force. Americans on it but pushed with the argument that it is inconceivable that the commander in chief did not have all the forces that are needed to perform the operation. This thing has not been resolved and was deferred to a later time. First, it was necessary to resolve the question of the tactical air force. Although Americans have long been reluctant to proceed to issue a directive to the commander of the tactical air force to it in the future could free ourselves from our hands the main commander, eventually it did at the beginning of November. Directive it pověřovala the creation of a unified headquarters of the tactical air force, which should be subordinate to the principal chief. AEAF was established 15. November and taken control of the british 2nd. a tactical air army and the Command of defence of Great Britain. The date of taking over control of the american 9. the air force was provisionally set at 15. December.

Directive to the commander of the AEAF was originally to be annexed to the directive for the supreme commander expeditionary forces, but that has failed the western Allies to agree and resolve the issue postponed to January 1944. Meanwhile, in December, in Cairo at least, were able to agree on the person of the commander in chief - he was appointed general Eisenhower, the former commander in the Mediterranean. He was informed in mid-December and to England arrived in mid-January. In February, for him, was drawn up directive, which was relatively brief, as it did not address the disputed points, and it contained just what both sides could agree on. Conflict points, such as control of the strategic air force, have been postponed to a later discussion, and should be based on the requirements of the commander in chief. The appointment of general Eisenhower ended the almost annual period of uncertainty which was beginning to threaten the preparations of the invasion, as it started to pile up questions that needed to be solved and their solution is expected is on the appointment of the commander in chief. Casablanca informally suggested that the commander of the Brit. But it covered the invasion of 1943, in which the British played a significantly greater role than it was at the invasion in 1944. In addition to Eisenhower in this role proven successful in the Midlands. In the case of the american commander initially included with general Marshall, but Roosevelt didn't want to release because he felt that he has no adequate replacement.

While at the highest level talked about the basic principles, began the establishment of the higher command levels. At the beginning of the summer, the British created the skeleton of its tactical headquarters, intended for OVERLORD. It was the british 2. army, canadian 1. the army and 21. a group of armies. The highest u.s. tactical headquarters in the Uk back then was In. choir. Commander of us army forces in Europe, devers was, together with Morgan, he urged the war Department to set up u.s. army headquarters, which both began with detailed planning of the relevant part of the invasion, both helped to persuade the Germans that the invasion is already in 1943. Successful they were but at the end of August, when he was the army commander with effect from 7. September appointed general Bradley, that the Kingdom has arrived 20. September. The question of the establishment of the headquarters of the army group was postponed to a later date. The preparatory work should be carried out by Bradley at the same time with their respective responsibilities, the commander of the army. Deversovy proposals on the interconnection of the functions of the headquarters of the army group and army headquarters forces in Europe, which was chiefly an administrative degree, Marshall rejected. American 1. army group was set up to 16. October. The first task of this headquarters was operational planning under the supervision of ETOUSA. This activity of the army group and army should gradually move under the management of COSSACem. At that time, however, it was agreed, that the american 1. the army will manage the activities of all american forces in the attack on the beach, while the overall command of these units during the attack and the early stages of strengthening the forces in the bridgehead will be entrusted to british 21. the group of armies, which will be planted earlier than the american group of armies, and in addition participated in the planning activities COSSACu. The american army group will happen on the continent, operating up to the minute, when there will be two of the u.s. army. Directive for action 21. the group of armies was released, already under the banner of the main headquarters, at the end of November. He wrote it to general Morgan, after consultation with general Marshall. 21. army group was tasked with participation in the planning, together with the commander allied naval and air expeditionary forces, and subsequently making the land part of the invasion until it comes to the establishment of the american army group. The commander of the 21. army group so in the initial stages of work as commander of all ground forces, but since the establishment of the american army group no longer. The situation of the army differed from the air force and the navy, which was envisaged at the next stage with one representative of the commander in chief. It's like reducing the prestige of the army at the expense of the two remaining weapons. In the Midlands there was one commander of the ground forces, but the battlefield here was territorially and numerically limited, so he was de facto commander of the army group. The question of the appointment of the ground commander dealt with internally in the Wasnhingtonu. Due to the fact that the commander-in-chief was American, it would be logical that it was even the commander of the ground units. But the american side did not have a suitable candidate, which could due to combat experience to compete with Montgomery or Alexander. Washington therefore this question did not need to address.
On this basic tracing command structure, nothing has changed even after the expansion of the assault phase of the operation from three to five divisions. the attack should lead the american and the british army under the control of the 21. the group of armies led by Montgomery, who thus became the de facto commander of the ground forces.

Cairo and teheránská conference


At the end of October the situation was in Italy a good. The allies had 11 divisions and by the end of January so expect a strengthening in the 16 to 17 divisions. The germans oppose them 9 divisions, which could be strengthened further 15, which were located more to the north. The allies thus face the possibility that they fail to keep step in the strengthening of the troops, and theoretically there could even lose. Eisenhower feared that he might be able to break through to Rome, but his units will be so weakened that it can't keep. On the other hand, but he couldn't remain standing on the south in front of him, because his cast was an important symbol, the airport to the north of it had great military value and it was necessary before OVERLORDem to keep the initiative on your side to get the Germans could move troops to Normandy, which would have wrecked the main declared sense of the whole Italian action. The only option under Eisenhower was to make another invasion of the sea into the flanks of the German defences on the peninsula. The british fully supported, particularly in delaying the transfer of landing craft to the Mediterranean to Britain, even at the cost of postponing the OVERLORDu. Washington replied, that the situation is not so serious, and previously in addition, there was agreement that the OVERLORD is the principal means of the defeat of Germany. However, the relatively minor question of when to transport landing craft, sparked another debate on allied strategy. Regarding the vessels themselves has been agreed compromise, Eisenhower could have until mid-December to leave the sixty-LST designed for the evacuation to England in mid-November.
The british after the fall of Italy tried to occupy the Dodecanese islands, but the action failed and further attempts were postponed because withdrawing too many forces from Italy, but the whole action was not completely abolished. You could therefore expect, that the British this question again pitches. And therefore, he expected that success in this area could convince the Turks to enter the war on the side of the Allies. Such action would obviously also had great support of the Soviets, because it could siphon off forces from the eastern front. To these three factors still contributed a factor of the rate of advance of the soviet troops and the impression that the allied bombing offensive of strongly undermining German morale. Some of the agents it seemed that the setbacks on the eastern front, and the difficulties caused by the raids approaching Germany to the state in 1918. It seemed to them that will instead of OVERLORDu need to start to think about the design of RANKINu. If it was the fall of Germany, was, according to the British preferable to strengthen the Mediterranean and avoid the invasion in France, which could come in very expensive. The americans thought most of the factors for too a good sight. The only thing that to them should, where appropriate, the importance of, would be a change of the soviet position. You still insisted on opening a second front in northwest Europe and the Mediterranean considered to be equivalent or sufficient compensation. It was therefore a question of how it sees Moscow.

In October british and american soldiers and diplomats visited Moscow. Marshal Voroshilov brought up three issues. The preparation of the US and the uk in 1943 for the invasion of Europe, the effort to engage Turkey into the war, and efforts to induce Sweden to provide air bases. Generals Deane and Ismay to the first point stated by the conclusions of the Quebec and assured the Soviets that the decision on the implementation of OVERLORDu is still valid. The soviets accepted it, push on determining precision data and the calm is left and information about a possible delay. It seemed that the Soviets no longer have due to their achievements on the front of the opening of the second queue such interest and that he would rather have welcomed more immediate assistance. Indeed, Molotov complained that the western Allies are not, despite their large resources, in Italy not strong enough, allowing the Germans to postpone the division on the eastern front. General Dean got the impression that the Russians can push on the strengthening of the pressure in Italy and maybe even the invasion of the Balkans. Washington warned to be ready for it, that the Soviets might have such a requirement to raise at the forthcoming tehran conference.

Prospects for implementation OVERLORDu under the plan, the u.s. joint chiefs of staff, when they were on their way to Cairo for the first meeting with the British before the negotiations with the Soviets, apparently, did not seem completely clear. According to the us ambassador in Britain, John Winanta considered the British about the condemnation of OVERLORDu, but were against setting a hard date. Wanted the surgery done at the right moment, and this was long ahead it is difficult to estimate. Failure to Dodekanésu Churchill just confirmed that the Germans are not so weak and that would, moreover, be able to move units faster than previously expected. The british still doubted whether it is appropriate to determine the date of the invasion just depending on the termination of their own preparation, regardless of the status of the German army. Rather they would expect to be sufficiently weak. The conference then Churchill asked for some flexibility, in order to expedite operations in the Mediterranean. The elasticity should lie in the postponement of the OVERLORDu about five to six weeks. During that time proposed the implementation of further drops in Italy and Rhodes. The british chiefs then specifically designed to advance in Italy to the line Pisa-Rimini, to support the partisans in Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania, induce Turkey to enter the war and open a supply route through the Strait into the USSR. These actions and their impact according to them, worth a possible delay in the Normandy. The americans agreed with the discussions about these plans. While they haven't changed the opinion about the primary position OVERLORDu, but the adoption of these proposals as a basis for negotiations with the Soviets meant that when adopting final decision would take into account soviet views. It is already in, nothing has changed and the negotiators went to Tehran.

The main objective of the tehran conference was the acquaintance with the soviet view on strategic issues. Stalin right at the beginning described all the essential components of soviet strategy in relation to the western powers. After the defeat of Germany was the USSR involved in a war with Japan. He welcomed the anglo-american successes in Italy, however, for the crucial consider the attack in northwestern France. Insights of general Dean is then shown to be odd. The americans were surprised, but pleased. Churchill was trying to figure out whether the USSR accepted the postponement of the OVERLORDu about a month or two for the price of that operation in the eastern Mediterranean would have lightened the Soviet union. Stalin replied that it was according to him for the delay is not worth it. Very on the contrary, he was interested in mentioned the landing in the south of France. He perceived it not only as a support attack, but on the contrary, as the second arm of large pliers, which was a favorite soviet tactic. This Stalin's interest caught the western Allies unprepared. They could just convey to that do not yet have a more detailed survey, as it only works. The aim was apparently to avoid setting a fixed date, because the planners have worked a large amount of work. Was not mentioned nor Eisenhower's negative opinion on the operation of concerns about a lack of resources. The soviet view was thus clear: to take place in may, landing in Normandy and the south of France. On the contrary, actions in the Mediterranean considered it just for the support. About the possibility of Turkey's entry into the war very much doubted and did not consider him as not significantly important. Stalin pointed out that it would be appropriate as soon as possible to appoint the commander in chief. Stalin and Churchill agreed, that he should choose Roosevelt.

When the western Allies met again in Cairo, it wasn't due to the course of the tehran conference the postponement of the OVERLORDu on the agenda. But it made no difference that persisted one major problem, which has been increasingly on the intensity - how to ensure funds for the almost simultaneous landings on the two French coasts. Planners propočetli that the landing craft was available for only one assault division and less than a division in the second echelon. Churchill but demanded the withdrawal of the at least two offensive divisions. Planners have proposed to convert to ANVIL, the monthly allocation of vessels for the Pacific, which was 26 LST and 26 LCT and add 5 LCT from OVERLORDu. He got about 24 LCT more than was expected in Quebec, so the loss of five ships should not be a major hurdle. Anyway, he was started the process of shifting of vessels between areas, sometimes unfortunately, just paper. One of the possible sources of a landing craft was the British proposed the cancellation of the proposed landing on the Andaman islands (operation BUCCANEER). The americans finally agreed to a limitation of the attack in half. Excess vessel was sent to England. Admiral King was concerned about the increasing tendency to perceive the Pacific as a pool of resources for the european theater of war. However, due to the lack of landing craft and the importance of the operations OVERLORD and ANVIL, which should be the main events of the year 1944, it was inevitable considered as a reservoir of forces for the european theater of war all other areas. Indeed, general Marshall ordered all headquarters, that any vessel with which it must be released for Europe. All of these movements have brought 26 LST, 24 LCI(L) and 64 LCT for OVERLORD and 41 LST, 31 LCI(L), 3 XAP, and 6 LSI(L) for the ANVIL. It was a pretty decent increase, but as they grew and requirements with how planners detailing rozpracovávali the individual components of the landings.

Command structure established


General Eisenhower arrived 14. January 1944 in London and he took over his new function from the commander in chief of the allied expeditionary force. With his arrival came the preparations for the invasion of the new pace, as it recently fell off another of the uncertainties, moreover, at a time when it was clear that the OVERLORD will be. Now, therefore, there was a person directly responsible for the success of the operation, which should at the same time, the relevant powers. Eisenhower and his people could draw from a huge number of paid staff work. In Britain at the time also was already half of the projected u.s. troops and more were on the way. The american higher headquarters has also been set up. 23. October 1943 took over the american 1. army general omar Bradley to the operating management of the american forces in the United kingdom. In the same month arrived the headquarters of the VII. the choir, which was immediately subordinated to 1. army. The ground troops had during the first phases of the operation control 21. a group of armies. At the beginning of January at its head stood the general Montgomery, who succeeded general Paget. Montgomery's chief of staff, general Guingand conducted a reorganization of staff of the army group and the number of positions occupied by officers of the 8. army.

At the beginning of the year was set up and command structure of the u.s. navy for the OVERLORD. In January he was still his highest representative in Europe, admiral Stark in command of the american navy in Europe (ComNavEu), which perform administrative management of various task force in Europe, and administrative components in the Uk. In September 1943 there was a consolidation of all naval forces in Europe under the newly established 12. the fleet, led once again with admiral Stark. While a number of things easier, but still it wasn't sufficient. In order to control the operations and training established a Task force 122 with rear admiral Kirk in the lead. Next came 11. amphibious group rear admiral Hall and the Headquarters of landing craft and bases in Europe, rear admiral Wilkes. Admiral Stark had as ComNavEu in charge of the coordination of the american naval preparations for the invasion with ETOUSA and COSSAC and as commander of the 12. flot was responsible for the allocation and operation of training devices for training and conduct of operations. Hall task force was guided by the training, preparation and operation of all of the local american naval forces. Before she was 5. may 1943, for the purpose of management planning works set up features of the commander of the allied naval expeditionary force. 25. October replaced the admiral of the Little admiral Ramsay. The operating control of american naval forces but took up to 1. April 1944, and even then it remained his superiority more or less formal until just before the invasion. Ramsay was tasked mainly to coordinate the planning work. The aviation plan worked Leigh-Mallory's AEAF, which at the same time guided by the already ongoing air strikes of the tactical air force. The question of the strategic bomber the air force has not yet been resolved.

The american troops were in Britain to arrive fully trained, but the planned amphibious assault had a variety of specifics, which were the division ready. And sometimes even could not, because the appropriate tactical and technical procedures are yet to evolve. The british in this area have experimented since the year 1940 under the Command of combined operations. After April 1942 were involved in this and american officers. The specifics of the Channel, and scope of operation necessitated the establishment of the training centre for the american troops. Find a suitable space was not easy, however, in April 1943 the centre was headed by lieutenant colonel Thompson created and in September to Woolacombe arrived the first men on the training. The centre has been through most of the american troops intended for the invasion attack. The exception was those, which have gained combat experience in North Africa and Sicily.

On the contrary, still remained unresolved, a number of fundamental questions, such as, for example, the strength of the initial attack, or whether to disembark in daylight or in the dark. From Casablanca, it was clear that the only workable plan can sketch out only those who according to him, then they will proceed. So arose the COSSAC as the embryo of the future supreme headquarters. It took several attempts, as Morgan grant at least a partial command authority, but none of it worked. After the publication of the preliminary plan OVERLORDu in July, 1943, so he wasn't COSSAC able to continue in the tactical planning, as there has already been necessary to proceed from the decision, which could not be done without a commander. In January 1944, therefore, after a certain length of time gave Eisenhower, Montgomery, Leigh-Mallory and Ramsay and their staffs to work on the elaboration of the plans. We could fortunately rely on a large number of studies of individual problems, which greatly facilitate and accelerate the work.

Debate the ANVIL-OVERLORD


It was clear that the plan from July of 1943 will have to undergo changes, mainly it will be necessary to strengthen the assault phase. COSSAC have already examined the consequences of adding additional units or extension of the queue, no conclusion was reached. Indeed, the general Morgan plan or rewrite couldn't, because COSSAC work on the basis of the directive of the combined chiefs, as well as the resources in terms of manpower and resources. The change did not have sufficient powers. When he was appointed commander-in-chief and COSSAC from the planning staff turned into its headquarters, formally there was only the aforementioned plan. Informally but planners worked with the idea of a wider action. They believed that if there will be enough vessels, it will be possible to carry out the initial attack of four divisions and one as the floating backup. But it wasn't written into the form of a specific plan, it was just about the considerations. Processing of the new plan now was the responsibility of general Eisenhower and his chief of staff, general Smith.

When the main army planner COSSACu general McLean 3. January met Montgomery and Smith with the current plan OVERLORDu, wasn't Monty satisfied. He didn't like that the front is too narrow and the number of vessels he also didn't seem. In the following days there were discussions, from which emerged the attack of the five divisions at the front from the Cabourgu after Les Dunes-de-Varreville on the Cotentinu. American 1. the army should attack on the right flank, the british 2. the army on the left. The boundaries between them should take place at Bayeux. Monty also stressed the need for the corps and the army operated on its own line and crawl through the bridgehead established by another command, since this would entail a complication of the administrative and logistical nature. Wider front znesnaďnovala the Germans orientation in allied intentions and facilitate the exit of the beaches and the breakthrough from the beachhead. Landing on the Cotentinu would significantly speed up the cast of Cherbourg. His profit given greater importance than the planners. Not all of his requests were immediately incorporated. But at least he managed to push through the strengthening of the attack on five divisions. It wasn't without resistance. Most of the major staff officers - Morgan, McLean, Barker - was to strengthen the attack, but did not seem to them a too great extension of the queue. Operating officer, general West was against out of concern about the dilution of limited resources. The concerns they were expressing also the staff officers of the air force and the navy. Morgan was still glad the problem at least started to address.

Planners were given the task of continuing the revision of the plan. He had to count with the attack by five divisions from the sea and one from the air. You should assume that they will be available to additional vessels and aircraft. As a source for additional transport capacity to logically offered the Mediterranean. Displacement of resources, but made it impossible to perform the Anvil. Smith already 5. January conveyed to Eisenhower to Washington, Montgomery proposes to not count with the Anvil as concurrent operations to OVERLORDu in the expected form of attack in three divisions. As a threat says more than enough attack to one division. Smith saying that he, Morgan and other planners agree with it. Planners have argued that the area of the Anvil is too distant from the main battlefield from the German vital military targets, so it cannot be assumed that there would have deployed such a large number of units that it had a greater impact on the operation in Normandy. Eisenhower agreed with the expansion of the OVERLORDu, but he did not agree with the fact that the ANVIL will have the same effect with one division as a three. Before the termination of the debates on the ANVIL planners have calculated the increase in the necessary resources for an expanded OVERLORD. And also the implications that will have for the place from which the cage will slide up. To obtain the necessary vessels, it was necessary to return to Britain, half of the vessels for dvoudivizní ANVIL. Date OVERLORDu will have to be postponed by one month, to be able to count on additional monthly production of the vessels in the shipyards. The number of vehicles for one division had to be reduced to 2 500 pieces. The extended line would require eight additional fighter squadrons. The transport of the entire airborne divisions instead of three-quarters of the division meant to get 200 trasportních aircraft. From the point of view of the vessels was a need for additional 72 LCI(L), 47 LST and 144 LCT.

Eisenhower, these outlets presented a week after his arrival in London combined chiefs. The postponement of his British and the Americans agreed. There was even a chance that in June will be better weather on the eastern front, which facilitate the activities of the Red army, which would have further exacerbated the German position. On the Anvil, the situation was more complicated. The british chiefs of the air force and the navy Portal and Cunningham suggested to carry out the ANVIL in the strength of the two divisions, as it saw in him a useful support attack. On the contrary, Churchill the importance of the Anvil questioned. British opinion then was against the Anvil still more lukewarm. Americans still thought of the landing in the south of France for the only means of how to effectively deploy the american and French divisions in the Mediterranean and how to draw part of the German division of the space OVERLORDu. Limited ANVIL would, according to them, so the maximum retained on the site of the already present German troops. On the ANVIL is additionally agreed in Tehran with Stalin. The americans, including Eisenhower, thought the OVERLORD and ANVIL as essentially parts of the same operation. Weaken one to strengthen the other and therefore didn't seem logical. The Role of the so, it seemed, exchanged. Now, paradoxically, Americans like used Mediterranean of greater importance than the British. But it was only seeming. The british only responded to the jam of the allied forces in Italy, which failed to translate the landings at Anzio in the gain of the new rate, and were looking for opportunity, how to present units to strengthen further landings in the strength of one division. The americans had nothing against the determined procedure in Italy. However, everything will be revolved around to what extent should the strategic decision-making and planning to wait for the developments on the battlefield. General Marshall claimed, that the planning and preparations for ANVIL should be continued. In the event that the Allies in April, didn't get to the area north of Rome, was to be the ANVIL canceled. If he was but odpískán now, it would be at the turn of spring and summer make, even if for it there were suitable conditions.

The main problem was to provide enough vessels for the OVERLORD. The american Ministry of war has promised machines for the attack of four divisions from the sea and one from the air. But the problem was where to get more transport capacity for the fifth assault division, and also for four armored brigades, or their equivalent, five of the regiments self-propelled artillery, coastal group, a unit of the air force and the navy, and for two-thirds of one druhosledové division, which had to be transported in vessels loaded according to the tactical needs for the possibility of its instantaneous orientation. The rest of the second echelon, i.e. one entire division and a third of another, should be transported with regard to the economics of the place, saying that his involvement in the fighting was to be expected only during the D+2. At the same time, therefore it was necessary to load a total of 174 of 320 of men and 20 018 vehicles of different types. A large part of formed units outside the division of the assembly, whose conditions match the roughly two and a half divisions. The result of negotiations at the headquarters of SHAEF in the Norfolk House during the week from 13. February was the compromise plan the use of vessels. SHAEF first proposed to reduce the existing allocation of 1 LSI(H), 48 LST and 51 LCI(L), which would mean the loss of 21 560 men and 2 520 vehicles. It should be replaced by transfer of the vessels of the APA, which should carry even vehicles, using the vessels AKA in the initial stage and finding additional 27 LCT. The plan was subsequently modified in exchange 6 AKA 20 LST and 21 LCI(L) between Britain and the Mediterranean, since a large cargo vessel to use more for the calmer southern waters. ANVIL could theoretically be carried out by two divisions, but it wasn't at all certain whether the commander in chief in the Mediterranean Wilson will accept the loss of tactical flexibility, which would be the exchange of specialized vessels for ships AKA brought. In addition, still missing around 15 LST. Eisenhower asked about the allocation of a minimum of seven other LST of the new production. The rest want to catch up, primarily on the transfer of LST, which should arrive during the third tidal waves, i.e. the morning of D+1.

Planners 21. army group a compromise plan subjected to criticism. According to them, just staring at the logistical side of things and ignored the tactical. For example, have pointed out that it was not calculated with separate vessels for the units of commandos and rangers, which had to arrive on their own boats, which but do not make use of the whole capacity but it's not from tactical reasons to use for other purposes. Also the backups would not be possible to transport loaded from the point of view of tactical. Here it was necessary to be loaded straight into vessels from which they will disembark on the beach, instead of wasting precious time in the initial stage. The increase in the proportion of men at the expense of the equipment in the assault phase then mean the loss of combat power and mobility, which would lead to delays and congestion on the beaches, which in turn would have slowed down the establishment of the bridgehead. And let the ships partially unloaded to wait for the arrival of the ships with vehicles produces a disproportionate risk for ships and transported by man. Eisenhower issues recognized, but the risk to him was acceptable if it meant the feasibility of Anvil. Montgomery put up with that and a modified plan was submitted to the british chiefs of staffs. You with a compromise plan, use of the vessels did not agree. According to them, is prejudicial to the OVERLORD and ANVIL. Moreover, it was due to the development in Italy, uncertain whether ever it will be possible to disembark in the south of France to take place. Move a total of ten divisions to the south of France would mean that Italy would have remained only twenty divisions for local fights and any other operations in the Mediterranean. The hope of making the Anvil so strongly declined, although Eisenhower's belief about its feasibility still did not give up. With Birty at least agreed, that although Italy is a must have in the Mediterranean a priority, will be developed and plans for further action in the Mediterranean, primarily on the ANVIL in its original planned form. Wilson had to release 20 LST and 21 LCI(L) for the OVERLORD in exchange for 6 AKA for the ANVIL. The exchange was scheduled for April, however, 20. march should still come to the final review. If, therefore, it was clear that the hope on the ANVIL are slim, should be vessels for the transport of one division moved from the Mediterranean to Britain. It eventually agreed military and political leaders of the two countries.

Eisenhower gradually changed the view and was still more convinced of the impracticability of the Anvil. Wanted to match on its cancellation or postponement, which would bring more certainty in the planning OVERLORDu. At the same time Wilson drew attention to the problems at Anzio and demanded delaying the transfer of vessels to the Uk. The debate but for some time did not lead to a consensus. And Eisenhower stood gazing still with more concern on the lack of vessels for the OVERLORD. This uncertainty greatly disrupts the process of preparing detailed plans. The american chiefs of staff concluded that, in Italy, is not a breakthrough, that would be the end of the month allowed the process to Rome. Hope on the implementation of the Anvil in parallel with the OVERLORDem is close to zero. 21. march Eisenhower recommended that the ANVIL was not carried out in parallel with the OVERLORDem. This recommendation was adopted and was directed to the movement of landing craft from the Mediterranean to England. Commander OVERLORDu so acquired enough vessels to carry out the operation..
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Organization planning


With the decision about the landing in north-west France was linked to the need to rebuild forces in England, after their decisive part was drained to the Midlands. It covered the material, command and planning cadres, which formed the Headquarters of the allied forces (AFHQ) lieutenant general Eisenhower. The retained function of the commander of american forces in Europe (ETOUSA), although the practical performance of this function commissioned his deputy major general Hartleho. In the summer of 1943 was the department of AFHQ and ETOUSA. In February was the new commander of forces in Europe, appointed lieutenant general Andrews. The territory of its scope, occupied the whole of Europe without the Balkans the Apennine and the Iberian peninsula. Andrews then had a considerably prořídlými forces. Before the invasion in Africa was in the Uk, approximately 190 thousand men. From the perspective of the units, three infantry division and one armoured. Three of them were sent to Africa. It was about 150 thousand men. In Europe, although arrived a new backup, however in February it was in the Uk, only approximately 110 thousand members. A further increase was not precipitous. Until the fall of 1943 was on the islands only 29. infantry division. TORCH has also affected the strength of the air force. 8. army aviation and just worked their attack power, when she had to surrender about half of the aircraft and part of the key personnel, including the commander of the major general Spaatze, in favor of the newly established 12. the air army. In addition, lost priority in the supply of reinforcements, supplies and new machines. The total number of stock transported from the USA to Britain dropped from September's 240 thousand tons to 20 thousand tons in February. Construction forces on the BOLERO began slowly gaining pace, but at September's numbers is the flow got up to in July.

Meanwhile, the continued planning of the Roundup. In Casablanca, although it was agreed the establishment of a combined planning staff, however, the work not too fast, did not continue. In Casablanca, unfortunately, have not been specified in detail in the task and form the new staff. Wording that is supposed to work under the guidance of the chief of staff for the yet unnamed supreme commander of the inject that the planners are the spawn command, which then takes over the management of operations. The conclusions also stated that for several months already existed a special mezispojenecký crew, who worked on the plans for the attack across the Channel. This staff should be reorganized in accordance with the new needs and should be reinforced by american personnel. Together then should planners work under the guidance of the supreme commander or his deputy, until he is appointed, and in conjunction with the seed of his combined staff in London. But it was in fact just a collection of working notes of the Combined chiefs of staff.
In march, the British and the Americans agreed to form a new staff. So far, but it was not clear, when will this crew set up and what will have responsibilities in the area of planning. The british suggested not to rush, as on the islands was not too many us forces, therefore you just need the current planning activity and it is not expedient to allocate the necessary senior officers from the existing instances. Instead, they suggested that he was appointed chief of staff, which would have the task of coordinating the planning work. It was appointed lieutenant-general Morgan. With his appointment as the Americans agreed, but the opinion about the suitability of restricted activities. Therefore, another debate among the major western Allies. Gradually it became clear, that in the year 1943 to the invasion does not occur. Planners now need to concentrate on, to the German analysts znesnadnili estimate of allied intentions for the rest of the year. It was also the only basic change made during months of discussions. The dispute has also led on the date of the invasion. From Casablanca to derive only the year 1944 without further specification. March directive to specify the spring of 1944. The british wanted to clarification about the spring to remove, but the Americans refused. They finally settled on the wording, that it occurs in 1944, at the earliest possible date.

The new directive of the Combined chiefs of staff were released in April, has been a new organization in the running. Morgan was in march said that whether the agreement will be any, he will be the main person responsible for the planning of the attack across the Channel. Received a folder of planning files and should draw up recommendations on the form, what should the crew have. Due to the fact that at that time it was assumed that the supreme commander will be a british officer, suggested Morgan's british organisation, headed by a british chief of staff. He had temporarily obtained power of attorney the future supreme commander. Staff should be the nucleus of a future allied headquarters. In this context, Morgan not recommend the establishment of some of the main british headquarters. On the contrary, called for the early establishment of the headquarters of the armies. Allied headquarters should work in the meantime, than the numbers of forces and means will enable the establishment of the headquarters of groups of armies, directly with the headquarters of the different armies. Allied staff had to be truly a unified whole without regard to nationality. Positions should be filled on the basis of ability, not according to the national criteria. Administrative issues however should be kept separately. Morgan also demanded for his crew the highest possible degree of autonomy, at least in the operating area. Basically, it can be stated that the proposed compact planning and coordination staff, with a maximum of freedom in the preparation of the invasion. Should be the integration of all military forces of both states. The crew set up in April 1943 in essence corresponded to Morgan's ideas. Referred to was as COSSAC, which was based on the name of Morgan's function - Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, i.e. the chief of staff of the supreme allied commander. The main officers of the staff met for the first 17. April. Morgan while immediately did not get the required powers, or unlimited control over all offensive actions taken from Britain, but it received enough power, so he could have entrusted the task to deal with. To his task he had rather actively. Didn't want to be just a planner, which produces only papers. He wanted to stimulate activity, although not all the necessary executive powers. Your staff perceived mainly as a coordinating body, not just planning staff, but the nucleus of the future staff of the high command. His model was the headquarters of marshal Foche at the end of the first world war - a small body of selected officers who identified the main features, while the day-to-day routine staff action to exercise the staffs of groups of armies.

The original COSSAC was divided into five sections - the army, navy, air, intelligence and administrative-logistics. Each section, except for the news, has been driven by two principal officers - British and American. At the forefront of the news was originally just a Brit. They were subordinate to the other staffs, divided vertically by nationality, and horizontally into sections responsible for the preparation of various plans, which had COSSAC instructed to prepare. The army section had two principal planners and a variety of other american and british officers in the three sections, who worked on the planning of OVERLORD (the invasion of northwest France), plan RANKIN (the plan for return to the continent in case of the collapse of Germany) and plan COCKADE (creating a threat that would bind most of the German divisions in the West). Further, there were three advisory sections. Maritime and aviation section had more or less similar in structure. A news section was divided into parts relating to the army, air force and navy. Within the administrative sections, these sub-components duplicated according to nationalities. The main planners coordinate activities of the section and then the results of the work presented COSSACu. Army, navy and air stretch draw the plan, a news section, added information about the enemy and the administrative section assessed the necessary resources. This section was also responsible for drawing up the administrative and logistical plans in the operating framework. This organization initially was sufficient, however, as gradually the tasks, grew the number of american actors and the crew began to still more change in the high command, began to be too unwieldy. When he was at the end of June appointed air marshal Leigh-Mallory the commander of the allied expeditionary air force, were american and british air component COSSACu merged. This integration process was indeed started earlier. A news section was from the very beginning, guided by one person and the administrative section had after a short time in head also just of one officer, british major general Brownjohna. In mid-July, Morgan ordered the establishment of the operating section with functionally grouped
sections that are not divided by nationality. Complete integration took place with the fall to the onset of major-general Barker to the position of deputy chief of staff. The announced the cancellation of all the division according to national criteria. Prefer to get a purely functional structure. COSSAC is still enlarged, although routine activities were largely delegated to the lower instance. But the scope of coordination activities is still growing, and until January 1944, when the crew finally recast in Chief of the allied headquarters. COSSAC had to provide the activities from the field of civil affairs or of the field of promotion and management of psychological warfare. But mainly he had to, he had to live up to our responsibilities, to take over the executive duties arising from the responsibility for invasive surgery. In the fall of 1943 took on the coordination of strikes and reconnaissance in northwest Europe so as to ensure their channelling to the invasion and diverznímu programme for the year 1943. A little later took over the same responsibility in the area of management of a guerrilla war and resistance movement in occupied Europe.

The british gradually formed its supreme command instance intended for the execution of operation OVERLORD. It was mainly about 2. army, 1. the canadian army, and 21. a group of armies. Into her forehead was built by general Paget, and took over from the Headquarters home defense all the planning, training and management functions in relation to the british expeditionary forces. Morgan with Pagetovým crew a close working relationship and delegated to him the detailed planning. Served him also as an advisory element for the deployment of any ground forces. It was based on the fact that Americans at that time did not have an adequate command of the land forces. The highest army operational hq in Uk hq In. corps. The us military in the activities of the COSSACu participated through the army headquarters for the european theater of war, i.e., ETOUSA. Organizationally, it was even so that, due to the absence of systematization issued by the Ministry of war for the american part of the COSSACu, american planners were there on business included in the planning section of the army's european headquarters and to COSSACu were formally only temporarily assigned. The commander of ETOUSA general Andrews and his successor, lieutenant general devers was at the planning actively participated, but they couldn't COSSACu provide an instance of the corresponding british headquarters of armies and groups of armies. This deficiency was removed in October, when it was in the England set up american 1. army. The british the Americans beat in the areas of navy and air force. At the beginning of may was Admiralty appointed to the functions of the capital of the british commander of the navy to the invasion commander at Portsmouth, admiral Little. The performed in parallel, both functions. In order to participate in the planning of the invasion, he was subordinated to the newly established special planning staff, referred to as the Naval staff (X), in the head with fregatním captain Hughes-Hallettem, who commanded the naval folder during the operation at Dieppe, and now became a member of the COSSACu. The american naval forces operating from the United kingdom at that time subject to admiral Stark, who held the post of commander of the naval forces in Europe. The corresponding operational instance was set up in the autumn, in the form of 12. flot rear admiral Kirk. Stark's command in the meantime had to coordinate the participation of the american navy for the invasion with ETOUSA and COSSACem. Stark sent out to COSSACu staff officers and liaison officers to the headquarters of admiral Little and also to Plymouth and Milford Haven, from which she had to hang out an american invading vessels. In the air force proposed in march, air marshal Portal, the establishment of a headquarters mixed group under the Command of the fighter air force, which was to find a suitable organization for operations over the continent and act as a command element in the event of a German collapse and an accelerated return to Europe. The group was set up in march and in June it grew back into 2. the tactical air army in the forefront with the aviation vicemaršálem d'Albiac. The american equivalent was formed in October by the establishment of 9. the air army.

the Size and form of an invasive attack


When he began to COSSAC to work, had available a large amount of experience and data collected during the two years of planning for the ROUNDUP and in smaller attacks across the Channel. The most important of these was the raid on Dieppe in August 1942. The operation is attended mostly by the Canadians, but were also british troops and american rangers. Was planned to Mountbattenově Headquarters of the combined operations and its objectives, was to test the techniques and tactics of a larger amphibious attack. It was actually about a little, vševojskovou invasion with landing of larger volumes of infantry and armored vehicles with a view to short-term occupancy of the bridgehead, but without any intention to this bridgehead for a longer time hold or develop. Tested was mainly the practicality of the small boat with the tanks and the option prevents the port a direct attack. The navy tried the management of an extensive invasive clusters, the air force again, winning air supremacy over the invasion areas and the provision of direct air support. The raid was carried out 19. August 1942, and from a tactical point of view it was a clear defeat. Strong resistance of the German defenders brought great losses and a planned withdrawal took place under circumstances very similar to the evacuation from Dunkirk. Of the more than 6 thousand men returned just 2.5 thousand. The rest died or was captured. From a strategic point of view but brought a number of very valuable insights - both for the tactics of amphibious operations, for planning the invasion. It turns out that it is necessary to perform a sufficient concentration of forces that could occur to the initial puncture of the outer defense perimeter. Probably also thanks to the experience of Dieppe occurred in the winter of 1942/43 to a certain change in the planning of the Roundup. Until now it was assumed that the attack on the French coast should be spread on a broad front, to avoid the concentration of German forces against one critical point with its subsequent destruction. In November 1942, general Barker and the chief british planner, general Sinclair on the thing looked from another angle. In the assessment of potential areas for major invasive surgery have focused on the possibility of concentration of forces. Abandoned the original idea of multiple separate plukovních drops and instead came up with a proposal on one main landing in an area that would allow for the next procedure and create a solid bridgehead. Sketched the necessary conditions. The area had to be within range of fighter planes operating from English airports, and had to include the airport or area allowing it to build up. The defensive elements on the beaches had to be reducible by the air bombing and naval bombardment, or the operations of the airborne or special forces. These defensive elements should of course be what the weakest, but even more important was the degree of expected success in their neutralization. The area with the high rocks or large zátopovými areas were completely out of the game. The area also had to allow for sufficiently rapid supply of additional forces and supplies for existing forces. It meant the possibility of rapid cast of the larger port. Near should be the next ports to be kept sufficient pace with an increase in forces. It was clear that the occupied ports will not be working fast enough, invading the beach, therefore, should be applicable also for the disembarkation of the material even in bad weather conditions. Important were also the conditions for the beaches. The area had from the capacity point of view to allow a sufficiently quick passage of forces and material. Decisive was not just the size of the beaches and the strength of their surface, but also the existence of adequate road infrastructure.

When they had established the main criteria, evaluate the planners of the individual areas. Neither did not satisfy perfectly all the conditions. The most she neared the area around the city of Caen. The netherlands had been dismissed, since it was outside the adequate range fighters, its beaches do not provide sufficient coverage, the sand dunes would complicate the movement, the road network up to standard and the area was easily zatopitelná. Even Belgium did not provide good conditions, the beaches here wasn't enough and, moreover, were small and the form of inappropriate. The German defense here would have to be much weakened, and the weather would have to be good at least for a period of one week, to be occupied by the ports of Dunkirk and Zeebrugge. However, the Germans here, on the contrary, had a strong crew. Neither the area of Pas-de-Calais was not appropriate. The beach here did not cover, were heavily defended and behind them were the heights with numerous emplacements of artillery. The beach had a few trips and ports of insufficient capacity. Even in the area of the Seine estuary were suitable beaches. Done here it was theoretically possible to just support the attack after the landing in Caen. In order to be used the ports of Le Havre and Rouen, they would have to be cleaned both banks of the Seine. These landings would but across the river they could not support each other, and could be gradually neutralized. Brittany had while sufficient port capacity, but overall has been written off as very inappropriate. The knockout method has stayed just the area around Caen. This did not meet the only condition sufficient port capacity. Considered, therefore, the main drop in Caen and supporting the away team on the peninsula of the Cotentin, with the subsequent cast of Cherbourg. Even that would be but from a longer-term point of view wasn't enough, so it was assumed the cast ports in Brittany or in the mouth of the Seine. The analysis was in march 1943 agreed and laid the foundation for the further planning of the invasion across the Channel. An immediate consequence was the preparation of a new sketch plan, which was the last thing worked out the Combined Commanders, before they handed over the planning activities of the newly established COSSACu. The new plan SKYSCRAPER reckoned with disembarkation in Caen and at the same time in the east Cotentinu four divisions in the first echelon and six in the second echelon. There should have been even eighteen sections of the commandos and four airborne divisions. After securing the beachhead, including Cherbourg, had to be cast to other ports. Plan prefer the ports in the Seine estuary, although it would probably require additional supporting landing northeast of Le Havre. After he had a procedure directed towards the northeast to Antverpám. This would the allied army settled in the area between the Pas-de-Calais and the ruhr-area.

The apparent aim of SKYSCRAPERu was the provision of standards in the field of the main problems, which must have been planning the invasion to contend with. It was all about big claims on power and resources. As the main critical factor was mentioned the lack of landing barges. The requirement for ten at the same time to be taken divisions was the minimum. Even this number will be able to contend just with forces present in the area of invasion. In the event that the Germans could move reinforcements, these forces would not be sufficient. It was therefore necessary to block the access route. SKYSCRAPER deliberately set the bar high, as it was an attempt to break up the aperture by a jumble of interconnected uncertainties laid on the planning of the Roundup. Planners pushed on making the final decision. To be able to prepare a plan for the invasion of western Europe, they had to all be fully aware of the need for funds and there had to be commitment is to create and provide. The postponement of the decision was according to the planners actually the decision on the failure to execute. The british chiefs of staff but checked by a vague concept of "decisive resistance" cannot be used as a criterion for determining an appropriate number of divisions attacking in the first and second sequence. However, despite this negative view was a range of ideas from the SKYSCRAPER was transferred to a OVERLORDu, as many planners went to COSSACu. However, resistance to the approach arising from the SKYSCRAPERu meant the necessity of finding a new approach. Morgan his staff said that it collects a lot of data, but has not been drawn up invasion plan worthy of the name. Planners should because of the time savings maximum make the current study, but the problem should be viewed as something new, as if yet, no plans have been drawn up. Morgan returned to the basic principles and created a broad strategic framework. The overall concept of counting with a large ground campaign culminating in the invasion and occupation of Germany by the forces of a total of hundreds of divisions. Start should the unit of the English and canadian armies concentrated in the southwest, which should add american units. The need of air cover meant that the attack had to be carried out on the left wing against the british forces. American troops should be cast into the bridgehead and then they curl towards the west through the british-canadian position and occupy the ports, which should be used for the adoption of the main masses of american troops that would be waiting for US on the instruction to move across the Atlantic. As this would mean mixing units, it was suggested a more appropriate solution. The Anglo-canadian bridgehead on the left wing as a cover, protecting the american procedure on the right wing to the west from the British. Anyway, the need of obtaining the ports meant that the initial advance will be directed towards the west and progress east in the direction of Germany will follow after. it Was clear that the invasion will have to be made in France. Deep enough ports with the appropriate capacity for the adoption of the masses of the american troops, although there were also in the area of Benelux, but I couldn't count with the fact, that such ports could be released units of the initial assault phase. Due to the proximity of Germany, these numerically weak units essentially alone, fought the battle of Germany with the pre-clear result.

the Lack of landing craft


At that time, was far from clear in which exactly the area to invasion will occur, nor whether the one or more drops. In large part, moreover, was contingent on the approximate extent of the surgery. While Morgan worked on a broader framework, his planners've examined that the precise numbers of men and ships. But it is back to the fundamental question faced by all those in front of them and solved. Namely: how to calculate the size of the attack. How to determine the necessary size? Their predecessors have worked with a number of ten divisions, four prvosledových and six druhosledových. Meanwhile, the ships and boats go back and start to bring in additional forces. The first ten divisions should be vyloděno during the first two days. The problem was that the only basis for the number of ten divisions was a feeling that a return to the continent will face a determined opposition and a smaller force would not achieve success. The british chiefs pointed out that the number of divisions can be derived from the vague notion of "determined opposition". But no better estimate was not available. Indeed, it was hard to estimate a year in advance, what will be the strength of the opponent. The only option was to take as a basis the existing state from the spring of 1943 and assumed the standard distribution of advances, assume that the Germans will improve the defense, and add hypothetical calculations on the basis of the logistics of the tables on the possibilities of the enemy as to the supply of reinforcements. However, even this calculation might be completely off, since there were too many unknowns, and for the year could total the image to radically change. Attempt to determine how the massive attack will be necessary, therefore, failed on the inability to realistically assess the vastness of the task. An alternative approach consisted in the fact that to compute just how massive the attack will be able to be due to the amount of funds available, and then assess what roughly could have such extensive operations about the success.

In may came the Hughes-Hallett with the idea, which required more detailed examination. In his opinion it was realistic to expect the assembly of such a quantity of landing craft that could transport four divisions. The fifth division could be prefabricated and be disembarked within 24 hours. However, the estimate of available ships was about as uncertain as an estimate of the necessary ships. Indeed, general Barker then wrote to general Handymu that the problem with securing the landing craft is a long-term obstacle that has not yet been in material terms, the resolved and in addition there is a need to overcome the psychological and political level. Barker feared that the lack of vessels could become an excuse for not going ahead with the invasion and Handyho asked for a clear opinion, that the US can produce and deliver enough of these vessels. But it was not so easy. The Idea of a wider deployment of specially designed landing craft in amphibious operations was so new that it hasn't even suffered universally accepted doctrine. There were even opinions that could use various substitutes in the form of a modified junks and river steamers. The us navy moreover, with this type of vessels started to experiment until 1937, and only in 1940 commissioned the first pieces. Great series but commissioned only in spring 1942. In the meantime, most of the peaks of the navy considered the development of such a vessel for the waste of resources that were needed elsewhere. The research was conducted in the Uk, which she began to experiment after the end of world war ii in connection with the arrival of the tanks. That couldn't be lifted from the ships intended for the infantry, as it required a boat with a ramp. In 1920 originated the barge, which neuvezl tank, but used for the carriage of vehicles between the naval ships and beaches. In 1938, moreover, the British developed a special boat designed for the withdrawal of the infantry, and in September 1939 entered the production of larger, but not massive series. Both types of vessels were produced firms engaged in the manufacture of smaller vessels and yachts, indeed, larger firms have been busy making large war and merchant vessels. The engines were imported from the USA. The vessel was primarily intended for different raids the units of the commandos. In June 1940 Churchill had personally ordered the development and production of landing craft able to carry three tanks. The first vessel was delivered in November 1940. I continued its development and in December 1941 could be awarded production model designed specifically for the French beaches. The vessel managed to kidnap even six tanks and could quickly produce in large batches. The british, moreover, in cooperation with the Americans, worked on the development of ships that would be capable of navigation by sea and at the same time discontinuation of the vehicles directly on the beach, which they after a time succeeded. The production of these ships took over the USA.

In the spring of 1942, the US began to with the program of mass production of landing craft for the invasion led across the Channel in 1943 in accordance with Marshall's memorandum. It wasn't that but it's far from without difficulty, rather the contrary. The navy lacked experience. This included the shipyards, which were completely utilized. Production then fell to smaller firms, which were located in rivers, so it was necessary to find and train a crew for the transport of ships to the atlantic ports. It provided the Coast guard, which with it but had no experience. An even bigger problem was the lack of material, especially of steel and engines. After the invasion of Africa were on the list of urgent items prefer escort destroyers and merchant ships. The number of new airborne vessels gradually declined. The british, even the Americans have asked to explore the possibility of increasing production, in order not to jeopardize the invasion in 1944. A number of factors u.s. navy, the British suspected that the to the fullest do not use your own capacity, and refused again to cut other programs at the expense of landing craft.

Allocation of resources


From the perspective of the planners COSSACu in London was the inability to take timely measures to increase the production of landing craft at the very least a manifestation of the myopia, if not a deliberate attempt to sabotage the invasion itself. In Washington but not in charge of just ROUNDUP. For example, the main task of the meeting in Casablanca was the elimination of the German submarine threat, and it hasn't happened yet, on the contrary, the numbers of destroyed tonnage grew, so no one wanted to restrict the production of escort vessels. Moreover, no one could responsibly say how many landing craft will be needed or whether the current rate of production by chance is not enough. Estimates of the planners ranged between discontinuation of five to ten divisions, which accounted for a huge difference. With this basic uncertainty arrived in may 1943 in Washington, british planners, to discuss, among other things, the allocation of resources for the european operations in 1944. The first british proposal requirements included 8 500 landing craft for the ten divisions. American planners checked, that is not possible such a number of ships to produce, and some even the British suspected that the numbers on purpose to overstate, in order to cancel the invasion. But neglecting the fact that with the number of ten divisions came before the common institutions, and agreed with him and ETOUSA. In the context of british arguments for further operations in the Mediterranean and their doubt about the feasibility of the invasion without much weakening of the German forces in the West, but it seemed that suspicion to be legitimate. It was clear that to be able to Americans to oppose the british vision of the other attacks in the Mediterranean, which was considered inappropriate as it can not bring decisive results, it will be necessary to reduce the size of the intended invasion somewhere in the area, which will be logistically feasible. Considerations are pointing to a total of twenty divisions, which at the same time reducing the number of prvosledových divisions. American doubts about the seriousness of british commitment to the invasion of France in 1944, then helped build their position that planning should be directed to the operation feasible with the resources that will be confidently available in the spring of 1944. In other words, the search for arguments against the british mediterranean strategy led the american command the tip to the adoption of existing production capacity as a limiting factor on the size of operations on the european continent in 1944. There was an effort to avoid discussions about the possibility of increasing the production of landing craft. Everything in this area was on the feet of clay. Was the need to find solid ground under your feet. It happened. Even the british planners weren't sure the fact that will need to exactly ten divisions. The americans complained that any british report states a different number. In the case of the number of landing craft it was about the variance between 8.5 thousand and 4 thousand. The british, moreover, themselves admit, that there is no certain basis for the number of ten divisions except in the sense that the strength of the attacking units must be large enough. But it was relative and depended on the future strength of the Germans, which at that moment no one could accurately estimate.

The connection of the joint chiefs, ordered his planners to examine the american and british options in the field of landing craft and supply troops. Planners reported that after the end of the two operations after the conquest of Sicily in the Mediterranean may be in the Uk in the spring of 1944, a landing craft available for the current move five divisions - three in the first echelon and two in the second. They believed that the second sequence may be transported by vessels used for the transportation of the first echelon. Detailed calculations have shown that missing about 500 vessels, which was considered a relatively small number in terms of the overall planning. As far as the troops available for the execution of the operations counted planners with the fact that in the United kingdom will be in the spring of 1944, between 26 and 30 divisions. These numbers were accepted without more debate, and Morgan was therefore saved to your plan, adjust the number of 4 504 landing craft. The five divisions introduced from the sea should add the use of two airborne divisions. All the calculations were necessarily based on many very questionable assumptions, about which there was a full match and not in practice be tested on a larger scale. For example, there were large differences in the number of vehicles, which had a division to have with you when landing. The difference between 3 thousand and less than 4,5 thousand is from the point of view of planning a huge. In addition, there is a difference between a small trailer and a heavy goods vehicle, but both items fall into the category of the vehicle. A lot also depended on the composition of the unit. From a tactical point of view it was not always possible to look at the economics of the use of space. The higher the average number of laden quantity of forces and means accounted for one vessel, thereby diminishing the flexibility and vice versa. Without a developed a tactical plan estimates were very approximate and based on the knowledge or rather the feeling of planners about the complexity of the considered operation. In general, Americans were more optimistic about the performance of the task, and so rather pushing numbers up towards the theoretical maximum. Was true, that the Americans in Washington were more optimistic than those in London. The lack of dc calculations was that sufficiently take into account possible loss or damage to the landing craft. Problematic was also the time schedule. The time required to cross the Channel depended on the place of disembarkation. According to some planners catered the estimated number of vessels timely supply of other sequences. In the washington negotiations are also really addressed that part of the vessels could not be used for moving units, as they were to be deployed in various support roles, e.g. as a carrier of missiles.

The washington conference therefore limit not only the number of vessels, but also the degree of tactical flexibility. With how detailed the planning has continued, with still more pointed, that the washington numbers was completely inadequate. American efforts to achieve a clear decision with a clear date has led to a willingness to agree with the operations adapted to the certainly the available funds. The british did not need them somehow vehemently make excuses, because when so much nezaobíralo long-term issues, but on the contrary very solve the nearest upcoming issue, which was at that time the Mediterranean, therefore, the invasion of Sicily and to Italy that it should knock out of the war as a German ally and force the Germans download here part of the forces of France, which would actually only allow the execution of Roundup. The americans deploy larger forces in Italy didn't really work, because they were afraid that it would jeopardize the invasion across the Channel, but neither side would leave the troops idle between african drag and the expected invasion of France. The washington conference has allocated five infantry divisions for the assault, two infantry divisions for immediate second sequence, the two airborne division for support and twenty divisions for the additional supply to the bridgehead. The date for the invasion was provisionally set at 1. may 1944. When the Americans reached the confirmation of the invasion of France, retreated in case of an invasion of Italy, however with certain limitations. Every operation after Sicily should be agreed by the common institutions and Eisenhower could only use powers that have already been to the Midlands allocated. Four american and three british experienced division will from 1. November 1943 held in reserve so that they could be moved to England for the needs of the invasion.

Three plans COSSACu


COSSAC was with the conclusions of the washington conference of the familiar at the end of may. In the meantime, he began to work on three plans, whose development was responsible. It was the plan of the invasion in 1944 (OVERLORD), plan of actions, that should the Germans give the impression that the invasion is already in 1943 (COCKADE) and the plan of operations which will be performed in the case of the German collapse (RANKIN).

COCKADE
The main aim of the operation COCKADE, which was a deceptive plan for the year 1943, was tying German forces in the West. The allies wanted to convince them that they're already in the this year invasion. Part should be a deceptive amphibious operation, which was to lure to combat the German air force, which had spojenčetí fighters hit hard. The plan consisted of three operations, each related to a different part of the coast. The american operation Wadham was focused on Brittany, and should the Germans give the impression that the us forces in the Uk are stronger than in fact. British forces in Scotland should be under the operation TINDALL simulate preparations for the invasion of Norway. The main components but it was operation STARKEY focused on the area of Pas-de-Calais. Part of it was a deceptive amphibious operation, basically the exercise of the landing operation, with the name of HARLEQUIN. But she wasn't in the whole range of implemented. However, STARKEY was carried out and included mainly odminovávací operations. It is difficult to assess the extent to which the COCKADE has affected the number of German forces in the West, due to a lack of relevant historical information. It seems, however, that a certain effect should have. Allies in addition have gained further experience in the implementation of the erroneous operations which used in the past in the following year.

a Sketch of the OVERLORDu
Most of their energy COSSAC from June devoted to the preparation of plans for OVERLORD. After a month of work, had the planners done a sketch of the plan. It wasn't an operational plan, it wasn't about the action plan, but a plan for planning. The plan reflected the fact that he assembled a crew without the commander, which didn't forward to tie up hands. Just wanted to answer the question arising from the may of the conclusions - whether it is possible to when anticipated sources take place in the spring of 1944 the invasion? The previous analysis showed that for the invasion are applicable only two areas - Caen and Pas-de-Calais. Although it was not yet the second area cast aside, Morgan returned it to the game, as it had its advantages, mainly to be closer to England. Morgan is well aware of its disadvantages, but he didn't want her to completely ignore. British planners then prepared the plans for the Pas-de-Calais, while the American for the area of Caen. The conclusion of the british planners was clear - the area is unsuitable. There were only four suitable beaches, which permit the withdrawal of only two offensive divisions. The problem was also the lack of suitable ports for additional supply units. The germans would have been able to push you their faster. The distance to Antwerp or the mouth of the Seine was too long. The bridgehead would be also wrong hájitelné due to adverse geographical conditions. Once again, therefore, remained only the area around Caen, respectively, three beaches in its surroundings. More not with the available forces possible to cover. Morgan declined to the current landing on the east Cotentinu, although recognized its value and in the case of the abundance of vessels would him to the surgery include.

The plan envisaged the landing of two british divisions on the two eastern beaches of Caen, one of the american divisions on the western beach, two-thirds of the british airborne division near Caen and other supporting strikes on key coastal battery made by sections of the commandos and other skydivers. Also had to occupy the crossings over the river by aure and secure a defensive perimeter on the river Vire. Specific details should be elaborated later. D-day wasn't exactly intended, but the plan dealt with the various issues associated with the weather and the tide. The day Y was 1. may, so the landing is expected sometime in may. Expected was 23 days suitable for landing from the point of view of wind power. A quiet period of four days and more could be expected twice during the month. The chances of that are able to predict the period of three quiet days 24 hours ahead of time, was 10:3. The question of weather suitable for airborne operations only the address, but it was clear that it still narrows the number of suitable days. The question of whether the surgery performed in the day or at night has not been finally resolved, however, the navy required daylight in order to reliably control the movement of a large number of vessels, and fire on targets. The army again favoured landing at night, as long as possible to keep the element of surprise. Recommended was also the first paratroopers landed three hours before high tide, that could be a big part of the forces ashore during the first high tide. The choice of Caen meant that ports suitable for maintaining large forces in operation will be obtained with a delay. Cherbourg could not ensure the supply of 29 divisions. A considerable part of the stocks will have to be vysazována on the invasion beaches. Morgan assumed that perhaps he will have available a trump card - at least two artificial ports moved from England to the French coast.

Due to the number of unknowns and the nature of the plan has not yet dealt with the detailed composition of the invasion forces. But it was noted that in the first wave will need a higher amount of armored vehicles and anti-aircraft resources. COSSAC assumed that wouldn't be such a big problem to break through the defensive positions on the beaches. Critical according to him, will be the first battle with the German advances. Backups could the Germans have put right during the first days, as indeed followed from their doctrine, therefore, Morgan emphasized the need for the tanks right at the beginning. Crucial then was transported rapidly enough to a sufficiently large force, in order to be first repulsed the initial German counterattacks and then defeated and pushed their other backups. It was therefore necessary to maintain in the field at least a slight advantage. But Morgan was from the beginning limited by the resources available. The guidelines envisaged the deployment of three prvosledových assault divisions and two druhosledových right behind them, and for this purpose has been allocated to the vessel. However, when planners try to put these numbers together, I found that a number of units can be loaded according to the tactical needs and a number of ships at all does not suit for a cruise across the Channel, not to mention the need to transport the anti-aircraft guns and a special engineering technique from the outset, which in turn further detracts from the shipping space. This meant that during the D-Day will be after the landing of the first echelon can be in the second echelon to transport only four reinforced regiments instead of two divisions. During the Day D+1 will be possible to move just one entire division and a third of another, although of washington conclusions imply a need for two. In addition, most vehicles will need to be during the day D+1 are transported by standard ships. It was quite risky and in addition it meant that the vehicle could not be interpreted in tactical order. The unit would then need 24 hours to regroup into combat formations. Units from D-day would thus de facto have been strengthened to D-day+2. During the day D+1 would be the unit to compile a maximum to plukovních battle groups, not to the compact divisions. COSSAC had to count with the deployment of two airborne divisions, but 632 allocated to the aircraft for their transport was not enough. It wasn't even enough for the two key missions - the cast of Caen and neutralize the coastal batteries at Grand-camp-les Bains and Ouistrehamu-Riva-Bella. In the case of Caen planners have assumed the need for the deployment of the entire division. To obtain this communication node considered crucial for averting defeat in the initial stage of the operation.

Morgan realized that with limited resources in the initial stages may count a maximum with a slight predominance. Said, therefore, that it is necessary to do everything possible to reduce the enemy forces to resist. Provided for the deployment of all possible means - from the air force through psychological action, political action, economic pressure, and sabotage, to false intelligence of the game. All of this should be carefully planned, systemizováno and efektivizováno to keep it together it brought conditions suitable for the invasion. The key was to use the air campaign to reduce the strength of the German fighter force in the West, to weaken the performance of the German military-industrial machine and destroy the transport infrastructure. Domination during landing has been considered a key element for the victory, as it had to balance deficiencies on the part of the land forces. Defensive positions on the beaches should be the goal of air raids until just before disembarkation. Planners also stressed that it is necessary to fail to notice the area of Caen, in order to be used of the enemy so far assumed landing elsewhere, which correspond to the number of forces in the field and the cardinality and frequency here built or constructed defensive features. But that could easily change. Deceptive surgery should on the contrary suggest the possibility of invasion in other areas. Planners, therefore, appealed to the weakening of the forces of the enemy. But how to determine how big a reduction is required, respectively, with what lying power can be reconciled. It was just very difficult to express. In addition, as already mentioned, it was difficult to estimate how much force here will be the opponent for the year. Morgan went for it from the other side. He tried to calculate how strong an opponent will be the invading force able to deal. Ignoring the positional units on the beaches, as assumed, that with them they handle the invading forces during the attack from the sea. After landing, they assumed the planners, will allied units able to face the counterattack in the power of two German divisions. Master would go even the presence of the three divisions, if one of them were held in reserve for possible deployment against the invasion of the Cotentin. D-day+2 was anticipated ability to withstand the attack amplified by two additional German divisions. D-day+8 could be repulsed the attack of the nine German divisions on the beachhead. If there the Germans were able to gather more threatened would the Allies defeat. If to take into account the effects of erroneous operations, it was assumed that it is necessary to the Germans in the area of France and the Benelux countries did not have more than twelve divisions. With the content of these uncertain calculations, and even essential conditions for the success of the agreed general Barker, who feared that with them will not be possible to plan to push through in Washington. It was clear to him that the local officials would have seen it as the british prepare an alibi for the postponement of the invasion. And so they did. Barker then had to explain that it is operation possible even when failure to fulfil this condition. According to him, it just meant that any further division will not be possible to defeat the ground forces, but it will be necessary to eliminate the air force or by other means. This hot head can calm down. Morgan took it with equanimity. His task was not to determine the allied intentions, but to develop a kind of feasibility study. Since he was pre-determined limits in terms of resources, it hardly could come up with a conclusion without any conditions. In addition, the plan clearly stated that it's not just a simple mathematical number, but it's a state of communications, especially the rail network, and the strength, quality and morale of the members of the German divisions.

The first objective of the invasion should be to ensure the bridgehead, including Grandcamp, Bayeux and Caen to the end of D-day. During the D-day should arrive the next two regiments in each sector, which should bridgehead only strengthen. Follow should lunges on the south and southeast of the area of the Bayeux-Caen, with the aim to defeat the enemy west of the river Orne and encircle his forces between the rivers Orne and Dives, which will ensure sufficient depth, which allow you to swipe across the Cotentin to Cherbourg. These operations should take the first eight days. D-day+8 should already be on the bridgehead twelve allied divisions. During the other six days should continue expansion south-westerly direction under the current procedure at Cherbourg, which was supposed to be cast in a D+14. Armored groups that had at the same time to attack south-easterly direction in the direction of Alençon, to be occupied by the airport southeast of Caen. D-day+14 should be on the bank of the eighteen allied divisions and German troops in the area were to suffer defeat. After the capture of Cherbourg and the defeat of the German forces west of the river Orne, should, under the premise of planners, cause the withdrawal of German forces from Brittany to the defence of Paris, with part of the forces should withdraw to the ports for their defence. Then it would depend on future supreme commander, whether to focus on the ports in Brittany or on ports in the estuary of the Seine. Although it should be contingent on the current situation, planners prefer Brittany. To her the cast was necessary to simultaneously push the Germans to the east to the river Eure between Dreux and Rouenem and the river Seine between the Rouenem and the sea. It should ensure the British and Canadians, while Americans should proceed in Brittany. In moving forward it was necessary to take into account the capacity of the communication lines, the necessity for early occupancy of the airports in the area of Dreux-Evreux and land for the establishment of airports in the area of Le Mans-Chateaudun, the value of the Seine as barriers, the significance of Dreux, Chartres and Orleans as a communication crossroads and the value of the Coteaux du Perche as a bastion to the west of Dreux and Chartres. This phase should culminate in the D+50 a cast of the area between the Seine and Loirou. COSSAC here emphasised the need to ensure a sufficient number of airports. After securing the area of the suspected planners of a certain period of regrouping and consolidation of forces.

The main objective of the following phase was the liberation of Paris and the ports in the Seine estuary. It was assumed that the Germans at this stage will put a very strong resistance. Then again, it was assumed regrouping, but should be accompanied by cleaning the south of France and the Channel islands. Everything could of course run faster depending on the ability of the Germans resist, but it was difficult to predict, it was contingent on the development with many unknowns. Indeed, Morgan's task was to plan the liquidation of the German troops, but the successful acquisition of a beachhead from which it would be possible to conduct further offensive operations.

RANKIN
The third task COSSACu was planning the occupation of continental Europe in the case of the collapse of Germany. The task was extremely difficult. First of all, it was not clear what exactly is a collapse. We worked with the definition of that collapse is the decline of German morale due to lack of funds, which will be reflected in the weakening of the will to resist. It was at least a very vague idea. COSSAC had to prepare a plan to use in the event of the need to return to the continent with all available forces in the shortest possible time in case of sudden and unexpected collapse of German resistance. The goal was to quickly occupy the important political and military centre in Germany..
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2.4 OPERATION PLAN NEPTUNE[/heading:aaaaaa]

A clear decision on the extension of the assault phase was entered in the sketch of the new draft plan, called the Single default of the plan of operation NEPTUNE of 1. February 1944. Its authors were Montgomery, Ramsay, and Leigh-Mallory. It was a kind of powerful tool, which should drive follow-up planning work and their implementation. The basis was a sketch plan of July 1943, drawn up by the COSSACem, and other follow-up studies of individual tactical headquarters. This document established the plans of the american 1. army of 25. February and the british 2. army of 20. march. Also the commanders of the air force and the navy submitted their detailed plans. Were also the plans for lower units. Then again, after the development to affect the plans of higher units. So the documents were still elaborated and modified. In the following paragraphs will be introduced by one plan as a whole, but rather the lift of a series of documents in relation to the intentions of the roughly at the level of the armies.

Enemy


Planners during the winter and early summer still worked from the assumption that the strength and distribution of the German forces in D-day doesn't change, because they needed some fixed point, from which they could bounce. However, already in February, it was clear that the Germans in France strengthen. Withdrawal of offensive divisions on the eastern front, he slowed down, although the supply of depleted divisions in the opposite direction continued. It was estimated that the total strength of the German forces in France and the Benelux countries rose from 40 to 53 divisions. And there were indications that during the spring festival this number could rise to 60 divisions. The may estimates in principle, these numbers confirmed. Yet the Germans had only about 12 panzers, which planners have calculated as the maximum of what can beachhead safely withstand. The increase in the number of divisions then the allied commander so too much wouldn't worry about it. COSSAC also attaches the condition that the Germans should not be able to at the time of the invasion download from the eastern front more than 15 divisions. In may, the analysts did not count with the fact that the Germans might any division to withdraw from the eastern front, with the other válčišť estimated maximum number of 13 divisions. About space invasion should not, under the conditions laid down COSSACem, German forces on D-day exceed three divisions on D-day+2 of the five divisions and in the D+8 of the nine divisions, all at full strength and beyond the coastal divisions. It was assumed that the Germans will not be able to pull such equivalent, since the number of divisions was on the podstavech and without adequate facilities means of transport. The marker divisions are expected to be the resistance put in the bunkers and field fortifications. The division in the West may strengthen, but he wasn't expected to could sufficient forces to achieve in a timely manner. The allies realised the German emphasis on the defense of the coast. They knew that the Germans have built some impermeable val on the Atlantic coast, but a relatively narrow waist, which should the invading forces detain them for a period of time before they come tactical backups located in the middle area, and subsequently the strategic reserve from a greater distance, which shall crush the invasion force. For the execution of the defense plan was a key factor in the condition and location of reserve forces. Analysts have estimated the number of Rundstedtových panzers to the ten tank divisions, one division of the panzer grenadiers and črtnáct up to seventeen offensive infantry or airborne divisions. Of them can be considered a first-class unit just three to four panzer and two infantry divisions. It was estimated that the Germans will be able to move the waste to the invading area of one tank and two infantry division during the D-day to strengthen the defense and the leadership of the local counter-attack. More reinforcements should be gradually přisouvány during the next two days, it being expected that they will be deployed right after arrival, without the concentration of forces. To D-day+3 could be the enemy in the field of three-tank, two paradesantní and four assault infantry division, in addition to the coastal divisions. A more extensive counterattack was to be expected during the day D+7. About its feasibility and time but led the debate. However, it was clear that at any time after D+3 can be expected to amplified pressure in the form of either gradual or coordinated the arrival of reinforcements. It was therefore imperative to land until D+3 as many units and techniques.

The German army on the invading troops waiting behind the Atlantic wall. But that was far from impenetrable, if they attacked him in an appropriate form in the appropriate place. Missed him with the necessary depth, so that a sufficient initial penetration in one area would have made it further unusable. Probably the biggest concern they had allied analysts from the batteries of the coastal artillery, including two batteries caliber 240 mm. It was expected that the Germans have also available a number of mobile artillery batteries further inland. Analysts have warned mainly before the 170mm cannons. Since February is also the planners began to deal with the issue of underwater obstacles on the beaches. Carefully watched the advance of the German work and reckoned the most advantageous condition of the water level at the beginning of the landing. The threat of the German air force and the navy was taken into consideration, but in this area was the allied superiority quite clear.

the Topography of the invasion area, and invasion objectives


The February revision of the plan did not touch the overall objectives, she was invading the area and the overall timing of the individual phases. The initial assault phase, however, has undergone great changes. Three COSSACem the selected beaches could accommodate only three assault divisions. It was therefore necessary to find new beaches. enlargement to the east into the area between the Lionem-sur-Mer and Ouistrehamem was without problems agreed. Discussion on the contrary erupted about adding another area to the northwest of the river Vire, therefore, on the peninsula of the Cotentin. Everything was based on the evaluation of the topography of the area. These consisted of five sections - northern Cotentinu with highlands to the north of Valognes, flat and watery southern Cotentinu, Bessinu, which was the coastal strip between Isigny and Bayeux, the Bocage, which was a forested hilly area south of the Bessinu and Cotentinu, and open landscapes in Caen between Bayeux and the south-eastern edge of the battlefield. Three british beaches were in the eastern part of Bessinu and at Caen. The Bessin and Caen from each other does not separate, no clear boundary, however, it can be stated, that south of the Bessinu is located Bocage, while the south-east of the landscape around Caen is an area of fertile arable land, which is suitable for the maneuver battle tank formations and for the establishment of airport areas. In all plans was given to the importance of the cast of Caen and the landscape around him just because of the need for the establishment of airports. British troops were to Bayeux and Caen to occupy during D-day and then push further south to Falaise and the south-east to the river Touques. That would ensure the premises for the airport and at the same time cover the procedure of american troops to Cherbourg. To meet this goal COSSAC originally planned two infantry divisions, Montgomery joined the third infantry division and the upper hand less than a airborne division.

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Cast Bessinu went to american corps, which had to stop one assault division. A significant topographical feature was the river by aure, which flows from the Bocage to Bayeux and to the north of him, then turns towards west and flows along the coast to Isigny, which flows into the sea. Mainly on your lower flow of the river flows through flat and bažinatou landscape, which was easily zatopitelná. From the area between Port-en-Bessin and Isigny so it was relatively easy to make a de facto peninsula. This plateau was studded stromořadími, orchards and meadows of the twin hedges. Relatively open here, the landscape was just between Vierville-sur-Mer and St. Laurent. Areas of the led lateral road between Caen, Bayeux and Isigny, which was part of the route from Paris to Cherbourg. This communication was a kind of liaison between the projected four beaches and was in need of it as soon as possible to ensure. In the original field COSSAC assumed that the american troops will first proceed to the south and southeast, to extend the initial beachhead, and then move to the northwest across the Cotentin to Cherbourg. A big obstacle had to be the river Douve, which přetínala greater part of the base of the peninsula, and the marshy, easily zatopitelná the area around their tributaries. Across the river were only three larger roads. Easy procedure to allow only the area between the villages of St. Lô-d'Ourville and St. Sauveur de Pierrepont, but was located on the west coast of the peninsula, and it was too narrow, so easily hájitelná. Get on the Cotentin from the south, therefore, was evaluated as a very complicated and risky. But there was Cherbourg, which played in the allied plans a key role. It resulted in the need for the creation of a bridgehead north of the river Douve. But this was not without risk. A glance at the map showed that a belt of territory for the east coast from Quinéville to the mouth of the river Douve, was interwoven with a tangle of small watercourse. Lines between the beaches and the hinterland has been only a few narrow paths leading around the náspech. In the place of the landing of the fifth division there were only four such communication. And so this area provided the defenders a significant advantage.

The solution should be the withdrawal of the airborne division into the rear of the defenders around You. Mère-Eglise. Her unit should ensure the exity of the beaches. Many planners, however, are worried whether you can add more hope to the success of the airborne troops. Yet, these forces have been more fully deployed only in the landing on Sicily, and not very successfully. There should be a more significant drop against the početnějšímu and better prepared enemy. A water obstacle in the form of the river Douve, its tributaries, and the river Vire could work as a wedge between the two allied předmostími. Many officials have argued that the success of the Cotentinu in the failure of the east of the river Vire would be useless. The main effort, therefore, be logically directed to the areas of Bessin and Caen, where, indeed, should be deployed to multiple units. The fifth division would therefore prefer to retain as a floating reserve for the deployment in that part of the main area, where the situation was not going according to plan and was in need of her to strengthen. In the operation of the Cotentinu saw an unnecessary gamble and a waste of your energy. But in the end, outweighed the importance of a rapid cast of Cherbourg and the landing party on the coast Cotentinu was incorporated. But it turns out that one parachute division to ensure the tract of the beaches is not enough.

Air tours


General Morgan had his time count with the deployment of two airborne divisions, but available only had 632 transport aircraft. His plan counted with the introduction of three-quarters of the division and the other seven to nine separate battalions. But to do this he even missed other 372 aircraft. In Quebec have been allocated on other machines, but this, too, but it wasn't enough. However, the main debate was about the way the deployment of the paratroopers, and whether it has any sense at all. There were concerns, mainly based on the study of the operation at Dieppe, that you cannot achieve a state where the weather will be suitable for the withdrawal of troops from the air and from the sea. Developments in the field of navigation devices these concerns are largely negated. Problems from Sicily but have brought other concerns from the over-reliance of the infantry units on the uncertain outcome of the airborne operations. Eisenhower, this negative view did not share. Believed that can achieve a good result, but the marines must be deployed at once and in large numbers. So they will be able to quickly occupy the important objectives. The same view of the thing had even the commanders of the airborne divisions. Suggested the increase of the tabulated number of members of their divisions. Although it failed to push through McNairovo Headquarters of the land forces, were the two american divisions that were in Normandy deployed, strengthened each of the two separate paradesantní infantry regiments. February revision so already counted with the limited praporními the paratroopers, as they were still considered tactically poor deployment of airborne forces, nor with the stroke of the airborne troops to Caen, since this area was added another infantry division attacking from the sea. On the contrary, but had to be resolved the question of securing the left wing, i.e. the crossings over the river Orne. For this purpose, it was a planned drop of airborne forces on its right bank.

In early February, Eisenhower proposed to the current discontinuation of the two airborne divisions. One should be dropped in british, one in the american zone. The third should be dropped a day later. The british argued that there is a lack of crews. Eisenhower at this point questions on neeskaloval, because he didn't want to interfere with the course of the bomber offensive. Over time, it proved to be enough machines and crews for the current transport of one and three-quarters of the division. So we made the decision to drop the 101. airborne division behind Utah and two brigades of 6. airborne division east of the river Orne. 1. the army, meanwhile, asked for the addition of another division of the landing party, which would block the corridor at St. Lô-d'Ourville, which would block the flow of reinforcements on the Cotentin. 82. the airborne division should be dropped in the vicinity of St. Sauveur-le Vicomte D-day in the night of the aircraft, which will return from the event. General Marshall's but was still considered too fragmented deployment and demanded more concentration. Recommended to the assessment plan general Arnold on the withdrawal of the airborne divisions in the area of Evreux-Dreux, which would have been basically created another front in the rear of the enemy, which from his point of view threatens Paris and the crossings over the Seine. Eisenhower's plan was rejected because he was too ambitious. Much smaller Anzio also failed. Indeed, even a plan on the withdrawal of the two divisions on the Cotentinu not without criticism. Eventually there was a modification, which consisted in discontinuation of the glider up at dusk, since their introduction in the early morning hours of D-day would be too risky and forced the would paratroopers to ensure for them a landing zone. In may news came of the supply of the German 91. infantry division on the Cotentin, necessitating further changes. Both the american division should now be planted closer together in the area between the beaches and the rivers Douve and the merderet River. But this area was too narrow, so they found a compromise. Two regiments of 82. airborne division were to be dropped west of the river merderet River and a bridgehead. It was a very risky plan, but Eisenhower was prepared to risk to bear.

the Connection of the two parts of the bridgehead and breakthrough from it


As Soon As In. and VII. ensure your position on both sides of the river Vire, should combine in the area between the rivers Vire and Taute. Carentan and Isigny were originally among the objectives for D-day. In the case of Carentan it turns out that this is unrealistic, and the goals were limited to securing crossings over the river, the city should be busy, as soon as permitted by the situation. Plans for the cast of Isigny were changing, and the last variant of mandating 115. infantry regiment to occupy it in the D-day, if possible. There were also assumptions that the procedure of the two councils, particularly In the. ward, forcing the Germans to retreat and to link the two areas occurs without a fight. Follow had the procedure at Cherbourg, which was supposed to be cast in a D+15. The americans had after the attack on the south to a line Lessay-Periérs-St. Lo and subsequently move the line Avranches-Domfront at the entrance to Brittany. Here were american troops arrive in D+20. Then I should be operationally eligible 3. the army, which was coupled with 1. army go below 1. a group of armies, that then had to clean up Brittany. Follow should curl up on the east and massive attack to the Seine. Here should the unit arrive at D+90. The end of operation OVERLORD.

Destination D-day


The general timing of D-day will be based on weather, availability of sufficient resources and coordination with the soviet party. Preliminary determination 1. June meant that the operation should be launched any suitable date after this date. Pick of the day will be very influenced by the requirements of the hour H of the area of tidal and light conditions. The very articulation of these demands was quite a complex thing. A large part of the factors was based on the experience from the Mediterranean and prefer surprise night attacks. But the OVERLORD was many orders of magnitude more complex operations. It seemed that it will not be possible to get the element of surprise, due to the scale of operations and because of the activities of the German radar. Night attack, while the Germans complicate orientation on the strength and direction of the allied blow, the convoys would have had to leave the previous evening in the daylight. Darkness may provide invasive forces some protection, but on the other hand it provided to the defenders, whose position was worse zasažitelná air and naval bombardment. The massive use of flares could have moreover this advantage eliminated. The allied commanders therefore had to decide whether they prefer more power, or options for better coverage. COSSAC in the original conclusions to this question decided, it's that left it to the commanders, however, noted that the navy preferring day surgery room for manoeuvre and greater accuracy of firing naval guns. On the other hand, existed for a number of factors of a doubt, whether it is the navy capable of effective fire on the defensive position to compensate for the factor of darkness.

Eventually it was decided that the k zoom will occur under the cover of darkness, but the attack itself starts at the crack of dawn, to increase the accuracy of the preparatory bombardment and to enable the management of effective covering fire during the final approach of boats from the mother ships to the beaches. Analysis of general Crocker requested at least 45 minutes of covering fire, so the hour H should be fixed somewhere during the first hour after sunrise. It was generally accepted. On each beach, then but must still take account of the tidal conditions, as each beach had a different width and depth. The longer waiting, the more it would have shortened the width of the beach, and therefore decreased the risk for the first wave of attacking infantry. On the other hand, it would be less time for the landing equipment of the ships, taking needed to the landing occurred before the tide, that ships are not left in the shallows. Beaches in the british zone thing further complicated. There were rocky outcroppings that prevented the landing at low tide. it all depended on the weather, so did not set a hard day, but a certain possible span of time between the morning dawn and the hour H, in order with regard to the weather postpone the surgery for one or more days. Operations could start in the day, when it was between dawn and the hour of H in terms of the tidal terms available minimum 30 minutes and maximum 90 minutes. The required conditions existed for three days once a fortnight. That in itself was pretty limiting. And it wasn't all. The successful execution of airborne landings required the moonlight. The number of suitable days is so narrowed down to three days a month. The first possible dates were the 5th, 6. and 7. June.

Organization and tactics of the offensive forces


Each of the five assault divisions should be planted by the forces of the two maritime task force, which was to dispose of the means of transport, means of their protection and means of their fire support. Infantry should be in place in large part conveyed to the larger parent vessels, which it then dropped into the smaller boats (LCVP or LCA) at a distance of about 17 kilometers from the coast in the case of american beaches and 11 miles in the case of the beaches of the british. Each boat was carrying thirty men. The boats should land in waves along the entire beach sector, that there has been some concentration of forces.

The main task was to pierce through the thick enemy fire from fortified points. Tactics based on the tactics of the attack on a fortified position, but the amphibious landing force provides almost zero possibility of maneuvering. You cannot download and encirclement of the points of resistance is possible only in very limited extent. Airdrop can be done aside from the main goal, but that doesn't change the fact that it is always fundamentally about a frontal attack. Once the enemy attack shall be recorded and open fire, is not the time or the place for strategizing. This is purely about how to get in the shortest possible time force to break through the way forward. The only strategizing, could theoretically lie in the attack just a part of the forces on the widest possible front, and deployment of floating backups in place, which turns out to be the weakest. But it was not enough landing craft, as this would load the unit purely with regard to tactical needs, i.e. regardless of the economics of the place, which wasn't due to numbers of ships possible. Due to the scale of the operation anyway, there were doubts whether it could possibly at some point come to a surprise, so he would then advance as well had to deploy everywhere. Preferred is therefore the concentration of the forces and economics of the use of the space in the vessels. Consideration was also given to the massive use of zadýmování, but during the tests it turned out that it makes life for both parties as well. The passage of the smoke I couldn't drive, could ultimately damage the more own units, and in addition got worse and worse the possibility of conducting accurate fire from the ships.

Attack through the beach so couldn't count with the cover of darkness, with the cover of the smoke, nor the flexibility of a floating advances. It was therefore necessary for him to lead with enough vigor, in order to quickly break the defense of the belt and at the same time places available sufficient funds for the procedure d inland, and the supply units of other sequences, thereby to consolidation of acquired territory and start building a bridgehead. It was therefore necessary to carefully balance the striking power and mobility. Was therefore on the adjustment of the equipment and the organization of assault divisions, but it was excluded as it would imply the need for subsequent transformation of these divisions on the standard, on which was space, no time Adjustment in the end was that it was for the purposes of the landing party was reduced to non-combat part of the classic division, and on the contrary amplify its firepower by using above-standard equipment and weaponry, whether it was machine guns, mortars, explosives, flame throwers or tools to overcome the roadblocks of barbed wire. In addition, should be the division supported by the assigned tank and armored units. You should be partially loaded on a LCT and reach the beaches in about the same time as the infantry, in part, to the objectives of the swim. Around the deployment of tanks has also led a lively discussion. Eventually they were deployed not as a maneuver of armored force, but as armored self-propelled artillery. It wasn't the ideal artillery, but thanks to the armour should at least have some chance of survival on the beaches. It was assumed that the tanks will be firing from basically a tower position with the chassis still in the water.

After tankistech and pawns who should break through the road of the beaches, came to a number of engineers. You should, covered by the infantry, create and indicate the exity of the beaches and to remove obstacles, than the flood tide. This was to further the success of the operation key thing. Engineers should cooperate with special demolitions teams of the navy. The work should facilitate the tankdozery, i.e. tanks with a blade. In the other waves should land above all other pawns and again, even the engineers, as was the need to remove large quantities of mines for the player. About an hour and a half after the beginning of the invasion should start landing the first artillery units. After three hours, should begin to enter the vessel loaded with a larger amount of vehicles. At the time, already had infantry and commanders have cleaned not only the exity of the beaches, but also inland.

Supporting fire


The break of defence of the belt should facilitate the air and naval bombardment. Persisted but doubts about its effectiveness. In addition, resources were not infinite. According to some calculations, for example the silencing of 15 batteries of the coastal artillery was needed 20 to 23 battleships or cruisers. Many ships, both not available, it would be hard to manévrovaly on a limited space. Every other big ship would then in addition, increased demands on the deployment of the minesweepers that they had space to maneuver clear, and those also not an infinite amount. Cover the areas near the beaches and shooting on a known retaining walled points would mean the need to deploy additional roughly 20 cruisers, and 100 destroyers. In total, this meant a lot of over 3 000 tons of ammunition. Even so, would not be the success far from guaranteed. Some position might be well disguised or moved. However, the experience of Dieppe showed that the active presence of large naval guns is necessary. There was also the experience of Tarawa, which showed that the possibility of naval guns against concrete bunkers are limited. It was therefore necessary to address the question of how to ensure the neutralization of the strong points of the enemy in the time shortly before and shortly after the seating of the boats on the beach. The first step was the allocation of a larger amount of large combat vessels. According to the agreement from Cairo should the landing support exclusively to british ships, but the growing requirements exceeded the british options and it was necessary to pull even in the us. These included three battleships, two cruisers, and thirty-four destroyers. This allowed to strengthen the bomber forces and create a backup formation, whose vessels had to replace boats that were damaged or without the additional ammo.

Fire plan nor did not with the destruction but rather the neutralization of the enemy position. Points of support and their operation should not be directly destroyed, but the intense fire they had to embarrass the leadership of combat activities. Air and naval attacks should proceed in carefully timed waves. The first goal of the artillery programme of the batteries have been able to threaten the allied vessels, followed the firing of the defensive elements on the beaches and in last place was the support of infantry that surged inland. There had of the vessel to ensure the arrival of larger calibre field artillery. Strikes on the coastal batteries were not carried out already during the preparation for the landing. Attacking mainly on the habitat, on which they began the construction of the casemates. Goal was not so much to destroy the particular guns, as a rather slow work. Spring was, indeed, placed almost all positions in the invading zone. In addition, they didn't want the Allies to the Germans to provide guidance to determine the invasive area and the tactical air force also had a number of other equally important tasks. Some batteries were also at the beginning of the invasion sent shock troops commandos and battalions of rangers, to keep them occupied. The most famous is probably the battery at Pointe-du-Hoc, the six 155mm guns could dostřelilo up to the places where they anchor the mother ship. Just before the invasion was supposed to be a strong air strikes, which was to follow the bombardment from the naval guns.

At the time of the last strokes on the battery to start indiscriminate bombing of the area beaches, where there was a whole series of bunkers, trenches and machine-gun nests or habitat of the works of smaller calibre, some of them with a concrete canopy. To participate should force even the big ships, but in general it was a task rather for destroyers and other smaller vessels. Here, too, was expecting more neutralization than destruction. Smaller vessels also can lead to the area of the beaches fire at the moment when it had to terminate for safety reasons the big ships. It is necessary to realise that at that time he was a good shot from a big naval gun considered to be intervention in the area of 50 to 100 meters from the target. An important role fell to the carriers of the rockets of LCT(R), which have proved themselves already in the Midlands. Experiments have confirmed also the possibility of fire from 105-mm self-propelled howitzers transported to the coast on ships. The plans therefore envisaged, therefore, that some of the howitzers and some of the tanks will fire from the decks of landing craft..
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2.5 EXERCISE[/heading:aaaaaa]

Exercise DUCK I


In July 1943 it was in the North Devon established a Training center offensive operations (Assault Trainign Center), which on the beaches in the area of Woolacombe zdokonalovalo training of american soldiers. The next step should be arranging a number of exercises. The first was an exercise DUCK I, held in January 1944. The following exercises can be divided into three groups. First it was a big exercise, involving soldiers of different units in a combined drop and test the functionality of the supply system. Tested were a single phase of the landing from the embarkation of the units, through their landing until after the consolidation of the bridgehead. The second group consisted of smaller exercises with the participation of the various units that trained perform their assigned specific tasks. The last group consisted of two maximum of the reality of similar exercises, which should correspond as much as possible actual battle conditions at Normandy.

The DUCK AND was thus the first and in a way, the most important exercise, because the flaws, which by him have been identified, affected the further training and subsequent exercise. Execution of the exercise has been discussed already since the mid-summer of 1943, but the plans of the exercise started from November. Originally it was supposed to go on the exercise hinterland areas of the services, however, the plan eventually to include other units, and all phases of an amphibious attack. The exercise was carried out in the area of beach known as Slapton Sands south of Dartmouth. In the area lived relatively few civilians and the terrain was approaching normandskému, especially on OMAHA beach. The exercise was attended by the core 175. infantry regiment 29. infantry division, 1. special engineer brigade, headquarters 29. infantry division and divisional units, the part of the staff In. ward, 56. connecting battalion and members IX. the air army. The exercise consisted of two phases. The first involved concentration of troops and of their embarkation, the other of their landing. These forces provided cover to the Royal navy and IX. army aviation. Units were deployed in the vicinity of Plymouth, taunton this, Barnstaple and other places. The embarkation would take place at the Falmouth and Dartmouth, the landing on Slapton Sands. Exercise should be for security reasons, take place in the day, which at the same time zjednodušovalo observation of the entire operation. The operation is on the side of the attacking units was attended by 10 of 242 men. The whole operation was ensured by roughly the same amount of members of the authorities and security units. Waste material started 24. December, embarkation units took place from 28. December. The original date of disembarkation 3. January was 1. January shifted to 4. January 1944 10:00. 3. January went in the dark ships of Dartmouth, accompanied by four destroyers and other escort vessels. When units nalodily, replaced it in the embarkation areas of the unit 28. infantry division, which nenalodily, but have undergone a process of preparation. Unit is on the beach gradually vyloďovaly from 10:00. Mostly according to plan, but not always managed to keep. Especially in the field of treatment of the supply has been tried a number of new procedures. Unit after two days returned to their original crews. Observers gave during January together your conclusions. Basically in all the areas were found to be weaknesses in coordination in the activities of the signal corps, in the actions of the engineers, in the loading and unloading of materials, in nesecvičenosti units in non-compliance with the formations, in violation of radio silence, in a slow and nekoordinovaném planning. On the other hand, there were no absolutely critical issue, and the exercise went relatively without a hitch, although it was the first of its kind.

Exercise DUCK II and DUCK III


Almost immediately after the summary of critical remarks to the exercises DUCK I started the planning exercise DUCK II and DUCK III. One of the conclusions was the need for the establishment of a permanent planning group. Its first meeting took place on 25. January and the group began work immediately. 14. February was the scheduled exercise DUCK II, and 29. February exercise DUCK III. Their task was to verify the status of combat readiness of the other part 29. division and those parts of 1. special engineer brigade, which they did not participate in exercise DUCK EVEN. From this exercise plans for the next two exercises were based, tried however, to avoid previous mistakes. DUCK II checked the core 116. infantry regiment, 1. battalion 531. corps of engineers coastal and regiment of the said brigade, DUCK III core 115. infantry regiment and part of the engineer brigade. Connect be even smaller tank units and tank destroyers. Exercise DUCK II is also focused on improving the accuracy of the commanders of the landing craft, better road marking, masking and better liaison activity. DUCK III followed too soon after the DUCK II, so as not to eliminate the identified errors, but rather to the practice of other units.

Exercise FOX


The largest exercise between the initial DUCK I and the final exercises, FABIUS I and TIGER was an exercise FOX, which is also pretty close to plans for the landing in Normandy. His execution ordered headquarters In. ward 7. February 1944 on the first half of march. The planning exercise was in principle to be suspended up to 15. February, when he published the first operational plan for operation NEPTUNE. As a result, was planning a Fox in a slip. A number of factors in addition, FOX considered rather as a training exercise than a test of procedures for the amphibious operation. Expected that a number of deficiencies will be eliminated within the next larger exercise, which will be able to be more thoroughly planned. FOX was held to 9. and 10. march. Assembly and embarkation of the troops took place despite certain problems resulting from the late preparation more or less fine according to the model of exercise DUCK, although it was conducted by a completely different staff. The attack was carried out according to the dispositions for OMAHA beach. Fox participated in the 16. infantry regiment 1. infantry division and 116. infantry regiment 29. infantry division. The two regimental battle groups zastřešovalo headquarters 1. infantry division, which was in turn controlled by the headquarters In. corps. The infantry was supported by units of the Makeshift special engineer brigade of the group. Its battalions were reinforced by a company of amphibious vehicles DUKW, company truck, medical detachments, connecting detachments and other auxiliary units. Embarkation began on 7. march in Plymouth, Weymouth, Dartmouth and Portland, and it took two days. Ships on the way to Slapton Sands was accompanied by five british destroyers and air cover, the allied air force. The attack on the beach was accompanied by the firing of naval guns and ran quite satisfactorily, although the phase of consolidation of the beachhead suffered from a lack of planning.

It turned out that the concentration of the units does not occur due to lack of time without problems, but during the shifting has improved. Staff at its security was involved, was therefore recorded and counted with him for the next operation. From the exercise emerged the initiative towards improving the state of the field of eating. Procedures associated with the handling of the material were after exercise significantly simplified, which resulted in a significant shortening of the required time. The attack itself suffered from a lack of planning and coordination between the various components. Security page, which included the masking and response to potential air raids or attacks of poisonous gases, has been identified as very weak. It was therefore taken for its improvement. As another big weakness appeared to be unloading supplies from the ships, the activity of the engineers on the beaches, and the communication of individual groups on the beaches. Communications then had a delay in laying of cables, as the respective equipment and material received too late. The problem was as well as for health professionals who have been dropped off much earlier than their equipment. Success was experienced in the area of ensuring the water-proofing of the transported vehicles.

Other exercises


The current u.s. exercise involved primarily units intended for OMAHA beach. But even 4. infantry division, destined for UTAH need to go through appropriate training and test readiness, although in this area expected to be less German resistance and support, should provide even the paratroopers. 4. infantry division and 1. special engineer brigade, therefore, passed in the second half of march seven exercises MUSKRAT I, MUSKRAT II, OTTER I OTTER II, the MINK I MINK II, BEAVER. Four of them were used for practice landing battalions, two to practice landing regiments and one (the BEAVER) was the test of the landing of two regiments with the support of engineers and air force. This last exercise actively participated in even part of the staff of the VII. corps. The exercise took place without major problems.

There was also a number of other sub-exercise more or less connected with the forthcoming landings in Normandy. To name a few artillery exercises, the EXCELSIOR I AND EXCELSIOR VI. It was the british exercise with american participation aimed at the commander of the artillery units and their staffs in the preparation of plans for the deployment of artillery at the corps level. Artillery, including anti-aircraft, and units of tank destroyers covered the march exercise CRIMSON II. Among other artillery exercises belonged to exercise the HAWK I and HAWK II with the participation of the artillery of VIII. corps.

Acuteness and air force and airborne units. 82. airborne division went through at the end of April and beginning of may exercises CURVEBALL I and II. At that time, held a smaller exercise even 101. airborne division. 11. may be then both the division participated in the joint exercise EAGLE in the area of Hungerford-Newbury. Part of the exercise was to support the navy and the withdrawal of infantry units from the small boat. Paratroopers on the place of haul machines IX. the headquarters for the transport units. Opponent played 28. infantry division. Paradesantní unit seskočily in the night, the glider troops landed in the day. At the end of April, the exercise took place 9. the air army called BOOMERANG. It was attended by more than five thousand members of the ground staff. They rehearse with the assembly, shipment, and the establishment of the storehouses of the aviation-related material on the occupied territory.

Took place and a number of smaller exercises, whose task was the examination or training in a particular segment of the process of a massive amphibious attack. Some of the exercises she was so small, that didn't even get a code name yet, but some of them had pretty crucial for the final form of the plans for operation NEPTUNE. During the exercise the CHEVROLET was practiced unloading the material and generating a masking smoke screen in the vicinity of the beaches and ports. The CHEVROLET has established a number of other exercises occipital and supply units, during which they were improved procedures for loading and unloading material. The largest of them was an exercise CELLOPHANE, in which were these new procedures presented to the representatives of the american 1. army. Exercise JEEP, jalopy looks, SNIPE and GULL examined the procedures of gathering and embarkation units. The movement of material along the beaches of verified exercise CARGO I CARGO II, CARGO III, and TONNAGE I, TONNAGE II, TONNAGE III and more. And medical units have carried out preparatory exercises. It was the exercise CRACKSHOT, which was examined the ability of English hospitals to accept more patients. The evacuation of the wounded from the beaches then reviewed the exercise SPLINT. For the connecting of the unit was prepared to exercise SPANDU, which was examined to establish radio contact between army group and the various armies, and the PIGEON, which was examined the connection between the two infantry divisions, engineer brigades, air force and navy.

Exercise TIGER


Exercise DUCK was planned before the allocation of units for operation NEPTUNE. Other exercises have already been organized with consideration to this assignment. Exercise FOX include units destined for OMAHA beach, exercise BEAVER the for UTAH beach. On them followed the two big exercises TIGER and FABIUS. NEPTUNE assumed the creation of two beachhead during the D-day. One should run from Caen after the Isigny and be made up of beaches of SWORD, JUNO, GOLD and OMAHA. The second was on the eastern side of the peninsula of the Cotentin, and accounted him only UTAH beach. Within two to three days should occur to their connection, but at the very beginning should go a relatively separate area. All the british, canadian and american troops, which were to be planted in the area from Caen after Isigny, they took part in a joint exercise FABIUS, which consisted of six parts - four british and two american.

For units intended for UTAH was organised exercise TIGER, which took place from 22. 30. April under the leadership of VII. corps. The planning started already in February, but the clearer the contours of the plan admitted in April. The action involved all three regimental combat groups of 4. infantry division. These were concentrated in the area of Plymouth and Dartmouth. Participated in even 1. special engineer brigade. Plan for the concentration and embarkation of the troops was based on those used in exercise DUCK and a BEAVER, but those have been adjusted according to experience from previous, smaller exercises. Attack should be this time conducted on the beaches of Slapton Sands of the boat 2. a group of 11. the amphibious group. Of capacity and technical reasons it was not possible to fully simulate a parachute jump airborne divisions, however, some of the units 101. the division arrived at the scene on trucks and simulate the discontinuation. The second day on the place came the part of the members 82. division. In total have been shipped twenty-five thousand men and less than three thousand vehicles. The exercise took nine days, of which six days were allocated for the assembly and embarkation of troops and material. D-day was 28. April. Plans and orders failed to deliver on time at all places, so there was improvisation. Some loading schedules had to be rewritten and even the late arrivals of barges and traffic complications. However, the airdrop was carried out without major problems after a simulated naval bombardment. The troops that landed, successfully merged with the paratroopers. One of the main shortcomings was that the soldiers are inadequately covered in the procedure on the beaches. The engineers also landed, odminovali passages, set up tours of the beaches and set up the warehouse. To the rear of the unit interpreted the material.

During the exercise, a tragedy occurred. The convoy of eight troop ships in the early hours of 28. April attacked the German E-Booty. The accompanying corvette unfortunately I was not near. Several vessels had been hit, two flared and sank. When he arrived the british destroyer, already just saved several persons from sunken ships. The army and the navy have lost 749 men. The positive side of the tragedy was that of her Allies, learned the lessons and made some adjustments. There was to better familiarize soldiers with the use of lifejackets, there was to improve the activity of the rescue boats, perfected the system of warning and transmission of orders to the soldiers on the ships in emergency situations. All the witnesses of the tragedy were given however, the ban about this event talk. This was cancelled until after the invasion. Another problem of the exercise was that some of the engineers have participated in for about the fifteenth exercise and to take it as a routine, while they ignored the various evident flaws. During the first half of may, a restocking units that have lost their men during exercise. The two rear companies had to but to be replaced completely.

Exercise FABIUS


Exercise FABIUS followed soon after exercise TIGER. Consisted of six exercise FABIUS I to FABIUS VI, and was the largest amphibians exercise in history. Compared to Tiger, which included only the forces for UTAH, include this exercise, all four of the other offensive formations and two druhosledové formation. Two of the forces were american, the rest were British. FABIUS ALSO included the forces designated for OMAHA beach, FABIUS II forces for beach GOLD, FABIUS III forces for JUNO beach and the beach FABIUS IV strength for SWORD beach. FABIUS IN check the british druhosledové units and FABIUS VI, of the american druhosledové units. Exercise FABIUS I to FABIUS IV was carried out at the same time and under the leadership of 21. the group of armies. The whole exercise was carried out from 23. April to 7. may. The day of the landing was originally set at 2. may, but was one day postponed due to bad weather. Part of FABIUS V and VI were originally scheduled for 4. to 6. may, but because of the shift lasted until 7. may. In the framework of the exercise FABIUS wasn't much time for experimentation, rather toexercise existing procedures, i.e. for an entire complex machine and debugging of minor bugs. Conditions should be as similar as possible to those during actual operation. Planning was conducted under the supervision of the 21. army group and to participate in it the staffs of all child folders up to the battalion level. After a simulated aerial and naval bombardment followed by the landing of tanks the sherman DD and the first offensive rot. Engage with units of special forces. Procvičilo and unloading inventory, the establishment of warehouses and the strengthening of the forces in the bridgehead. The unit, which exercises participated in, then returned to their home garrisons, but at a staging area near the ports, where it remained until the embarkation for operation NEPTUNE. The collection units for the exercise and of their embarkation went smoothly. Was also the practice of participation minesweepers. Shortcomings were identified in the activities of the military police in the coordination of the landing forces from the ships upon the arrival of reinforcements after the events of attack of rot, in a small number of networks for the unloading of stocks, in an inappropriate laying of the connecting cables, in the late arrival of medical equipment or in the identification of storehouses of various kinds of material. The supply of druhosledových units have been identified shortcomings in the size of the temporary camps and in their sanitary security. Here also lacked a sufficient amount of members of the military police for traffic control..
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2.6 LOGISTICS SECURITY[/heading:aaaaaa]

Artificial harbours MULBERRY


The key point of the battle of Normandy was the ability of the Allies to supply their troops on the continent supplies from Britain and the USA. It was necessary as soon as possible to get a working ports with sufficient capacity. Those were but only a few and the Germans have their importance were well aware. The allied plan was counting on, that must be quickly acquired by the port in Port-en-Bessin and as soon as possible port in Cherbourg, who was able to receive a greater amount of inventory. Even optimistic estimates of his cast but did not allow his operation soon enough to have the Allies been making do with smaller normandskými ports. The solution was found in artificial harbours, which were to be after the parts of the přivlečeny from Britain and assembled in the St. Laurent (MULBERRY a) AND Arromanches (MULBERRY B). The outer protection of the harbor formed the breakwaters constructed of sunken ships, concrete caissons and floating hollow steel tube cross-profile. Within the protected area was the pier, which was not firmly attached to the bottom and could adjust the height of the water level.

The use of these artificial harbors worked. Unfortunately, a strong storm, the area hit between the 19. and 22. the June destroyed the american harbour so much, that his operation had to be terminated. The british in time to have taken measures to minimize the damage and their port had a more convenient location. The storm was also damaged, but his traffic could be restored.


fuel Supply


Planners it was clear that the technique of the allied armies will be for their activities need considerable amount of fuel. The fuel was to be transported from Britain in jerry cans or tankers. Due to the necessary amount of fuel and the scarcity and vulnerability of the tankers is looking for a different solution. Was found in in the underwater cables. Adjusted telegraph cables, referred to depending on the material used as HAIS or HAMEL, were laid between Shanklin Chine on the isle of Wight and Querqueville near Cherbourg. Until help experience their laying and operation, was the supply carried out the canisters and from the day on D+9 the help of underwater cables of the system, the RAFFLE, which were laid in Port-en-Bessin between berth tankers and warehouse on the coast. When the allied troops advanced closer to Germany, were laid additional cables between Dungeness and Ambleteuse in the area of Pas-de-Calais..
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3.1 the ACTIVITIES of the FRENCH RESISTANCE MOVEMENT[/heading:aaaaaa]


the French resistance


Already from the year 1940 in the occupied south part of France formed a resistance group. At the time of the landings in Normandy were the French resistance about 200 000 members. You came from a different social and political spheres of society, and were therefore a homogeneous group. The germans were the common enemy, but the individual parts are also preparing for the post-war struggle for power. General de Gaulle and his Intelligence and operating the switchboard managed to get most of the resistance, under its influence, albeit sometimes only nominally. In may 1943, in Paris, formed the National council of the resistance led by Georges Bidaultem. Its members were as a resistance group and political party. The council recognised general de Gaulle. The council has created a Secret army led by general Delestrainem. The army was created on a territorial basis, and should speak out after the arrival of the Allies. However, in June 1943, carried out the gestapo rozáhlou arrest the action and command of the army was decimated. Resistance although suffered heavy losses, but quickly shook myself off. Moreover, the Germans found a large part of the military material and the entrance of the group were able to receive more. The resistance had an extra year on the creation of new structures, which were this time much more decentralised, and withstand so much better the next arrest.

Cooperation with the SOE and OSS


From the spring of 1941 cooperated with the French resistance, british SOE, which supplied weapons, ammunition, explosives, radios and agents. Sources but were limited and SOE had many other tasks. It was therefore necessary to assess the potential contribution of the resistance for the liberation of France, which wasn't exactly an easy task. The current and potential number of members and their combat value is hard to estimated, a number of them could be shortly before the invasion of the arrested and the idea of a totally unified management was illusory. Planners therefore decided that the resistance will not be assigned any task which would be garage dependent on the success of the invasion. Its activities should be more a welcome bonus. A number of factors trying to the resistance to assign a greater importance, but for a long time they were not afforded the hearing. However, in the spring of 1943, the Germans began with the conscription of young Frenchmen for forced labor in Germany. Thousands of them instead went underground. In central and southern France, they formed armed groups, called maquis, which attacked the Germans and the French collaborators. Soon noticed them SOE, who managed to persuade the british political and military leadership about the importance of these groups. These operations were allocated additional funds and SOE began maquisty a supply of arms and sabotážním material. In cooperation with the French resistance in addition, in 1943 he joined alongside SOE and the american Office of strategic services, through its section of special operations.

Strikes against the railroad


The resistance, their sabotage operations focused mainly on railway objectives, which overlap with the activities of the allied air force. The contribution of the resistance was small, but in that time, he was able to evaluate the in England few people. It was hard for these strikes to predict, record and evaluate their significance, let alone to estimate the further development. Even in Normandy the Germans have created roughly padesátikilometrové protection zone, in which it was very difficult to operate. In addition, it was very difficult here to haul supplies due to increased bomb measures. Planners, therefore, they didn't account for that resistance fighters could effectively restrict German movement in the area of the bridgehead and its nearby areas. They focused more on the coordination of sabotage activities, which would disrupt the strategic communication intended for the supply of reinforcements from further away. BCRA together with the SOE and OSS have developed two plans. Plan Green included strikes against the railroad, plan Turtle strikes against road infrastructure. It turns out that it is much easier to physically interfere with the superstructure than the road. Plan Turtle was therefore redesigned and continue counting rather with the ambushes of road convoys. Resistance in addition, organized the passive resistance of the French railway staff. Since it was not possible to tell the resistance the exact day of the invasion, they got local leaders for the task to listen to the BBC every 1., 2., 15. and 16. day of the month. If they hear the pre-determined message, And have to prepare for a confirmation message B. After her hearing should await the adoption of the specific tasks that should be broadcast through the codes again via the BBC. Each area had its own tasks and its own codes, so it was possible to activate only the necessary part. SHAEF but decided that the more chaos, the better, and so were broadcast all the instructions to start with targeted sabotážními operations. Indeed, the allied military commanders still didn't want to rely on the specific operation of the resistance, for the uncertainty about the chances of their fulfilment. Analysis carried out after the invasion showed that the resistance was quite effective weapons. During June could break the lines at 486 locations and interrupt 26 of the stem lines. At the site near the invasion were disrupted by the line Avranches-St. Lo, St. Lô-Caen and St. Lô-Cherbourg. The attacks against the convoys slowed down, for example, arrival 2. panzer division SS.

Operation JEDBURGH


Plans for the use of the resistance did not entail only the implementation of the sabotage operations, but also open to military performance in the form of a larger uprising, mainly maquistů, who would in the outback tied part of the German units. Planning and management of this activity was in charge of general Joseph Pierre Koenig. But it was a very difficult task. To organize this activity but it was almost impossible because I couldn't determine in advance and communicate the date, when should the action occur. Why were the French groups sent three-member teams, composed ideally of one Brit, one American and one French, but it wasn't exactly a strict rule. You should act in the role of couplings between maquisty and Koenigovým crew. Ever in addition ever receiving inventory or even organized the overall activities. Their task was to also provide support to the teams of the SAS. The first team was dropped in the night from 5. 6. June in the area of Châteauroux. Others followed until December.

Operations 4. battalion of the SAS in Brittany


Isolation of the normandy battlefield was an important prerequisite for allied victory. The isolation was carried out primarily air force through the deceptive operations and attacks on the railroad and bridges over the Seine and the Loire. But Brittany was located between Normandy and Loirou. Here the mounted units was the need for the most difficult option of moving into the space invasion. Next to the activities of the tactical air force with the Allies decided to deploy part of the French members of the SAS. You had to carry out sabotage activities and to initiate and lead a guerrilla war with the help of local resistance fighters and partisans, and thus slow down the movements of German units, respectively, bind them in space. In the night from 5. 6. June were above Bretaní planted two groups from the assembly 4. battalion of the SAS, which should prepare the conditions for the arrival of other groups. The first group of 18 men was planted in the framework of the operation SAMWEST near the village of Duault in north Brittany. Their first task was to establish a base at Saint-Brieuc, establish contact with the local resistance, to prepare the landing zone and then to fight against the Germans. To 9. June here landed the 116 members of the SAS. However, the 12. June the Germans on the base attacked. Here they managed to scatter, but to the men of the SAS managed to disappear and continue to fight, partly by the side of the second group, partly in the framework of the new operation GROG. Mentioned the second group was under the operation DINGSON planted near the village of Plumelec north of Vannes in south Brittany. Their task was to establish a base at Saint-Marcel. Shortly after the jump, got into a gunfight with vlasovci, during which he was wounded and then executed corporal Emile Bouétard, the first dead soldier of the invasion. However, the base managed to establish and gradually arrived here 160 members of the SAS. Arrived here even comrades in arms from the scattering of the base in Saint-Brieuc. The germans on the base attacked 18. June and scattered it. The surviving warriors joined the members of the group of operation COONEY. In the framework of this operation was on the night of 7. to 8. June planted a total of 58 members 4. battalion of the SAS in groups of three to five men. Dropped off were at the 18 designated sites. After the jump, should embark on sabotage activities, their purpose were mainly the railroad tracks. To help members of the group of operation DINGSON was in the night from 22. 23. sent a seven-strong group as part of operation LOST. When Brittany approached the american troops, made the resistance with the support of the SAXON rebellion, which the Americans facilitate the next procedure.

1. the regiment of the SAS and the us task group


The activities associated with the invasion of involved and 1. the regiment the SAS. One part was planted as part of operation HOUNDSWORTH in the vicinity of Dijon in eastern France, the second in the framework of the operation BULBASKET in the vicinity of Poitiers, south of the Loire. Similar operations were conducted also the american Operating group. Each was composed of four officers and thirty men. Their job was mainly to transport the rebels heavier weapons..
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3.2 DECEPTIVE OPERATION



in General


For the success of operation NEPTUNE was important to ensure that the German army in Normandy nedislokovala too strong defensive units, and after the start of the invasion here quickly did not move reinforcements, notably the strategic reserve in the form of panzer divisions. The allies, therefore, conducted a number of successful sting operations. The aim was to convince the Germans that the landing would take place at other locations, respectively, that the landing in Normandy is just a feint, which is supposed to distract the German division from the actual place of landing.

spy game


The allies conducted a number of more or less effective intelligence operations in previous periods. The experience gained in the operations as they were CASCADE, BARCLAY and COCKADE she made good use of a secret organisation called the London control section, when the implementation of the summary . Among the basic elements included the use of exposed double agents, the increased diplomatic activity, the radio communication between the imaginary units, phony inflatable rubber tanks and other machines. [url=https://www.valka.cz/topic/view/113477/Operation-Fortitude-North]Operation FORTITUDE NORTH she had to persuade the Germans about the upcoming landing of the dummy 4. the army in Norway, which helped operation GRAFFHAM consisting in an increased british pressure on neutral Sweden. Operation FORTITUDE SOUTH the imitated preparation patton's fictitious 1. the army group to land in the field u Calais, as appropriate, in the bay of Biscay around the Bordeaux (operation IRONSIDE). Operation VENDETTA envisaged the discontinuation of the fictional american 6. airborne division in the area of jihofrancouzského Narbonne and operation ZEPPELIN should the Germans signal the danger of an allied landing in the Balkans. The credibility of these operations to supply concurrent operation ROYAL FLUSH of increased diplomatic communication with Sweden, Spain and Turkey. The above operations were carried out a longer time before disembarking and some continued in the period after it.


Fake airborne fleet


Operation GLIMMER simulate an amphibious landing force to the area of the Pas de Calais, roughly at Boulogne. The action is for the navy participated in several boats with the appropriate radar equipment, which drove the admiral at Dover. In the air rozhazovalo metal tape Window six stirlingů 218. squadron. The same goal and the method of implementation was operation TAXABLE. She focused on the area of Cap d'Antifer at Fécampu. Took it also a few boats under the command of the dover command. In the air over them moved sixteen lancasters of 617. squadron, shazujících the same tape. Several boats falling under the Offensive grouping In the then carried out the operation BIGDRUM. Its purpose was to entice the attention of German radar in the vicinity of Barfleur, and thus partly cover the main forces of the grouping, partly to complicate the Germans to orientate himself in the situation.


Fake landings


Other air operations, that had the Germans fooled, was operation TITANIC. Within the toppled forty hudson clans, halifaxů and stirlingů fake parachutists, simulators of fire from rifles, metal tape and a squad of SAS outside the actual invasion area. The aim was to cause confusion in their places of impact, give the impression of the approaching air formation and the subsequent landing of paratroopers, distort the real scale of operations and then serve as proof that Normandy is not the actual place of landing. Squad of SAS had the task to leave some of the Germans escape, to be able to spread information about the supposed jumping out of aeroplanes.


draw German night fighters


Above the mouth of the river Somme, the aircraft the B-17 214. squadron and lancaster 101. squadron. Toppled here metal tape and turn on the radar jammers of Liechtenstein, known under the code name Airborne Cigar. This should distract the German night fighters away from the actual area of operations of allied transport aircraft.


Radar cover the actual forces


Sixteen stirlingů 199. the squadron, together with four liberators of the us 8th. the air army has taken position in the area between the Littlehamptonem and Portland Bill, with here turn on the radar jammers Mandrel, which could knock out the German radars Freya and Würzburg. While the previous operation should create the impression of approaching of invasive forces, which in fact did not exist, Mandrely on the contrary, cover up a real invasion fleet


Fake airdrop in the Channel islands


In the night from 12. 13. June conducted two canadian destroyers HMS Haida and HMS Hurron fake a landing operation near the Channel islands. The germans had the impression that he was going to disembark in the area of Granville, and instead of moving out of the unit on the peninsula of the Cotentin, which the Americans were cut off from the rest of France. The action failed, because on the destroyer Haida failed transmitter, so that the bogus posting had to maintain just Hurron. In addition to the ships already noticed one allied reconnaissance aircraft and reported it as an unknown vessel, which would in the case of the landing fleet did not happen. Moreover, the action was not accompanied by any radar interference. The germans, therefore, the action nepřipsali no more meaning..
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3.3 AIR OPERATIONS[/heading:aaaaaa]

in General


Experience from North Africa, Sicily, Salerno and from the Pacific showed that for the success of the landing operations is the key to the successful deployment of the air force. It wasn't just on the cover alone, the attack on the beach, but about a wide range of operations. Due to the kruciálnímu the importance of D-Day we would expect in all areas of warfare occurred on that day of the dramatic events. But most of the work has been done already in the days and months before the actual landings. In a general sense, they were all anglo-american air operations carried out over the continent since 1941 preparation for an invasion. Most of it concerns the major strategic bombing offensive of spring 1944, as a result of which ceased to be a German air force attack force. Air part of the D-day was relatively calm.

The word relatively is however in place for the proper loading of thousands of paratroopers in transport aircraft, the juxtaposition of these machines into the air formations and the discontinuation of the cargo in the right place was not anything simple. It was also necessary to coordinate with sorties of fighter formations and air raid bomber aircraft on the position of the enemy on the beaches. Overall, were deployed thousands of aircraft, from that point of view it was a gigantic event, but it lacked what makes the air encounter the most interesting, thus the amount of air duels. The German air force was so exhausted from the previous encounter, this time not even attempting a greater counteraction. From doktrinálního point of view should the air force supporting the operations of ground troops on D-Day for the task to carve out and maintain air superiority in the combat area, to isolate the battlefield by preventing the flow of enemy reinforcements and provide direct support for ground troops. As it was the domination obtained already before the actual landings, and the German air force is attempting its acquisition, it could have the allied air force on D-Day to dedicate the two remaining tasks.

Flight plan


Even so, but there was a whole series of strategic and tactical tasks, which was necessary to meet before starting his own landing. The overall air plan was drawn up 23. April 1944. The first task established by gaining and maintaining air superiority, a situation where the luftwaffe will not be able to threaten the army and naval forces participating in the invasion. The task was divided into three phases - the preliminary, the preparatory and assault. For the first stage was established between the D-50 to D-30, and the emphasis in it should be put on operations against the German air force and on a survey. The second phase should take place between D-30 and D-1. Among the priority targets belonged to the German aircraft, marshalling yards and other important elements of the railway infrastructure, selected coastal batteries and the airport to a distance of 200 kilometers from Caen. The last phase began in the night of the 5th. 6. June, during which they had to jump off the american and british paratroopers. Five squadrons of spitfires should constantly cover the area of the beaches from a low height, while the five squadrons thunderboltů should patrol high above them. The other five squadrons destroyed lightnings had a create a fighter screen over the invading vessels. The squadron should štafetově alternate. The total was allocated to 54 fighter squadrons over the beach, 15 above the Channel 36 to direct air support of ground units, 33 as escort and assault strength against potential intruders and 33 as a backup strike force, together 171 squadrons.

After the invasion should the air force continue to progress in the disposal of the air forces of the enemy and in bombing raids on Germany. Among other main tasks belonged to the already mentioned isolation of the battlefield and support ground forces. In addition, it should ensure the exploration and the transport of persons and material. Engineer units of the air force should prepare the ground equipment on the ground so that in D+40 from airfields in Normandy to operate 116 of the fighter squadrons. D-Day should the western Allies available 3 467 heavy bombers, 1 645 medium, light and fighter-bombers, 5 409 fighters and 2 316 transport aircraft.

Uxbridge


The place from which the air force managed, it was the English Uxbridge. Located here the headquarters of the Coninghamovy 2. tactical air army, and the forward headquarters of the american 9. the air army. These two staffs share a single, combined operating room. Formally, there also was a forward operating headquarters Leigh-Mallory's AEAF, which was a superior grade of both air armies. At the head of the forward command post stood none other than again Coningham. Quesadovo IX. fighter command had shared in the Uxbridge control centre with 11. a group of RAF, so ensure the coordination of the operations of fighter aircraft. Created was also the common center for the evaluation of the survey. Advanced headquarters of the AEAF have communicated with Montgomery's 21. a group of armies, which was in Uxbridge liaison element, who presented the air force requirements and communicate other important information. Leigh-Mallory remained in Stanmore, where he supervised all operations of AEAF and coordinated tactical support provided by the heavy bombers with the relevant american and british hqs. On each of the five command of the vessels at the beaches was the representative of the air force, which advised the commanders of the ground of volumes and directed the aircraft in attacks on targets on the beaches. The sea routes were three radar equipped vessels intended for the management of accompanying fighters, which should induce on the target. As quickly as possible should be in Normandy established land centres for the management of operations. With the hqs of the land units were teams of the air force designated to communicate with the air force, primarily to guidance on the targets.

Strikes on the habitat of the missiles V-1 and V-2 rockets


Already at the end of 1943 the air force as part of operation CROSSBOW focused on the range of missiles V-1 and V-2 rockets, which were a threat to the still larger number of units, which have been in southern England, gradually concentrated up to D-Day. Attacks on this post then continued until the beginning of June.

Supply resistance


The next part of the deployment of air forces was operation CARPETBAGGER, during which he was French, belgian, Dutch and Italian resistance supplied weapons, material and trained specialists. Thrown weapons have sufficed for the equipment of 20 thousand resistance fighters. You conduct sabotage strikes against the coupling means and transport infrastructure.

Blows against the German air industry


The strategic bomber force in February focused on the German aviation industry. already in the previous year he suffered numerous wounds from the allied bombers. The strongest strikes came in the week from 20. February, which was překřtěn on the so-called Big week. American and british bombers attacked, for example, at the factory for ball bearings at Schweinfurt or plant of the company Messerschmitt in the Aušpurku. German fighters try to these royal air force to resist, but the bombers accompanied by a strong escort accompanying fighter aircraft. The result was more than five hundreds of downed German fighters. This loss proved to the German air force to replace.

Strikes against the German navy


In march, the allied air force concentrated on the German naval threat. Aircraft of the british Headquarters of the coastal air force, reinforced by a machine Command bomber air force has taken a series of attacks against German submarines and hladinovému fleet, there was mining of sea routes and areas. The aim was to prevent the German navy in the possibility of compromise invading the area.

Strikes against the railroad


The basic aim of the strikes against French and belgian rail network was the isolation of space invasion. 26. march was approved the plan of air raids. Among the main objectives belonged to the marshalling yards, depot, depot, repair workshop and warehouse of spare parts, including tracks. The rail network already wasn't in good condition, as the upper suffered from wear and tear and lack of maintenance, there were not enough spare parts, and coal, and the nazis seized one-third of the locomotives. The allies estimated that two-thirds of the transmission performances are intended for the German military forces. If they managed to disrupt the key points and prevent their repair, the Germans would have had a problem with the flow of forces and material into Normandy. The largest concentration of targets in northwest France and Belgium. Here the network was densest, it was here that most of the advances, was mined here coal for locomotives, and it also indicated the future site of the invasion, because of the strikes here may indicate the isolation of the area near Calais. Some allied politicians and commanders feared for the lives of civilians in strikes on the station, however, the isolation of the battlefield was among the primary prerequisites for success of the invasion. Air raids began in the first half of march, at a time when it wasn't yet approved the final plan. In actions to gradually engage as a fighter and medium bombers, heavy bombers. A good tactic brought a relatively low loss of civilian life, and so was in mid-April lifted the ban on attacks on targets in heavily populated areas with the exception of cities like Paris or Nancy. The increased number of targets. Targets assigned 8. air army were in Belgium, northwest France and western Germany, 15. air force flying over southern France and central Germany, heavy bombers of the RAF attacked targets in northwestern France, Belgium and the area around Paris. The tactical air force had left the rest of the targets in northern France and Belgium. A series of raids yielded very good results, however, the Germans were able in march and April a total of quick a bombed-out train station make. The allies found out, that it will take more repeated air raids, than originally anticipated. So far managed to basically stop the French and belgian civilian transport, the operation of the German military transports was relatively smooth. In may have been air strikes against the railroad intensified. Of their quantity and concentration, it seemed that the main goal lies in Calais, but the most elaborate punch were carried out on the lines to Normandy. The tactical air force was in the middle of may, basically fulfilled and performed more maintenance on the air strikes, strategic air force, on the contrary continued in full force. Some of the targets in Germany were removed and replaced by the objectives in Italy and the Balkans. On D-Day, it was assumed that of the 80 objectives in the north of France it was 51 heavily damaged. Others were damaged significantly. Losses to aircraft were relatively low and hits pretty accurate, so even losses among the civilian population have been lower than expected.

In mid-may decreased the volume transport in the West about the third and the curve of the decline was falling ever faster down. However, it still wasn't enough. 20. may therefore have been more robustly carried out air strikes fighters against a moving transports in order to destroy as many locomotives. During the two weeks they succeeded, especially during the missions CHATTANOOGA CHOO-CHOO, when there were synchronizovanému the deployment of a huge amount of fighters over large territories, damage less than five hundred. Pilots also practice strikes against small ground targets, which they then use in the direct air support of ground troops. The French railroad workers had had enough and began to desert, necessitating the deployment of German operators, which then missed elsewhere. In addition, it was ordered to restrict the movement of the day.

Probably the most successful part of the operation was the destruction of the bridges. At first it seemed that there will not be a chance to achieve significant success, as the bridges, especially the steel across the river, were heavily defended flakes, it wasn't easy to hit, and used them too a large amount of tonnage. The experience of Italy during operation STRANGLE but revealed that the attacks on the bridges are feasible and destroyed bridges have a great effect on the activity of the enemy. Ground commanders in addition to their destruction they started getting more press. The test strikes typhoons proved to be another promise. 7. may thunderboltům and marauderům 9. the air army managed to severely damage the four bridges using a small number of bombs. 10. may they were therefore sent another machines against bridges over the Albert canal and the meuse river, which again sort of points to a Calais, but well served and the isolation of the Normandy. Planners have concluded that it's a more efficient way to isolate the battlefield than the current air raids on transport targets, and have prepared a programme for the destruction of all the bridges over the Seine to Mantes, across the Loire to Blois and through smaller water flows in the area between Paris and Orléans. The bridges over the Loire should be for safety reasons, discarded at the time of landing. The bridges over the Seine were to be destroyed shortly before the invasion, because their elimination could show how on the Normandy, so at Calais. Meanwhile, it was during may carried out a number of strikes against bridges in Belgium. The most effective combination was an air raid marauders shazujících pound bombs, thunderboltů with čtvrttunovými bombs and typhoonů with unguided rockets RP-3. The damage was such that the Germans didn't repair. Lagged the even flow of the material, including for the construction of the "Atlantic wall". Even 1. June but has not achieved the desired level of disruption of the transport volume. It was therefore vitally necessary to destroy all twelve railway and fourteen road bridges over the Seine to get from the north to the south could not move the unit 15. army. It is fortunately for the Allies managed to arrange in the last days before the invasion.

Allies in air strikes against transport targets dropped a total of 71 thousand tons of bombs on the railway centre, 4 of 400 tons on the bridges and 800 tonnes on the rails in the open countryside. At the time of the invasion to the right in the north of France, basically stopped. Reinforcements from the area behind the Seine had to be summoned from a large part on its axis and divided into smaller units without the possibility of concentration for an effective counterattack. The allies managed to cross the Channel to transport more reinforcements than the Germans across the Seine.

Attacks on the petrochemical industry


Attacks on German refineries and other elements of the German petrochemical industry, which produced fuel and lubricants either the refining of crude oil or a synthetic route, have been considered since the 1940s, however, these objectives were too diffuse and out of reach. The situation changed arrival 15. air army on the Italian battlefield, but at that time there were many other goals, which should have greater priority, and were more vulnerable - mainly it was about the aircraft factories and plants for the production of ball bearings. Enough of the bombers was up to at the beginning of 1944, then, but again arose the necessity of missions as part of operation CROSSBOW, and it was also necessary to deal with the luftwaffe and ensure the execution of attacks on targets associated with the invasion, primarily on the rail. The allied air commanders have long argued, what is more suitable to attack. It so happened that the first strike in the campaign against the German refineries occurred up to 5. April 1944, when it was carried out a strike against Ploješti, and it was also the declared goal of the marshalling yards. However, the attack proved to be successful, and so came next. 12. may join 8. air army, which on that day carried out a test raid against the refiners. A thousand bombers this army, accompanied by a very strong fighter escort of 8. the air army, 9. the air army and the RAF, to avoid the Ruhr area and from the south podletěla this hot spot round here and headed over Zwickau, Merseburg-Leunu, Bridge, Lützkendorf, Böhlen, and other targets. All were affected, some quite severely. In addition, the luftwaffe couldn't keep away and her fighters had to willy-nilly into the air. They managed to shoot down many bombers, but the Germans themselves have noted a significant loss. And it just went - both harm the production of fuel, both to lure and shoot down German fighter pilots. 205. a group of RAF in addition zaminovávala the Danube, to impeded the river traffic on this artery. At the end of may then Command bomber air force joined the strikes against the refineries. These raids, particularly those on targets in the Balkans and in central Europe, forced the Germans to maintain here the remnants of the fighter forces, which then could deploy against the invading forces.

Strikes against the German airports


Already from the beginning of planning all aware that for the success of the invasion will be necessary to neutralize the German airport in western Europe, from which the might of the luftwaffe to operate against the invasion forces. For the minimum target, it was found to displace the German fighter units on the east, not to have an advantage over allied machines, which first had to cross the Channel. At the beginning of the year culminating in the successful operation POINTBLANK, which was a big air campaign against the German aviation industry and luftwaffe as such. The result was considerable paralysis, but not complete destruction of the German air threat. It was assumed that the Germans could against the invasion of the deploy 900 aircraft, of which 450 would be bombers. Indeed, the luftwaffe give in the spring to know during the so-called Baby Blitz, when he unsuccessfully tried for the bombing of London and ports in southern England, to so jeopardize the preparations for the invasion. The germans, moreover, were counting on the fact that in the case of the initiation of the invasion moved to the west other air units. In a radius of 550 kilometers from the place of landing was about 100 airfields of the luftwaffe. Most of them were in the spring of 1944, the empty from the a few operated a couple of reconnaissance and protilodních units. The empty airport but could easily be reactivated. The attacks on this airport seemed to be non-productive, because the Germans would be able to after the raid quite easily and quickly repaired. Not therefore make sense to attack them too soon, rather until shortly before the actual invasion. The allies therefore draw up a comprehensive plan, which consisted of three elements: the continuous pursuit of the clashes with the luftwaffe, to be kept in the reduced states, the raids of the heavy bombers deep over Germany, to here had to be kept fighter machines, and mass strikes against the airports during the three weeks before the invasion. At that time already, the Germans should in addition have problems with supply of material and spare parts to repair damage due to previous strikes against the transport system.

In April took the allied tactical air force struck several blows against the German airports outside the invasion area, which on the one hand continued to confuse the enemy about the invasion and, secondly, you nacvičilo this type of attacks. If at the end of the first third of may began very offensive against German air bases and landing areas. On targets outside the invasion area did the Allies more air raids and in the invasion area has mainly focused on the around Paris and Lille, whose elimination could also be related to a possible landing in the area of Calais. Just a raid on the airport in Brest could be some help, but naval commanders do him force, because the aircraft could, in cooperation with u-boats threaten the invading vessels. At the end of may it turned out that the Germans are still moving into the area no units from the occipital areas, and therefore, it was decided that the program of air raids on the German airport will be muted in favor of other objectives, although has not been completed and a number of objectives has not been damaged to the extent which had been anticipated. Even so, it was the ability of the luftwaffe to operate against the invasion forces very distorted. The germans couldn't push the other fighter unit, as it is needed over Germany, where they had to respond to powerful air strikes 8. the air army, couldn't they use a range of implied airports, would it be a problem with transportation and, moreover, feared operations strong group of allied fighter units. The result was that the luftwaffe during D-Day did not carry even a single day raid on the invading forces.

Strikes against radars and communication nodes


Network of German radar was densest in the area between Oostende and the cherbourg peninsula. Every 15 miles there was one more post. The allies had pretty good awareness and aware of their hazards for air and sea invasion force, as they could drive the activity of the coastal and anti-aircraft artillery. These objectives but it was too many and were well defended. The allies therefore, in the majority of them focused on their bursts. It is but it wasn't the radar between the Norman islands and Oostende, it was necessary to neutralize the old-fashioned way, which occurred during may. And here was true, that on every radar in the area, went to attacks on two other elsewhere. Strikes on radars implemented mainly by typhoons 2. tactical air army, although engage other air volumes. Most of the targets in the area of the landing was severely damaged or completely discarded. In addition, in Cherbourg managed to eliminate regional connecting and reporting centre. The ability of the German radar in the area has fallen below 20 percent. After the deployment of the distracting elements then dropped to 5 percent. The germans were literally blinded.

Aerial survey


Very busy they were before the invasion and reconnaissance units. To common tasks, which represent coverage targets in Germany as part of operation POINTBLANK, and the tactical survey of German activities in France and the Benelux countries, it was necessary to obtain some specific information on the implementation of the landing. Due to the need to conceal the exact location of the invasion had to a survey carried out over wider regions of western Europe. The coordination was ensured by AEAF, which collect the requirements from 21. group of the armies, the navy, and from SHAEF. Also coordinated the interaction with the reconnaissance units of 8. the air army, which under the AEAF did not fall, but the requirements primarily on tactical reconnaissance with the impending landings multiplied and the machinery wasn't quite a sufficient number. Pilots of reconnaissance aircraft, in addition to bringing valuable photographic images, often reported the movement of enemy trains, and the columns still in flight so that it can straight be directed fighter-bombers. Itself the beaches and their surroundings, including the landing and impact areas for the airborne units, the pictures were taken from different heights and distances so that the commanders of land-based bundles could make you a detailed idea about their future battlefield. The level of the beach was taken from a five meter high height, so that they can be identified underwater obstacles.

Strikes against coastal defense


Atlantic wall wasn't in Normandy at all perfect, however, allied planners with him had to count. The most feared of the batteries of the coastal artillery, whose cannon with a calibre of up to 400 mm can strongly compromise the allied vessels and vyloďující soldiers. It was assumed that these batteries will be fully functional from June 1944. The cannon was well hidden, properly placed and protected with reinforced concrete covers, so it was necessary to hit exactly. Moreover, it is to protect the flakes, so their elimination did not represent an easy task. The original plans were calculated with air strikes on these targets for up to several hours through the start of the invasion, when she had this position and their operators receive their allocation from the allied vessels and aviation. Was envisaged with the deployment of medium, light and fighter-bombers. Ground commanders but extorted the involvement of heavy bombers. Machine Command bomber air force should attack in the night of the 5th. 6. June and machines 8. the air army should make the raid a half hour before the actual invasion. But it wasn't enough and the army and navy increasingly pushed for it to be done more effort to disable these works, as they feared that one shot might not do the trick, maybe because of the bad weather. In April, it was found that several of the batteries is during the finishing work temporarily vulnerable. Eventually outweighed the opinion of those who were pushing for a strike against them. Because of the deception of the Germans but for every normandskou the battery went to two out of the invasion area. The raids were carried out 2. tactical air army, and especially 9. army aviation. The first strike was carried out 13. April, another followed. At the beginning of may to these attacks involved the british heavy bombers of the RAF and to the end of the month and the machine 8. the air army. The effectiveness of these raids is difficult to assess, as these objectives were the target of further raids on the beginning of the invasion. It seems that the direct damages were not extensive, however, the airstrikes led to the delay of the work and to undermine the morality of the operators. Ground commanders, who had charge of the landing, are also increasingly interested in the various obstacles that the Germans set up on the beaches and below the surface. There have been proposals for punches fighter-bombers against the workers, who these inhibitions inscribed on the place, but were rejected, as they could disclose the location of the invasion.

Air patrols and fighter raids


At the end of may were introduced to air patrols over the areas of English ports and French beaches. This impenetrable air barrier should the Germans prevent any air activity over this territory. In addition, they were over France shortly before the invasion, carried out raids groups of fighter aircraft, which formed a kind of a forward fighter defence.


Night out of 5. 6. June


2. group the RAF has sent out his light bombers to 150 missions. their task was a survey and isolation of the airspace. A thousand heavy and medium bombers carried out the strikes on the coastal batteries in the invasion zone. It was a post at Fontenay, Houlgate, La Pernelle, Longues, Maisy, Merville, Mont Fleury, Pointe-du-Hoc, Ouisterham and St Martin-de-Varreville. The plane toppled to the objectives of more than five thousand tons of bombs. The air force this night also transposed a number of deceptive operations - see chapter above.

6. June


Machine Hq air defence of Great Britain provide day and night air defence, staging areas troops, airports and ports in the parent islands. Over normandským battleground then be in charge of the night protection. Here provide also aircraft Command of the coastal air force, which in the French coast looking for German submarines and surface vessels. Furthermore, this headquarters was broadcast machines on the nightly forays into the rear of the enemy. Last but not least, provide fighter cover for the daily blows of the bombers and the movements of the gliders and their towing machines, whether transported men or supplies. Also worth mentioning is the share of the rescue crews, which ended up in the waters of the English channel.

Headquarters air defence of Great Britain has cooperated closely with the 2. a tactical air army, which formed part of the Allied air expeditionary forces, and which tasks are partially overlapped with the first mentioned command. However, the tactical army was expected to be advance together with ground forces and provide air support. 6. June was tasked to provide air cover in the combat area, excluding the peninsula of the Cotentin, to provide direct air support to british ground units and provide tactical and photographic reconnaissance. Among other tasks included laying a smoke screen on both flanks of the bridgehead and the identification of targets for naval artillery.

The allied air force addressed the question of how to provide a warning before any attack by the German air force, as the habitat of the radars in England was too far away. The solution consisted in the loading of the equipment on the three attack boats. Here should be controlled by firing anti-aircraft guns and enticed the aircraft, in on spitfires, in the night mosquito. Other equipment was on the trucks and was disembarked at the end of the day. After the preoccupation of the designated habitats provide allied beachhead information about what is happening in the airspace.

Shortly before the beginning itself of the landing forces on the beaches of the lost allied aircraft in the area north-west of France many leaflets, which the French civilians report that the approaching liberation of their country. Further recommended to the people near the coast to go inland, or at least avoided the roads and resorted to the wide open landscape. Mosquito 21. squadron RAF, meanwhile, operated in the rear and in the dark, attacked trains, road transport and basically everything that moved.

Heavy bombers of the 8. the air army were given the task to attack the coastal batteries and defensive positions on OMAHA beach, on the beaches in the british sector and on the strategic points with Caen. Due to their number, the number of targets and a short distance, they had to attack in waves. In those and launched, from 01:55 to 05:29. Due to the weather, it was necessary to attack the instrument. The allied commanders were concerned that the bombs would hit the vyloďující units, and therefore, it was ordered that the last bomb must hunt down the ten minutes before the start of the invasion and bombometčíci had bombs to throw with a certain delay. From the state of 8. air army a total of took off 1 361 machines B-17 and B-24. Waves of about six wing close to the beaches at right angles, kept značkovacími aircraft equipped with the device of H2S. 1 083 machines tossed 2 944 tons of bombs. Lost was only one machine. Bombs mostly did not have delay timers to detonate just after impact and minimize thus the formation of deep craters, which would later be difficult to transport.

Objectives in the area of UTAH beach were allocated IX. bombardovacímu headquarters 9. the air army. Due to the bad weather and the better instrumentation of the institute enable the machines 8. the air army, it was considered that its machines, specifically the ones intended for targets at Caen, carry out these strikes. Brigadier general Anderson but assert, that any transfer of tasks to avoid. His pilots but they had to bomb from a height of less than 1 kilometer. Medium bombers then flew between 03:43 and 05:00 in formations of eighteen machines. On the more distant targets were dropped the first bombs in 05:17, on targets on the beach of UTAH in 06:05. Another then fell for a period of less than twenty minutes. 278 machines dropped 550 tons of bombs. Amounted to even fighter-bombers of the IX. fighter command. 33 machines attacked the coastal battery, 129 of the other targets from the area of transport infrastructure, mostly on the peninsula of the Cotentin.

Evaluation of the effectiveness of these strikes is difficult, as it was not possible to take high-quality photos immediately after the raids, a number of the objectives was the object of strokes already in previous raids, was directed at them fire from naval guns and artillery land units and your done and the engineers. However, it turned out that the more efficient were medium bombers. But for those heavy have been introduced restrictions, which necessarily impair their accuracy, although they have brought more security for ground forces. A number of bombs while your found, but the tremors were so strong, that there has been an explosion of minefields. Intense air and naval bombardment also strongly zhrošilo the morale of German soldiers, while posílo the morale of allied soldiers. Unfortunately part of the coast to the east of OMAHA beach remained without damage. Anyway, the air force owed pawns for it, that the Germans were forced to withdraw the battery of Morsalines, St.-Martin-de-Varreville and Pointe du Hoc, though it wasn't thanks to strikes from D-day. It seems that these strikes had no impact on any battery. Nevertheless, it is necessary to say that most of the batteries ostřelujících beach on D-day did not belong among those which were on the list of objectives for the morning air raids, but was located further inland.

The first attacks by bombers and fighter-bombers of D-day were a harbinger of the growing activities of the tactical air force. Even after the rest of the day to fulfil both the american air army tactical tasks. Heavy bombers of the 8. the air army dropped leaflets for the French civilians and then headed out on strikes against important targets in the immediate vicinity of the beaches and further in Thury Harcourt, St.-Lô and Caen. However, thick cloud cover and the lack of marking machines have been caused by it that most of the bombers came back, without on the targets attacked. However, the bombers that day didn't say the last word. In the next wave will focus on Caen. Local bridges over the Caen were except for the one destroyed, which slowed the arrival of the 21. panzer division on the battlefield. The fourth and last mission bombers 8. air army on D-day facing the traffic targets close to the invasion area from Coutances after Lisieux.

Medium bombers of the IX. bomber command concentrated on the coastal battery on the wings of the invasive area, the important objectives in cities like Carentan or Falaise and on the four marshalling yards east of the Seine. Fighter and fighter-bomber machines VIII. fighter command established at operation FULL HOUSE the operations of the STUD, and ROYAL FLUSH. Their goal was to move German troops and supplies, and also any activity of the German air force. To the account of the accounted for less than a thirtieth of destroyed German aircraft. Similar to the work performed and the british 2. a tactical air army.

The pilots of the IX. fighter command immediately after leaving the assigned mission for D-Day, began with the direct support of ground units on the beaches and behind them. Requirements of the commanders of ground units to transmit to a group of air controllers, which were members of the air force assigned to ground crews. Before the end of the Day, they asked the commanders of the Combined control centre at Uxbridge by thirteen strokes. Five of them had to be rejected, but of the remaining eight turned to eleven missions. Among the targets belonged to the status of works at Isigny, Carentan, and Maisy, of which were shot up the beach, or the various transport objectives. It turned out that the control centre in Uxbridge was too loaded with requests for quick air support. Standby squadron were therefore subordinated to the senior aviation officials of the air force at the command ship ANCON, which was located near OMAHA beach. It possible to quickly transmit the requirements of reconnaissance and fighter-bomber aircraft in the air.

Shortly after ground combat units in Normandy arrived and the units of the air force, whose task was to build in Normandy airport and provide them service support. It was about the three types of airports: emergency landing areas, areas for the replenishment of ammunition and fuel and předsunut landing area. At the end of the D-day arrived and the forward surgical teams 50. mobile field hospital that took a position at the emergency landing area.

Live was even at sea. For all operations include the attack of the machines mosquito of 248. squadron and a beaufighter of 144. squadrons for three destroyers of the class Seetier. While the mosquito to ensure the space, beaufightery carried out on the vessel strike missiles and cannons. Did not cause but more than just damage to one ship. On the way to the base planes of at least shot down a German bomabrdér Ju 188, which is dangerously getting closer to the allied destroyers.

The evening of 6. June, the air force shipped during operation MALLARD the gliders to the battlefield the rest of the 6. airborne division. In the night from 6. on 7. June then under the operation of ROB ROY followed the stream of supplies on parachutes.

Next days


RAF pilots have made 7. June strike on road and rail targets in northwest France. Panzer division approaching from the Alenconu suffered heavy losses, when she lost over two hundreds of vehicles. That day was the Asnelle at Bayeux; the first airport. In the night from 7. to 8. June attacked the bombers on the railway circle around Paris and other targets from the area of transport infrastructure. The following night, shot through the machine 617. squadron RAF towards Saumur, since, according to the intelligence information here should be to Normandy against the German panzer division. Against the local railway tunnel was applied for the first time air puma called the Tallboy, which it knocked out of operation.

8. jun managed to the british commandos to occupy Port-en-Bessin, and to link the beaches of GOLD and OMAHA. Two days later, there was a connection to OMAHA beach with the beaches of UTAH and interruption of transport links between Carentan and cherbourg peninsula. Thanks to the darkness it could be a gradual change in the deployment of the air force. Heavy bombers attacked the tanks of fuel more important defensive elements, and a larger gathering of troops. However, more and more of them were transferred to the air strikes on strategic targets deep inland. Light and medium bombers attacked the launch of habitat shots In a-1, transport hubs and communication centres. More and more often but received the tasks in the framework of the direct air support of ground units. It was, however, a domain primarily fighter-bombers. Their activities increase the effectiveness of the deployment of forward air controllers and taxi system of their deployment. This consisted in the fact that the air was still several fighter-bombers prepared to quickly attack after receiving the request from the návodčího. Another element was light aircraft in the function of the artillery battery. First, follow the fire of the naval guns, then fire the main artillery land units. Often but to guide and fighter-bombers. Machines Headquarters of the coastal force across a dense patrol network, which should prevent the penetration of submarines or surface vessels in the area of supply routes, on which sailed a large number of allied vessels.

10. June began the allied planes operated from airfields in Normandy. On the other hand, there has been 13. June to launch the missiles V-1 to the south of England. The british reacted to this reorganisation of anti-aircraft artillery and forces of the Headquarters of the air defense of Great Britain. 14. and 15. June, the Allies decided to deal with the danger that accounted for the attacks of the German E-Bootů from the ports of Le Havre and Boulogni. Ports were given a ration of bombs Tallboy and classic bombs. Danger in the form of E-Bootů was completely eliminated. 22. June operated the combined teams. Their first target was anti-aircraft guns south of Cherbourg. Were attacked by a mixed group in the form of four typhoonů, six mustangs, and more than five hundy -- thunderboltů and destroyed lightnings. 25. June has carried out more than seven hundred machines from Britain and Normandy, the preparatory bombing of the defensive positions in the vicinity of Caen.

the Role of the transport air force


During the landing shipped the transport air force in the areas behind the invasion beaches and around their hips skydivers and paratroopers in gliders. You should disrupt the German effort to strike against the invading forces occupy the key elements and cover for the wings. Then the transport air unit focused on transportation of supplies to the normandy beachhead and the evacuation of the wounded.

Direct air support


As far as the area of the beaches, was direct air support is needed the most on the beaches of OMAHA. Here managed to get only a mile or two broad strip of territory. This complicated the supply of other units, equipment and supplies, failed to establish a connection with the other beaches, and the situation here was generally critical. It was necessary to knock out the enemy artillery position, from which the space was the beach being bombarded, to get more space for maneuvering and connect with the beaches of UTAH and GOLD. The Commander In. ward demanded the continuous support of fighter-bombers, which were to search and destroy the German guns. The queue was moving and the awareness of the exact location of the artillery position was limited. Therefore I couldn't guide the plane straight to the target. Instead, it was determined the bomber line on the river by aure, whose trough was between Isigny and Bayeux parallel with the coast at a distance of from three to six miles. IX. headquarters tactical air force should ensure the continuous armed reconnaissance in the area of the river by aure-Bayeux-Airel. Only two goals were allocated from the ANCONu, the rest of the goals to find the pilots themselves. Most of the targets accounted for armored and cargo vehicles or a mustering of the troops in the forest of Cerisy and Balleroy, however, managed to locate and disarm the five batteries.

While the situation on OMAHA beach was a serious, IX. bomber command attacked the bridges and traffic junctions in the cities near the front line. Effect but wasn't too big, since the Germans relatively early set up detours. On the other hand, the attack of the medium bombers at the train station in Folligny heavily damaged two German transports.

The area of UTAH beach was at the end of the day, relatively secure, although not achieved all the objectives set. VII. the choir proved relatively quickly to advance to the south, to occupy the Carentan and connect with In. choir. Subsequently he went to the north to Quineville and westward to Barneville. This enabled him to even permanent air support. Fighter-bombers knocked out 7. June gun battery at Maisy, and then in ten days attacked the other fifteen artillery position. Pilots attacked bridges and conducting research for the ground troops. They also managed to eliminate the commander of the 77. infantry division. Medium bombers attacked the opěvněná position at Cherbourg, but with minimal effect. 13. June In. the choir stood on the positions and conducted only patrolling, VII. the choir set off to Cherbourg.

Help with the procedure at Cherbourg


In connection with the final phase of the attack on Cherbourg asked the army air force for a larger stroke. The commander of the VII. ward asked about the "air dilution" at a depth of about 25 miles. A massive air strike shouldn't necessarily be directed at specific targets, the main outcome should be to undermine German commitment to the defence and the disruption of lines of communication. The attack began at 22. June shortly after noon. First got to the word artillery, which attempted to knock out the German anti-aircraft guns and draw the white mist of the southern and western edge of the target area. At 12:40 from the west rushed the machine 2. tactical army - four squadron typhoonů with podvěšenými unguided missiles SC-3 and six squadrons of mustangs. Followed by twelve groups of fighter-bombers 9. the air army. One wave went through one after the other. At 13:55 knocked out the last fighter-bomber. The germans but much neodpočinuli. Shortly after 14. class above them appeared the medium bombers of the eleven groups of the IX. bomber command, which odhazovaly bombs on the tougher defensive positions. The total was deployed 675 fighter-bombers (38 lost) and 396 medium bombers (1 lost). In the sky appeared a few German planes, but neither pilot did not dare to approach and attack. The immediate tactical results of not come true expectations. American ground troops may have been ordered to temporarily retreat for the bomber line, but even so, on some of them the bombs fell. Losses were low and most likely the result of the activity of the German artillery, which fired zadýmovací projectiles at locations outside the bombing zone, with the aim to confuse the pilots. Often also, there were delays between the end of the raid and the beginning of the procedure of the infantry. However, it should be recalled that the main objective should be to undermine German morality and the disruption of the connection between units and hqs. And for that to happen, although the number of defensive points remained intact. The ability of the air force were great, but not perfect. Indeed, Cherbourg was occupied by 27. June and the last points of resistance fell silent 1. July. Even after the 22. June is in the sky over the north Cotentinem appeared allied aircraft, but their presence wasn't great what with the number of take-offs. For the first air raid on La Glacerie, which lies just before the cherbourg peninsula. Thunderbolty here on the goals they dumped the 24 bombs, and 23 of them turned out exactly on the designated target.

Changes in the management of the tactical air force


Already mentioned moving the control from the forward command post 9. the air army in Uxbridge on the deck of the vessel ANCON. But this was not a completely satisfactory solution. 10. June took over the management of 70. fighter-bomber wing, which has already landed on the continent. 18. June has replaced it shipped in from the forward headquarters of the IX. the headquarters of the tactical air force. It received requests for support from ground-based volumes, profiltrovávalo is and allocate the forces and means. If not enough own funds, submitted an application to Uxbridge. That could be a great way to quickly work 70. wing and then referred to the forward hq was in large part the merit of the signal corps, who landed at the end of D-day on OMAHA beach and immediately got to work. Also important was dělná cooperation that prevailed between ground and air commanders and staffs, the same is true of cooperation and the sharing of objectives and of the forces between the Americans and the British. Often there were temporary tactical přepodřizování fighter-bombers or bombers for fulfilment of a certain task, if one side lacked sufficient capacity. No less important was, that IX. ženijnímu headquarters quite quickly managed to build in Normandy airport, from which they could operate fighter-bombers, which otherwise they were losing a lot of time when you fly out of the Channel. Not to mention more effective communication and the elimination of obstacles in the form of bad weather in the south of England. 19. June began to operate from normandy airports of the first group, however, has previously been the airport used for take-off, when the plane takes off from the south of England, carried out a punch, then landed on the normandy the airport, carried out another strike or several strikes after another landing and then took off for home base in England. Add that 8. June started at the beaches of OMAHA to operate the airport designed for the conveying of the priority stocks and the evacuation of the wounded.

Procedure in the south


3. July began a limited american advance to the south. The aim was to complete the cast of the bridgehead, and thus gain enough space for the subsequent maneuver that had yet to bring a breakthrough from the area of normandy coast. American troops on the Cotentinu to exert pressure on La Haye-du-Puits, and then on to Périers and Lessay. Other then the way from OMAHA beach to St.-Lo. The germans put a stiff resistance and the rugged terrain they provide an advantage. However, the Americans advanced up to 20. July forward. Tactical air force to help them mainly in attacks on the position of the cannons and machine guns or tanks buried in the tower position. Among the other targets belonged to the predicted command posts, observation (often a church steeple), moving the column, places of concentration of troops, warehouses, and bridges. Pilots attacked on the requested and allocated to the objectives or conduct armed reconnaissance. Not always succeeded in the goal to hit or significantly damage it. In other cases, but proved to the air force to distract the German attempts to counter-attack or thoroughly prepare the way for the infantry. And it wasn't because of a very mobile front line always the time to thoroughly determine the bomber line. Pilots had to be very careful to not hit your own units. The germans repeatedly reported that artillery and air attacks greatly deplete their units as far as the team and the technicians. The germans could often rely only on bad weather, which often make it impossible or significantly hampered air activity. Steady ground procedure and the supporting air strikes have allowed the Americans to occupy the St.-Lô and take a position just a short walk north from the highway Lessay-Périers-St.-Lo. 14. 20. July in this area concentrated reinforcements, and prepared to operation COBRA, which made to operation NEPTUNE.

Air support in Caen


British and canadian troops were right at the beginning of operation NEPTUNE occupy the strategically important city of Caen. However, they failed right at the beginning or in the days following. The germans concentrated a strong tank formations supported by many gun emplacements anti-tank artillery and other supporting points. 8. July should be made another attempt at the conquest of the city. In preparation of the strike bombers to the Headquarters of bomber command the air force and IX. bomber command on targets south of the city, while part of the medium bombers of the IX. the air army zacílilo on the bridges in the city and over the area operated machine 2. tactical air army. Just before the start of the attack, 7. June shortly before the 22. hour conducted heavy bombers carpet bombing. 8. July morning to them was followed by five groups of bombers of the IX. bomber command. Not all machines but could the bombs finally drop. Then with a relatively large delay began the attack ground units. The germans managed to concentrate and air and naval bombardment has created a considerable amount of large craters. Both a very slow procedure. However, most towns eventually fell to the british and canadian hands. The operation CHARNWOOD followed up with operation GOODWOOD, the aim of which was to cast the rest of the city and the break of the south towards Falaise. Even this operation was preceded by powerful aviation preparation. Early in the morning 18. July send Command bomber air force of nearly a thousand heavy bombers. Followed by 571 heavy bombers of the 8. the air army. The top arrived eleven groups of medium bombers of the IX. bomber command. Those but the clouds and smoke from previous bombing of the very complication of the work and the effect of their strike was limited. The word came machine 2. tactical air army. Immediately after the departure of the medium bombers are moving ground troops. Initially progressed quite well and captured a number of completely ohluchlých Germans. However, in the first lines, the British encountered heavy resistance anti-tank guns, which had not been before the attack revealed, which meant that they didn't drop any bombs. Soon complemented by infantry, which had recovered from the initial shock. When the rainy weather 20. July stopped the activities of ground troops, so the Allies attributed only about ten kilometers. The allied commanders were disappointed from the fact that the attack brought such meager results, although it was deployed approximately 1 600 heavy-duty and 350 medium bombers, which together dropped 7 700 tons of air bombs. But the German commanders saw it differently. They were literally devastated by the possibility of an allied air force, and predicted the early fall of German forces in Normandy.

Appreciation


As we have noted, the air force had next to the side quests the three major - fighting and maintain air superiority on the battlefield, the isolation of the battlefield and support to ground units. The evaluation of the success of the air force is not easy, because in such a complex operation played a role more officials, and air force, therefore, neoperovalo as a separate element, but rather in cooperation with other forces - ground forces, navy, intelligence, resistance and other components of the war machine. However, certain conclusions can be formulated. The first task was accomplished almost without rest. The air force established the air cover of the naval forces over the Channel and then cover the invasion forces in both low and high altitude. Fighters hit the almost zero resistance and they wouldn't let the German air force basically no space for combat action against the invading forces. The second task was considerably more complex, and from the nature of things could not be complete, however, it can be concluded that especially the liquidation of the railway bridges, particularly those over the Seine and the Loire, resisting attempts to their correction, permanent strikes against seřaďovacím station and the locomotives greatly disrupted the flow of troops and material to the battlefield. German troops had to move in large part on its own axis, and preferably at night. It is very wear, especially in the case of tank units, and in addition so delayed. The germans weren't capable of moving enough spare forces, let alone contemplate the creation of backups for a large-scale counterattack. The unit arrived broken into small units, which were immediately deployed to the front. The germans also struggled with the lack of fuel and ammunition. Another problem was the desertion of the French railway personnel and psychological problems for the female staff train administrative buildings. Probably the most difficult is the evaluation of the efficiency of direct air support. Its implementation was very complicated for several reasons. One of the original theoretical postulates of the air force in the anglo-saxon area was that either undergoes the battle with the enemy fighters, or attack targets that are out of reach of infantry and artillery, that is guns on the strategic level. This was a very dulled by the applicable field rules and the introduction of the medium bombers and fighter-bombers, but a number of the air commanders still prefer duels with the German fighters, or attacks on strategic industrial and logistics objectives. Direct air support for them wasn't the favourite, because of the machine during air raids often expose the danger of the flakes next to it. Air strikes in the frontline areas were more dependent on good weather. It was also important to determine and mark out the space dedicated to strike, to prevent the release of bombs on their own units, which was not always completely simple, as the queue was often very variable. Fighter-bombers were very effective against tanks and similar targets, but their ability to damage the ruggedised objectives was limited. heavy bombers may have sufficient ammo, but their possibility of the precise intervention were very small and were in the direct air support suitable for more carpet bombing, but which require sufficient distance from his own units with the subsequent delay between the end of the raid and start the procedure of ground units, and in addition create large craters, which slowed down the procedure. Probably the best results should be medium bombers, but even their airstrikes not always the results corresponding to the number of deployed machines and dropped ammo. One but direct air support couldn't fix. Her places of constant presence had a devastating effect on the morale of German soldiers, especially new recruits and reservists, while in the ranks of his own forces to stir up enthusiasm..
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3.4 NAVAL OPERATIONS[/heading:aaaaaa]

Mining - operation MAPLE


To protect allied vessels in the area of the landings was implemented by operation MAPLE, which consisted in the mining of large-scale space. The operation implemented the navy in cooperation with the air force. The aim was to limit the movement of German vessels in the area, complicate the possibilities of supply of other German vessels from the North sea and from the Atlantic to the area. If any German vessel tried to attack the allied ships, it should be minami forced to move outside the band range of the coastal batteries and the range fighter support. The mining operation was carried out minonoskami HMS Apollo and HMS Plover, on by 10., 50., 51. and 52. fleet minonosek and vessels 9., 13., 14., 21., 22. and 64. the fleet of motor torpedo boats. Mines dropped also 1., 3., 4., 5. and 6. a group of RAF. The whole operation was divided into six phases. In the first stage, to 17. April were the standard zaminovací operation using the normal sea mines. In the second stage to 9. may to standard operations added dropping special min into the fields at the Ijmuidenenu, Hook, ústé Scheldt, near Boulogne, Fécampu, Le Havre, on the coast of Brittany and in the Frisian islands. Part min had a delay mechanism, to be activated only with a lag and were thus not prematurely revealed. In the third phase to 28. may to existing activities, added the establishment of the other fields in the area near the Ushantu and in the space between Ushantem and Gasquets. In the fields near Le Havre and Cherbourg were přihozeny mines are zpožďovači. The aircraft at this stage lost a large number of mines in the Kattegat, at Heligoland, the Frisian islands and in the bay of biscay. Other mines have been in a few raids thrown into the Kiel canal. Others were set up in the Sound, in Aarhus and Aalborg. During the fourth phase, which took place between 29. may and 4. June, were dropped special mines to the fields in Ijmuiden, the Hook, the mouth of the Scheldt, near Calais, Le Havre, Cherbourg, St. Malo, Morlaix, Brest, and the ports in the bay of biscay. The aircraft again headed to Aarhus and Aalborg. The fifth phase was carried out in the night from 5. 6. June. Was originally supposed to include the laying of mines in the Barfleur, Le Havre, Etretatu and St. Malo. It was implemented but just laying in Etretatu. The others were cancelled as minonosky would get in the way of other vessels. From 6. June was the sixth stage. Most of the vessels was transferred to the implementation of escort and patrol work and the mines were laid only in Le Havre. Other mines were dropped from aircraft at certain ports of the aircraft. Total was laid or thrown 6 850 min. The navy accounts for 42 percent of the under 66 operations, air force 58 percent within the 1 800 take-offs. Mine screen has proven to be a very effective means to blocking the German naval forces. Allies surgery cost one motor torpedo boat s, and aircraft.


the Neutralization of the large German surface vessels


The great vessels of the German navy (battleships, cruisers, etc.) were located in Norway and in the baltic ports. If these forces went to attack against the invading the area, should stop them the british Home flota with the base at Scapa Flow in conjunction with the aircraft of the headquarters of the coastal and bomber air force. Those on the German ships indeed, since the November attacked to undermine their combat readiness. Anyway, at the time of the invasion of this vessel in peace, so british ships have no way to respond.


Neutralization of the threat of German submarines from the north


Another dangerous accounted for German submarines in the north, which could be directed into the Channel around Britain. For the purpose of elimination of this threat sent the Headquarters of the Western approaches, three escort carriers, with further naval and air escort to the area west of Cornwall. However, since it was recorded minimum contacts, was part of these forces 10. June diverted elsewhere.


the Closure of the western end of the Channel


The headquarters of the navy in Plymouth was in charge of the closure of the western approaches to the Channel. The germans should have in the region of Brittany and the bay of Biscay, roughly five destroyers, a hundred smaller ships and more than a hundred submarines. Their number could be increased up to hundreds of two. The allies therefore organized a sea barrier known as CORK. Consisted of the three divisions of destroyers for a total of twelve vessels, four squadrons of motor torpedo boats, and four anti-submarine support groups. There were even machines 19. group RAF. 10. June, these forces quite easily cope with a range of four destroyers from Brest. Ships have been involved in the deceptive operation ACCUMULATOR.


Closure of the eastern end of the Channel


Closure of Dover strait was an easier task. It is narrow only about 30 miles, and in large part it consists of shallow water. On the british coast in addition were a number of coastal batteries with sufficient range. The enemy had in addition in the area between Dover and barrier Home flot only the thirtieth E-Bootů, gun R-Bootů, forty minesweepers and forty other smaller vessels. Not here, no submarines, torpedo boats or destroyers. But she was concern that a few destroyers or torpedo boats from the Baltic sea or German gulf might be able to slip through the patrols of the Domestic flot and try to enter into the Channel. The commanding admiral at Dover is mainly taking care of the maintenance and strengthening of minefields. Otherwise had available ten squadrons of coastal vessels for the patrol activity and four destroyers, which had a dual role. Both should guard the eastern edge of the routes of convoys through the Channel together with the east wing Groups L, first, should, if necessary, to immediately intervene in the strait. Available was 16. a group of RAF. The germans on the intersection of the strait didn't try, rather were preparing for the expected invasion in the area of Calais.


Radar frigate


Radars on the English south coast to satisfactorily cover the entire area of the Dover straits. On the west wing he could of their reach just somewhere for half the distance between England and France. For this reason, they were to the center of the channel four frigates equipped with powerful radars, which should cover the southern part of the western area of the Channel.


Demining


The barrier of the German min represented a great risk to the allied craft, and it was therefore necessary to this threat to limit and create a safe path through minefields. All vessels headed to the beaches, first gathered in the Area Of which was located southeast of the isle of Wight, and only then turned south towards France within the corridor referred to as the SPOUT. The task of minesweepers was to clean the area in which the crossed SPOUT with the German minovou barrier, on location anchoring the ship, from which will sprout the attack boats, and also the area in which they will be able to maneuver ships providing artillery support.

Entrances to ports, the area along the british coast and the Area From were maintained using the normal patrol and, if necessary, cleaned from min. It was necessary but the count with the aching possibility that the Germans might lose the new mines because of the increased concentration of the allied forces. The space south of the Area From not continuously cleaned, however, the survey indicated that north of 50. the parallel of the enemy has no mines. The south then was the great mine barrier. Further south the Germans maintained between the barrier and the coast corridor to its coastal transportation, which was to be considered, in principle, clean. In the coastal waters has been reported an increased incidence of min, but the intelligence information was not complete. In the shallows near the beaches were also not expected naval mines. I couldn't but completely ruled out and the enemy could have flown in, if necessary, some lose.

A mine plan was that the five steps. Routes between ports and Areas Of and the portion of the Lot to the north of the German barriers should be regularly pročesávány up to day D-1, then from D+2. Not so shortly before the attack (to minimize the disclosure of the operation) and shortly after (the forces deployed elsewhere). In the German mine barrier should be set up to ten channels, i.e., two for each invasion beach. The third step involved cleaning the area for mooring ships and the space for maneuver. During the attack, it was necessary to ignore the threat of potential mines in the coastal areas, however, in the framework of the fourth step should be as soon as possible, this area is also scanned and possibly cleaned. Minesweepers should then wait at the ready for in case the Germans attempted to drop new min. The fifth step of counting with the expansion of the ten channels into one large corridor proraženého through the barrier. Total were deployed approximately 350 minesweepers of various types.

The germans on the landing of reacted the night air, taking down min into the waters of the Channel. Managed to get them to knock out a few ships and complicate the flow of the other forces in Normandy. The slowdown but not significant influence. Rather, it was necessary to deploy more minesweepers for a longer period of time, narrow corridors, reduce the speed of the convoys to deal with a new type of pressure min, stop the operation of certain types of vessels, intensify patrols, night fighters and carry out more attacks on the airport, from which operate the aircraft dropping mines. In July was also demining Cherbourg, to this way to flow stocks. The process was terminated 19. July.


Area operations - protection and escort


The immediate protection of the areas of the landing was assigned to the commanders of each task force. For this task set aside part of the allocated forces. After arrival to the coast took part of the escort and patrol vessels tasks related with cover of airborne forces. Part of them then sailed back to England, when on the way to function as the escort of returning convoy. The cover is in the meantime replaced by the other ships that complied with their initial tasks. The escort vessels, which came back was collected in the subordination of the commander in Portsmouth, to whom fell the task of securing the supply of the other forces in Normandy, which he needed as transport ships, as vessels for their escort. Cover the aperture to ensure the particular corvettes and trawlers, but also part of the destroyers. In the case of facilities, especially in poor visibility, the space was thickened even minolovkami and airborne boats with guns and anti-aircraft guns. Vypomohlo even the air force, which regarded the smoky aperture. The germans realized D-Day only a single attack using torpedoes, which hit the Norwegian destroyer Svenner. The british battleship Warspite sent one of the attacking torpedo boats to the bottom. At night the Germans attempted several other attacks with the help of torpedo boats, E-Bootů and R-Bootů. Except for one case, the ships were discovered and forced to retreat. Considerable damage in the ranks of the airborne vessels assigned to patrol services done to the German people controlled torpedoes. In the days following the attacks on the beach entered the field of various ships and convoys without notice. 13. jun this practice caused the fire of the american ships to the british cable ship Murdaugh Monach.


Protection of convoys in the Channel


Protection konvojových routes in the Channel (SPOUT) was compiled by the patrol system, which is supposed to defend against a possible attack of the German forces stationed in the area. These consisted of one toprédoborce, four torpedo boats, seventeen E-Bootů, five R-Bootů, four minesweepers, eighteen light gunboats, forty minolovných trawlers, thirty patrol vessels and seventy vessels, to protect ports. Headquarters in Portsmouth, was in charge of the protection of the west wing konvojových routes, the admiral at Dover wings of the east. Protective forces consisted of several destroyers, frigates and several squadrons of coastal forces. Support provided 16. and 19. a group of RAF. Along both edges of the konvojových route was created ten protective zone. Any ship that is in it in the dark appeared, was automatically considered hostile. Allied ships here were allowed to enter only shortly on the heels of the enemy in pursuit. Destroyers have been patrolling on the outer edges of the zone, along the so-called western and eastern walls a Lot.


Naval bombardment of artillery batteries and the beach


A major threat to the airborne forces accounted for the coastal batteries and defensive elements. Next to the aerial bombing, strikes, special forces, electronic warfare and the laying of smoke screens belonged to between the means of the neutralization of this threat and direct shelling from naval vessels. First and foremost it was needed to silence the battery of guns of large and medium-caliber guns, which could threaten the allied vessels and for certain conditions to abort the whole landing operation. These batteries have been identified around 25. These it was necessary to destroy or at least temporarily taken out of service. The germans also could pull up a mobile artillery means. In the second row was needed to facilitate the infantry's own landing neutralization of defensive elements on the beaches. The naval bombardment was supposed to destroy obstacles, trigger the explosion of mines, to reduce the combat value of the defenders and their equipment. No one has any illusions about the possibility of exact hit such small targets, in addition to increasing the amount of smoke and blowing dust. The beaches have been the aim of some sort of maritime unprecedented carpet-bombing. After his own landing had guns of large vessels to serve as mobile artillery, at least until they land and form an army artillery unit. Alongside battleships, cruisers, monitors, destroyers and other types of vessels on the bombing of the beaches should also participate variously modified landing barges, which have been modified as carriers of a variety of guns and missile devices.

The accuracy of the firing naval guns was backed by the deployment of reconnaissance aircraft. Cannon vessel of the Eastern task force is struck 40 minutes before sunrise and continued until H hour. This meant the entire 130 minutes of the bombing. Vessels of the Western task force sent the first projectiles in H-40 and continued to the hour H, when was the cannon redirected to target more inland. Then these ships are focused more on the battery on the wings, where nesměřovaly vyloďující units. The rest of the big ships, which is not to neutralize artillery batteries, and the modified gunships, launched in H-40 shelling of the spaces of the landing, which lasted until H hour. Naval cannon after, if necessary, burned to the German batteries, which again came forward, or to target desired ground troops.



Naval bombardment of Cherbourg


The original plan counted with the bombardment of artillery batteries from a distance of 26 kilometers. Then it should follow the approach and shooting from half the distance. The first stage was cancelled due to fears that there would be less accuracy could bring fire into your own units, which are already closer to the city. But it disrupted the original schedule. A large ship is too close to the minolovkám and had to slow down just when turning into position for firing. In that moment, on them opened fire coastal battery. Destroyers may be considered a smokescreen, but the shooting was quite accurate, and the ships had to speed up, even though it sometimes meant the entrance to the uncleaned water. At 12:12 triggered the ships fire according to the original plan. Soon but have to cannon to redirect to the battery, which they were shooting. Mostly it were the ones that should silence the fire from a great distance. The ships had to a lot to change speed and direction, which negatively affected the accuracy of their fire. Even so, some took significant cuts. Ships the event ended at 15:30, when they were silenced all the batteries except two..
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4.1 OPERATION DEADSTICK[/heading:aaaaaa]
It was 22:56 5. June 1944, when the air base of Tarrant Rushton in the air soared six halifaxů. Behind stretched gliders Horsa. In them sat the members of D company, which was part of the 2. battalion Oxfordshirského and buckinghamshirského light infantry regiment, which now fell into the assembly 5. parachute brigade. The company commander was major John Howard. Their goal was the bridges over the river Orne and Caenský channel u Bénouville. At 00:07 disconnected the first of the six glider from the tow plane and began to descend to the place of landing (LZ "X"). In one minute intervals followed him the next. At 00:16, landed the first glider and I must say that very precisely - about 55 meters from the bridge over the channel. Howard and his men quickly left the gliders and the group under the command of lieutenant Brotheridge immediately surged through the roadblocks of ostatného wire to the bridge. In the meantime landed a few meters away from the first glider the other two. Brotheridgova 1. platoon went through on the bridge progressed through it to the positions on his other side. On the bridge carry out a patrol of two German soldiers. The landing of the gliders did not notice because of the noise she made shooting anti-aircraft artillery. When they saw the british paratrooper, gave one of them to escape, but the other managed to fire the flare before Brotheridge defused his submachine gun. The lieutenant then headed for the bags with sand, behind which was the position of the machine gun , MG-42. Brotheridge took his direction to throw a grenade, but right after became a victim of his fire and was pronounced dead at the scene. However, his men right after the Germans destroyed. Subsequently, after the cleaning members 1. the platoon around the western side of the bridge. Members 2. a platoon led by lieutenant Wood meanwhile wiped out the German positions, including machine guns and anti-tank guns on the eastern side of the bridge. In the third glider landed men of the 3. the platoon under the command of lieutenant Smith. Major Howard is posted on the west side of the bridge, to help 1. the squad cleaned up the area and build a defensive perimeter. Sappers, meanwhile, were searching the bridge and přestřihávali all the wires on that come across. In the end it turned out that explosives were not even installed, you didn't order.

At the time part of D company was cleaning the bridge across the channel, landed nearby the other two gliders, on whose board sit members of the other two platoons. The third glider, on board of which in addition to the other platoon was also Howard's representative of the captain Priday, unfortunately, landed near the river Dives, which was 8 miles from the designated places. Two platoons that had more luck and landed about half a kilometer from the bridge over the river Orne, quite easily the target occupied. For the price of minimum losses has been achieved during the 15 minutes occupy both bridges, and in undamaged condition. Major Howard, therefore he could have ordered to send a message to headquarters about the success of the operation DEADSTICK. Members of the company have taken up a defensive position and waited for the arrival of the 7. skydiving battalion, which was supposed to land in about half an hour and then head out to the bridges. Howard's men repelled several German attempts to reinvade bridges, including the attack of two German tanks, which stopped its PIATy..

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4.2 OPERATION TONGA - the DISCONTINUATION of the 6. AIRBORNE DIVISION ON the LEFT FLANK[/heading:aaaaaa]

Značkaři on the scene


At 23:03 took off from the air base Harwell six transport aircraft Albemarle and, for each of the three seskokových zones to converge the two machines. On their board were značkaři, members of the 22. independent parachute company, who had first to parachute into areas of the jump and mark them with radio beacons Eureka, so that the main airborne forces seskočily as accurately as possible. To the place of the jump arrived shortly after Howard's company. Unlike him, but it was not their operation, not nearly as successfully. Značkaři were after the drop, scattered far apart, and too long it took them before they gathered. Other machines with the paratroopers arrived according to plan half an hour after them, roughly at 00:45. The failure of the members 22. company when you try to the proper designation of the seskokových zones and fire of the German anti-aircraft artillery, landed a large part of the paratroopers in other places, than it was in the plan.

5. paratroop brigade


Among those who caught the scattered and promíchaně, were also members of the battalions 5. parachute brigade. A number of them managed to relatively quickly assemble and go to their targets, but some arrived to their units only after several hours or days. 7. the airborne battalion lieutenant colonel Pine-Coffina jumped down into the zone of u N u Ranville. The commander waited a moment for the arrival of the troops of their units. After a time he decided to leave on the spot jump his deputy major of Baum, so he waited for another, and set off with the roughly two hundred men, what they were able to collect. He was aware that he must quickly arrive to the bridges over the river Orne and Caenský channel, because it is defended only D company. After arriving at the place took over command of the bridges. Howard's company was concentrated on the eastern part near the bridge over the river. Company a And C 7. the battalion occupied the southern part Bénouville, and blocking so the road from Caen, while company B took position at the village of Le Port, where it guarded the road from the Ouistrehamu. Johnson 12. the parachute battalion had a jump near the quarry along the road Ranville-Sallenelles. The colonel was waiting at the quarry for about an hour and during this time has been about sixty percent of the members of the battalion. He decided that was enough and went out to Le Bas de Ranville, where he had the task of protecting the southwestern edge of the operating area 6. division. Luardův 13. the parachute battalion jumped off in similar conditions. After collecting roughly the same part of the battalion went out to Ranville, whose cast and ensure it was the task of his department.

3. paratroop brigade


Northeast of 5. parachute brigade seskočily battalions of the 3. parachute brigade. Even their members didn't end up in a compact condition. Probably the most scattered, the men were 9. skydiving battalion, who had, paradoxically, one of the most important tasks - to destroy the artillery battery at Merville. Its cannon was directed at the part of sea, after which they were to sail in the invading boats for SWORD beach, and significantly so threatened the progress of the disembarkation. The battalion had to disable the battery from service until 05:00. If he failed, it was in reserve of the shelling from the cruiser Arethusa. The battalion commander lieutenant colonel Terence Otway had to have available 750 members of the battalion and on top of anti-tank cannon, heavy mortars, flame throwers, engineers specialized in demolition work with a large amount of explosives, reinforced with medical teams and members of the navy, who had to drive any fire the ship's cannons. In the time of the attack should land on the roof of the battery the other three gliders with reinforcements. Help should i to the previous air bombardment aircraft of the RAF. However, the raid worsened the visibility in the drop-zone and a large part of the team went to the east of the designated area, at the river Dives. The battalion is to collect only very slowly. At 03:00 had Otway available only 150 men, and in addition arrived one of the five gliders with heavy weapons and supporting teams. Yet the colonel, aware that time is of the essence, decided to go towards the battery. Here he met with major Smith, who told him that the air attack may have caused minimal damage, but his men managed to hunt out the four paths through the outer line of barbed wire and mark also passes through a minefield between them. In addition, they identified the machine-gun position, without the Germans they saw. Otway decided to use just two passes - more men did not - and attack at the time of landing gliders on the roof. The germans the movement of the british troops spotted and opened fire, just at a time when close to the gliders, Otway gave the order to attack. Unfortunately, one glider had to go back due to a failure back to the base and the other two target missed. Otwayovi men took out the inner line ostnaného of the wire using the charge of Bangalore and began to conquer the German position. German soldiers placed a determined resistance, but once discovered that the attacking paratroopers, their determination began to quickly fade and the Germans surrendered. Members 9. the battalion then quickly destroy the cannon. It was only a 75mm field guns and not the expected 150 mm cannon, but the task was accomplished. The price was 70 dead or injured. The battalion then withdrew to the area of Le Plein, where it took defensive positions on the northeast edge of the battlefield.

Bradbrookův 1. canadian parachute battalion jumped as much as 9. battalion into the drop zone "In". The task of the Canadians was the neutralization of the German crew in the Varaville and the destruction of the bridges over the river Dives right in Varaville and Robehomme. A large part of the members of the battalion landed far from the planned location, however, part of the battalion (company A) along with individuals from the 9. and 8. the battalion was formed under the command of major Mcleod assault group, which surged to the Varaville, where they clashed with German defenders. The battle lasted almost all night, but a small group managed to sneak to the bridge and destroy it. Part of company B arrived at the bridge near the Robehomme, and attempted to destroy improvised explosives. Bridge, but only damaged. Fortunately, after the time arrived, the engineers and the bridge was blown into the air. Battalion after the destruction of the bridges withdrew to Le Mesnil, where its members have taken the defense of the eastern edge of the operational area 6. airborne division. South of the Canadians jumped Pearson 8. the parachute battalion, whose task was the destruction of the bridges over the river Dives at Troarn and Bures. Place a drop of the battalion was zone K, however, the greater part of the battalion parachuted into a zone N. At 3:30 had a lieutenant colonel Pearson available just 130 men and 11 officers, but the time pushed him, and then the battalion set off to the river. A smaller group headed to the railway bridge at Bures and the greater part into Troarn, where they gave you wait the stronger the resistance and the bridge was placed in a less advantageous position. In the meantime, moved from the zone of N two groups of skydivers and engineers with a large amount of explosives. In Baventského the forest is split, part went to Bures, part to Troarn. Here fought a hard fight, but both bridges eventually managed to destroy. The battalion then withdrew to the northwest tip of the Baventského forest, where it took defensive positions on the southeast edge of the battlefield.

Arrival of the commander and staff


Around 3:20 landed in the zone "N" gliders Horsa and greater gliders Hamilcar. On board was the commander of the division major general Gale, the staff of the division, heavy equipment, light field guns and anti-tank guns. Gale in the morning reported the meeting all the main tasks of the division and organized a defense against the expected German protiútokům on its position between the rivers.

German reaction


Around 01:20 is about the british airborne learned the commander of the 716. infantry division generalleutnant Wilhelm Richter. He was reported to výsadkům occurs east of the river Orne with the fact that the bridges across the river and channel are in british hands. Some of the smaller German units located in the area of jumping with the Brits and Canadians fought. Richter immediately called the commander 21. tank were wondering generálmajoru Edgar Feuchtingerovi and ordered him to his nearest unit, conducted a counter-attack. Around two o'clock in the morning, it was clear that this is a big surgery that will required a large counterattack. Richter therefore ordered Feuchtingerovi to carry out the attack the whole division against a field of 6. airborne division. But Feuchtinger refused. His division was part of the armored advances OKW, and the general therefore had to take such a step to confirm with higher authorities. There is a long time but couldn't decide if this is a real invasion or just a feint. While the generals couldn't decide, fought with the paratroopers smaller German units.

Granátnický regiment 736 of the assembly 716. infantry division fought near the river Orne. In the area of Troarn, Sannerville and Colombelles set out to action members III. battalion of the regiment of the panzer grenadier 125, which was part of the 21. panzer division. In the north, near Sallenelles come across British company of the Eastern battalion 642, which was ranked as the fourth battalion of the above-mentioned granátnického regiment. Merville and Franceville-Plage prevented the company III. battalion and company, eastern battalion. These units attacked the british paratroopers just because they jumped or landed near them, or attack the goal they defended. The first attack units from the area outside the operating area of the 6. airborne division has taken II. a battalion of the regiment of panzer grenadiers 192 of the assembly 21. tank division. Battalion major Zippeho set out from Caironu shortly after 02:00 in the direction to the bridges over the Orne and the canal. After the capture of the bridges had a river to cross and attack the west. From the north should help him partition tank destroyers 716 and heavy artillery section 989. The germans forced the members of the british 7. skydiving battalion to from the vicinity of Bénouville downloaded into the village, from which but despite repeated German attacks did not diminish, and the bridgehead so keep. In the morning they attacked the battalions of the regiment of the panzer grenadier 125 in the area south of Ranville. The british here but had a good defensive position and using anti-tank guns the German attack repelled..
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4.3 OPERATIONS ALBANY AND BOSTON - WITHDRAWAL 82. and the 101. AIRBORNE DIVISION ON the RIGHT FLANK[/heading:aaaaaa]

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Sectors of Utah beach and drop zone operations Albany and Boston - using the mouse you can enlarge and move around

OSS, Commandos, and značkaři


It was around 1:30 in the night from 2. 3. June 1944, when it was over France planted six small special teams. They were the first soldiers, who were brought as part of operation NEPTUNE. Each team usually consisted of two communications from the Office of strategic services (OSS) and three members of the british sections of the commandos, who provided them with protection. The task of these groups was the designation of the landing and seskokových areas for numerous marker teams, which were to these areas to mark, using more productive equipment, for the subsequent waves of airborne troops. Nineteen aircraft značkaři went before midnight and approximately at a quarter past one in the night of the 6th. June began to jump over Normandy. Značkaři used the beacon of Eureka and for the final approach Aldisovy colorful beacon lamp assembled into the shape of the letter T. the Aircraft carrying the paratroopers then was equipped with radiomajákem Rebecca and some radio navigation system Gee. When the aircraft is značkaři closer to the above goals, there's a problem. In the area was the clouds that led to navigation errors. In consequence, most of the markup of the teams went beyond the specified area. In order seskočily only teams in charge of the seskokovou area C in the area designated for the 101. airborne division and seskokovou area Of in the area designated for the 82. airborne division. The other teams were too far away from their goals, and not enough time for it to take a designated position. Some of the teams at least to create a homing device in other places, but more could be put into operation only radio beacons, as it couldn't turn on the guidance lamp for the excessive closeness of the German troops.

Paratroopers start


5. June started on fifteen different airports in southern England members of the airborne troops with the last-minute preparations before the event. The transfer of the two american airborne divisions over France was given charge of the IX. the headquarters for the transport units. His 50. wing for transport units should in the context of operation ALBANY transport 101. airborne division and 52. wing for transport units within the operations BOSTON 82. airborne division. In the first wave was dispatched 821 of the C-47 and C-54. In each of them usually were eighteen to twenty men. Only in the case of artillery units, it was about nine or ten men, because their equipment took up more space. Transport aircraft began to take off around midnight. Into enemy airspace, entering over the west coast of the peninsula of the Cotentin and facing a north-easterly direction to seskokovým areas. Here ran into the same cloud cover as the plane značkaři, which is in front of her she couldn't warn for the specified radio silence. Additionally join anti-aircraft artillery. The pilots began to maneuver to avoid the stream of bullets, thereby disrupting the formation.

Mission Albany - introduction 101. airborne division


The main task of the 101. airborne division, which was to start with landing around 1:30 was to ensure the area in the rear of Utah beach between St. Martin-de-Varreville and Pouppeville. It was in the morning to facilitate the 4. infantry division procedure from the beach. Among the other objectives of the division they belonged to road and rail bridges north of Carentan, the lock at La Barquette, and generally to create a beachhead on the river Douve northwest of Carentan. The execution of the main task was entrusted to the 502. paradesantnímu infantry regiment and 506. paradesantnímu infantry regiment, weakened by one battalion. The first wave formed 2. battalion and headquarters 502. regiment. The transport aircraft flew scattered, as clouds and a strong barrage of anti-aircraft artillery broke the tight formation. The paratroopers so caught away from the designated Impact zone And. 2. the battalion, although he landed in a relatively compact unit, but only on the edge of the Impact zone C, which was located about five kilometers. The area was full of famous hedges bocage and the battalion took a long time before they even gathered. In the fighting of this wave of power hit. 3. battalion 502. the regiment landed in a very scattered form to the east of Sainte-Mère-Église. Lieutenant colonel Cole has collected about 75 men and set off to the coastal battery near Saint-Martin-de-Varreville. The position of the found abandoned, and then moved to the next destination, which was the west side of the road embankment at Audouville-la-Hubert, near exit 3. Arrived here at half past seven in the morning and take a defensive position. Members Even. battalion Granátnického regiment 919, who are downloading from the fulcrum WN 8, they wanted two hours after go through this place. The paratroopers attacked them and scattered them. The battalion tried to even clean up exit 4. They found him the point, but near was the German artillery battery, so this space was used for the exit from the beach. Around 13. hours the battalion established contact with units 4. infantry division from UTAH beach. The rest of the day the battalion was gathering the rest of the team. 1. battalion 502. the regiment of lieutenant colonel Cassidy landed at Saint-Germain-de-Varreville in a relatively compact state. One group surged to the Mésières, where there was a garrison battery of artillery from Saint-Martin-de-Varreville. The group occupied the intersection at Mésières and announced that the two north exity assigned to the battalion are cleaned. Another part of the battalion commander sent to Foucarville to here set up a defensive perimeter. At the intersection of Cassidy leaving only one platoon, and guard with her approaches from the west, the rest sent to the east side of Mésières. At that time also arrived the commander of the regiment lieutenant colonel Michaels with other men. Cassidy's battalion then was concentrated near Foucarville. Part of the battalion then went to the west, as it had the task to establish a connection with the 82. airborne divisions at Sainte-Mère-Église. In Fournelu but ran into German resistance, which failed to break for most of the day D. The battalion as a whole held the northern defensive perimeter. Most multiple unit was 377. paradesantní field artillery regiment. His parts fell on a broad area between the Saint-Marcouf and Valognes. Of his twelve 75mm howitzers in the fighting in the beginning involved just one.


Mannequin on the church tower in the Sainte-Mère-Église to this day recalls the events of that night (Photo Admin, 2014)

South perimeter fell into two battalions 506. regiment. Part of the paratroopers landed in the Impact zone C, the part of the piece from her, a part of the outside of it. In the zone of the assembled regimental commander, colonel Sink around 140 men from the headquarters of the regiment and 1. battalion. 2. the battalion landed further north in the impact area 501. regiment. However, the battalion commander lieutenant colonel Strayer gathered two hundred men and set off to the south to the road embankment at the Houdienville, where was the exit 2 and, at Pouppeville, where he was exit 1. Sink didn't know about it, and so he sent 1. the battalion of lieutenant-colonel Turner to Pouppeville. Strayer along the way ran into German resistance and to Houdienville arrived until the afternoon, when already from the beach perforating unit 4. infantry division. Even Turner's battalion to Pouppeville raged for several hours.

Over the Cotentin on came 3. battalion 501. regimental and divisional headquarters. their task was to gain control over the area near Hiesville, where they later land gliders with other units. Here, too, after the impact has gathered a group of roughly three hundred men of the battalion and the headquarters, headed by lieutenant colonel Ewell. The commander of the 101. airborne division, general Taylor did not know about Strayerově and Turner advance on Pouppeville, and so he sent forty men led by Ewell. Paradoxically, there this group got around the eighth hour of the morning as the first. The germans of 2. battalion Granátnického regiment 919 here held positions in the points WN 6, which covered the western part of the embankment, and WN 2a, which covered the beach. After four hours, the Americans overpowered. At exit 1 attach Ewell conjunction with the 2. the banner 8. infantry regiment. In the Impact zone C, where was located the headquarters of the division, it was busy. In Sainte-Marie-du-Mont because they were soldiers of the German Artillery regiment 191. Paratroopers gradually the battery shut down and the town was the afternoon cleaned with the help of the members 8. infantry regiment.

The last group of paratroopers formed 1. battalion 501. the regiment, part 2. battalion 501. regiment, 3. battalion 506. regiment, sappers and medics. Land should be in the Impact zone of D, which was located most to the south. Already in the air were shot down six aircraft. Otherwise, the group was relatively exactly. Unfortunately to his detriment, as the Germans jump in here assumed, and since it was the last wave 101. division, were the defenders ready. The commander of the 1. battalion 501. the regiment was killed, his executive officer captured. The commander of the regiment Johnson landed in the middle of the zone and gathered about 150 men. With them immediately set off to the first destination, which was to lock the La Barquette. It soon occupied, but they came under fire of the German artillery. Hundred men here, the colonel left and with fifty returned to the impact zone for reinforcements. Half of the 2. the battalion fought a sharp battle with the Germans near the village of Les Droueries. Instead of one of the platoon here was the whole III. battalion Granátnického regiment 1058. The battalion therefore couldn't break away and go to strengthen the group at a lock. Johnson, however, gathered a few other paratroopers and set off with them to the bridges over the river Douve near its confluence with the river merderet River. You wanted to either occupy or at least destroy it. The worst welcome waiting for 3. battalion 506. regiment. The germans, who were waiting for them, set fire to the wooden outhouse, and had a good view of the falling parachutist. The battalion commander and executive officer were among the first dead. Captain Shettle had landed outside the zone and with fifteen men set out to the bridge at Le Port. Along the way he was joined by other paratroopers and in the half of the fifth was at the bridges. The germans is of them while they drove, but the positions around them to keep. A paradoxical situation has arisen in the morning, when the captain he could summon aid in the form of aircraft P-47. But instead of the German positions attacked on the bridges.

Mission Boston - withdrawal 82. airborne division


82. the airborne division had to at the end of may adjust their plans, because the originally anticipated dopadového space was against the German 91. kluzáková division. The new plan envisaged the withdrawal of the two regiments west of the merderet River, and one regiment on the eastern side of Sainte-Mère-Église, which was to secure the bridges across the river. But the paratroopers 82. division were even more scattered than the 101. division. The tasks assigned for D-day so fulfilled just one regiment. Members 82. airborne division began above the Cotentin're gonna be landing about an hour later than their fellow soldiers from the 101. the division, therefore, around 2:30. 505. the regiment had to land in the Impact zone of The north-west of Sainte-Mère-Église. The visibility here was relatively good and značkaři did a good job. The regiment therefore fell relatively compactly. 3. the battalion of lieutenant colonel Krauseho set off in the strength of the roughly 180 men in the town. It's a pretty fast cast. The commander of the 2. battalion lieutenant colonel Vandervoort gathered about half of his men and set off with them to the north of the impact zone, so he created a defensive perimeter. But when at half past ten that launched the German Granátnický regiment 1058 from the south counter-attack towards the town, he ordered the commander of the regiment colonel Ekman Vandervoortovi to withdraw to the city and help in its defense. Vandervoort did so, however, allocated a platoon lieutenant Turnbull to stay in Neuville and watch here, the approach from the north. This platoon then at eight o'clock halted the attack of the whole German company and in order to prevent its incursion into the back of the units defending the city. Of the 44 men but survived only 16. 2. the battalion arrived from the north into the city around 10:00 and shore up the defense 3. battalion. A German counter-attack led by two companies of the Georgian battalion 795 and detachments 91. division for the support of a handful of divisional self-propelled guns StuG III was repulsed. 1. the battalion landed, accompanied by divisional headquarters, and the commander of the general Ridgwaye. Company, And lieutenant Wisner had been sent to the small stone bridge near La Fière, which was quite important, because it connects the impact zone west of the river merderet River to Sainte-Mère-Église. The company had initially 155 men along the way but gained a variety of members of the 507. and 508. regiment. Along the way, she had company several times to compete with the Germans. At the bridge then the company ran into German machine-gun position. With defenders then the Americans during the day brought a few clashes.


the Bridge at La Fiere today (photo Admin, 2014)

Both remaining regiments of the 82. division seskočily around the Impact zones T and N west of the river merderet River in a very scattered form. Značkaři here had big problems due to the proximity of German units, the weather wasn't and the pilots had huge problems to find the right places to drop paratroopers. A large part of the 507. the regiment was thrown into the wetlands east of the zone T, and 508. regiment south of the zone N, with half roughly to a distance of three kilometers from the zone, but the rest landed either on the other side of the river, or somewhere completely outside the area. The swamps were in the area of impact of the total deep and a number of paratroopers drowned. A number of shozeného equipment in addition landed also in the water and it was necessary for this material to find and pull out, which unnecessarily commit forces and resources. An element in the landscape was for 507. the regiment embankment of the rail body of the track from Carentan. Around him are a large part of the regiment gradually gathered. His task was to secure the western approaches to the bridge at La Fière. The germans feared that he could jump off the paratroopers, and therefore the area on the west side of the bridge flooded. To the bridge from solitude at Cauquigny could get only after a long embankment lined with trees road. After the already mentioned attempt of a company And lieutenant Wisner is the eastern approach to the bridge became the gathering place of the paratroopers, who were parachuted on the eastern shore instead of the western. At the beginning of the morning, there were already six hundred. The group under the leadership of captain Schwarzwaldera of 2. battalion 507. the regiment began to clean the village east from the bridge. Later came general Gavin, which the group divided. 75 paratroopers sent to the south to find another crossing over the river, while the other 75 men marched to the bridge at Chef-du-Pont. After a time he got here even general Ridgway, who entrusted the command of the troops at the bridge, colonel Lindquistovi of 508. the regiment and ordered him to conquer the bridge. Meanwhile, from the west was approaching a group of fifty paratroopers from the 2. battalion 507. regiment. But they were also beaten back by machine gun fire and took defensive position at the church in Cauquigny. Around noon on the bridge attacked the 80 paratroopers, led by captain Schwarzwalderem, who most occupied and then made contact with the platoon on the west side. The captain kept on the bridge a dozen paratroopers, who were the bridge hold until they arrive from the east for reinforcements, and with the rest of the set out to set in Amfreville northwest of Cauquigny where he wanted to connect with the rest of the battalion lieutenant colonel Timmese. But than from the east arrived, other marines, attacked on the bridge Granátnický regiment 1057 of 91. the division with the support of several light tanks Hotchkiss H-39 Tank section 100. You quickly area have regained under your control and after the next two days, despite the fierce fighting, keep. Gavin's group at the bridge at Chef-du-POnt ran into determined opposition and came therefore back to La Fière, leaving in place only půlčetu led by captain Creek. The Germans almost destroyed, however, arrived at the scene of a glider with a 57mm anti-tank gun and several troopers from the La Fière. The Creek then on the contrary, cleared the bridge from the Germans and crossed the river to the other shore.

On the west bank gathered a lieutenant colonel Shanley of 2. battalion of the 508. regiment near Picauville group of paratroopers, with which he wanted to originally accomplish the assigned task, that is, the destruction of the bridges across the river Douve at Pont l'abbe, but the formation soon got into conflict with the banner Granátnického regiment 1057, which participated in the operation of the blocking of the west bank of the merderet River. Shanley group withdrew to hill 30, where he supported the fight for the bridge at La Fière. In his neighborhood this afternoon there were three isolated groups. Both the 300 paratroopers in the Shanleyho group and 120 paratroopers in Timmesově and Schwarzwalderově group in the west bank, both of 400 skydivers in the group of colonel Milletta of 507. the regiment on the east side of the bridge. All groups run out of ammo and were under constant pressure Granátnického regiment 1057. About the bridge but should still fight for another three days.

Mission Chicago and Detroit - arrival of the gliders with reinforcements


The aim of the missions of the Chicago and Detroit have been to transport reinforcements for 101. and 82. airborne division. The plane to Chicago took off from England in 1:20. In fifty gliders were 155 soldiers and sixteen 57mm anti-tank guns. A glider with a radio with long-range SCR-499 was sadly lost shortly after the start. A glider with a representative of the commander of the 101. division of general Pratt crashed on landing. The general died in the accident. Even the gliders landed in the scattered form. In the intended area of Landing zone E of them landed just six. The mission of the Detroit fits in the Landing zone Of the in the 04:10. The machine had on board 220 soldiers and sixteen anti-tank guns. Most of the machines landed in the right place. 6. on the evening of June were still vypraveny mission Keokuk and Elmira, the second day in the morning then missions Galveston and Hackensack.

German reaction


German troops on the peninsula of the Cotentin was not in the night from 5. 6. June in readiness because of the weather, which was not considered appropriate for the execution of the invasion across the Channel. The first signal that there's something non-standard, came just before midnight. Was captured encrypted messages for the French resistance and the radar station at Cherbourg reported an unusual concentration of allied aircraft and ships. From half-past one o'clock in the morning began to receive the first reports about the jumps of paratroopers and with advancing time is multiplied. One of the drops even landed directly on the headquarters Granátnického regiment 919. From Sainte-Mère-Église came the information about the arrival of u.s. marines. At headquarters Marcksova * law lxxxiv. ward raised concerns that the allied paratroopers created a gap between the 709. divisions in Utah and 352. division in Omaha. Only backup the ward was Meyer's battle group from the assembly 352. division. At 3:10 Marcks ' Meyer commanded to go from Saint-Lô to the space between the two beaches. A few hours later, the group has been ordered to return without her presence in the field what is valid. A group of moreover, repeatedly getting under the fire of the allied fighter-bombers. Not very convincing was the performance of 91. division, apparently because of its commander was on the staff of the exercise in Rennes. Out of general Falley early in the morning set off back to the unit, but along the way ran into a patrol of american paratroopers in Picauville, and in a firefight he lost his life. In the forefront of the division it was replaced by the operating officer, general Klosterkemper. That, when he found out that Sainte-Mère-Église in american hands, ordered Granátnickému regiment 1057, began to move east over the bridge at La Fière. Here the regiment got into the already mentioned combat of this crossing over the river merderet River.

In the meantime, he asked the colonel Keil * law lxxxiv. choir for permission to use Mochov battalion Granátnického regiment 1058 of Saint-Côme-du-Mont as an aid in his pursuit of the conquest of Sainte-Mère-Église from the north. Mochův battalion but the city got around 13. hours. It already but ran into the paratroopers set up a defensive perimeter. The remnants of the Georgian battalion 795 to get into the encirclement to the south of the city due to the progress of airborne troops from the north and 4. infantry division from Utah. This pocket but on the other hand, the entire D-day blocking the road from Sainte-Mère-Église on the south. Mochův battalion had strengthened in the pursuit of advance to the south and the second of the battalions Granátnického regiment 1058, but this was stopped at the Montebourgu. The corps alerted even Assault battalion 7. army and sent him along the road of Saint-Floxel in Beuzeville-au-Plain, to the afternoon attack on Sainte-Mère-Église from the east. Accompanied him part of the Platoon of tank destroyers 709, but along the way destroyed in the fight with the paratroopers. Around midnight, he was put into combat readiness and paradesantní regiment 6 in Périers, who started to contend with the parachutists, who landed a lot to the south of the designated impact zones. Its commander, von der Heydte tried to reach to a higher instance, but the link was broken thanks to the actions of the resistance. Around 6. hours got Marcksovi and he ordered him to clear the area of Carentan from the jumpers and start moving towards Sainte-Mère-Église. The regiment had but the problem of concentrating subordinate units, as in the previous period received orders to distraction. Von der Heydte ran the Carentan before the arrival of the regiment and found that in the city are neither German, nor american soldiers. In Saint-Côme-du-Mont stumbled on a buried German battalion. From the church tower looked down the entire battlefield down to the beach, so he was the first senior officer, who found that the paratroopers are just the vanguard of an amphibious landing. His III. the battalion was still busy fighting with the paratroopers in the south-east. II. the battalion was headed in the afternoon along the main road to Sainte-Mère-Église, while Also. the battalion advanced to the east as cover against the troops on the beach. Both battalions advanced quite undisturbed, but at night they almost on his head fell the other airborne units..
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5.1 SWORD BEACH[/heading:aaaaaa]

Air and naval bombardment


Around the third hour of the morning began, the allied air force the last air raid on the defensive positions on the invasion beaches and in their vicinity. This was followed by a massive naval bombardment by Grouping With. Artillery batteries at Villerville, Benerville and Houlgate showered projectiles guns of the monitor Roberts and battleships Warspite and Ramillies. The aim of the works of cruisers Scylla, Danae, Dragon, Frobisher, Arethusa and Mauritius was the coastal guns and the German fortified post. Later, more close added more destroyers. Around 05:10 laid the RAF planes were a smoke screen, which had a ship to protect it from a possible fire from the works in Le Havre. Paradoxically, but was even used in German 5. a fleet of torpedo boats, which, thanks to the screen could zoom in on the firing range and detonate the 15 torpedo. Most of it missed the target, but one of them hit the Norwegian destroyer Svenner. Hit right under the boiler room was for the ship deadly - the boat broke and went quickly to the bottom. However, most of the crew saved. Then came the landing craft infantry Glenearn and Cutlass and around 05:30 began to water run assault landing boats. On their decks were members of the offensive rot 1. battalion Jiholancashirského regiment and 2. battalion Východoyorkshirského regiment 8. infantry brigade 3. infantry division. By this time, headed to the beach eight airborne lifeboats for the tanks with a cargo of forty amphibious tanks Sherman DD 13./18. a hussar regiment.

From the ships to the beaches


It was approximately 06:00, when the boats with the infantry went toward sectors Quenn Red and Queen White. Accompanied by the other boats with tanks, this time it was a part of the Hobartovy 79. armored division, therefore about the a variety of special armor. For a quarter of an hour took five of modified landing craft, on board which together ježilo more than a thousand missiles. Nine minutes after them on the way issued a further nineteen boats for the tanks, on which board there were three regiments of self-propelled artillery. When the infantry and tanks moved close to the beaches, detonated raketonosné boats their projectiles, to create a mortar fire protecting vyloďující with infantry and tanks. While it is then to accompany the barrage samohybek from the boats. At a distance of roughly less than five miles left thirty-four tanks aboard and went on a cruise to the beach, which should reach before the infantry and special armor. The sea gave them what-for - tanks quickly picked up the water. Pump while driving at full capacity, but still, two tanks sunk. Another sank after it collided with one of the invading boats, which tried to avoid the projectiles, that the invasion fleet began to churn out the Germans, who have found that they roll down the invading army. On the beach they got thirty-one machines. A number of crews after reaching the beach, but found that their engines are inoperable. At least, that worked their cannons, which supported the infantry at least in this static position.

Landing on the beaches


At 07:25 reached the boats with the infantry to the beaches, around the same time as tanks and special machines. On the beaches, they were greeted by machine-gun and mortar fire of the defenders, who began immediately to collect their victims. Company And Jiholancashirských landed in the right part of the sector Queen White, near the fortified position of "Cod", and immediately suffered heavy casualties, including dead commander. The rest of it but managed to regroup and go right in the direction of on the Lion sur Mer. C company landed next to the company And attacked the "Cod". B company landed straight against the "Cod" and went straight into a frontal attack, during which she tried to worked his way through roadblocks of concrete and barbed wire. This experiment has claimed a number of victims, including a company commander and battalion commander lieutenant colonel Burburyho, which landed just shortly before. Východoyorkshirský battalion landed in sector-Queen Red, to the left of the "Cod" and got the extra right into a crossfire of German machine guns, mortars and cannons. Luckily, he supported the firing of tanks 13./18. hussar, 22. dragounského and westminster dragounského regiment, although they have suffered a variety of interventions. One company joined the two rotám Jiholancashirských and together the "Cod" come and eliminated. Meanwhile, the teams arrived for disposal protinvazních obstacles on the beaches, which are immediately put to work. It was a dangerous job, for it is besides the fire of the German defenders, threatened and landing boats, and mines, or booby explosive systems.

Commandos for the first time


It is to the beach close to the smaller assault landing boats, on whose decks the fight were preparing the members of the commandos of the 1. and 4. brigade of the special services. Members 4. section commandos landed on the left edge of the sector-Queen Red. Their task was the liquidation of the the support points at the Casino at Riva Bella and artillery batteries at the Ouistrehamu. At the time of their landing should already be the beach cleaned up, but the infantry still wasn't enough to dispose of the "Cod". Commandos therefore had to engage in a gunfight on the beach, then proceed along the transverse road in the direction to Ouistreham. On the opposite end, on the western edge of the sector Queen White, landed 41. section commados (marine). Section without much difficulty got off the beach and then divided into two groups. One darted discarded foothold "Trout" in the Lion sur Mer and the second to occupy the castle west of the village. Lion sur Mer it was soon in british hands, as Trout was abandoned, but the lock proved to be too large a morsel. In the event there were many members of the section, including the commander of the group and a few lower commanders. Section could not proceed further west and connect with the troops on Juno beach, or decommissioned radar station in Douvres.

Third battalion 8. the brigade landed


At the beach arrived and the third battalion of the 8. brigade, 1. battalion of the suffolk county regiment, which began with the help of the tanks 13./18. hussar regiment pave the way from the beaches. Of great help were also the de-mining and bridge tanks. The procedure for infantry support and vylodivší with self-propelled guns. At the beach arrived and another armored unit - Staffordshirský zemanský regiment. Around 09:00 took 1. battalion Jiholancashirského regiment the village of Hermanville and 2. battalion Východoyorkshirského the regiment was headed to the German foothold "Sole". 1. battalion of the suffolk county regiment set off towards the village of Coleville and the focal points of "Morris" and "Hillman".

Arrived at 185. brigade


On the beach behind them the influence of the inflows gradually increased the level, and so zúžoval space for landing. On the coast began to emerge of the chaos and created traffic jams. Into this smaller space because the headed for more men and equipment. It's the time of the landing of 2. brigade 3. infantry division - 185. infantry brigade. She had a task to go through occupied territory and attack the city Caen, the most important goal of the division for the D-Day right after landing. Most of the tanks, which had its infantry to accompany it remained in traffic, however, the brigade commander, aware of the importance of the occupation of the city, ordered the windshield 2. battalion the King's own shropshirského light infantry regiment to go forward. I was hoping that the tanks will soon come out and the infantry catch up.

Commandos for the second time


In the meantime, 4. section commandos moved on to their targets. Two squads 10. section, which have been temporarily reassigned to 4. section and were is the French members of the commandos under the command of captain Kieffera, stormed the Casino at Riva Bella. Stumbled here on a determined defender and a well-prepared position. The germans overpowered after the captain managed to get one Sherman, that took out the cannon and machine-gun position. The 4. section attacked the gun battery at Ouistrehamu. The germans have placed a strong resistance and when it turned out that cannon was taken, the section the action ended and he retreated to the Ouistrehamu to the rearrangement and connection with the rest of the 1. brigade special services, which has also landed. Brigade commander lord Lovat sent a 6. section, as quickly as possible through to the bridges in the Bénouville, and relieved so 7. parašutistickému battalion. Along with the rest of the brigade then set off behind them. Section stumbled along the way on a number of German positions, including artillery batteries, but in the end arrived in a timely manner. When he arrived the rest of the brigade, moved that the master of the 6. airborne division general Gale on the northern edge of the bridgehead, specifically on the heights near Le Plein.

the Struggle for "Hillman"


Late in the morning it was completed the landing of 185. infantry brigade and two of the three armored regiments 27. armored brigade. Part of these forces, but stuck in a traffic jam on the beaches and in their vicinity. Brigade commander Smith moved to the front of the formation to Hermanvillu and from there sent 2. battalion the King's own shropshirského light infantry regiment for the aid of self-propelled works 7. field regiment the regiment towards the Caen. In Perierského ridge is, moreover, caught up tanks the Staffordshire zemanského regiment. The procedure is issued by the other two battalions of the brigade. 2. battalion Warwickshirského the regiment passed through Saint Aubin and 1. a battalion of the Norfolk regiment passed through the Colleville, but after the hard hit on the defensive point "Hillman". This large-scale and well-armed status, which served also as the headquarters of the 736. infantry regiment, just trying to neutralize the company 1. battalion of the suffolk county regiment. Air and naval bombardment of the object too damaging. Suffolkským infantry took the elimination of this space of resistance until eight in the evening, because they had to dispose of one well-prepared shooting position after another, and often had little choice but to rely on shooting from dorazivších tanks or powerful explosives engineers. The battalion was exhausted and the evening no longer strained.

Landing 9. brigade


The third of the brigades 3. infantry division, 9. infantry brigade, landed in the afternoon, but quite a bit of time lost in traffic on the beaches. Originally had a brigade to advance on the right flank of the division towards the airport in Carpiquet, but after landing she got a new order, according to which should go on the left wing and help the 6. airborne division in repelling the attacks 21. panzer division. The brigade had to wait until they arrive to it from 27. armoured brigade assigned to 1. battalion Východoridingského zemanského regiment with their tanks, and then head back toward the bridgehead, which would actually help in the procedure on the Caen. In the meantime, but he was injured by mortar fire brigade commander general Cunningham and his deputy wasn't available. When the command took colonel Orr, to change the situation. The activity of the Germans on the right wing has intensified, and the brigade had to be deployed here. 2. battalion Lincolnshirského regiment took up positions at the Cresserons, 2. battalion of the Royal ulsterského fusiliers, is buried on the edge of the Hermanville and 1. battalion the King's own scottish hraničářského the regiment concentrated in the Saint-Aubin.

Procedure 185. brigade at Caen


Part 185. infantry brigade meanwhile advanced on Caen. The group formed 2. battalion the King's own shropshirského light infantry regiment, Staffordshirský zemanský regiment (tanks), 7. and 33. field regiment (self-propelled guns), 41. anti-tank battery and a machine gun platoon of the 2. battalion Middlesexského regiment. The grouping proceeded to the area of the left part of the Perierského of the ridge, to the right of the Hillmanu. With dimensions of 61 hit on the Even. battalion of the German 1716. artillery regiment, which after the intense shootout overwhelmed. Due to the fights in the Hillmanu left lieutenant-colonel Maurice squadron B Staffordshire on a hill and with the rest of the formation set off for Caen. Cast Beuville, Biéville and sent one platoon into the woods near Lebisey.

Attempt 21. panzer division to counterattack


The area of the beaches of Sword lay in the scope of the LXXIV. army corps and prevented her part 716. infantry division, specifically Even. a battalion of 736. infantry regiment in the vicinity of Ouistrehamu and III. a battalion of the same regiment in the area of Lion sur Mer. Artillery batteries use members Also. battalion 1716. artillery regiment. Although it has been in these units many foreigners from the east, put a pretty strong resistance, mainly in fortified positions. Air and naval bombardment had damaged these habitats to a much lesser extent than the planners had expected and the british forces had to conquer a point by point. Fortunately, the Germans in these places they didn't finish building the Atlantic wall into the final shape. When the German high command received news about the paravýsadcích, it was not clear whether this is the beginning of the invasion, or just a deceptive attack and invasion is yet to come in another place. When then arrived the information of an away mission on the coast, it was clear that this is a bigger event, although at the highest levels still prevailed the belief, that the main blow was yet to come in the Pas de Calais. Von Rundstedt so while he asked for the release of the panzer divisions, which formed the advance specified just to ward off the expected invasion, but the high command rejected the division send. Rundstedt had the allied forces to defeat the forces of rommel's army Group B, with the help of two panzer divisions, that were deployed in Normandy - 12. tank division of the SS, and Tank instruction division. The allies were lucky that Hitler believed the false intelligence operation FORTITUDE NORTH, and Rommel was at home in Germany, so he wasn't at the time of disembarkation to his headquarters and immediately intervened in the decision-making process. If they were immediately deployed panzer division, it would be a risk that allied forces on the coast were driven into the sea, considerable. Thus in the first stage, carry out the counterattacks only 21. tank division. Later, while gradually reached other units, but the Germans wasted time, which already could never get back.

The commander of the LXXIV. army corps general Marcks ' he realized that he now plays mainly on the strategically laid the city of Caen, to which they tried to fight the British. Thus he advised the commander 21. panzer division, to concentrate his troops to the north of Caen near Lebisey, and from there carried out the attack towards the coast between the beaches of Sword and Juno, and he divided the two beaches and then lateral to the attack cleared from the British. The problem with this plan was already in that to Lebisey was heading a group of around 2. battalion the King's own shropshirského light infantry regiment. Approximately at 16:00 on each both sides of the bump. Against the british group set off 100. tank regiment of colonel von Oppeln-Bronikowského. He had two battalions and incorporate an battalion of 192. the regiment of panzer grenadiers. Tank regiments advanced on the right flank, while the grenadiers on the left. But the British were on the German counterattack informed and prepared. Lieutenant colonel Maurice placed on his left wing eskadronu And Staffordshire zemanského regiment and throughout the length of the deployed šestiliberní anti-tank guns and self-propelled guns. On the right wing navelel eskadronu B Staffordshire with Shermans Firefly. When they arrived German tanks II. battalion of the panzer regiment, welcomed is the firing of the guns, which a number of tanks destroyed or damaged. Others reacted to this being bottled up to the left, where the but rolled into the wound sedmnáctiliberním guns eskadrony B. II. the battalion was greeted by a barrage of british samohybek Priest. Tank grenadiers did better, they have suffered may also have some losses, but they managed to slip down to the sea and Lion sur Mer teamed up with the rest of the 736. infantry regiment. Later they were joined by yet a few tanks Even. battalion 100. the tank regiment. The other events yet but we ourselves out and waited for orders. Further attempts to counterattack but did not follow. At St. Aubin namely the landed 6. a brigade of glider troops, who bolstered the other units 6. airborne division on the bridgehead east of the river Orne. The commander of the 21. panzer division therefore began to fear an attack in his rear, and ordered his units to withdraw to the north of Caen, and take here a defensive position. The commander of the 3. the british division but with some attack on this day already counted and ordered his jednotkým bury and perform the regrouping. The intersection of a number of smaller German units to the sea, although he was a torso původného plan, perceived general Rennie as warned about the weakness of the british position.

Attempt to counterattack as well. tank corps of the SS


Rommel arrived at his command post on the night of the 6th. on 7. June. Immediately ordered to the american beaches were surrounded the infantry and panzer formations concentrated in the area of Caen for a concentrated attack on the british position. This blow was to carry out Dietrich's . SS panzer corps, which was to consist of 21. panzer division, Tank instruction division and 12. panzer division SS. Although the instruction division was not yet in place, was ordered to carry out the attack 7. June. The task, therefore, actually fell on 21. and already arrived part 12. division. 21. panzer division should attack in the direction of Lion sur Mer and fighting a group of standartenfuhrer SS Meyer, commander of the 25. the regiment of panzer grenadiers of the SS from the assembly 12. tank division of the SS, had to go from the airport of Carpiquet into the gap between the british and canadian units. Meyer's regiment was the only compact part 12. tank division of the SS, which for now has arrived. Available had yet II. panzer and III. artillery battalion 12. division, but together it amounted to only about 90 tanks, and it is still only in theory, because in time there came in only about 50. And 21. tank division had after the attacks available to only some 70 operational machines. For some more help 716. infantry division couldn't rely, since it was virtually wiped out.

A German counter-attack but did not develop according to plan. The concentration of German forces from distorting the in-depth raids of the allied fighter-bombers and additionally 3. the british and 3. the canadian division started to move. 185. and 9. infantry brigade went to Caen. 185. the brigade went on Lebisey, but it was the Germans stopped. 9. the brigade progressed to Cambes. Hit but on the component 21. tank division, which it stopped. On the other hand, but this british procedure made it impossible for this division to break away, regroup and go on the attack with Meyer's battle group; had to stay in the defense. In a similar situation got even Meyer group. 3. canadian infantry division attacked just to the places, where this formation has been focused. The two sides clashed in a bloody battle for Authie. Meyer managed to prevent the Canadians in the capture of the airfield at Carpiquet, but he had to deploy all its departments, and the thrust into the attack, therefore, could not be even speech.

Reinforcement of the bridgehead over the Orne


General Gale took advantage of the arrival of the 6. a brigade of glider troops and 1. brigade special services and expanded the bridgehead in the direction of the north and south. Commandos in the north cleaned up the Franceville-Plage and 6. brigade rozšřila and strengthen the bridgehead in the south.

Summary


At the end of the second day, therefore, the British firmly held the bridgehead over the Orne, they were about 10 miles inland and on the second wing of the cover for their advance on Caen the Canadians. The allies to maintain air supremacy and the area of the bridgehead was still in range of the guns of vessels on the coast. The bridgehead on the beaches of Sword was secured. Now it was necessary to conquer Caen which the Allies failed to occupy according to the original plan..
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5.2 JUNO BEACH[/heading:aaaaaa]

Air and naval bombardment


During the night attacked the defensive elements in the beaches of the allied bombers. However, the air strikes a lot of damage nenapáchaly. At 5:30 opened fire the cannon of the cruiser HMS Belfast, in less than a half hour, added HMS Diadem. Help even the light cruiser HMS Ajax. Together quickly knocked out the battery in the Longues and Bény-sur-Mer. Most of the other batteries in addition has not been completed. At 6:10 blew my eleven destroyers closer to the coast, to attack the German defensive position in synergy with medium and fighter bombers. Yet the closer she got to the landing craft for tanks modified to carry a šestiliberní cannon. Assist them in that eight vessels armed with more than a thousand unguided rockets and more than twenty of the vessels are self-propelled guns, M7 Priest on the board. Their task was to fill four pre-designated points of resistance with their projectiles, including the laying of smoke screens. Them are artillery návodčí inclusion in the first wave had started. The bombardment of heavy guns should have ended at the time when they will move infantry into the attack, but the state of the sea had forced a ten minute delay. 7. canadian infantry brigade began landing in the sector Mike at 7:45 and 8. canadian infantry brigade in the sector Nan in 7:55. Vessels with artillery, therefore, had to edit the course and vessel with tanks, she must first break a path to the beach and then back it up closer. Shermans DD in the sector Mike has sailed roughly at the distance of one kilometre, respectively, partially forded. Tanks in the sector of the Nan came out basically right on the beach.


Landing 7. canadian infantry brigade


In the meantime, went to the beaches each of the company 7. brigade. The sectors Mike Red and Mike Green is close to the two assault company Royal winnipegského rifle regiment, one assault company of the Canadian scottish regiment and one eskadrona 6. canadian armored regiment (1. hussar). The sectors Nan Green headed members Reginského rifle regiment, which was supported by the tanks of the second company 1. a hussar regiment. In the sector Mike landed the first soldiers from company B winnipegského regiment in 7:49, the main part of the units in 7:56. Soldiers in B company ran into three of the casemate and twelve machine-gun nests, their advance had stopped and they waited for the arrival of the tanks. Company D landed more to the west, where the hit the stronger the resistance, she quickly covered the beach and she made her way through the barbed wire. Still further to the west landed C company of the Canadian scottish regiment, which ran into even smaller resistance and, moreover, found that the position of the 75mm cannon which accounted for their first goal, was destroyed by the fire of the navy. In the sector Nan, Green landed two companies Reginských. Rota And arrived at 8:09, and ran into fierce resistance. Fortunately, in time came the tanks eskadrony B 1. a hussar regiment. One squad ran through a barbed-wire fence and drove into a Courseulles-sur-Mer. Then knocked out the machine gun nests, and the position of the 75mm and 88mm guns. Further to the east, landed at 8:15 B company, which ran on a limited resistance, fell into Courseulles and began to brush him. It has already started to supply druhosledových rot. Winnipeg iron company a And C immediately started to advance towards the Banville and Sainte-Croix-sur-Mer. In the sector Nan, Green landed C company and D reginského regiment and slowly moving to the port. Most of the Canadian scottish regiment arrived at 8:30 and landing them very znepříjemňovala barrage of mortars. After an hour, the regiment formed and started with the procedure on the south to the inland.


Juno Beach front Courseulles-sur-Mer (Photo Admin 2014)

Landing 8. canadian infantry brigade


In 8:12 in the sector Nan White against Bernières-sur-Mer, landed two companies of the Queen's own canadian rifle regiment. The germans here had the status of a 88-mm cannon and several machine-gun nests. B company landed roughly 150 metres from the designated places and unfortunately right in front of the muzzles of cannons and machine guns. Uncomfortable were even mortars. And in addition their own tanks couldn't eat, because their ships had to bring almost to the shore, so in the fighting on the beach basically not intervened. The losses were great, however a few soldiers, who through the fault of the injured party the helm of the parachute boat, landed more to the east, managed to get to the bunkers from the flank and eliminate their crew shells. The rest of the company advanced to Bernières. Company, And on the beach met with significantly less resistance, overcoming the barrier of barbed wire and entered into Bernières, where she ran into fire from mortars and accurate snipers. Further to the east, landed in the sector Nan Red at 8:10, company a And B Northshoreského regiment. Defensive positions in Saint-Aubin suffered during the bombing of minimal damage and their crew launched to the Canadian fire. You had to overcome about 100 metres to the beach, which was littered with land mines. "A" company suffered heavy losses. B company ran into even stronger resistance, however, she managed to overcome the first line defence elements. However, the 50mm anti-tank gun was still in operation. At 8:10 arrived tanks Sherman 10. a canadian armored regiment and a sapper tanks, which immediately began to assist company B with the attack on the position of the cannon. Eskadrona lost four tanks before the bunker managed to knock out. At 8:30 arrived brigadier deposit in the form of the Regiment de la Chaudière, together with the remaining companies of the first two regiments, which are immediately involved in the fighting. So managed to improve the situation in Bernières and Saint-Aubin. The regiment de la Chaudière then took up his position between the two municipalities, and thus also the regiments. At Saint-Aubin landed and 48. section commandos of the marine corps, who had to go to the east and occupy Langrune-sur-Mer. The German nest of resistance in that time has not yet been taken out, and the section during the moment lost 40 percent of the state team.


Arrival of reinforcements


After the ninth hour of the land 14. and 19. army field artillery regiment, whose guns about myself began to know about from 11:00. Since managed to disembark and get from the beaches to the villages, could be to the shores of sent the third brigade of the division, i.e. 9. canadian infantry brigade, along with tanks Sherbrookských fyzilírů. The projected sector Nan Red but wasn't even cleaned, and then 9. the brigade had to land in a sector Nan White. When at 11:40 arrived its four battalions, there was a decent jam, and the soldiers had to wait in the boats. When they finally landed, moved with the brigade into Bernières, where it was shortly after noon, the established divisional headquarters. In the meantime, the engineers were cleaning the beach.


the Procedure of the beaches on the south and east


General Keller met with the commanders of their respective brigades. Since the first target line (YEW) was occupied, ordered the 7. and 8. the brigade set off for the support of tanks and artillery to the south to another line (ELM). Then among them should take a ride 9. brigade and attack in the direction of the next line (OAK). Try to stop the canadian procedure should the remnants of the three battalions of 736. granátnického regiment and three battalions of 726. infantry regiment. In Courseulles still not discarded all points of resistance. The situation was the same in Saint-Aubin. However Winnipegští together with the canadian Scots and eskadronou hussars went through Vaux and Gray-sur-Mer on the St. Croix and Banville. At St. Croix with the Canadians managed to thwart the German attempt to develop a counterattack. Further to the south of D company of the canadian scottish regiment secured the two bridges over the river Seulles. The foot soldiers then set off for tank support to attack in the space between St. Croix and Banville. In the east progressed reginský regiment south towards Reviers, who shortly after occupied. 8. the brigade surged to the attack on the south a bit slower, because the Regiment de la Chaudières lost in the landing of their equipment and supplies and even in Bernières still resisted the last pockets of resistance. Another problem was the intense fire of the German anti-tank guns from the Beny-sur-Mer. However, the infantry slowly marching to this goal, which after occupied and getting ready for a further advance towards the airport at Carpiquet. Other units, meanwhile, progressed to the Tailleville, which entered at 14:00, but a few more hours of him cleaning as well from the German soldiers, who had built a vast complex of underground bunkers. It to the Canadians made it impossible to occupy during the D-day radar station south of the village. B company nortshoreského regiment and 48. section commandos at the time, tempt the fight at Saint-Aubin and Lagrune-sur-Mer. After two hours from landing was basically neutralized WN 27 and commandos could advance further to the west to WN 26. From the east from the beaches of SWORD was running 41. section commandos. The evening WN 27 failed to discard, and the attack had to be stopped, because there have been reports about the counterattack of the German 21. panzer division, just into the space between the beaches of JUNO and SWORD. German bunkers in Langrune and Luc-sur-Mer were discarded to 8. June.

the Procedure of the ELM and the transition to defense


The canadian infantry advanced to the Anguerny, Columby-sur-Thaon and Basly. It was also the pursuit of a sortie to the airfield at Carpiquet and the road Caen-Bayeux. Due to the evening news about starting a German counterattack was ordered, transition to defense, and so the Canadians began to build a defensive position. The canadian scottish regiment in the meantime set off on Colombiers and then to the road Creully-Caen. From here set out to the line of ELM, where they began to drive gradually occupy a defensive position. One squad of 6. armored regiment went south and reached the railroad line Caen-Bayeux without having to hit the more resistance. It reached a line of OAK and one of the few units, therefore, fulfilled the tasks assigned for D-day. Commanders were asked about the allocation of reinforcements for the subsequent attack on the airport, but was ordered to download the Elmo and the passion of defense. At the end of the day D 3. canadian infantry division reached the line of the ELM, so has advanced considerably in the south, however, laid down a line of OAK has not reached. To Caen had about 5 miles. However, the Canadians were able to approach the set target lines, the closest of all the units. On the other hand, during the D-day has failed to occupy the Lagrune and combine the beaches of JUNO and SWORD. The canadians on JUNO and the British on Golda could take such a defensive position, that the German 21. panzer division, although prove between both beaches temporarily drive a wedge, but couldn't any of them out.


Canadian cemetery in Bény-sur-Mer (Photo Admin 2014).
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5.3 Beach of GOLD[/heading:aaaaaa]

Approach to the beach


Approximately at half past five in the morning arrived the Offensive clusters of G to a point, where should the landing craft infantry run of the attack boats, which they also immediately began to do. Closer to the coast taken by the cruisers Orion, Ajax, Argonaut, Emerald and Flores firing positions and began to target the positions of the artillery batteries. Meanwhile, over the beach rushed heavy and medium bombers and emptied their bomb bay. Once departed, replaced is cruisers. For them to coast out gunships with tanks and foot soldiers. On the wings is accompanied by boats with missiles and guns. At 7:30 landed the first boats on the beaches. Tanks should indeed arrive in advance, however, the state of the sea is slowed down, and then in one moment they landed shermans DD, specialized tanks from the 79. armored division and the infantry, which disrupted schedules and caused traffic jams.


Landing 231. infantry brigade


Unit 231. infantry brigade land on the eastern edge of the village of Le Hamel. 1. battalion of the Royal Hampshirského the regiment was on the right wing, 1. battalion Dorsetshirského regiment on the wing of the left. These battalions were to secure the beach and move forward to make place for the next sledům. Hampshirští should occupy Le Hamel and Asnelles, while Dorsetští should attack the foothold La Cabane des Douanes and then continue the procedure on the heights above Arromanches. That they should facilitate the previous air bombardment, which was to knock out German defensive elements. But that didn't work, and the British so welcomed by the intense fire of the German machine guns, mortars and guns. Moreover, should the tanks Sherman DD problem with overcoming obstacles, lacked even the Centauri marines. Special engineer tanks were disabled or destroyed by the fire of the works. In addition, the current took the attack boats outside of the designated positions, so Hampshirští were dropped off at the La Cabana and they had to attack on this foothold instead of Dorsetských. Company a And B were brought to earth fire from the fulcrum and from Le Hamel, without chewed through the wire barricades and mine fields. However, one platoon for the first time, after all, managed to pass through the barbed wire and knock out at a furious attacks the defensive element on the wing of the German defense. Breakthrough managed to expand, and Hampshirský battalion then began to push off the beach inland. A major obstacle was the foothold in the sanatorium at Le Hamel, who had a powerful armament and thick reinforced concrete walls and cover the area to the west and to the east from Le Hamel. The cannon was able to knock out several tanks and a bunker resisted. In addition, a join German guns further inland. In this unfavorable situation reached C company, and D. The germans is immediately welcomed by a strong fire, which claimed many victims. The battalion commander lieutenant colonel Smith suffered two hits and had to be evacuated. The same fate met the advance of the artillery návodčího and the battery commander field artillery. The battalion lost opportunity to support maritime works and works on the commando boats. Command took over major Warren. This should relieve the senior major Martin, whom but immediately after landing he shot a sniper. Warren decided that a frontal attack on Le Hamel would be suicide, and decided to attack him from the back, on the way through Le Cabane and Les Roquettes. After a few hours he succeeded. Dorsetští landed east of the intended position at the La Cabane. Even so, it encountered resistance, for they were in range of Le Hamel. Tanks, that should clear the way of beaches, have been disabled or for various reasons have stuck. Yet Dorsetští managed to get from the beach, advance through the wetlands and regroup at Les Roquettes. From here proceed through Buhot on the Puits d men do we got. Dorsetským in the morning managed to get on the heights south of Arromanches, where it is stopped by a hostile party from the heights on the other side of the village. As the last part of the brigade landed at 8:15 2. battalion Devonshirského regiment. The beach still was far from guaranteed, since Hampshirští only performed the attack on the sanatorium. Good devon to strengthen their efforts once the company, while the rest of the battalion passed around Asnelles and attacked in the direction of the Ryes. In the space of the landing of the brigade landed and 47. section commandos of the marine corps, but the fighting on the beach he didn't include, because his task was to ensure the connection with the beaches of Omaha at Port-en-Bessin. Their mission is described in detail below in the chapter about the connection of the beaches to one of the bridgehead.

Landing 69. infantry brigade


At 7:30 landed the first assault of the company 69. infantry brigade near La Rivière.


Sector beaches of the Gold at La Rivière (Photo Admin 2014)

Support is should tanks 4./7. Royal dragounského guards regiment. Eskadrona C should promote the 5. battalion Východoyorkshirského regiment on the left wing and eskadrona B 6. battalion Green Howardského regiment. The third battalion of the brigade, which was supposed to arrive for the first two, was 7. a battalion of the same regiment. This should support eskadrona And dragounského regiment. The brigade was still strengthened by specialized armor units 79. armored division and ženijními machine. The plan counted with the fact that tanks were on the shore to swim, but it was too restless, and so were the tanks planted on the shore from boats. Resistance was initially weak, but as soon as began to go out on the beach the first tanks, headed here by the accurate fire of the 88mm cannon of a fortified position on the outskirts of La Rivière, which began to phase out one tank after another. In addition, the landed infantry. Yorkshirští landed right next to the fulcrum in La Rivière and had to hide behind the wall on the beach. Attempts to overcome it have been without success. One of the mine-clearance tanks, but after a while managed to roll up to the kasematům and shot destroy the gun and eliminate its operation. Then under the cover of summoned fire naval guns, which engaged the Germans at the focal point, surpassed the british infantry wall and the lateral road leading along the beach. Subsequently, overcame minefields and roadblocks of barbed wire around the village. Then began the infantry with the support of Sherman tanks and AVRE with its charges of Firecrackers La Rivière cleaned. More to the west landed Howardští. Hit the significantly weaker opposition, although the Germans on them from the support point at Hable de Heurtot were firing machine guns and small arms. Moreover, this resistance point soon disposed of thanks to the joint action of infantry and tanks. One company then went to the battery at Mont Fleury. Meanwhile, the sappers cleared exits from the beach. One mine clearance tank even broke through to the Ver-sur-Mer, thus opening the way for other vehicles. It quickly took advantage of infantry and tanks 4./7. regiment. Howardští, whose other two companies, meanwhile, landed on the beach, sailed away one position after another and headed to the Créponu. At 8:15 landed a third battalion of the brigade, i.e. 7. battalion Green Howardského regiment. He immediately set out to Ver-sur-Mer, where he occupied the position of the artillery battery.


self-Propelled howitzer Sexton - a monument to the 88th Field Regiment, Royal Artillery in Ver-sur-Mer (Photo Admin 2014)


the Arrival of the druhosledových brigades


Around 11. the clock arrived the backup brigade 50. infantry division. 56. infantry brigade landed at Hable de Heurtot, although originally should arrive to Le Hamel, but here still fighting over. 151. infantry brigade landed under the plan for 69. infantry brigade. 56. the brigade took advantage of the fact that Dorsetští and good devon cleared space in the area of the sector of the Jig and fired in the direction of Bayeux, although Hampshirští should still work with the fortified point in the sanatorium at Le Hamel. This nest of resistance managed to knock out up to around 16. hours, thanks to the support of one machine AVRE, which the bunker opened fire torpedoes Firecrackers. Part of the battalion, meanwhile, occupied the fortified point WN 38 in Saint-Côme-de-Fresné and radar on the bluff east of Arromanches. It was now surrounded from the south and east. Infantry with the support of naval guns in the afternoon, the municipality freed. Dorsetští occupied the Ryes and good devon headed to the battery at Longues, which D-day brought several long-distance shootings with several battleships and cruisers. Repeatedly was hit, but she could always fire (sometimes very exact) to restore. Slowed to 7. June morning, when they arrived good devon and the entire crew captured.

Procedure to the outback


When was the closest bridgehead secured, and the whole division was around lunch time on the shore, could begin the procedure more inland, in order to fulfill the tasks designed for the D-day. 56. brigade had to go to Bayeux and beyond the river Drome. Part of the brigade ran the La Rosière and crossed the road to Bayeux. When headed to the radar station in Pouligny, she found only a burnt-down device, and an abandoned post. From there she continued to Vaux-sur-by aure and ensure a smooth transition across the river. Nearby artillery battery was found abandoned. The other wing of the brigade occupied the St. Sulpice and Magna. Here the brigade halted and secured the position. The Bayeux sent only reconnaissance patrols. 151. the brigade advanced in two groups, with the aim to cut the road Caen-Bayeux and railway between Bayeux and the Seulles. On the right flank of the advanced portion of the brigade in the lead with 9. the banner Durhamského light infantry regiment along the road Crépon-Bayeux. To the left advanced a 6. a battalion of the same regiment, with tank support from the Créponu to Villiers-le-Sec, and then toward Bayeux. 69. the brigade advanced on the left edge of the sector for the beaches of the GOLD. From Créponu progressed through the Villiers-le-Sec on the Creully. Already in the dark, crossed the river Seulles and took positions in the villages of St. Gabriel, Rucqueville and Coulombs. Also she managed to establish contact with the Canadians who landed on JUNO beach. While the 50. the division advanced into the interior, started on the beaches of the landing of the unit 7. armored division.

German reaction - an attempt to counter-attack Meyerovy combat group


In the early hours of the morning 6. June recorded the German commanders in Normandy, there's something non-standard. First came the report about the actions of the airborne troops east of the river Orne and west of the river Vire. When the coast arrived at the allied ships, it was clear that the beginning of the invasion, but it was not clear to what extent. Part of the German 716. the division of major general Wilhelm Richter participated in the has already night of clashes with paratroopers. Units of the british 6th. airborne division actually landed in the easternmost part of the territory under his command. His situation became even prekérnější morning when the British and Canadians landed on three beaches, which again fall within the area of his division. The German trench divisions, which included, in particular, the exhausted veterans, foreigners and the older baby boomers, now tempt the fight with the enemy about the strength of roughly three divisions, composed often of the best, what should the Allies available. A match that wasn't even straight. As soon as the attacking company reached the defensive positions on the beaches and out of the activities of the reinforced concrete bunkers, he didn't Richter any more significant resources to stop the invading forces. In the open countryside, outside the protection of their covers, it will German soldiers to resistance quickly faded away. For beaches, GOLD had a Richter 441. the eastern battalion of Russian soldiers, who vyztužovali section 726. the regiment defending the defensive elements on the beaches. Support them to provide the gunners of the 352nd. artillery regiment 352. infantry division. Foray units 50. infantry division soon disrupted the consistency of the German defensive line, which was falling apart at individual nests of resistance. The latter was gradually eliminated. Around 9. o'clock in the morning recorded at the headquarters of the 352. division, that in the area of Meuvaines are british tanks. Its commander, major general Dietrich Kraiss was concerned that the British could make a lunge to the south and then swing west, and occupy the Bayuex, thus the division was surrounded. The core of the division were employed to fight with the Americans on OMAHA beach and in the area of the american airborne. The advance division, which served also as a backup Marcksova * law lxxxiv. the choir, in the form of a reinforced 915. infantry regiment from the morning of seducing a fight with american paratroopers around Carentan. Kraiss now ask to move this battle group to the east. Marcks ' due to the situation in Omaha and the fragmentation of the marines agreed that the biggest danger they represent british tanks on Golda. Battle group of colonel Meyer, which consisted of two grenadier and one fyzilírský battalion, therefore, had to go to the east and through Bayeux to arrive in Villiers-le-Sec, where did she lead the attack on the Crépon. But even after the way she had to leave one battalion in favor of the 914. the regiment, which defended Omaha. A substitute should be ten assault guns from 1352. company of assault guns and pledged the support of the railway artillery battery of Torigny. In Villiers-le-Sec Meyer took over command of the remains of 441. the eastern battalion and II. battalion 1716. artillery regiment. A big annoyance accounted for the allied fighter-bombers, which hampered the movement of the column. When Meyer group late in the afternoon arrived in Villiers-le-Sec, was already a british 69. infantry brigade in Créponu and she was going to progress further. Meyer so didn't have time to form groups into the offensive formation, because immediately upon arrival, there was a fight. The germans may have recorded some achievements, the assault cannon took out a few tanks, but the British did, and thanks to the support from the air, break up the German formation to smaller units. Meyer was during the fighting killed and the small remnants of the group, less than a hundred men, began to withdraw back. Inconvenience was this also, that Meyer had a detailed map of the German position, and it now fell into british hands. Kraiss realized he had no chance to the British to push back, but wanted to at least stop the fall of Bayeux. The remnants of the 915. the regiment obeyed 726. the regiment and ordered to occupy a defensive position on the line Coulombs-Esquay-Bazenville-Asnelles. But most of this area was already in british hands. Kraiss also ordered the troops in Bayeux, to leave the city and together with the III. the banner of the 352. artillery regiment, the rest of the 915. regiment and part 726. the regiment took a defensive position before the city. Kraissovy has been allocated and 30. mobile brigade, which was on the road from Coutances, however, have transported on the bicycles, so her arrival is expected till the morning..
URL : https://www.valka.cz/Operace-Neptune-t125802#508976Version : 0
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5.4 OMAHA BEACH[/heading:aaaaaa]

Planning, targets, terrain



The future of OMAHA beach was chosen already in the early planning stage of operation Overlord, because at that time was not heavily defended. The high coastal cliffs but formed a significant natural barrier and facilitate the defense. Although the Rommelův command started in the autumn of 1943 fortifying this sector, the beach remained in the plans of the landing thanks to the possibilities of a deep berth about a mile from all parts of the beach, at low tide the water was still 12 feet in depth, which should allow baby makes three artificial port for the subsequent supply and reinforcement of troops. The terrain up above the beach was more suitable for motor vehicles than the terrain adjacent UTAH beach. Study 1. the army in February 1944 noted that the natural conditions multiplied the possibility of the defenders and that if the beach will be defended by one infantry battalion, as a result of the attack will be heavy losses. If you will be defended by all the infantry division, it will be impossible defense to break. Up to the time of the landing of Americans believed that the beach is guarded by a single, weakened and ill-equipped battalion. A major flaw in the allied survey and plans had cost the lives of many soldiers - on the Allies on Omaha because the expected three times more defenders.

The formation of the plan of disembarkation is from the beginning attended by the crew of the american In. the choir, which is joined already in July 1943 and dealt with specific issues around the landings in the Normandy. In October 1943, then to Great Britain moved the headquarters of the american 1. army and 1. army group and the planning of the operation is running at full speed. Overall plan operation Neptune was released 25. February 1944, the plan In. ward 26. march 1944, 1. infantry division then 16. April 1944. It was not, however, completed the distribution of units and plans are so varied yet at the end of may 1944. Plan In. the choir was 326 pages and 23 maps and charts.

The basic premise of the whole operation Neptune was a moment of surprise. In the event of the disclosure of the allied plans, the Germans were able to strengthen the entire area of the landing and amphibious assault would become impossible. This assumption is influenced by the especially air bombing, to reveal the future area of the landing, the Allies limited the bombing of Normandy, three weeks before the planned attack, and for every bomb dropped on Normandy went to at least two other dropped in the area Pas de Calais and Picardy. This choice paid off for all the beach with the exception of OMAHA.

Landing at dawn was chosen because of the underwater obstacles that the Germans have installed on all the beaches in the space of the landing. Ships approaching the shore should remain hidden from German eyes for as long as possible.

Fire support of the landing should provide a union Force Of, consisting of 2 older battleships, 3 light cruisers, 15 destroyers and a number of smaller vessels. With the rays of first light at 5:58 association had to open fire at position 14 of the German artillery batteries. Twenty minutes before the hour H should be ostřelovaní focus on the coastal fortifications of the defenders, in the hour H is then to move more inland or on both ends of the landing beaches. Due to the influx must have been landing on OMAHA to start earlier than at the other beaches and naval shelling, it should be even shorter than elsewhere - 40 minutes. Force thus had neither the time nor sufficient force to ensure its bomber role.

Shortly after the start of the naval bombardment had on the coastal defences to attack the heavy bombers of the allied air force. The goal was to have the cliffs above the beaches, the concrete strength at the exits from the beaches and the area behind the beach - the beach itself bombarded shouldn't be, so that created craters not hinder the landing tanks and motor vehicles.

The aim of the amphibious landing should be securing the beachhead between Port-en-Bessin and the river Vire, where should be the procedure in a southerly direction to Caumontu and on St. Lo, in parallel with the procedure of the british 2. army. The corps should land in a total of 4 waves.

[map]9[/map]
Sectors of Omaha beach - with the mouse you can enlarge and move around

The first wave should consist of 1. infantry division, reinforced to a total of 4 infantry regiments and expanded further on the artillery, tank and engineer departments. The main components accounted for the 16th and 18th Detained Combat Team (RCT, regimental combat team) 1. infantry division and 116th Detained Combat Team 29. infantry division along with the 115. infantry regiment, then a Makeshift group of Rangers comprised of 2. and 5. a battalion of Rangers. This whole Group A had 34 142 men and 3 306 vehicles.

The second wave, Group B, had to land after noon and consisted of the other 25 117 men and 4 429 vehicles from the 29. infantry division (175. infantry regiment and the 26th Detained Combat Team from 1. infantry division).

In the days D+1 and D+2 should land the next two waves with the main departments of the 2. infantry division, with a further 17 500 men and 2,300 vehicles.

And in the other two weeks after landing should gradually accrue and 27 of the remaining staff, 32 000 soldiers and 9 of 446 vehicles.

The plan counted with the lines in the breadth of one division and develop the attack in two divisions, also thanks to the mixing units 1. and 29. infantry division had to be ensured command. Brigadier general Norman D. Cota, deputy commander of the 29. infantry division, was to land with the 116th RCT, and assist the commander 1. infantry division Huebnerovi in command of the departments 29. infantry division until their return to the original unit. While 1. infantry division was an experienced unit with combat experience from North Africa and Sicily, 29. infantry division in Normandy had to brush off its combat baptism.

As already mentioned, the unit didn't just convenient terrain. The swamps around the mouth of the river Vire transferred in the high cliffs around Grandcamp-Maisy, 30metrové cliffs lining the narrow beach continued on up to the Pointe de la Percee. After another 8 kilometres, then cliffs again returning, along with the rocky beaches, and continue to Port-en-Bessin. And just those 8 kilometers to the beach without the high rocky reefs with the should become a place of disembarkation of the american In. corps. The beach in this sector sloped down into the sea very slowly, the difference between the inflow and outflow of around 6 meters so uncovered at 300 meters to the beach. This area was covered with protiinvazními obstacles, wading with the troops and equipment waited even underwater dunes and troughs hollowed coastal currents. On the border of the tide is then a rocky beach heaved up to 3 meters, had a width of around 15 feet and stones should be around 7-8 cm in diameter. On the eastern two-thirds of OMAHA rocky beach crossing in the sandy dunes and low sandy embankment, which formed a natural obstacle for the passage of vehicles. In the western part of the beach has passed a stone breakwater in the amount of between 1 and 4 meters, which was interrupted in several places in a width of several hundred meters. Directly behind this breakwater was a paved road passing from Exit D-1 to Exit D-3, on like the unpaved road up to the Exit E-3. From the breakwater to the cliffs is then the area of the flat, in addition to Viervielle is an area overgrown with tall grass and bushes, usually at the foot of the cliffs. Towards Exit E-1 is a row of houses between the road and the cliffs, and at Exit D-3 lay a small village, les Moulins, with buildings along the road leading to the interior. A number of the houses were the Germans razed to the ground, make it possible to build defensive positions and improve the firing of the field defenders. East of les Moulins was several separate cottages.

The reefs are sharply rising up above the beach to an amount of 30-55 meters and dominate the entire sector. Slopes are generally steep, but in the different locations varies. Between the Exitem D-1 and D-3 are almost impassable, further to the east are rising more slowly, but to greater heights (50 meters). Grass-covered slopes are full of various irregularities which allow you to cover the front of the side of the fire, from Exit E-1 are then the slopes covered with shrubs and a spinney. Cliffs then sharply moving in the flat area behind the beach, only on the eastern edge of the slope is less steep, the gradual and the transition is not too noticeable.

In four places from the beach builds wooded valley, at the Exit D-1 is the paved road, in the other then unpaved roads. These exits have been the primary target of the attack and the main place of defense. The attackers had to open these exits from the beaches, to ensure the supply and the path for the armored units that had a different path from the beach to the inland. On the east end then was a shallow, steep valley, continuing the unpaved road into the interior, marked as a potential fifth exit Exit F-1.

Although after overcoming the reefs could the attackers appear to have appeared on the large flat plain, within two miles towards the inland plain was rising up to 80 meters above sea level south from Colleville-sur-Mer. What uncovering the terrain, however, perfectly concealed hedges, orchards and clumps of trees. On the road to the interior, 500-1000 m from the shore, lay the village of Vierville, St. Laurent and Colleville. Agricultural village with a partial summer/holiday traffic had their stone houses is around the road, connecting them with Bayeux and Grandcamp-Maisy.

Further to the south lies the valley of the river by aure, leading from east to west. West of Trevieres, the area was flooded and formed more than 1.5 km wide barrier. Over Trevieres river by aure wade across. South of the river then the terrain gradually rises and is crowned by a forest of Cerisy, 19 kilometres south from the coast and almost 135 meters above sea level. This forest figured in the plans. the choir as an important tactical objective, because the rendered space to the commander of the troops fighting on the coast, was in the range of beaches and touted as a gathering of enemy soldiers for eventual counterattack.

The area west and southwest of OMAHA then was another of the objectives of the procedure, in particular because of the need to link american In. and VII. ward between the OMAHA and Utah. Flooding on the lower reaches of the river by aure created from the area of the peninsula with a length of 16 kilometers and a width of 8 miles between Formigny, Trevieres and ústim of the river Vire. In this area were the strongest of the German defensive positions, controlling the approaches from the sea to Carentan, through which walked the main road from Paris and Caen to Cherbourg and the peninsula of the Cotentin. The town of Isigny, where the highway crossing the river by aure, it was crucial for the connection of both the american beachhead. The road network south and west of OMAHA, it was characterized by the absence of north-south roads, the main roads were parallel with the coast. The main thoroughfare of the area was the previously mentioned joint of the Bayeux-Isigny-Carentan, then the road from Bayeux to St. Lo, passing through the forest of Cerisy. From Port-en-Bessin led the road to Grandcamp, about 1.5 km from the beaches. North-south roads were mostly only minor and it could be expected that they will be full of narrow bridges and dangerous roadsides - these routes serve local farmers for the cultivation of the fields, but were not suitable for large movements of military equipment, so they had to reckon with the massive deployment of engineers on rebuilding these south-north routes for military traffic arteries. The combat deployment of these routes impede the ubiquitous hedges, low walls and embankments. Double track from Caen to Cherbourg led to the highlands a few miles south of the river by aure. Discontinue the rail line between Bayeux and Caen was the primary goal of the british 2. army.

A specific obstacle in the entire area were hedges. On the plain behind the beaches were fields, orchards and pastures for livestock, hedgerows formed a natural corral for the animals and they differed as well, as the shapes and sizes of individual fields. Some of the fences were low scrub, two meters, easily permeable, others thick, solid barriers, over three meters high, complemented by a greater or smaller trees. Along hedges often through drainage channels and provide additional hiding places for the defender. Hedges in combination with embankments or hillsides, along paths formed an impenetrable barrier even for armour. Hedges are preventing the unfolding of paths, observation, and quick fire response to the enemy, the defenders then facilitate the defense and in combination with mortar and machine gun fire prevented in the approaches to the fortified positions. The attackers had problems with communications and fighting in such terrain had to push through aggressive tactics, initiative and cooperation within smaller groups.

The number of the French inhabitants throughout the area, with the exception of Bayeux, was to 10 000. Stone houses, which were located at the intersections of routes have become often the cover of the defenders, as well as in a flat landscape without much of the field of inequalities, were the towers of the churches cover for artillery observers and snipers - their ruins then tell us about an effort to silence the enemy artillery.

German coastal defence in the area of the landing In. the choir was organized with regard to the availability of individual segments of landing. In the area between the mouth of the river Vire and the port of Port-en-Bessin was a total of 32 fortified positions, the most were then defended as just the area around Vire, Grandcamp and Port-en-Bessin. On long stretches of beach, where the cliffs formed a natural barrier, was the fortification of the more sparsely spaced. The germans, clearly aware of the benefits of sector OMAHA for a landing from the sea and 12 fortified positions were located so as to directly control areas of the beaches. The German tactical plan to repel the allied landings was based from the layout of fortifications along the beaches, without a deeper zone defense. It was obvious that the Germans concentrated all available forces to repel attack even at sea or on the beaches, in the worst case, to delay the enemy on the beaches until reinforcements arrive. The coastal defense was designed to stop vyloďující soldiers underwater obstacles, land mines, and it was destroyed by the concentrated fire of all weapons. The underwater barriers designed to intercept and destroy landing craft at the beaches of OMAHA appeared in April 1944 and their construction continued until the time of disembarkation. Approximately 250 m to the sea was established the first band of obstacles, "Element C" with the mines. The second zone was located about 20-25 meters towards the beach on the border of the tide, a strong wooden stakes or wooden reinforced ramp recessed into the sandy bottom so that it will be facing to the open sea, at the end of the again equipped with minami. This band of the obstacles turned out stronger than expected. 130 m from the shore then held a third series of obstacles, hedgehogs and other metal structures, which should pierce the hulls of landing craft. This zone was not continuous, the obstacles were scattered at random intervals. Shortly after the start of construction of underwater barriers on this significant complication informed allied intelligence and allied commanders had to resort to adjusting the plans.

Even after overcoming underwater obstacles awaited the soldiers of the zone of the beach before they got to the coastal cliffs. The band was zaminováno and spared not even barbed wire. Some places hid the explosives TNT, disguised as bushes and barbed wire. Some of the minefields was just a sham pieces of metal zahrabanými just below the surface. A firing position to cover the area of the beaches by all kinds of weapons, direct and indirect fire. Observation and guidance of the firing of the hips allow for a slight arch of coast, in which an entire sector of OMAHA was located. Sector between Vierville and Pointe de la Percée was particularly dangerous, because here could be guided by the fire on long, nothing uncovered sections of the beach. Each fortified positions consisted of concrete bunkers for artillery and infantry weapons, open positions for light guns and infantry guns, and firing trenches, protected by bands of barbed wire and minovými field. The individual parts were interconnected by trenches and underground tunnels, connected were and a command section and a storehouse of ammunition. Most of the fortified positions in the sector of OMAHA was located near the exits from the beaches, which were further ztíženy anti-tank ditches and road barricades. In June the Germans still a number of fortifications finished, particularly the fortifications controlling the exit E-1.


The basic defensive element was the machine gun nests, but, in addition, OMAHA was located at the 60 works of all possible calibers. 8 concrete casemates and 4 open positions have been designed for the cannon caliber 75-88 mm, 35 bunkers then was fitted with guns of smaller calibre, further, there were 18 anti-tank cannons 37-75 mm calibre. The heavier guns were placed so as to postřelovala the beach from the hips, their reading was limited by the thick concrete walls of bunkers, which is supposed to protect and hide the flashes from observation from the sea. The position of the mortars was ever part of the fortified points, but more often were located at cliffs. After landing it was discovered 40 trenches on the heights above the beaches, prepared for the 32cm rocket launchers.

Sector of OMAHA was not so strongly defended by batteries of coastal artillery, but right on its edge, on Pointe du Hoe, some 5 km to the west, should be stationed an artillery battery, equipped with 6 French 155 mm houfnicemi, partially hidden in the concrete casemates. This position has been identified as the greatest danger in the american sector of the landing, because its guns not only could hit the area itself landing In the. even VII. corps, but also a meeting and access the area on the sea. Further west, in Maisy, she had be the battery of 4 155mm howitzers, near Gefosse-Fontenay then 4 105mm field howitzer. Just over the border of the american sector, in the field of british troops at Port-en-Bessin, then there was another artillery unit able to hit sector of OMAHA.

For the coastal zone was no more a secondary line of defense, with the exception of a few minefields and small fortifications in the areas of assembly points troops, all the defense after the break of the first line is so relying on the counterattack mobile backups.



German units, commanders


(will be moved to the common chapter on all the beaches)

Rundstedt
Sperrle
Krancke
Rommel
Geyr von Schweppenburg
Dollman
Marcks'
Kraiss


Omaha lay in the area between the river Orne and the mouth of the river Vire, which should defend the 716. infantry division. This division was defensive, in the estimated strength of 2 regiments, two or three artillery battalions, and several smaller units. It was estimated that up to half of the troops forming the Poles and the Russians, and the morale is poor. 726. infantry battalion was responsible for the defense of the coast from the Grandcamp after area 5 km east of Port-en-Bessin. According to the allied survey was the area of OMAHA to defend roughly a reinforced battalion, 800-1000 men serving the guns in the fortified sectors. A backup should consist of roughly three battalions, two of them stationed close enough to the fighting on OMAHA hit within three hours. Counter attacks of these units, however, not mean a significant danger to allied units, which is reached through an area of the coastal fortifications, a massive counter-attack then depended on the arrival of other advances. The closest was 352. infantry division, which was to be stationed in the area St-Lo-Caumont approximately 30 km inland. This unit under the command of lieutenant general Heinz Hellmicha was offensive division of good quality, consisting of a core of veterans from the eastern front and gave from her expect a strong resistance against a procedure In. corps. Was in the full force of three infantry regiments and three artillery battalions of 105mm guns and one with 155mm guns. For using the local transport should be division able to send at least one regimental combat team to the area of the landing on OMAHA during the afternoon of D-day. In addition, they can be on the counter-attack involved three smaller battalions of 30. mobile brigade, stationed in Coutances. Each battalion consisted of three companies and was sufficiently equipped for fast movement. Other German mobile backup, including panzer divisions, were deployed in the area of the Bayeux - Caen in the direction of advance of the british and canadian units, therefore In. the corps issued a warning against the possibility of a German armored counterattack on the left flank during the afternoon of D-day. Three divisions on the peninsula of the Cotentin should be fully engaged in the landings, VII corps and the possibility of further landings in this sector.

The allies also expected that the Luftwaffe, despite the many losses still enough forces, during the landing carried out up to 1500 take-offs of fighters and fighter-bombers.


Allied units, commanders


(will be moved to the common chapter on all the beaches)
Eisenhower
Bradley
Gerow
Huebner
Gerhardt
Hoge
Taylor
Canham
Cota
Rudder

Plan of attack



the pre-invasion bombing

Landing on the beaches of OMAHA should be preceded by massive air and naval bombardment in the 30 minutes preceding the first invasion wave. The goal should be all the known fortifications and the position of the works and the demoralization of the defenders. In the period before D-day, air attacks should focus on the artillery batteries in the area of the landing, but only as part of a wide air offensive in which was the biggest emphasis put on the severofrancouzské the coast north of the Seine. The battery on the Point du Hoe as a priority target was attacked by a 15. April, 22. may and 4. June. The RAF had to continue the bombing of coastal batteries during the night, and the dawn of D-day. The coastal batteries from the mouth of the Seine to Cherbourg were the aim for 1333 heavy bombers, which dropped 5316 tons of bombs.

In time H-30 minutes to H-5 minutes should have coastal fortifications between the mouth of the river Vire and river Orne to attack the bombers of the american 8th. the air army, in the field of In. the choir of 480 bombers, the B-24 should have thought of 13 goals with the help of 1285 tons of bombs. Of these 13 targets, 11 lying in the area between Pointe de la Percée and the eastern region sector of OMAHA and included all the fortified points of the coastal fortifications. Cargo bomber accounted for most of the 100liberní clusters and 500liberní jerky cougars on some fortifications. Bombs had set fuses so as to prevent breakage of the beach craters. 18 medium bombers of the 9th. the air force then had in the hour H-20 minutes to H-5 minutes last time to attack the position of the Point du Hoe. At that very moment, was directed to attack the same forces on Maisy, the artillery battery, as well as the near Gefosse-Fontenay, then was the target of two squadrons of fighter-bombers.

The naval bombardment was supposed to start 40 minutes before the hour H and the end up to three minutes before disembarking. Battleships Texas and Arkansas (with a total of ten 14palcovými, twelve 12palcovými and twenty 5palcovými guns) were firing from a distance of 18 km from the shore, 600 their hardest shells should be directed again to the battery on the Point du Hoe, and then further on to the fortifications at the exits from the beaches. Three cruisers with 6palcovými and 152mm guns should have as goals for their 950 grenades fortifications at Port-en-Bessin and at the exits from the beaches. From a distance of 1800 meters on the wings of the landing sector, then 8 destroyers with four - and pětipalcovými cannons should burn at 2000 grenades at the defenders on the beaches.

In addition to these ships should engage a varied mix of support vessels, which should cover the fire area of the landing. Five LCG(L), each with two 47mm cannons, should burn 630 shells on the selected fortification 20 minutes before disembarking. 16 LCT(a) AND LCT(HE) vessels carrying tanks M-4 Sherman in the first landing wave was designed to offer the two tanks of each vessel they could shoot over the bow of the boat to the beach, the fire should start from a distance of 3000 meters in the time the H-15 minutes. Each tank had 150 rounds of ammunition. 10 LCT(5) taking 36 self-propelled 105mm howitzers 58. and 62. field an armored artillery battalion, which should land during the third hour of the attack. The howitzer could fire 8 km from the shore in the time H of 30 minutes and in the time the H-5 minutes to be in the region of 3700 m from the shore. Firing the diameter of one of the howitzers formed 100 rounds. 9 LCT(R) at position 3000 meters from the shore should burn the volley 9x 1000 missiles at the moment when the landing boats with the infantry close to the beach at 300 meters.

At the time of the landing of the barrage ships have to pass more to the interior, or burn according to the instructions of one of the 24 artillery observers allocated to each vyloďujícímu with the battalion, including the Rangers. Further observation and fire control, should ensure the aircraft, and that for the first five hours. During the procedure inland then had a Fire Support Group, consisting of 1 battleship, a cruiser and 4 destroyers, to be available to the units 29. infantry division, while the Fire Support Group II, composed of battle ships, 2 cruisers and 4 destroyers, should support the procedure 1. infantry division.

Naval landing force

Naval and air bombardment was to disrupt the defense system, but the main part of the attack rested on the shoulders of the infantry in the invasion boats. This was arranged so that each team had all types of special equipment needed for breakout of coastal defense. Each unit was trained to a specific task in the target area. The area of the landings was divided into sectors and subsectors, 6 of these subsectors then covered the main area of the amphibious landing.

1. infantry division had to attack with two regiments - on the eastern edge, podsektorech Easy Red and Fox Green in the breadth of 3000 feet should land 16. regimental combat team (16th RCT), with two battalions side by side. Another battalion was to disembark in time H+70 minutes.

On 4 western podsektorech, Dog Green, Dog White, Dog Red and Easy Green, also in width of 3000 meters, had a land 116. regimental combat team (116th RCT) with two battalions, the third, then had to disembark on the three eastern podsektorech.

The makeshift unit of Rangers, composed of two battalions (each of the 6 columns), assigned to the 116th RCT, had a special mission on the right flank - 3 platoon 2. a battalion of Rangers had to climb the cliffs at Point du Hoe, 5km west of the area of the main landings, and occupy the artillery battery. One company of the same unit should land to the west of Exit D-1, in addition to units of the 116th RCT and attack the enemy positions at Pointe de la Percée. If the attack on Point du Hoe was successful by H+30 minutes, 5. a battalion of Rangers and the remaining company 2. the battalion should land at Point du Hoe, if not, they should have at time H+70 minutes land in podsektoru Dog Green and on land to move on to the Point du Hoe.

H-hour was set so as to vyloďující the soldiers got to the beach as soon as possible after daybreak, while the underwater obstacles will be the maximum detected outflow. This timing was for the landing on OMAHA critical factor. Meant that vyloďující the soldiers of the first wave will have to overcome a few hundred meters away anything uncovered to the beach, but on the other hand, allow you to ženijním teams to create passages in the barriers for other invasive waves and supply during high tide.

In time the H-5 minutes should be amphibious tanks Sherman DD 743. tank battalion landing on Dog White and Dog Green. These tanks should be lowered to the water at a distance of 6000 metres from the beach and swim to the shore, on the border of the tide to take firing positions and cover the first stage of the away team. Their fire was supposed to concentrate on enemy fortifications, especially the west from the east D-1, because she could shell from the side of the sector Dog. The tanks then you should together with the infantry advance east D-3. In the hour H should be 8 LCT to land the tanks of the Company And 743. tank battalion in sectors of Easy Green and Dog Red. Their task was similar as in the previous case. With the Platoon And should land and 8 tanks with the blade, with trailers with explosives, to assist engineers by cleaning the landing beaches. All three tank companies were allocated to individual infantry battalions, to ensure the closest possible support to the advancing infantry.

In time H+1 minute should land the first wave of infantry. 4 companies, each divided into 6 LCVP boats (and accordingly also further organized according to the boats, not by reading). Platoon And should land on the Dog Green as the vanguard of the attack 1. infantry battalion on the east D-1. Company E, F and G should land in sectors, Easy Green, Dog Red respectively. Dog. White. This first wave had overcome the area the tide exposed beaches through the obstacles and launch an attack on the German defensive points. Team of each ship should operate as a separate tactical unit and was tasked with a specific target in the specified sector. Units should be encouraged in the elimination of the enemy defenses, but he wasn't the emphasis on the common organisation of the procedure, before leaving the area of the landing through the exits from the beaches. The attack of infantry and tanks had to recruit a defender and cover the engineers in their work on cleaning the sectors of the beach for further landings.

The engineers, members of 146. the combat engineer battalion, should land in time of H+3 - H+8 minutes in 13 of the LCM and were organized in 8 offensive, 4 support teams and a command section. Teams had an average of 41 men and 11 teams included a unit of naval engineers - 12 men under an officer. Their task was to mark out the areas of the beach to the vessel at high tide could safely land right on the beach. In the area of the disembark 116th RCT had to clean eight 50metrových of stripes in the barriers, two in each podsektoru. 8 tanks with radlicemi should push out, destroy and pull obstacles, the demolition teams had destroyed the rest and the special teams should take care of the mines on the obstacles and, where appropriate, in the sand of the beach.

The engineers had on his work no more than 30 minutes, in time to H+30 minutes on the beach to get the second, larger landing wave, divided into 5 groups vyloďujících during 30 minutes. You should be on the beach bring the rest of the two attacking battalions and the entire third battalion. At the same time should also contain the headquarters of the regiment and the battalion, two battalion 81st Chemical Weapons Battalion, and the unit 112. and 121. the engineer combat battalion. This second wave of engineers was tasked to support the attacking infantry through minefields and obstacles, then open the exits from the beaches for the passage of vehicles in time of H+3 hours. Inland should proceed together with the 116th RCT to prepare a transit area for vehicles.

At the same time in this wave should get at OMAHA beach and the units of the third wave of engineers, Provisional special engineer brigade group under the command of brigadier general William M. Hoge, composed of two brigades of three battalions. This group should continue cleaning the beaches of mines and obstacles, cleaning the exits and after leaving the royal engineers with the 116th in the inland group had to take over the organisation of the operations on the beaches.

In time H+90 and H+120 minutes should disembark first artillery unit, in the lead with 58. field armoured artillery battalion that was a part of artillery from the deck of your invasive vessels. DUKW should bring to the beach unit 111. field artillery battalion, 467. anti-aircraft battalion and anti-tank and artillery battalion 116th RCT. This wave should contain a variety of vehicles, but the real rush of vehicles had come in time to H+3 hours, and still to accrue. In time H+4 hours it should be cranes, recovery vehicles and tanks, half-tracked transporters and freight vehicles of all kinds. In this time should play a major role in the transport of vehicles on the shore of the DUKW and motor rafts Rhino.

In sectors Easy Red and Fox Green was the 16th RCT disembark according to a similar plan. Of the three companies 741. tank battalion, with companies B and C had to land on beach Easy Red and Fox Green, while the company And on the line connecting the two sectors. Even the deployment of engineers was similar, as well as artillery crew should disembark at the same pace.

Other supporting units were to start landing in time to H-195 minutes, when on the beach Easy Red was to land the 18th RCT. Infantry units of the 115th RCT should disembark for the 116th RCT on the basis of the orders of the commanding general In the corps, and to proceed under the command of the 1. infantry division.

a Roadmap to the outback

According to the original plan of the landing of the two attacking regiments were to break through enemy defenses on the coast during the first two hours after landing. The fortifications defending the exits from the beaches had to be eliminated early enough to three worthy after the beginning of the disembarkation was possible exits from the beaches open for the transport to the hinterland.

[map]4[/map]

After penetrating the zone defense should be the unit to regroup in the areas of about 1000 meters inland, and here the individual battalions to proceed to the objectives set in the outback. 2. battalion 16th RCT was to occupy Colleville, move forward and occupy the heights south of this village, to protect area beaches from possible enemy counter-attack from the area of Trevieres or Bayeux in the course of the day. 3. battalion after climbing the coastal cliffs had to issue an easterly direction and dispose of the enemy positions along the cliffs to St. Honorine-des-Pertes, then to occupy the heights toward Mount Cauvin, to protect the eastern flank of the attacking division. 1. battalion, support during the landing, he had to proceed with the 2. the banner and occupy the Formigny, the heights above the Trevieres and the valley of the river by aure in this village, to secure the bridges across the river by aure in Trevieres. Battalions should prepare to defend against enemy protiútokům from all sides. Units of the 18th RCT, a covered procedure, 16th RCT, should focus on the procedure through by aure southeast of Colleville and the conquest of the heights east of Trevieres. 26th RCT, which was supposed to land in the second wave on the basis of the order of the commander of the corps, should join 1. infantry division. His goal should be to cast and the defense of the area south and southeast of Tour-en-Bessin on contact with 50. infantry divisions of Great Britain towards Bayeux.

On the west flank of the attack had a 29. infantry division to occupy the area between the flood valley of the river by aure and the sea. After the capture of Vierville should 1. battalion move to the west, and in cooperation with the Rangers cleaned from the enemies mouth of the river by aure. Should be ready to cast Isigny and to connection with units of the VII corps from UTAH beach more in the west. 2. the battalion had to occupy the St. Laurent and the heights south-easterly direction. 3. the battalion had to advance through Logueville, to occupy the heights of 2.5 km in western direction, and prepare to advance on Isigny. 115. infantry regiment, vyloďující within 1. infantry division, should be ready to help dočišťovat coastal defensive positions. Furthermore, progress in the area of La Cambe and further south of the by aure. 175. infantry regiment as the advance corps should land up on D-day+1. Five battalions of 105mm howitzers had to advance together with infantry, more artillery fire was to provide the navy.

If the plan managed to fill, he would have been In the corps ready in day D+1 to proceed further south across the river by aure, one of the key heights in the forest Cerisy, to occupy Isigny and advance further to the west, where he had contact with the VII corps. Plans ward nezvažovaly next steps for the river Vir, because it was foreseen by the German retreat to the south of the area of Vir-Carentan.



Landing



Accurate determination of the date for the landing was influenced by a number of factors - it was necessary to solve a number of problems on each of the five landing beaches and to even meet another set of conditions - the days must be long enough to be able to in the maximum extent of allied superiority in the air. The moon should be almost full moon, in order to during the night safely maneuver at sea and perform an aerial insertion, strong outflow should help the detection of obstacles and barriers, the tide again to allow comfortable landing landing craft as close as possible to the beach. Itself hour H had to prevent about an hour of daylight, in order to carry out the bombing and shelling from the sea, organize a landing craft to the formation, the tide should be in their mid to obstacles have been seen, but the rocky cliffs in the british sector were already under water, the tide then had to rise further during the day then they should still be two more tides for maximum ease of unloading the material. Only a few days past the original deadline of 1.6.1944 to meet this complex set of conditions - 21-22-23. may 5-6-7. June or 19-20-21. June. 8. may 1944 it was decided that D-day will 5. June 1944.

Units In. the ward should be included in the er on 23. 3. 1944 and on the basis of the warrant begin to move to the rally point to embark. The movement of the troops of the first and the second wave was launched 7. 5. and finished 11. 5. Move almost 65 thousand men and 7600 vehicles provide XVIII. and the XIX. headings of the Southern Base Section, Services of Supply. In the event arenas, the soldiers found themselves in isolation, drawing the last remaining pieces of equipment and were in detail acquainted with the various phases of its deployment. At the end of may was moved from the staging areas to the ports for embarkation, and in their place were the soldiers of the units intended to strengthen the newly open queue in the second wave. 3. June all units of the Force Of naloděny and some of the soldiers have already spent on board ships in the ports of Portland, Weymouth and Poole the umpteenth day. In the night of 27. May have made the Germans less air attack and mines destroyed several small vessels. Nothing else but the course of embarkation disturb and German aerial reconnaissance remained until D-day in the usual scale.

The trip to Omaha beach was ready 34 thousand men on board, 7 transport ships, 8 LSI's, 24 LST's, 33 LCI(L) 36 LCM(3) and 147 LCT's, and 33 other vessels.
The 16th RCT had 9828 troops, 919 vehicles and 48 tanks, of 3502 men and 295 vehicles ensured just move on to the landing beach. The unit was loaded into the 2 transport ships, 6 LST's, 53 LCT of different variants and 5 LCI(L), on the disembarkation of the troops have transgressed into smaller boats launched from large ships, 81 LCVP's, 18 british LCA, 13 other vessels and 64 DUKW.

The attack was after all the time heavily dependent on the weather, which influenced both naval and air operations in the area. And before that there was a danger that the whole operation will be for bad weather, cancelled. The shift of the next day would entail a risk of deteriorating weather, problems with the supply of ships that have already sailed on the sea, and a variety of other complications and this could mean postponing the surgery until at least 19. June. It was therefore finally decided that the Allied landing in Normandy will take place 6. 6. 1944, and for OMAHA beach was set H-hour at 6:30 in the morning. The outflow should occur at 5:25, and the tide was peaking at 11:00. The sun had come out in 5:58 and fit in 22:07.

Convoy to OMAHA sailed from Great Britain in the afternoon 5. June and went on undisturbed journey across the Channel. Low over the convoy have been patrolling british Spitfire, above and on the edges of then 4 squadrons of american Thunderboltů. American 9. army aviation should ensure that over the allied beaches in broad daylight have been constantly at least three squadrons.

The USS Ancon, flagship of admiral Hall and the command post of the general Gerowa, launched the anchors 6. June 1944 in 2:51 at the distance of 23 km from OMAHA beach. Despite the slight improvement in the weather was far from ideal conditions. The visibility was 16 km, but the sky was overcast, a strong wind blew from the northwest, at the speed of 16-35 km in an hour and caused meter-high waves, fits and starts and a two-meter. These conditions lasted until the day D+1, than the wind gradually ceased. This bad weather to sign on during landing.

Get thousands of troops ashore would require precise timing and coordination of dozens of vessels. In the first place it was necessary to load the troops into the small boats, LCVP and LCA. This operation began roughly three hours before the hour H, and was significantly inclement weather and the sea. USS Thomas Jefferson, carrying the soldiers of the 116th RCT, launched their landing boats on the water during the 66 minute, 33 boats floated into the assembly area at 4:30, with 25 minutes in advance, because návodčí feared that bad weather would delay the landing.

The bad weather now soldiers natěsnaní in small boats with a flat bottom felt to the fullest. Showers of salty water, you were way on board water pumps on the boats went to full power, but even that often wasn't enough and the soldiers to the water to collect the helmets. The ships, which had problems with the pumps, trying to catch up with the other vessels, which resulted in just another torrents of water. Serious problems but affected only a small percentage of vessels. Of the first roughly 180-200 boats carrying two regimental groups with 10 sunk, either at sea, or during the approach to the beach. Most of the soldiers of the sunken vessels were rescued, although some had to spend in the water for several hours.

A rich breakfast, which the soldiers had indulged on board the transport ships, most of them didn't last long. Seasickness was pervasive, even if some boats have not been affected at all and in the other's stomach problems did not avoid all vyloďujícím to the soldiers. Similar conditions prevailed also during the exercise and the excitement of the upcoming battle kept the men on their feet. The soldiers discussed how the beach in front of them will be rozorána bombs and naval bombardment, and one of the officers remembers that he thought it was like another exercise on Slapton Sands - two days of misery culminating in a warm shower, and rest.

As the landing boats came close to a few kilometers from the beach, began to pass by the soldiers in life jackets and on rafts. They were the crew of the amphibious Sherman tanks DD, whose tanks failed to raging seas defy and sunk. According to the plan at the time the H-50 minutes launched on the water of 6000 meters from the shore tanks of company C 741. Tank battalion, to lead the first assault wave to the beach. Very soon, however, began to allow the plates, tear to canvas, and the engines began to flood water. Of the 32 tanks only two swam to shore, 3 further down the LCT, which had damaged the ramp and couldn't have tanks launches on the sea.

In the zone of the 116th RCT to officers on the LCT board decided not to risk and 32 tanks 743. tank battalion transported directly to the beach. Overall, however, these problems were so many complications, such as poor navigation. Under the plan, each unit should land on a narrow stretch of beach, in exactly defined and known sector, each soldier then had nacvičeny specific procedures and the specific objectives. Quick procedure from the beach was critically dependent on the fulfillment of a number of small tasks for individuals.

Despite the great efforts on the study of local conditions, currents and wind in this part of the coast, visual aids for observing and finding landmarks on the individual beaches, panoramic photos and to the entire training program of most vessels the first landing wave was given to another sector, than she should have. Smoke and dust after the air and naval bombardment deteriorate the search for landmarks. One of the control vessels for the beach Dog has moved from his position, so the next wave should have problems with navigation in this sector. The fact that the majority of the boats landing in the wrong sector, was shifted to the east speaks volumes about the strong water flow along the shore - with the rising tide reached the current speed of 5km/h at a distance of 8km from the shore and a strong wind still contributed to the increase of this speed. The destroyer Satterlee reported that the must shoot 20-30 degrees after the swing, so he managed to keep the position for artillery fire.

Whether it was the cause of any, most of the soldiers of the first echelon at OMAHA was given to another sector, than she should have. The shift was often very significant, even more than 1000 meters - E company of the 116th RCT, the aim of which was the sector Easy-Green, is blended got up to sector Fox Green, where he operated on the 16th RCT. More common was a shift of several hundred meters, but even so there was a disruption tactics to pre-established objectives and tasks, and the soldiers often "lost" in a foreign field, which made it more difficult for subsequent attempts at reorganization, an estimate of the forces of the enemy, and next steps. As if that wasn't enough, the mixing of the units during the landing incl. the relatively small shifts (e.g. 200 m) meant in reality the beach the inability to link rot and successful improvisation. Where were the commanders killed, problems on násobily.

The landing boats to the beach close under the soothing cover of artillery and rubbish from the sea and to a distance of several hundred meters from the shore were many reasons to believe that the German nests of resistance was silenced. But then a number of vessels had come under fire by automatic weapons and gradually began to add even the German artillery. It was clear that the German defence was silenced was not. The positions were well fortified and camouflaged (some positions were difficult to locate even during the day, for better visibility and better conditions for observation). Tanks and artillery, firing from the deck of the ship on the stormy sea, not nearly the chance for accurate fire. The rockets were an amazing spectacle, but the enemy's position, they did not intervene (say infantry, the navy says the opposite). Yet, overall, was the bombing of their impact on enemy defenses, often bigger than the attacking infantry could remember. Although it was OMAHA beach literally riddled with artillery, in some sectors of the Americans with enemy artillery fire ever met. Of the nearly 200 boats, which were carrying the infantry during the first two hours, only ten were hit by artillery fire before disembarking, none of them was this fire sunk, and casualties were low. Larger ships, like the LCI, were easier targets for coastal and inland batteries and firing on them facing more.

For vyloďující units but it was the biggest disappointment that the beaches have not been affected by aerial bombardment, of which the soldiers concluded that this bombing has no effect. Cloudy skies forced the crew of the B-24 to bomb through the clouds by reference to instruments. Order to avoid hitting their own troops at sea, should the crew Liberátorů delay drop bombs, so the bombs rained down further inland in the range of several hundred meters up to more than 4 kilometers. Without the German report it is not possible to verify the effect of this bombing, can be inferred perhaps, the only disruption of the occipital bone of communication and staging areas of the German units.


the First wave of attack - 6:30

8 rot corps (1450 men), engineers and part of the original 96 tanks slowly approached to the shore just after half past six in the morning. On the right the tanks of the 743. tank battalion of the imported ashore LCT. B company got directly in front of the exit at Vierville and came under fire of enemy guns.


Sectors of the Dog White (a closer) and Dog Green Omaha beach at Vierville (Photo Admin 2014)


The LCT carrying the company commander was sunk just off shore, 4 other officers were killed or injured and combat-ready remained only a lieutenant. 8 of the 16 tanks of the company got ashore and opened fire on the enemy positions. Tanks rot C and And landed more to the east at sufficient intervals in order to avoid initial losses. In the zone of the 16th RCT only 5 of the 32 amphibious DD Shermans 741. tank battalion got ashore. Of the 16 tanks of the company And 2 sunk far out at sea after the explosion of unknown origin, 3 were hit and put out shortly after reaching the beach. The remaining third of the battalion landed between exits E-1 and E-3 and went into battle against the enemy nests of resistance. Army and marine engineers have before us the most challenging task of the whole landing - the time allotted to clear beaches of obstacles and mines to significantly reduce the problems during the landing. Late teams gathered at embarkation on the LCM of the vessel, and so half of the 16 teams arrived on the beach with more than desetiminutovým delay. Only five teams received at the designated beaches, the rest landed more to the east, which meant that sector of the beach Dog in the zone of the 116th RCT was not covered as originally planned. In addition, at least three groups of engineers were on the beach, where there was no infantry or tanks, to support and cover fire. The men, loaded down with explosives and equipment, seskakující to more than a meter deep water, were a target for enemy fire. Of 16 bulldozers are only 6 got to the beach the functional, and 3 of them promptly knocked out by an artillery barrage. Most of the equipment, such as buoys and poles for marking of cleaned routes, it was destroyed before it was possible to use. 8 sailors were drawn to the shore rubber boat with explosives, when above them exploded artillery shell and the explosive detonated. Survived only a man. Another artillery shell hit a LCM Team 14, the subsequent explosion of the explosives killed all the sailors. A team of 15, stretching the boat, was hit by minometným projectile, the explosion of explosives killed 3 and wounded 4 more men. Support team F got to the beach around 7:00. The landing boat was hit by artillery fire to the ramp and lost 3 men. Unruly vessel then hit another grenade into the side and killed 15 soldiers. Only 5 of live men from this boat got to the beach.

Despite these losses and under intense fire, the engineers set to work wherever they landed and with whatever they had on hand. The advancing tide began to flood low-lying obstacles. Delayed landing boats of the infantry, passing to the beach, to further complicate and retard the work of the engineers. One of the three still-functioning bulldozers was blocked by a handful of soldiers, who were trying to find cover from enemy fire. Even if they managed to attach to the obstacles to explosives, it is due to ships in transit and the soldiers, seeking cover, detonate. Exactly in the moment when Team 7 was preparing to detonate the explosives, drove into the barriers LCVP, hacked wooden stakes and blew up 7 min, so the charges it was not possible to detonate. Arriving boats also undermine the detonating cord to the placed. A team of 12 preparing charges, to clean up the 30metrový stretch, when flying in a mine from a mortar and hit the detonating cord. Premature explosion claimed the lives of 19 engineers and a few soldiers nearby.

After a grueling and bloody efforts of the engineers managed to clean 6 passes completely and 3 partially. Of these 6, two were located in the zone of the 116th RCT, 4 in sector Easy Red. Only one passage of was sufficiently marked. Then the engineers joined the infantry on the beaches and towards the coastal breakwater before the next ebb, to be able to continue to work. Casualties for the Special Engineer Task Force accounted for 41 %, the majority of them occurred during the first 30 minutes of disembarkation.

Vyloďující the infantry was divided into sections according to the barges, 6 into one company, with the command section in the second wave (7:00). In each LCVP boat was in average of 31 soldiers and 1 officer. The men were arranged so as to be first landed, the commander of the section and 5 soldiers with rifles M-1 with 96 bullets. Follow have 4 soldiers with a pair of scissors on the barbed wire and rifles, 2 machine-gun groups of 2 men with machine guns BAR and 900 rounds of ammunition, 2 groups with bazookas for 2 men, mortar team of 4 men with a 60mm mine-thrower and 20 bullets, 2 men with a flamethrower and 5 soldiers with sticks and with explosive charges of TNT. Medic and assistant section chief sat in the back. Men in addition to the personal weapons they carried a gas mask, 5 grenades (the riflemen and the soldiers with scissors carry 4 smoke grenades), a quarter of a pound of the explosives TNT and incendiary cord, 6 dietary doses (3 doses of 3 doses D). Clothing was impregnated against gas attack, the men were wearing life jackets and equipment and weapons to them was attached, to be able, if necessary, swim.

As expected, only a few LCVP and LCA boats got to shore, most of them have stopped the underwater sand dunes of 50-100 meters from the shore, often in the area of water deep up to my neck. The soldiers concentrated artillery, mortar and machine gun fire. Many of the soldiers recall how they heard the bullets from the machine guns ringing off the hook about sklápějící with a ramp for landing boats or watching the oncoming hail of bullets after folding ramps. Many have tried to jump sideways or diving to escape sprškám of the German machine guns. Prostration a long and arduous voyage to the shore, loaded down with weapons, these soldiers only a small chance to quickly get to shore. Those who got there, were absolutely exhausted, they had another 200 yards of open space before they could hide in the breakwater or sand embankments, but even in the gathering fire of the defenders there a number of soldiers managed to reach (literally). The others, who stopped to reorganize, rest, or in the shelter of underwater obstacles and tanks, only prolong their difficulties, and suffered heavy losses.

But not everywhere the situation developed so badly. A few hundred meters of the cliffs west of exit D-3, les Moulins was shrouded in the clouds of smoke from the burning grass, lighted a naval bombardment. Blinded by the smoke couldn't have defenders enough to effectively shoot at the beach on this end of the sector Dog and the soldiers of company G of the 116th RCT, here is vyloďující, went to the beach relatively well. In addition to advancing the F company was in partial cover of the smoke, but the far three sections have been uncovered, and the soldiers suffered up to 50% losses before they managed to get to the shelter on the coast. Even on other beaches managed to find the blind spots in the enemy fire and the boats could get troops on the beach with a minimum of losses. Even so, but it was the first assault wave on OMAHA beach severely weakened.

Probably the worst situation was observed in sector Dog Green, directly in front of the defensive positions in the east D-1 at Vierville and under strong lateral fire from the west from the Pointe de la Percée (the defensive position of WN72 and WN73). A company of the 116th RCT was to land in this sector along with company C 2. a battalion of Rangers on its right flank. Both units are landed directly against your goals. One of the LCA's, carrying the soldiers of company A, began to dive at roughly 1000 meters from the shore, and passing Rangers watched as their colleagues were jumping over the sides of the boat and disappear under the water under the weight of their equipment. In time H+6 minutes remaining boats launched of the ramp about 30 metres from the shore and the soldiers in three lines began to rappel into the meter up to a meter and a half deep water, to immediately have become the target of accurate machine gun fire of the enemy. The German mortars hit one LCA boat a total of 4 wounds, the vessel was completely destroyed. The soldiers at the price of losses, fought their way to the beach, but found out that there won't hold and started to pull back into the water, while the others took cover behind the invasive obstacles. The remains of soldiers from one of the boats formed a small firing line on the first meters of the beach, directly in front of the muzzles of the German defenders. Soon all the officers of the company, including captain Taylor N. Fellerse were killed or wounded, as well as most of the sergeants. Troops without their commanders gave up trying to move forward and tried to rescue the wounded, who were in the advancing tide. Some of the men gradually got to the toe of a coastal breakwater, when kept in the water and followed with a rising tide. 15 minutes after the landing was a Company And put out of action for the rest of the day, its losses were estimated up to 2/3.

Incomplete company of Rangers of 64 men arrived in two LCA in time H+15 minutes and landed to the west of exit D-1. Shot from anti-tank gun hit the boat captain Ralph E. Goransona and killed 12 soldiers. The second boat chose a German machine gunner and 15 soldiers were hit when jumping out into the water. The survivors immediately set off through the 250-foot stretch of beach to the foot of the cliff, but from the original 64 them got there only 29.

Unscheduled gap of more than 1,000 meters separated the company And from other units of the 116th RCT. Rota G instead of the original destination in sector Dog White landed to the east on the junction of Dog Red and Easy Green. Three or four sections, vyloďující the nearest Dog Red, concealed by the smoke of the burning grass, easily crossed the stretch of beach and many up in the middle of the road noticed a sporadic and inaccurate fire of the enemy. Within 10-15 minutes from the landing of this unit was in cover behind a stone embankment in good condition. The officers realized that landed more to the left than expected, but they weren't sure of the next procedure and squandered a chance at an instant procedure.

Further east, in the sector Easy-Green, with the remainder of company G was under significantly stronger fire of the enemy. One boat lost 14 men before it reached the shore.

Company F landed almost exactly according to plan, before the fortifications at gate D-3 in les Moulins. 3 sections to the east, exposed the smoke, got into the thick of the fire and it took a whole 45 minutes before they were able to overcome a bad stretch of beach. By that time their number was reduced to half and the rest got into the cover of the incapable of further action. The remaining section had more luck, but they also lost a number of officers.

Company E of the 116th RCT was to land in a sector Easy Green, but missed the entire 1.5 km to the east.

Three companies in the zone of the 116th RCT were in a poor state of repair. Company And was blown to bits and stopped on the border of the tide, F company was destroyed by the heavy losses, scattered groups of soldiers of company G, which was in better shape, preparing for the procedure towards the west to their original objectives.

East on 16th RCT image of the landing differed only slightly. Sector Easy Red, over 1.5 km wide, directly at the exit E-1, should be occupied by companies E and F 2. battalion. Most of the soldiers but once again ended up significantly more to the east, only two lost boats company E, 116th RCT, and after one section of rot E and F of the 16th RCT landed on Easy Red, all in the space between exits E-1 and E-3. Men from the two boats jumped into the water deep down to the waist, but after a trip to the shore ran into a deep ditch and had to swim, while the stream was tearing down the further to the east. During the fight for survival was a discarded part of the weaponry, including flamethrowers, mortars and bazookas. Two sections of company E lost only two men to reach the rocky shore. More to the left, 1. section F company came under heavy fire from the east E-3. Of the 31 men from the water deep up to your neck on the rocky shore received only 14. In addition to this roughly hundreds of men in sector Easy Red were only 4 DD tanks, one of them discarded.

Another image offered sector Fox. Most of the 4 rot, 3 of which should land more to the west, landed in the sector of the heavily fortified and bráněném. Company E of the 16th RCT landed on the western edge of the sector Fox Green, the boats scattered in the breadth of nearly 800 meters. The approach went well, but the cross-fire of automatic weapons hit the man in the moment of the start ramp landing boats. Losses were heavy, the company during the whole day lost 105 men, most of them in the morning on the beach during the landing. The exhausted men reached the shore, but they didn't have the strength to continue and so they just move with the rising tide.

4 sections of company E, 116th RCT landed in the same sector and have undergone the same experience. Of the three sections came ashore about 60 men. The company commander, captain Laurence And. Madill, already wounded while moving on the beach, he was again hit twice from the machine gun, while going back for ammo in the mortar. His last words were "non-commissioned Officers, get those men off the beach". Sections were scattered along the beach and took some time before they managed to establish contact.

5 sections of company F of the 16th RCT landed in sector Fox Green scattered throughout the breadth from the east E-3 to approximately 1 km further to the east. Two sections landed next to each other, directly against the defense of the post defending the east E-3. A third of the soldiers hit by machine-gun and mortar fire before they managed to get to shore. Further east are three more sections have dealt with similar problems, from one boat to the shore got only three soldiers. On the shore of the entire F company got two officers.

Companies I and L of the 16th RCT, designed to disembark in sector Fox Green are delayed so that you can't even count in the first wave. These units carried the stream to the east, and the boats carrying the company (excluding two, which are sunk), they got all the way to Port-en-Bessin, than was a mistake in navigation discovered - more than an hour and a half was lost. Company L landed with a half-hour late against the plan and instead of at gate E-3 was at the east end of the sector Fox Green. One boat sank 3 km from shore, 8 men were drowned. An artillery barrage focused on the landing ships, hit one close after the men landed. Machine gun barrage has taken its toll on the men crossing the 200 metres to the beach. 3. section, whose soldiers have maintained a large spacing, not lost but even of one man, the other sections have lost a total of 34 soldiers. Thanks to landing on the edge of a sector to units found themselves in areas where the tide reaches up to the foot of the cliffs and where the cliffs of sharply rising up. In this cover the soldiers, they reorganized and started the procedure right, to be able to attack the cliffs. Company L, reduced to 125 men, was the only unit of the first wave, which was after crossing the beach able to operate as a unit.

Misfortune of the first wave affected the further course of the disembarkation. In many sectors there has been a shift in the landing, because they were not destroyed underwater obstacles, fire support of the tanks was on the east, significantly less, than was planned, the shift in the landing created a large vacant lot in the offensive line, and some sectors of the (Dog White and Easy Red) had a shortage of soldiers for the next procedure. Stubborn German defense and the confusion caused by landing in the wrong place paralyze the troops of the first wave. Most of the soldiers faced an unknown terrain, absorbing the shock of the worst moments on the beach and just slowly initiates the operation for the procedure to the inland.


a Second wave of attack 7:00


116th RCT

At 7:00 started to the beaches of Omaha landing barges of the second assault wave. These waves nepřistávaly according to plan - advancing tide began to flood the underwater obstacles, in which they were not created sufficient passages, enemy fire, which started to decimate the units of the first wave, still not silenced, and a number of units remained nailed on the beach by the rocky embankment. Tanks and infantry on the beaches have not been able to provide sufficient fire cover and so had to repeat the situation from the first landing. Repeated heavy losses in some sectors, but even though there has been a shift - the enemy fire is no longer so concentrated, and in some places was almost none. Repeated problems with navigation on the right place of disembarkation, which complicated the life in particular engineers, who were tasked to clean the beach.

The infantry company of the second assault wave were organized differently than those of the first wave. Two sections from each platoon were "offensive" and carry special weapons and equipment such as those in the first wave. These offensive sections should be cleaned up enemy fortifications obejitá the first assault wave. The next four sections were normally equipped infantry units - it was assumed that the defensive positions of the enemy will already be pierced and the section should as soon as possible to proceed into the interior towards praporním shromaždištím.

In the 16th RCT, the support battalion was organized as well as for the first wave, which was based on the experience of the landings in Africa and Sicily, where they failed even in one case, to proceed according to plan.

In the area of the 116th RCT had 3 companies 1. the battalion disembark on the beach, Dog Green, to strengthen the company And at the exit at Vierville. Only two sections of these three companies managed to land on Dog Green. Company B was to land at 7:00, but failed to sufficiently orient and landed scattered in the area of 1.5 km on both sides from the initial point of disembarkation. Only three scattered sections on the wings should play a role in other battles. The vessel, which landed on Dog Green and near this sector, came under the same destructive fire, which stopped the platoon And, and scattered groups of soldiers were mixed from the leftovers of the company And in the struggle for survival on the border of the tide.

C company landed at 7:10 thousand meters east of the exit at Vierville in sector Dog White - and-error, which proved to be a decisive positive. One boat out of six hit on a mined obstacle and another 20 minutes trying to extricate ourselves, without the mines detonated. The other five boats stuck together, except for one boat that flipped over and literally emptied out the troops and their equipment to more than a meter and a half deep water. The task of these men were dočišťovací work on the exit at Vierville and their entire equipment, including flamethrowers, explosives, and mortars were lost. Enemy fire was only light, probably because C company was covered by the western edge of a belt of smoke from the burning grass, and so suffered the loss of only five or six men. Nearby there are no other units in sight, it was only 4-5 tanks. The soldiers zreorganizovali in the cover of the foot of the wooden breakwater. Most of the equipment remained intact and were probably in the best condition of all the units in the area of the 116th RCT.

D company was not so lucky. 3 of her vessels had got into serious trouble due to big waves, one vessel was abandoned far from the shore and his men got to the beach until after noon. Another vessel struck a mine or was hit by a sabot and sunk to 400 metres from the shore, his men had to swim towards the machine-gun and mortar fire. Half of them managed to get to the beach. A third boat dropped off the troops 150 meters from the shore, and you followed the example of their predecessors, hiding in the water and behind barriers. It took all of two hours before the survivors got to the beach, with only one mine-thrower and completely without ammunition. The second platoon arrived on the beach with two machine guns, one mine-thrower, and only a few bullets. The first squad had one machine gun and one mortar. Heavy weapons 1. the battalion then in the landing played only a minor role.

To make matters worse, three vessels, carrying troops battalion headquarters and units to ensure the beach Dog Green, landed a few hundred meters west of this sector, directly under the cliffs. Losses among the officers and non-commissioned officers were high, including the commander of the 58. a battalion of armored field artillery. Crossing the beach to the cliffs under fire, small arms fire caused a loss of half to two-thirds of men. Survivors covered under the cliffs. Not only that the headquarters was separated from the rest of the unit, but its members were so scattered that they had to use walkie-talkies to communicate with each other. Barrage sniping from the cliff then made it impossible for the procedure of this group for the rest of the day.

Three companies of 2. the battalion landed in the first wave. In the second wave then landed company H, without other units to provide more substantial support. 1. machine-gun platoon and two mortar section landed in sector Easy Red, where later this morning joined to the units of the 18th RCT. Other elements, which landed in the sectors, Dog Green and Easy Green, suffered heavy losses - from one raft to the beach got only 6 soldiers. The headquarters of the battalion and the command platoon are landed at 7:00 in the sector of Dog Red. Once launched ramp of the landing boat, the soldiers laid a dense barrage, so many of them tried to hide behind the tanks on the shore, just before they found out that tanks are good targets for enemy artillery. Major Sidney In. Bingham Jr., the battalion commander, was among the first at the rocky embankment and immediately began to organize the soldiers of company F, who lost their commander. About an hour was out of radio contact with the scattered parts of his battalion. During this time only part 2. battalion that landed in good condition, namely, 4 sections of company G, went towards the originally intended sector Dog White. The soldiers had to advance several hundred yards along the coastal breakwater, where were crowded the other soldiers, under fire of small arms. Section gradually lost cohesion, individuals and small groups slowly followed and stopped in the cover, and only a few of them arrived around 8:30 to sector Dog White, where at that time it was already after the fight. The efforts of major Bingham on the organisation of the attack on les Moulins were unsuccessful - gathered some 50 soldiers of the F company near the three-story building at the mouth of the east from the beach, in the shelter of the trenches around this house, but their often sand clogged rifles have failed to create sufficient fire support. Bingham, along with 10 men managed to get to the edge of the cliff to the east of exit D-3, but they failed to knock out the enemy machine-gun nest and had to go back down to the house.

3. battalion of the 116th RCT had landed between 7:20 and 7:30 in the units 2. the battalion on the beaches of the Dog White, Dog Red and Easy Green. With a delay of 5-10 minutes, the battalion landed east of les Moulins (east D-3), part of the got to the edge of the sector Easy Red. Only a few units of the first wave ashore in the area between exits D-3 and E-1 - two of the scattered sections of company G and the command section of E company landed at 7:00 right on the spot, to ascertain that after the rest of the units of the company E is not even a trace. Now was this tisícimetrový strip of beach literally našlapán, although among the units were the gaps, which create the impression of isolation. The vessels rot To and Even landed well, the enemy fire of small arms was the only light. Company To get ashore without loss, the company Also lost several men. Unit but the switch-up and the men stopped as soon as they got to the shelter. Company L landed on the half way between the two exits from the beaches, the enemy fire was so light that a number of soldiers remained on the open beach, than they were after them, shooting from machine gun. The boats of the company M were still more to the east in sector Easy Red. One boat was sinking after the explosion of the mines, the 3 men were injured. The soldiers were exhausted already by zooming in to the shore, a heavy load of equipment and ammunition it even more complicated - as he recalls one of the soldiers that day, "the equipment that we normally carry, we had to behind drag". Enemy fire in this sector was stronger, the soldiers didn't want to continue and cover behind obstacles. Machine-gun fire, churning the sand in front of them, and the soldiers observed that postřelovaná area is relatively constant, and have found a way, where you could machine gun fire to avoid. When the tide pushed more on the shore, the entire unit suddenly surged. Only lost a few soldiers - the men were to be surprised at how dense the fire of small arms can pass through without being affected.

18 LCA-boats, carrying 5. a battalion of Rangers and company a And B 2. the battalion Rangers, expected in the sea of information from the Point du Hoe. One vessel was sinking, the soldiers had to transfer to a passing LCT. Even with a 15-minute delay shouldn't Rangers information, as it develops the situation of their colleagues at Point du Hoe, and had to assume, then, that the attack failed. According to the plan, therefore, should continue to Dog the Green, land in the area 1. battalion of the 116th RCT and advance into the hinterland of the east D-1 u Viervielle. During the approach to the beach was lieutenant colonel Max F. Schneider clear that the situation on the beach is not good and gave the order to move the landing more to the east. Even so, the is but company a And B 2. a battalion of Rangers were on the edge of Dog Green and experienced the same situation as their fellow soldiers before them. One of the 5 vessels were sunk by mine, 34 of the men had to swim ashore under enemy fire. Firing small arms and mortars rained down on the other boat as soon as he landed at the shore. Company Rangers were numerically smaller, 65 men including officers - only 35 men of easy company And 27 of the company B got to the shelter of the breakwater. Just a few hundred yards away in the quieter section of Dog White with 13 of the 14 vessels with 5. the banner of the Rangers landed together, in two waves. LCI 91 was hit and began to burn, while to the Rangers as they passed, but none of their boats was hit and then with 450 men got ashore with the loss of 5-6 men. Breakwater was fully occupied by the soldiers of the 116th RCT.

Overall, the second wave got ashore with less difficulty than the first. Five of the eight rot 116th RCT landed relatively close together and with low losses. The landing was covered by smoke and the burning grass, but also increased the number of soldiers on the beach, decreasing the concentration of enemy fire. At 7:30 so was the attacking units spread out along the entire sector of the 116th RCT, the weakest spot was the area in front of exit D-1, in sector Dog Green were almost no units capable of action.

At 7:30 began to land the men of regimental headquarters. The main group included colonel Charles D. W. Canhama and general That. LCVP 71 landed in sector Dog White, when before it crashed into the barriers and had to literally sklepat mine to prevent the explosion. The landing and transition to the beach about a meter deep in water, stood the life of one officer, but otherwise it was the ideal place to land, with regard to the immediate possibility to start to organize the procedure in the area of the 116th RCT. On the right and left were crowded the men of C company and part of the units 2. battalion, near the landed and the Rangers and the enemy fire was ineffective. Headquarters could play a decisive role in the further procedure.


16th RCT

The first wave of attack in the sector of the 16th RCT the influence of the coastal current has landed so far to the east, in sector Easy Red, longest of the beaches on OMAHA, it was at 7:00 only a few isolated groups of american soldiers. But that should change with the next wave in the next 45 minutes, when the landing koncentrovalo between exits E-1 and E-3, where also there were many survivors of the tank 741. a tank battalion.

Company G landed directly on the beach, all craft together except for one, which has been delayed. When landing in the vicinity of the worked out several artillery shells, but did not cause any losses. A great job they did and the sailors for kormidly - one ship hit the sand dunes a few hundred meters from the shore, but the pilot literally bludgeoned his way through the dune and continued to the shore. Engineers still working on the destruction of underwater obstacles, while company G floating around, 3 amphibious tanks on the beach were already disabled by enemy fire. Loss of company G for the whole day amounted to 63 soldiers, most of them just on the first few meters of the French coast, caused in particular to fire small arms and mortars. Men obtěžkaní equipment only slowly waded to shore, the loss is so inevitable. Yet each section kept together and reached the stone embankment, where during the next 15 minutes prepare supporting weapons and opened fire on the enemy as soon as he revealed his position by firing at the other vyloďující soldiers. The soldiers of company G landed in places where they before them found themselves one section of E company of the 16th RCT and two sections of company E of the 116th RCT.

"H" company, which is on the same beach had to disembark at 7:10, late for a connection with the tracking vessel, and eventually landed about 20 minutes later a few hundred meters to the left of george company. When the landing came the significant part of the equipment, including all radio stations, in addition to got directly in front of the east E-3 and there also under heavy fire from an enemy spent the next few hours.

1. the battalion, which was to strengthen the first assault wave, landed between 7:40 and 8:00 between exits E-1 and E-3, on the right, company a And B. Machine-gun section was attached to the gun sections of company G, while the heavy mortars were traveling within the battalion headquarters. The losses were not as high as those of the first wave.

In sector Fox Green were part of the 5 rot, shaken and broken (with the exception of company L) as a result of the first wave of the landing, and enemy resistance. Company K, arriving at 7:00, is mixed into this confusion, divided into two parts, which together have lost contact for several hours. K company lost that morning, 53 men including 4 officers.

The vessel carrying the company M occurred gradually between 7:30 and 8:00. One flipped the piece from the shore, but the soldiers managed to keep and get ashore enough equipment to be able to effectively engage in support of infantry on the beach.

Company I, which was ashore in the first wave, she wandered off so far that the Fox Green showed up around 8:00. Along the way she lost two vessels, the remaining four got in the last meters under heavy fire. The ship with the commander's sections ran on a mine and was subsequently set on fire a dose from the machine gun, the other two vessels got hit from artillery (or also ran on a mine), and a fourth vessel hit an underwater obstacle and came under machine-gun fire. The losses were heavy. Captain Richmond after landing he found out that he is the senior officer in sector Fox Green, and therefore the commander of the intermingled units of the 3. the battalion in this sector. The rest of the command section landed more to the west, and for several hours remained separated.


the Situation on the beach 7:30-8:00

In the first and second wave nevyloďovali just soldiers shooting rot, but also engineers, naval them are artillery observers, vanguard and artillery units, medics, anti-aircraft units and a number of others. The actual artillery start landing within the next hour. Wrong place of disembarkation, as in the case of infantry, it really confuses things with the original plan. The engineers found themselves hundreds of meters from the targets, exits from the beaches and the sectors to the designation and cleanup, often without equipment. The engineers can determine for a sector Dog Red landed on Easy Red, about more than 1500 meters elsewhere, but even so, the raised panels indicating the beach. At 8:30 an officer on Dog White noticed a pair of engineers, both are pulling heavy crate with explosives along the coastal breakwater. When they stopped to mop the sweat from his forehead, one asked : "Where are we? Should we throw something in the air at Vierville", thus for nearly a mile further to the west. They lifted her crate, and continued along the beach to the most deadly place of all over the landing.

Problems with navigation increased with advancing tide - most of the underwater obstacles were not removed, and so the landing boats, including the larger ships of the LCI and LST, they had to literally fight my way through to the shore between the zaminovanými obstacles. Some vessels dropped their troops, barely hit the sand in the middle of the obstacles, the other to somehow get to the shore. Is not documented for many cases, when the vessel sank after hitting an obstacle, before he managed to unload his valuable cargo, but, for example, the LCA 853 was half of the sailors killed in the explosion of mines. A number of the boats was hit in the moment when she tried to break away from the shore and get out from the zone of obstacles, several of them were set on fire, which nedodávalo too much optimism to the men who the whole drama watched from their hiding places on the shore.

The tragic fate of the vessel LCI 91, arriving in sector Dog White in 7:40 and carrying the alternate headquarters of the 116th RCT. The vessel, controlled by a crew with the experience of Sicílíe and Salerno hit by an artillery barrage, when he first attempted to swim through the obstacles. The ship backed out and tried to cut through again. Hit but on the next obstacle, and then launched a ramp at a depth of around 1.5 meters. The officers went forward, when the ship landed the next artillery barrage and hit the crowded deck. Men in flaming uniforms jumped or fell into the water and still under fire, tried to get to shore. From the first section 25 of the men, focused on the board, on shore did not get any. A few minutes later he met a nearly identical fate of the vessel LCI 92 - underwater explosion ignited the fuel tank. Both vessels burned for several hours. Artillery fire in this part of the beach was coming from the area behind the Pointe de la Percée. Tanks should focus on these positions, but even so, should your hands full with the enemy fortifications ahead of you on the beaches.

At the other end of the beach, in sector Fox Green, landed LCI 85, carrying the men of easy company And 1. the medical battalion. The ship hit an underwater obstacle, she stopped and was then hit by artillery fire. The crew evaluated the situation, the water was too deep for the launch ramp, and then try again on the landing at the shore. Section 3 was on fire, the vessel was hit below the waterline and starts picking up the water, but on the second attempt with only a few soldiers got out before it was a ramp blasted out and the other two front sections were in flames. Of the ships carrying the medical staff thus de facto became a hospital ship and so LCI 85 away from the shore, extinguished the flames and took their wounded to another ship.

The conditions were more than bad for the landing of vehicles, which is now expected to start appearing on the beach. If you already jeeps, polopásy and trucks survived the journey to the beach in a dense artillery fire, found themselves on a narrow stretch of beach, without the secured exits, and for the ultimate rocky embankment. Many vehicles have eliminated problems with the engine, the other became a target of German artillery, and the rest found themselves in a hopeless traffic jam. 397. anti-aircraft battalion lost 28 of its 36 machine guns, the rest of the weapons has been temporarily eliminated the influence of water and sand. The first thing she had to a number of soldiers do after she got to the shelter, it was to disassemble and clean your rifle. Although a number of special equipment was thrown away, when the soldiers tried to get to shore, much more was saved at the cost of the victims of the soldiers, who in spite of great exertion tried to carry or for him under the fire coming back into the water. Unpleasant was especially the loss of the radios, colonel Canham reported that up to ¾ of all radios 116th RCT was during disembarkation destroyed. The loss of the radios caused the loss of control over the vyloďující with the infantry on the beach even during the day.

Therefore, when each command started to disembark, hit on every section of OMAHA beach on a very similar image - mixed units nailed to the ground, covering for the coastal breakwater, obstacles or embankment, often without a commander. In addition přimíchaní sappers, sailors from the sunken vessels, them are artillery observers, commanders of the sunken and destroyed tanks ... In some places the soldiers of the second wave found free place behind the rocky embankment and had to stay on the uncovered part of the beach. Confusion was inevitable, and the loss of communication facilities prevented its effective suppression. The headquarters of the so in the best case was able to influence events only in a narrow sector of the beach around you. Small units, often the remains of the landing sections, so they had to take care of themselves, about the organization and morale. Many soldiers found themselves for the first time under fire of the enemy, have experienced heavy losses of their colleagues in arms, they found themselves somewhere else than planned and before they were nacvičeni. The tide slowly but surely progressed and many wounded soldiers were drowned, their bodies then the tide brought to the shore. No matter how rocky val seemed safe, it did not provide cover against artillery and mortar fire. Before them lay cliffs occupied by enemy soldiers, snipers, barbed wire, land mines. That the fire from many places gradually waning, that the american infantry yet couldn't fully realize and appreciate. 've only seen what they had to go through and guessed at what else they have in front of you. In addition to their own weapons and fire support tanks could not rely on any other support - artillery fire from the ships basically ceased as soon as the infantry came closer to the beaches. The ships were ordered to stop firing, only if it appeared a clear goal, than will be restored to communication with the artillery observer on the shore. Destroyers so they did not dare to shoot into the smoke-clouded shore, where they could follow the american soldiers.

Around eight o'clock in the morning so able German observers on the edge of the cliff to get the impression that managed the allied invasion to stop. By this time, however already the number of places the Americans penetrated the weak defense of the enemy.


the Attack on the cliffs



Not everywhere stay of american troops in the relative safety of the coastal breakwater or rocky embankment. For more than half a dozen places, the soldiers have battled, from a sandy beach towards the cliffs. Regardless of the bad place of disembarkation of the troops have put together a new tactic, how to deal with obstacles that are ahead of you. Units about the strength of the company, but also the smaller the group, the platoon of about 20-30 men, moved forward, without sometimes knowing what's happening to the right or to the left and to the progress of the other. The phenomenon of the battle of the insulation is fully manifested even in such a transparent sector, which certainly was slightly lespedeza OMAHA beach. The soldiers followed in places where the enemy defense is weak, disturbed fire ships and tanks, where soldiers covered up the smoke from the burning grass. In two places to engage and destroyers, that your fire have contributed to progress in the sector Fox Green. Sappers destroyed the barriers of barbed wire, helped with the transition of minefields and on the cliffs above them, they advanced together with the infantry. Was the determining factor, but surely the presence of the commanders. Anywhere procedure was initiated, it was thanks to the officers and non-commissioned officers, who have inspired, supported and donucovali your troops to advance and often set off among the first. In sector Easy Red a lieutenant and a wounded sergeant of divisional engineers under fire came to the wire obstacles, to explore. The lieutenant came back and with his hands on his hips with disgust looked at the soldiers lying behind a stone embankment: "you want to stay and get killed, or get up and do something?". No one moved and so the lieutenant and sergeant took the explosives and blew the barbed wire into the air. In the next sector, where the procedure stopped in a swampy area, fearing that there are mines there, they found lieutenant from the royal engineers, that the plaza on his belly and seeking mines with his hunting knife, he found a way to further the procedure.
When the remnants of the orphaned section of company B of the 116th RCT came on a well-concealed enemy position, lieutenant commander darted into the attack. In an attempt to hit the enemy nest with a grenade was three times struck by fire from rifles and eight shell fragments from a grenade. He passed his map and compass to the sergeant and ordered that his men continued to advance into the inland.

All the intrusions connected the fact, that occurred in the locations of the exits from the beaches, heavily defended, but in the space between them. The path for the tanks and vehicles off the beach was not yet open.

the Procedure of Dog White

The most important breakthrough was achieved at the western part of the beach, company C of the 116th RCT and 5. the banner of the Rangers. Both units were in relatively good condition, with minimal losses, but the soldiers stayed crammed one beside the other along the coastal breakwater, often in several rows behind. In addition to these two units there were about two sections of the other units and a few engineers. Regrouping before the attack took place under the command of general Coty and the command section of the 116th RCT. Exposed to enemy fire, which wounded the colonel Canhama on the wrist, walked through the commanders along the breakwater and pushed the officers and non-commissioned officers, so they took their men and went forward. Sector was for another procedure suitable, the nearest enemy fortified position was a few hundred meters on both sides and crowded beach nepostřelovala focused fire as elsewhere. From the shore to the foot of the cliff it was some 150 meters, but equal to part with a few křovisky not provide almost no cover. In the whole space between exits D-1 and D-3 the cliffs are steep and bare, but the men who started the climb, they found plenty of crevices and shelters before the fire of small arms. The German defense in this sector was made up mainly of trenches and the soldiers with small arms on the crest of the cliff, a few machine gun nests for the side fire on the beach, but not for defying charge attack.

Procedure for company C began around 7:50. Across the road, which lined the breakwater, were drawn up two lines of barbed wire. Private Ingram E. Lambert jumped over the wall, ran across the road and set up the bangalore torpedo. But when it wanted to blow, the fuse has failed. At that moment, Lambert was killed by a bullet from a machine gun. The platoon commander, second lieutenant Stanley M. Schwartz, darted after him and managed to explosives detonate, causing a large passage in the barbed wire. The first soldier who tried to the passage of the pass was hit, but the other passed through and occupied an empty trench next to the road, where soon joined by other soldiers, who had to wire barricade cut my. After about 5-10 minutes, while the other soldiers were coming from the beach, set off the men of the trench and in the psychological cover of the high grass and the bushes were advancing towards the cliff. Once they were on the slope, depressions and smoke them provided sufficient cover, but the procedure she complained of a concern of min. The men were advancing in close line and combed the path ahead. In the trenches on the ridge there were no defenders, and so a number of soldiers advanced a few hundred meters inland flat terrain, before being stopped by machine-gun fire from a greater distance on the wing. It was so far the only hint of enemy resistance, company C suffered so far only 6 losses. Captain Berthier B. The Hawks, who had from the landing leg was crushed, ascended to the ridge with his men.

5. a battalion of Rangers joined shortly afterwards - some of his men followed along with the soldiers of C company. The battalion reached the coastal breakwater around 8:00 and colonel Schneider rush your troops in instant preparations for an attack. Then it was the keyword "Tally" and the soldiers went after the squads towards the cliffs and on the planned site of re-encounter in the area south of Vierville. At 8:10 soldiers have crossed the road, without many in the dense smoke and confusion have noticed that just a few meters away progresses C company. Bangalore torpedoes created a further 4 passages in the barbed wire and the men began to climb the cliff up. The smoke that is covered, was in places so dense, that several soldiers had to deploy gas masks. On the ridge were already squad considerably scattered and contact was lost. Right over the ridge Rangers have used the original German marking the transition of a minefield (from which eventually the engineers have removed at 150 min). The first soldiers on the ridge, a platoon of company a And the men of E company, set off immediately inland, and disappeared. The rest of the platoon, arrived on the ridge around 8:30 stopped to regroup. On the left flank of the battalion, platoon, company G had to expel several of the Germans from the trenches along the crest of the cliff and knock out the machine-gun nest postřelující from the side of the beach. The battalion lost only eight men, while the German fire from small arms falter, and so you could go further inland.

The procedure in sector Dog White was in the lane barely 300 metres wide, at 8:30 last troops left the coastal breakwater and the headquarters moved into the halfway up a cliff. Attempts radio contact with 1. infantry division using the SCR-300 was not successful. In addition to enemy mortar fire began to dangerously focus on the slope, one hit killed the two soldiers standing at the general's, Coty, and this together with the hand of the blast knocked to the ground. The headquarters continued in procedure towards the ridge of the cliff along with the soldiers of company G and a machine gun squad of company H, who is in the sector Dog White got the procedure along the breakwater from the east D-3. On a ridge then it was for the headquarters of a lot of work. Soldiers from C company and 5. a battalion of Rangers were promíchaní and insecure the next procedure. Inconsistent firing of small arms is kept in the country and in the surrounding area began to turn out an artillery barrage.

East of Dog White of a small group of soldiers rot F and B widened the area of penetration. The remains of the three sections of company F crossed the beach and reached the cliffs, shortly behind them followed a lonely section of B company. Even one group did not encounter the enemy resistance on the ridge of the cliff. Company F turned right and eventually joined the 5. a battalion of Rangers. 12 soldiers in B company took the left, towards les Moulins, until it is stopped by machine-gun fire. Lieutenant William B. Williams himself attacked the machine-gun nest, he was wounded and ordered his troops to continue toward Vierville.


Procedure between exits D-3 and E-1

3. battalion of the 116th RCT landed on 800 meters of beach including most of Easy Green and the western part of Easy Red. All the units here face the unknown terrain east of the originally intended zone of disembarkation (the shift was sometimes even 1200 meters), but losses during the landing were not great. Section rot To and are held together in the sector Easy-Green, companies L and M were more scattered towards the east. Because each section had to fight your way to the cliffs up to the prapornímu event separately, not the pursuit of the organization rot for the attack and the so began the actions of the many independent small units and gradually peaked. At 9:00 they were the soldiers of the three companies up on the cliffs. The company Also has advanced closest to the fortifications defending the east in les Moulins, but from this direction to get it just a minor fire. Each of the two assault sections had to get through the barriers of barbed wire - one section used 4 Bangalore torpedoes, while the second wires prostříhala. Then section advanced the next, followed by other sections advancing from the beaches. However, the procedure wasn't easy - the commander of the platoon of I company advanced a few hundred meters to the west, he found a passage in the barbed wire and he went back for his men. In the belief that the soldiers followed, progressed through the barbed wire and then through space to the beach, to find that behind him is only ten soldiers. The sergeant, who for the rest of the men returned, it is not found and it took another two days before the unit once again met.

The beach was flat, without covers, as well as slopes up, but fortunately, the enemy fire was the only light, without artillery support. Soldiers as the most hampered the minefields, the first troops got to the cliffs after half an hour, and a number of other it took even longer. On the ridge they met with no defence and so the soldiers of three or four sections hide behind the hedge ongoing in the direction of west-east about 200 meters from the edge of the cliff. Only few of them knew where exactly it is located (some in the memories described his position as west of exit D-3) and after its own and enemy soldiers was not a trace anywhere.

Company To and the company Even had bigger problems to get to the ridge. Sporadic machine-gun fire hit several of the men on the beach and a dense minefield was causing problems on the slope. The artillery and rocket barrage before disembarking expose a variety of min, but even so, it was necessary to mark out a safe trail. K company lost 18-20 men before she got to the ridge of the cliff shortly after 9:00. One group of company G was right in front of them. The soldiers of K company started to group together, once they managed to reach the ridge of the cliff - not because to advance as a company, but simply because every little group of soldiers were looking for the company and eventually form groups mixed across companies and battalions. The soldiers of K company had advanced several hundred yards inland before it is pinned machine-gun fire and artillery ambush.

Teams of company L were more broken down and so it took longer, than gathered, but otherwise was their story similar to soldiers rot To and Even. Each section progressed separately from the beach towards the cliffs and the ridge with only small losses. Up to then the section started to turn to the southwest, knowing that the land to the left of your original target area. In advance to the inland encountered on the well prepared positions of the defenders.

Most of the sections of the company M landed together sufficiently close to the exit E-1, to came under heavy fire as they attempted to overcome the space of the beach. The soldiers fought their way to the ravine, which had rendered the cover, and have prepared here 4 machine guns and 2 heavy mortars, with which to then attack the enemy position at E-1 and the defender along the ridge of the cliff. 6 soldiers were shot dead in an attempt to find a way out of the gully towards the ridge and most of the company M remained trapped until the arrival of large reinforcements to the exit E-1.

the Procedure of Easy Red

Of the three companies involved in the attack on the cliffs between E-1 and E-3. In this section of Easy Red beach was more than 100 m wide, with bažinatými areas along the heel of the cliff. On a 40 meter high cliff led about 200 meters long slope, covered with bushes. 500 meters west of the E-3 led to a small ravine curled slightly to the west and formed a potential corridor of another procedure on the comb. Below the gorge stood the ruins of the house. 1. a platoon of company E, 16th RCT, and two sections of company E, 116th RCT, landed in the first wave. Soldiers of the 16th RCT, under the command of lieutenant John M. Spalding created a passage in the barbed wire, went around the house and were stopped by a minefield in the marshy soil at the foot of the cliff. A strong barrage of small arms coming from the left from the fortifications near the exit E-3. Spaldingovi men found a path through the minefield and launched a procedure to the hill in the cover of the small indentations.

More to the west, out of touch, act two sections of the 116th RCT, prostříhaly with barbed wire, but at the edge of the cliff is stopped in the minefield, so the soldiers hid in the trench. The soldier, who tried to clear the road using a bangalore torpedo, was killed by a mine. In the meantime, company G of the 16th RCT landed and relatively well it reached the embankment. Its machine guns but did not have any goals, until the LCVP 1. the battalion around 7:03 not yet begun to move closer to the beach and the Germans on them didn't set off fire. While the heavy weapons provide covering fire, the men have created passages in the barbed wire, despite the mines connected to the wires. The engineers of the company And 1. the combat engineer battalion and C company 37. the combat engineer battalion to help with the creation and marking of passages. When the soldiers of company G got on the slope, combined with the Spaldingovými men of E company and two sections of the 116th RCT. In an effort to coordinate the next steps it was agreed that these units will proceed to the right of the company G.

Mined area (or the area where there were mines fake), slow down the procedure of all the troops advancing from the beaches. "G" company went one minefield after the bodies of the two fallen soldiers who were killed earlier. While the men proceeded over the beach, captain Joseph T. Dawson and another soldier went forward. About halfway up the hill is stopped by fire from a machine gun, the captain then sent his companion back for the rest of the soldiers and himself crawled from one bush to another, and when approached on 75 meters, the enemy lost it out of sight. Gradually he got to the left into trenches about 10 meters from the machine gun when the Germans spotted and turned his weapon against him, while Dawson threw a grenade. Grenade explosion kulometčíky disabled, and this bold action opened the way out. 5. platoon, which arrived first, knocked out two more machine guns and took one prisoner. Overall, wasn't the defense significant and in the cover recesses so " G " company had advanced with only small losses, so the ridge got around 8:30. The enemy fire gradually died down, as Americans began to appear in the fields in the inland and advance towards the south. The biggest concern still remained frequent indicators of mined areas just over the ridge.

On the right, with the soldiers of second lieutenant Spalding got on the reef in roughly the same time, with the support of covering fire, company G and helped to widen the area of penetration. The section had 23 men, the loss amounted to 3 men on the beach and 3 during the procedure on the reef due to machine gun fire. The machine gun was manned by one man, who fell into captivity, and it turns out he's Polish. Informed Spalding that the other 16 soldiers in the trenches on. E company assaulted the trenches, sprinkle is a fire and found out, that the Germans withdrew. Spalding turned west along the ridge of the cliff and lost connection with company G, who went to the south. The procedure through the fields enclosed by hedges with E company got into the rear of the fortifications strážícího east E-1. The germans were guarding the beach and attack from the rear is surprised. During a two-hour struggle to overcome Spaldingovi men outside the fortifications, and overcome the defender with the help of grenades and rifles. Artillery fire from the ships, bound to parts of the fortifications under the ridge of the cliff, demoralize the defender and 21 of them fell into captivity, a number of other was killed. Fortifications were too extensive, than it could clean up a small group of soldiers, but even so it was effectively decommissioned at exactly the time when important reinforcements have started to land at gate E-1. Around 11:00 is like with mr. spaulding joined other parts of the E company, which came up more to the east and brought with them the information from the battalion headquarters, to act on the south, at Colleville.

The intersection of company G has become a sector, which poured in troops from the beaches around the whole of the rest of the morning. Command a platoon of the 16th RCt had landed in two parts, the first at 7:20 lost executive officer and 35 men in the transition to the beach. Colonel George And. Taylor landed in the second section in 8:15, and like the other masters he had before me a mountain of work. The men are still sheltering on the shore, where it is further kill the artillery and mortar fire. Colonel Taylor summed up by the words "Only two kinds of people remain on this beach - the dead and those who soon will die. So let's get the hell out of here!". Groups of soldiers were collected, regardless of the units they were assigned to the nearest petty officer and have been sent through passages in the barbed wire towards the cliffs, while the engineers widened the passages in the barriers and marked paths through the minefields. Confusion prevailed even during the journey to the top of the cliff, a barrage of small-arms and mortar fire accounted for and soldiers freshly disembarking the impression that they are at the forefront of the attack and threatened that the group stopping to rest during the trip up they clog up the narrow trails. Colonel Taylor has been moved to just below the crest of the cliff and the officers of the battalion and the regiment focused on making their men have advanced further inland, which they do, despite the difficulties managed. During the morning scattered sections of rot E, F, and H moved along the beach up to the places, where through " G " company, and progressed in her footsteps. 1. battalion of the 16th RCT came from the west. The battalion landed between 7:30 and 8:00, rota And east of E-1 and the rest in the places where the soldiers of the 2. the battalion began its advance on the reefs. Company And crossed the beach, but got into trouble in the anti-tank ditch under the east E-1 - the mines and the firing of small arms have caused a loss of 48 men, including 3 officers. On the ridge of the cliff then the company ran into more mines and then turned to the east. Progress was slow, the soldiers went in a row, and for some time ran into a man 116th RCT advancing in the opposite direction. The rest of 1. the battalion got on the cliffs around 9:30 in the places of the original procedure of the company G.


the Procedure in sector Fox Green

Sector Fox Green sided with two exits - wide valley (of the east E-3) advancing a 1.5-mile inland toward Colleville and, 600 m to the east of areas where there were cliffs undermined by the shallow and the steep pit (east F-1). The sector was controlled by two main nests of resistance, one was located east of F-1 and the second one was in E-3. In the field with the error in the navigation to the eighth hour of the morning gradually was 7 rot. Fragmented elements rot E 116th RCT, E and F of the 16th RCT were mixed with the units of 3. battalion of the 16th RCT.

Battalion headquarters landed more to the west, in another sector. The landing was bloody and nowhere was such a bad mood, as in this sector. In spite of this, but even here at 8:00 was getting the attack. Its main protagonist was company L, which retained its organization and led the attack. To it is added a men rot I, K, and E (116th RCT) for the support of heavy weapons company M, of the two remaining tanks and fire support destroyers. In a herculean effort managed to achieve sufficient coordination and to initiate the process.

4 sections of company L had landed on the western edge of the sector Fox Red, where the cliffs give sufficient cover. The company commander was killed, when he tried to direct fire tanks on the enemy's position and has assumed command of lieutenant Robert R. Cutler, Jr. The section progressed to the west, from the cover of the cliffs, directly below the enemy's position, the controlling east the F-1. Two tanks were called in to help. Lieutenant Cutler sent three sections and the headquarters of the ravine to the west of the fortifications. Dense bushes provide cover from enemy fire, and on the ridge were not prepared, no enemy positions, and then the sections were given up without significant losses despite the fact that they had to pass through a minefield. 2. section turned to the left and took position in rear of the enemy position, while the 3. and 5. section forwarded to the inland and hastily built defensive positions. All sections kept contact with each other and with troops on the beach.

Other units headed out towards the slopes, to support the company L. 1. Section of company L, reduced to 12 men, and separate from the rest of the units landing near the exit E-3 to try and attack the fortifications defending the east, which was the original aim of the company. The barrage was too strong, and so is lieutenant Kenneth J. Klenk and his men withdrew and moved to the east along the beach, on the way picked up the man of company E of the 116th RCT and prepared to attack the fortifications of the F-1. Captain Kimball R. Richmond of company I, who had just got to the beach, Fox Green, to here as the ranking military officer living officer took command, he began to organize the expansion process of the company L. Two sections of K company, a few from the company I and the joint section lieutenant Klenka accounted for the second wave of attack, which soared directly towards the enemy position. The cover consisted of mortars and machine guns company M, tanks and naval guns, which sufficiently suppressed the enemy fire. The soldiers of company L, who were already on the hill, postřelovali position of the Germans from machine guns and they kept them in the trenches. Artillery fire on the destroyers, but forced a stop, because it was necessary to cease fire, to be able to fortification to conquer. 2. section of company L was on the phone to the beach, it is possible to stop the naval shelling, that is ready to attack. As soon as the ships odmlčely, the Americans attacked and soon all was over. Grenades and explosives have cleared the path, the position was stormed, and 31 enemy soldiers were captured, of which 15 were injured. Around 9:00 so battalion headquarters had information that the position was stormed and the soldiers led by company L launched the procedure into the interior.


Other action

The above-mentioned breakthroughs of the beaches do not provide the whole picture of the situation in the sector of the landing - in many places the beaches are smaller groups trying to fight your way on, without often knowing what is happening around them. Most of these actions failed to record or to accurately determine with regard to place and time.

C Company 2. a battalion of Rangers was probably the first unit on the heights (sector Charlie) in places where the cliffs bounding the western edge of the beach. About 30 men of the first wave had to pass through purgatory to toe 30 m high cliffs. When they found out that the cliffs are there to climb, they launched the procedure further to the west, to find the way up. About 300 meters further they found the gorge, which they managed to climb up, using bayonets. From the left they found themselves under fire from small arms. Lieutenant William D. Moody along with one soldier followed along the ridge of the cliff above the soldiers of C company and shouted down at them, the way they have to proceed further. At 7:30 they were all men up on the cliff. During the procedure caught a glimpse of captain Ralph E. Goranson landing LCVP, carrying men of company B, 116th RCt, and sent a man back to them also he showed the way to the top. Captain Goranson decided to swerve to the left toward the fortified house, whence came fire, and conquer it. Then, the soldiers had to continue towards the Pointe de la Percée for the originally defined objectives. At the house the Rangers found out that right behind him lies a maze of trenches and okopů for the shooter, machine gun and mortar positions. Goranson and his men jumped into the abandoned trench west of the house, headed towards the other side of the house and began a battle that lasted several hours. Even with the addition of the men in B company, Americans had enough forces to take out the whole nest. 3-4x attack on the enemy positions, knocked out a mortar and inflicted heavy losses, but the enemy reinforcements flowed connecting trenches from the Vierville and the Rangers couldn't clean up all the trenches. Until late afternoon, so the Rangers and company B to declare this stronghold for the conquered - they lost only 2 men in the trenches was found 69 dead Germans. A prolonged struggle, he bound the German units in the sector, Vierville and others so they can better pass out from the beach.

A small part of the 2. a battalion of Rangers is reached from the sector Dog White, to the west of the main area of penetration. Just less than half of men rot a And B reached the cover of a coastal breakwater around 7:40. Several tanks, firing on the enemy positions, were scattered along the beach, but the Rangers haven't seen any other soldiers, and should feel that they are on the entire beach for yourself - just about 400 meters away, the soldiers of 5. battalion of the Rangers received on the already crowded beach. Within a few minutes to overcome the Rangers road leading along the beach and got into the cover of the wreckage of houses lining the road. 18 soldiers of the company B is turned to the right and along the heel of a cliff followed a few hundred meters towards the exit at Vierville, where they wanted to proceed according to the original plan. But then came under heavy fire on the open part of the beach and had to turn back. Meanwhile, the company to And tried in several places to climb the cliffs behind the ruins of houses. Gradually joined them and machine-gun section of company D of the 116th RCT and 3 amphibious tanks, which silence the enemy position on the wings. Two soldiers of Rangers reached the ridge of the cliff, where they found trenches and two or three machine-gun nests. In a few minutes joined a group of other 6 Rangers and together they began to explore the system of trenches, apparently unoccupied. From two directions called machine-gun fire, as the Germans climbed from the covers and occupied prepared positions, but it was already too late. The first Rangers were barely 20 metres away and a number of other was on the way. In twos and threes gradually cleared the enemy position, captured 6 soldiers and killed a number of others, they themselves lost only 3 men. B company returned from my journey towards Vierville and 5. a battalion of Rangers was in sight on the cliffs on the left. Men 2. the battalion was then joined him for another procedure in the outback (it was between 8:00 and 8:30), have expanded so the area of penetration on Dog White and assist greater procedure to the east, by covering the right flank of the landing.


Situation 8:00 - 12:00

The attack moved forward, but not according to plan. I managed to achieve a breakthrough in areas where enemy defenses were not too strong, in the areas between the exits from the beaches. The only peculiar east was the F-1, but he was too sharp, so didn't count with its use, neither was there sufficient engineers. Of the other exits was the only fortification in the E-1 surrounded. Elsewhere only small and fragmented groups of soldiers probojovávaly towards your shromaždištím. Enemy positions near the main exits E-3 and D-3 were still fully combat-capable. In many places the beach was enemy fire still effective and able to stop the advance towards the exits. The engineers were not able to open so far to the beach for transport - in 8:00 not yet made even one pass through the rocky embankment. In another two hours it was not possible to use the existing bridgehead and to expand it. The vehicle, which arrived at the beach, she had no way out and no place to hide from enemy fire. A number of vessels in an attempt to avoid obstacles landed their vehicles in the sectors of the Easy Green and Easy Red, where the risk of clogging the entire beach, while her postřelovala enemy guns from positions on the wings. The commander of the 7th Naval Beach Battalion issued an order, stopping all the landing vehicles in the area. After a few more hours so a number of vehicles and vessels, including a DUKW cruised the waters along the sectors of the Easy Green and Easy Red, waiting for their chance to get to the shore. Especially the DUKW had on the stormy sea hard enough, she must have still cranked the engines at least at half power, and so threatened, that they run out of fuel.

It also meant that the beach will not get heavier weapons designed for infantry support. Anti-tank company, 116th RCT managed to get to shore 1 platoon with 3 57mm guns, but it took several hours before they got out from under the fire of the enemy and from the beach area. Of two batteries of anti-aircraft guns 116th RCT on the shore were only two cannons, the rest was lost at sea when attempting a landing. Artillery company of the 16th RCT, while landed its polopásy at the second attempt around 8:30, but neujely more than 50 metres before it is blocked debris of destroyed vehicles. Its 6 howitzers were loaded on a DUKW, but she was sinking one after the other, including 20 soldiers. The gunners of the individual battalions were supposed to disembark between 8:00 and 9:00, but even that struggled. 111. field artillery battalion of the 116th RCT was completely decimated. Advance troops, including artillery observers, signal corps and the recon section, landed between 7:30 and 8:30 directly in front of les Moulins and as well as soldiers 2. the battalion sustained heavy losses during the transition to the beach. The radio was destroyed, sea water and so it was not possible to broadcast a decision that this beach is not suitable for landing works. Lieutenant Colonel Thornton L. Mullins, battalion commander, said "To hell with the guns, now we're infantry!". Despite the fact that he was already twice wounded, lieutenant colonel Mullins began organizing small groups of soldiers, abetted by a tank to fire against the enemy positions, and the deer ran just to the other tank, when it killed an enemy sniper. Howitzers were loaded on the 13 DUKW, together with 14 men, 50 pieces of 105mm ammunition, sandbags, and other equipment for the establishment of the artillery palpostu. The inexperienced crew of the DUKW with a heavy load, unable to face the vagaries of the sea, 5 DUKW sank about 700 metres from their parent LCT, 4 further ships were lost in the meeting area, one flipped at the moment when the procedure was initiated to the beach, the other is stuck about 500 meters from the shore and was sunk by machine gun fire. The remaining two DUKW around 9:00 got close enough to the beach, make it clear to them that this is not the place. When she stopped to discuss the next steps, it was one DUKW hit by machine-gun and artillery fire and began to burn. 8 men reach the shore and into the second DUKW, which itself was under fire. Information received from the beach were contradictory, the navy didn't know at all, how has the DUKW to proceed, but before it was clear, started this last DUKW dive. Two or three men remained in an attempt to save the last howitzer and managed to get DUWK to another boat with a crane. Translate howitzer on a rhino ferry and this one the barrel 111. The battalion got on shore in the afternoon together with 7. field artillery battalion.

Other artillery units have fared a little bit better. 7. Field artillery battalion lost 6 of their 105mm howitzers on the DUKW that sank on the way to the shore, the other failed to land. 58. armored field artillery battalion, which participated in the artillery from the deck of the LCT, lost his commander shortly after the landing at 7:30. At 10:30 to 3 LCT attempted to deliver weapons to the mainland, but ran into mines, one flipped, one sank in a two-meter depth and howitzers of the third was dropped into the water, to the vessel maintained at the surface. 62. armored field artillery battalion of the landing in the morning at all try. Part two self-propelled anti-aircraft battalions (197. and 467.) began to disembark after half past eight, and in spite of tangible losses at the beach were given weapons that could be used against enemy fortifications.

During the morning the situation on the beach has improved. Gradually weakened fire from the main enemy positions, one nest after another was taken out, often with the support of tanks, which fought with the enemy and the advancing tide, caught in a trap behind a rocky mound on the sandy beach, where they provided a good target for enemy artillery. The connection didn't exist, the tanks were scattered across the beach, and when the commander of the 741. tank battalion landed around 8:20, he found that his radio flooded in salt water and can just throw away. A small command section so she had to contact the one tank after the other and in the process lost 3 of the 5 soldiers. On the other side of the beach was lieutenant colonel John S. Upham Jr., the commander of 743. Tank battalion, struck as he crossed to the tank, to drive his fire. Despite this, but the tanks they continued to fire, one immobilized in the water, burning until the water nezalila tower. Their contribution cannot be expressed statistically, but a mention in the memories of a number of soldiers is clear - the commander of the 2. battalion of the 116th RCT, which experienced the worst of the fighting at les Moulins he heard that the tanks "have saved the whole situation. The germans have tried to beat the crap out of and they are it again trying to beat the hell out of the Germans".

The destroyer Carmick assist the tanks on Dog Green which had managed to get to the coastal road and probojovávaly toward Vierville. Observers on the ship followed, where tanks are burning and according to the followed fire of the works of the destroyer. Overall, the support ships, necessarily limited during the initial moments of the landing, became an important factor on the battlefield. Some of the landing boats were trying to support the infantry fire from their machine guns. While " G " company vyloďovala in les Moulins, one patrol boat stopped directly in front of the enemy fortifications and started to throw one blow after another. German shellfire began to zoom in, hit the boat and forced it to hover on the shore, but the sailors continued to fire until a direct hit has not been removed from the fight. During the morning then two boats carried out a bold landing in sector exit E-3. LCT 30 on full throttle burst right through the obstacles, pálíc all of your guns. At the same time LCI(L) 544 rammed a path through the obstacles, firing on enemy machine-gun nest. Both events have clearly shown, that barriers can be overcome, in particular the larger vessels, which have so far prevented the approach to the beach. For naval artillery, it was first difficult to find the right goals - in 9:15 it was reported that the risk of hitting your own troops, but between 10:00 and 11:00 arrived two destroyers up to a mile from the beach and began to fire on the fortifications to the east of les Moulins. How warm feeling it was for the infantry and the engineers, who tried to fulfill his task and to open the passages of the beaches. At 11:00 he ordered colonel Taylor to all tanks capable of the event went towards the exit E-3. Arrived with only 3, two of them were destroyed when they tried to ride east out. Captain W. M. King was given the task to collect the tanks to the action, and so were the beaches towards the west, to inform the individual tanks. When he arrived to the last, he found out that his commander is wounded and took his place. Poodjel from the rocky embankment and headed towards the exit, weaving between the wrecks and the injured men on the beach, when it hit a mine, probably a relaxing of some of the obstacles. Mina snapped tank belt, and so he had to King and his crew continue towards the E-3 on foot.

Decisively, the situation has changed in the sector exit E-1. Fortifications were neutralized at flank of E company of the 16th RCT, the unfinished fortifications on the other side but it was still partially in the hands of the enemy, but the under fire company M, 116th RCT. Engineers 37. the combat engineer battalion have completed around 10:00 the first pass through the dunes to the east from the east, company C 149. the combat engineer battalion has created another passage on the west side. Artillery support destroyers speed up the whole process, during the next two hours was backfilled anti-tank ditch, cleaned the minefield and was so to allow the passage of vehicles up to the exit. In that moment, in front of the exit E-1 began to disembark more reinforcements, and the last remnants of the resistance at this exit were soon převálcovány.


On Easy Red come backup

The 18th RCT had to start landing on the Easy Red by battalions from 9:30. After leaving the rally point with the first wave of LCVP and LCM boats got into trouble, couldn't keep the formation and the course, towards the beach was too many vessels, and each manévrovalo the other direction. 2. the battalion began landing just west of exit E-1 shortly after 10:00, and as the soldiers approached the beach, it seemed to them that their colleagues from the beach wouldn't - "the beach was covered in debris, full of tractors, tanks, vehicles and soldiers, the heights still held in the hands of the Germans and the beach was under fire from small arms, mortars and artillery". The underwater obstacles caused other problems, although one narrow passage was created near the exit E-1 - vessels carrying 18. The regiment had the navy to write off a 22 LCVP's, 2 LCI(L) and 4 LCT as destroyed in the landing, most of them after the impact on underwater obstacles or mines. The loss of the soldiers but they were light. To the right of the exit E-1 came across the soldiers of the 2. the battalion on the still functional hostile bunker and with the help of the tank to try to conquer. The attack was stopped, but the shipping them are artillery observers contacted the destroyer and coordinate the procedure of the infantry with his artillery fire. Grenades from the ship were flying barely a few feet above the crowded beaches and after about the fourth volley with 20 defenders surrendered. Thus, around 11:30 was taken out the last enemy position in front of the exit E-1. Within half an hour, the engineers cleared the minefield and with the help of bulldozers creating a path for the vehicle. East became the main way out from the beach, but first was the need to relax the crowded beach. Shortly after the landing of the first units of the 18th RCT on the beach appeared LCI(L) carrying the soldiers of the 115. infantry regiment, who was a reserve for the landings on Omaha and was at the last moment intended to disembark in sectors Dog Red and Easy Green at 10:30. The vessel LCI found the control boats for the mentioned sectors, and so she got too far east, on Easy Red, where was disembarking 18. infantry regiment. Causing further confusion and delays in the disembarkation of both regiments and their progress from the beach. Instead of landing between 10:30 and 11:30 to 1. and 3. battalion 18. the regiment were on the beach until around 13:00, in the meantime, however, landed all the banners 115. regiment. 2. battalion 18. the regiment is from the beach got up around noon, units 115. regiment it took until 14:00 before, along with the remnants of 18. the regiment could start to move inland. Rearrangement of the units complained to enemy fire and minefields. Mortar fire fortunately missed the accuracy, the artillery fire is again focused on vessels at sea - she received several hits, but the losses were not great. Once managed to get 2. battalion 18. the regiment out of the beach, the order came brigadier general Willard G. Wyman, deputy commander of the 1. infantry division, that has to take over the original objectives of the 2. battalion 16. regiment. The unit then turned left toward Easy Red, where in the footsteps of the 16th RCT progressed towards Colleville. Battalions 115. the regiment marched toward the rendezvous point southeast of St. Laurent, where they regroup. The commander, colonel Eugene N. Slappey, received the on the beach order from Wyman, to continue to the original destination in the area of Longueville. However, before he could leave, appeared on the beach general Cota with news from the sector of the 116th RCT. After consultation with the Wymanem it was decided that one battalion 115. the regiment will be allocated to further clean the area of St. Laurent. Our radio didn't work and the colonel Slappey had with his soldiers contact, when around 16:00 went to the outback to find it.

Reports on the progress inland from Easy Red reached the higher command and were particularly welcome, because the command In. army corps not in the first hours almost no information about what is happening on the beach, relying only on information from the navy and the advance of the intelligence section, colonel Talley. This section tried to get to the beach in two DUKW, but it was noticeable that the wire equipment the way nepřečká unscathed, and so the two DUKW stay near the beaches on the water. Unfortunately, the messages from both sources were inaccurate, delayed in transmission, and in addition nevyznívaly too well. Sunken ships, heavy artillery, the DUKW sinking, the soldiers nailing to the beach. The first practices of the allied troops often covered up the smoke, all the attention is additionally held onto the exits from the beaches, which were still in the hands of the enemy. At 9:45 reported In the chorus 1. army : "the Obstacle is booby-trapped, the procedure slow. 1. battalion of the 116th RCT reported in 7:48, that is stopped by machine guns, two LCT discarded artillery fire. Amphibious tanks in the sector Fox Green sunk.". At 11:55 shouldn't have kept the congregation up to date information, and so reported "the situation at the exits from the beaches Easy the Fox and the Dog in the 11:00 still critical. 352. infantry division (German) confirmed, 115. the regiment got in a 11:31 for the task of clearing the heights southwest of Easy Red, the 16th and 116th RCT on the shore, still fighting on the beach, the vehicle is going slowly. From Easy Green reported German prisoners of war." Around 10:55 started colonel Talley to deliver only positive news "penetration in the range of the platoon halfway between exit E-1 and E-3" and "men are advancing slope behind Easy Red, probably our soldiers on the ridge". These messages are but the headquarters were given until between 12:25 and 12:43. And until around 13:09 could In the choir to report the first good news on the army headquarters : "the previously pinned units in sector Easy Red, Easy Green, Fox Red advancing on the heights beyond the beaches". From this moment, too, were the headquarters of the corps to maintain an overview of the situation on the beach, and other reports have already been calming.

Problems in communication but hampered even the work of the artillery observers. When one of them shortly after noon, approached with his ships to the shore, he saw a man (and dead men) scattered along the beach, under a thick fire of the enemy coming from the cliffs above them. He asked headquarters for permission to the missile attack on the enemy position, but the headquarters rejected with the fact that there may already be allied troops.




Rangers at Point du Hoe



While in the main sector was the landing, three of the company 2. the battalion Rangers (company D, E and F) are pointing to a secluded spot 4.5 km to the west. Under the command of lieutenant colonel James E. Ruddera, commander of a Provisional unit, the Rangers, with 200 men landed under the Point du Hoe. Their main goal was to occupy the fortified position of the enemy and destroy a battery of 6 155mm howitzers, which they could shell the whole of Omaha beach and the boats to her arriving. The mission wasn't easy - the beach below the cliff was only a 25-foot strip, followed by 30-35 meters high rocks. The Rangers trained for several months on the English coast, in similar conditions, and with the help of the british Commandos have created a variety of special equipment for this task. Each of the 10 LCA of boats was equipped with 3 pairs of launchers of rockets, to which was mounted the ropes and rope ladders. In addition, you should men in each boat, even a pair of smaller rockets on thinner ropes, folding ladders, 4 DUKW drove 30metrový folding ladder similar to those which were used by the fire department. The soldiers were carrying only the minimum equipment, 4 machine guns, a BAR and 2 60mm mortars in each platoon. Two supply vessels carrying backpacks, supplies, explosives and ammunition for all three companies.


Point du Hoe today (Photo Admin 2014)


In the hour H should companies E and F to land from the east side, company D and then from the western side. No Rangers but did not avoid problems with navigation, and so headed on the wrong sector of the beach, when was the mistake discovered, they had to come back basically parallel to the coast, under fire from enemy positions on the cliffs, so the invading fleet arrived to the Point du Hoe to 40minutovým delay. This delay has caused, that is 8 other rot 2. and 5. a battalion of Rangers was not followed and according to the backup plan landed at the Vierville (their the procedure is described above). One LCA sank shortly after leaving the assembly point, a supply ship sank 15 minutes after the beginning of the trip and the other had to get rid of all the baggage, in order to keep on the water. One DUKW was under fire from 20mm anti-aircraft cannon from the reef and was sunk. The remaining 9 boats are closer to a 400 m beach on the eastern side of the reef. Naval shelling has stopped in the hour H, and so had the defenders time to get back to their positions. Closely but watched the crew of the destroyer Satterlee, who's turnover has included a barrage of projectiles of all calibers, what was available on board. Despite the support from the sea on the Rangers rained down a spray of machine guns and the firing of small arms, the losses amounted to 15 men. The Rangers immediately after the landing of the fired rockets, some failed to pull the water soaked ropes up the cliff, but only one vessel failed to get up at least one anchor with a rope. In one or two cases, were used for folding ladders. DUKW is close to the beach, but they failed to get past the craters dotted the strip up to the rock, from the water, their ladders to the reef have not reached. The germans appeared on the crest of the cliff and began to shell the Rangers of the rifles and throw them grenades, retaliation was the accurate fire of machine guns along with a barrage of the destroyer Satterlee, discouraged further attempts to attack. The Rangers didn't wait and within five minutes of landing were the first men on the cliff. The less fortunate of them, who fell into the deep lakes in the craters after the bombing, had climbing problems. The germans cut a few ropes, or they managed to release the anchor. Rangers in groups of three or four soldiers went to the positions of the works. They were in no man's land, in the land of absolute destruction after aerial bombing, all landmarks destroyed and the craters were so deep, that groups distant not more than five meters together lost contact. Only a few enemy soldiers have been spotted, and even they now hide in a network of trenches and debris. Rangers gradually given up, while others already exploring the enemy positions. Casemate, where should be located the enemy guns, it was empty! The Rangers then without delay went to the outback to fulfil another task - to reach the road lining the coast, to interrupt her between Vierville and Grandcamp, and to build here a defensive position before they arrive units of the 116th RCT from the beach. 300 meters from the position of the guns came under fire of small arms and artillery from the south. 15 men were killed or wounded, when the Rangers tried to fight their way forward and took out two nests of enemy resistance. 36 men rot D and E reached the road around 8:00, 12 others from company F came up a little further and the unit come together. The soldiers have taken a defensive position in the field beside the road, one group blocked the path from the Grandcamp. During the rapid movement they encountered only small groups of enemies, which managed to drive away without losses of their own. Around 9:00, two soldiers embark on a path of 200 meters from the main road and in the woods found the battery 5 works, cleverly masked and ready to shoot toward Omaha or Utah, with large stocks of ammunition. Only the gunners missed. The patrol destroyed the two cannons with the help of grenades and coming back for more explosives. While they were gone, managed to get another patrol to complete the liquidation of the howitzers and light the ready ammo. Back on the reef have travelled report on the completion of the task, but at the same time, it was clear that the Germans are recovering from the surprise. In the east the men of company F attempted to conquer the machine-gun nest, which was behind most of the losses, but they failed to get close enough and a machine gun remained in action until the morning even with a piece of a cliff, sent into the sea artillery fire from the ships. West of Point du Hoe on the edge of the cliff there was a anti-aircraft position, which began the area of the shell. At 7:40 they were all Rangers offloaded and a dozen men from the past was sent to the elimination of this anti-aircraft position, but they were stopped by mortar and artillery fire. A few minutes later from the trenches and the tunnels rushed in a body of Germans, and during the counterattack they captured all the men, except one. The landscape was so covered with craters, that command section in a crater only a hundred yards away, not about this event, any idea, until the only survivors came back. The Rangers have compiled more team, a dozen soldiers and a mortar section. Made it to the half of the enemy's position, than it is stopped by an artillery barrage which killed or wounded almost all of the soldiers of the group. The rest of the day was a small unit in danger of encirclement. In the rubble settled snipers and Rangers despite all the efforts have failed to clean up the broken maze of trenches, damaged bunkers and okopů. 3 or 4 Germans are still holding at the tip of the cliff in the observation bunker. During the afternoon there were two German counterattacks in the direction from St. Pierre du Mont, but both were stopped, the more dangerous for the help of the only remaining mortars. The anti-aircraft position was still active and a destroyer from the sea it still couldn't hit. Connection with the group blocking the road was tedious, were it only patrols, which have had to sometimes literally fight your way back into their positions. Headquarters at Point du Hoe had a connection with the rest of the vyloďujících units on Omaha, but he did maintain a connection for using light signals, and later radio, with ships in the area. The maritime section of the fire control maintained from 7:28 contact with the destroyer Satterlee, who stayed for most of the day and to provide important support. Later, when the afternoon arrived at the headquarters In. army corps a brief report of the "Point du Hoe found, mission accomplished, we need ammunition and reinforcements, the loss of a large", was at the command of the doubts and fears.




Procedure to the outback



Penetrations of enemy defenses between 8:00 and 9:00 were the decisive success of the landing at Omaha, despite the great difficulties. The success of this was limited and prevented full use of the breakthrough and the achievement of the objectives for D-day. On the reefs is not yet reached just a fraction of the attacking battalions, formed is fragmented units, which were seldom larger than a company and often no less than one or two sections. Should only a minimum of heavy weapons, without tanks and artillery support and a certain period of time it took before it was built sufficient communication facilities, in order to effectively coordinate fire from ships at sea. Communication between units was throughout the day very limited. Units have been mixed, a number of them lost on the beach his officers. Most of the exits from the beaches were still blocked or under fire, so the strengthening of the advancing units was not possible. Part of the units are still huddling behind an offshore breakwater, is often more of a psychological reasons than physical, and it took a long time before it managed to get behind the advancing soldiers. The reserve regiments of the refrain from the confusion in the landing, and up until this afternoon have not been able to effectively engage in battles and even then they were not used to the fullest. The defenders of the recorded terrain and situation to make the landing as much as possible kept. Again and again the Americans getting a shot at the German defenders in small nests of resistance in prepared positions, often built around machine-gun nests in or along the hedgerows with a good view. Search for these positions was not easy and even if I managed to find, their elimination with the available weapons also was not easy. To circumvent these places usually meant the distribution of the advancing soldiers and loss of control during the procedure into the interior. The difficulty of the fights in the landscape, hedges have been great under any circumstances, but as a first combat experience was worse. However the Germans were concentrating in units about the size of a company on just one or two places (as was Colleville), they were able to stop the procedure. army corps far from its stated goals. Battle in the outback can be divided into three areas according to three villages, around which they fought. In two of them, in Colleville and St. Laurent was a strong enemy of the crew. In all three areas that were the stories of combat units smaller than a battalion, fighting in a more or less coordinated engagements.

the Area of Vierville

In the time between 8:00 and 9:00 to 600 men rose from the beach, sector Dog White. In addition to the C company, which led the entire procedure, they were also men 8 red Rangers, the headquarters of the 116th RCT, sappers 121. the combat engineer battalion and the remnants of rot B, F, G and H. Small groups should tend to after reaching the crest of the stop and coalesce into larger bodies. At least a semblance of organization that you have built in the process of the beach was lost, the reorganization took place only slowly. Although right in the vicinity there were no enemy positions, snipers and machine gun fire from a distant position along with shells from the 88mm works znepříjemňovaly situation and it took all of two hours before they managed to achieve some progress. One smaller group went to the outback on their own. A platoon of 5. a battalion of Rangers, led by lieutenant Charles H. Parker, Jr., after reaching the ridge seen any of the other soldiers and then went in a southwesterly direction around Vierville and to prapornímu event center. Offended almost a mile, than ran into enemy resistance at the Chateau de Vaumicel, just south of Vierville. She spent the rest of the morning trying to eliminate this enemy position on the territory of the castle.

The command group of the 116th RCT arrived at the crag around 9:00 and found the soldiers of the Rangers and the 116th RCT scattered in the fields to the south, the part of the soldiers near the road lining the coast. The only functioning radio station belonged to the connecting officer 743. a tank battalion. Colonel Canham was completely out of contact with the individual battalions, didn't know what was happening at the exits in the area of the 116th RCT and could only guess that the other battalions are on their way to the regimental assembly area.

The units were finally in motion between 10:00 and 11:00, when general Cota arrived and helped departments "limber". 5. a battalion of Rangers had to proceed south to cut the road and bypass the Vierville from the south, while the units 116t RCT should follow to Vierville directly. The procedure of Rangers was stopped when the first men reached the road - a hostile machine gun located in the hedge in the field to the south opened fire. The column was halted, while one squad tried to gun bypass along the parallel hedge. There but ran into another machine gun, more on the left. Another squad of Rangers with it, then released discarded, only to on the way ran into another machine gun nest to the east. The third pincer movement was also stopped by machine gun fire and the soldiers had to retreat in anticipation of the artillery support. 58. armored field artillery battalion just landed part of his works, but the lookout reported that it is not possible to shoot in this area due to the amount of reefs on the beach. 4 hours were lost. Around 14:00, the Rangers gave up trying to advance south of the road and instead turned toward Vierville, in the footsteps of C company and a few smaller groups, 116th RCT, that have been through here previously, as well as B company 5. a battalion of Rangers, which went through in the belief that her other units of the battalion to follow. American soldiers entered the Vierville before 11:00, shortly behind them the general Cota, up on a small firefight at the entrance to the village was the enemy gone.

A platoon of company B, 116th RCT, went through Vierville and lost contact with other units. The platoon turned to the south towards the castle. On the way to hit the enemy position, attacked it and captured 14 men. In an effort to circumvent the lock was a platoon attacked by another group of Germans who had just arrived on the buckets of 3 trucks from somewhere from the south. The remaining 25 men of the unit withdrew to the castle and having no heavy weapons, they had to repel a German attack by accurate fire from the rifles. At noon to join them Parker's platoon of company a, 5. a battalion of Rangers to the castle she got from the other side. Not one unit had no idea whether they are in Vierville other allied soldiers.

B Company 5. a battalion of Rangers and company C of the 116th RCT went through Vierville around noon and headed out along the highway toward Pointe du Hoe. After about 500 meters, is stopped by fire from prepared positions along the hedgerows perpendicular to the road. A few more hours so both units spent in an attempt to flank and eliminate the enemy position. Machine-gun position was well hidden, every time the Americans tried to cross the open space, rained down on them fire from machine guns and rifles from a distance of 200-300 meters. At 17:00 arrived at the main part of the units of the Rangers, was initiated the planning of the attack, but he was eventually revoked and shifted to a later time. Colonel Canham decided not to progress toward Pointe du Hoe, because its the Rangers formed the greater part of the defenders of Vierville.

The command section of the 116th RCT went through Vierville around noon towards the pre-designated post of the southwest from the village. Commanders have found that in addition to the enemy snipers are no units in that area and that they are essentially isolated. A platoon of B company, 5. a battalion of Rangers appeared thanks to obchvatnému manoeuvre and remained to provide the command protection. Patrols sent towards Louvieres in order to find the unit 2. battalion, the films are about a mile to the south, but then had to come back, without having encountered a single american soldier. The gunfight persisted around the command post for the whole afternoon and at least 15 Germans were killed near the headquarters. At 18:30 has arrived the commander of the 1. the battalion, which came from the sector Charlie, and that's when the colonel Canham learned what was happening on the beach in front of the exit at Vierville. Around midnight came the information, that 2. and 3. the battalion located near St. Laurent.

At dusk as was the area of Vierville weakest beachhead at Omaha. 5. a battalion of Rangers, the remnants of 1. battalion of the 116th RCT and several smaller units, and part 2. and 3. the battalion held defensive positions west and southwest of the village, while other american troops were closer than in the St. Laurent. Reinforcements in this sector nevylodily, east of the beach is during the evening just preparing to open. If they were available units could be a way out from the beach open during the afternoon. Between 12:00 and 13:00 at the German fortifications withstand the artillery fire of the ships, a guided vyloděnými observers, in the action involved, with their huge cannons and the battleship USS Texas. After the first 4 volleys destroyer McCook reported that the Germans are leaving the position and giving up. The engineers on the beach, took 30 prisoners. The other fire was directed at the massive fortifications. Shortly after the cannon has been silenced, on the beach appeared general Cota, to find out why still are unable to get from the beach to the vehicle. With a group of 4 or 5 other soldiers missed the enemy emplacements, anti-tank wall and got to the beach, without having attracted the fire of the defenders. During the trip they took 5 prisoners, the firing of the holes on the cliff, is then conducted through a minefield. The general saw little activity in the east D-1 - the only infantry near were exhausted debris company A, 116th RCT, tanks were then further east. General Cota went on his way along the coastal roads to see the state of affairs at les Moulins. There, the engineers have just started cleaning the exit to Vierville.

121. the combat engineer battalion, responsible for the east D-1, passed as well as all the other units, problems in the landing. He came about three-quarters of all equipment and a significant portion of their men. The officers of the battalion for several hours to gather his men and tried to save the equipment and explosives from the beach. A small patrol trying to attack the enemy position. One patrol entered the fortifications in Hamel-an-Pretre, found it destroyed by naval fire and almost abandoned. The fortifications here, as well as in Vierville, was connected by long underground tunnels, which provide good cover for the German defenders and prevented a complete clean up defensive positions.

A platoon of company a, 5. battalion of the Rangers, fought my way up to the Ponte du Hoe, 6 miles through enemy territory. Lieutenant Parker and his men left around 14:30 the castle to the south of Vierville and delivered to the designated assembly area of the battalion. On the way ran into several German positions and dismantle them, while they killed at least 2 Germans and captured another 12. Two dozen Rangers arrived to the rally, but if there have found no other american soldiers, assumed that 5. the battalion set off toward Point du Hoe, and decided to go there. The Rangers avoid the main road and follow the smaller roads through Englesqueville into positions south of their destination before being stopped by the barrage. The Rangers tried to break through, but the enemy was on both flanks and one time it seemed that the unit will have to give up. Eventually they managed to fight your way back, left the path and went across the field, where he teamed up with men 2. battalion of the Rangers at Pointe du Hoe. Although the squad for the entire period met with other men 5. the battalion commander, believed that he must be somewhere near, and in this sense also informed the colonel Ruddera.


Area St. Laurent

In addition to company M, nailed on the beach in front of the exit E-1 with most 3. battalion of the 116th RCT had on the heights above the beach around 10:00 and launched the advance to the south. Thanks to the strong resistance of the enemy with them but the rest of the day failed to advance by more than 800 meters.

You cannot create a clear and uncluttered picture of the fighting that morning, because more than a dozen different groups probojovávalo their way normandskou landscape towards the village of St. Laurent, where was set the rally point of the battalion. The field between the beach and St. Laurent wasn't so densely lined with hedges and open countryside, so the more stressed the enemy's fire, even if it was inaccurate and scattered. Soldiers rot L and Even had to fight his way through a number of well concealed enemy positions, machine gun nests and trenches, but around noon was already most of company L and part of company I on the northwest edge St. Laurent, where to the village enters the road from les Moulins. Enemy missile battery was destroyed by mortars company I and fire the ship's cannons. K company was near and the commander of the battalion tried to organize a unit. Major Bingham proceeded from the beach to the east and with the part of the men rot F, H, and hq 2. the battalion now proceeded into the interior. Enemy resistance but amplify, snipers complicate our approaches to the village, but most problems have been at the west end of St. Laurent. Here was buried unit of the strength of the company and to control the approaches to the main intersection and the path from the exit of the beach. Two teams from company K and a few men of the company And in order to circumvent the enemy position through the exit from the beach roughly halfway towards les Moulins, then stumbled on the road and in sight on the men 5. a battalion of Rangers. Decided to to follow them toward Vierville. Along the way were the men of K company attacked from the side and lost several soldiers after a surprise machine-gun ambush. Finally arrived company To to plukovnímu headquarters, where she spent the night as an alarm unit.

The rest of the battalion was stopped at the intersection for the rest of the afternoon. Several attempts have been halted by machine-gun fire from the places which the troops failed to appear. Most of the losses of the company L that day comes just from this area. After dark, the greater part of the 3. the battalion was still at the end of the gorge leading from the beach, supplemented by a platoon of M, which in the meantime has arrived from the east E-1. Nearby was a command section 2. the battalion with a handful of soldier rot G and H, the rest of the battalion was dispersed throughout the area between Colleville and Vierville, and part of the soldiers still on the beach in front of les Moulins.

St. Laurent proved to be a hindrance in the procedure even for a man of 115. infantry regiment, coming from the northeast and towards the southwest to your event. Means of transport of the regiment were not intended for landing during D-day, and so the men were carrying a heavy load, in particular men carrying mortars, machine guns and ammunition. The occasional firing of the enemy from disrupting and slowing down the procedure. 2. the battalion reached St. Laurent, ran into enemy resistance and the rest of the afternoon trying to eliminate an enemy unit on the estimated strength of the squad. This time was for the inexperienced soldiers, the biggest problem to locate enemy positions. When dusk finally able soldiers to launch an attack, they fell on the village the shells of the allied ships, unfortunately even among us soldiers, and the procedure is stopped. The battalion withdrew south from St. Laurent, where to connect with 1. the banner and where it through the night. 1. The battalion reached a position near the road to Formigny, a few hundred metres south of St. Laurent and slowly progressed despite the mortar fire and snipers. 3. the battalion took to the road connecting St. Laurent and Colleville didn't get before nightfall.

Part 5 battalions so spent the afternoon and evening of D-day fighting in the area of about 2 square kilometers with scattered groups of enemies. The efficiency of this fighting force was constrained by a number of factors, from the lack of communication for lack of artillery support and tanks.


the Area of Colleville

When company G got behind the reefs, and around 9:00 went to the outback, in the way she stood just a few shooters and the occasional signs of a minefield. Company, quickly advancing a mile to the south, advanced to the originally designated area and according to plan. The first objective was the area where they had to collect German soldiers, roughly 400 metres to the west of Colleville, from there then the company should curl into Colleville. The rally point was reached around 9:30 and the company broke down a dense barrage of automatic weapons and mortars from both wings. In dvouhodinově the battle house after house pushed the Americans to the German defender out of the area. The company lost 12 men. The remnants of F company and a small group of company H, along with two sections of company E of the 116th RCT were followed by company G, and join to it, thus making it available to about 150 soldiers for the attack on Colleville. Shortly after noon a platoon of company G launched a procedure on the western edge of the village, but after the capture of the first few buildings it was stopped by strong enemy defense. The rest of the company was stretched further west and the extreme section of gradually lost contact. Due to a misunderstanding with the two sections of the 116th RCT withdrew to a bivouac area, while the small group of defenders had penetrated through the resulting gap. The bunker at the mouth of the east E-3 was still active, firing coming from the hips and behind, and create a feeling of encirclement. Another two hours spent " G " company in the defense, from the fight knocked out 18 of the Germans - this was probably the biggest hint of a German counterattack on D-day. Around 15:00 arrived to the Americans reinforcements in the form of 2. battalion 18. infantry regiment, dorazivšího from the east E-1 with orders to take position 2. battalion 16. infantry regiment. "G" company but has not been able to advance further into the village and own naval artillery support hit the 8 men, while the enemy remained untouched. Whatever " G " company she felt alone, a number of other units progressed from the beach and around noon was in the vicinity of Colleville. Praporní and the regimental headquarters was organised by the unit between the sector Easy Red and Colleville, although the connection still was not enough, the hedges preventing the observation and the small groups of enemies are still kept in positions that american troops flank, and from time to time opened fire into the side or back of the head passing through the soldiers. You then had to go back and engage in dočišťovacích operations, which took another 2 to 3 hours. In addition, suddenly discovered that the German defenders, withdrawing from the position in the beaches, in sectors that were already considered cleaned. After a full day in the area between exits E-1 and E-3 place of countless smaller engagements.

Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert C. Hicks, Jr., the commander of the 2. battalion of the 16th RCT, followed by company G to Colleville and tried to get the rest of their men into this area. The only larger unit, which ran across was a group of about 50 men of company E, including section lieutenant Spalding from the east E-1. The group reached the road lining the coast around noon, and proceeded on a few hundred meters, to cover the right flank of company G. The group came under fire from behind and lost contact with other units. In the afternoon, the group assessed that risks being cut off and pulled back toward Colleville. Meanwhile, in the same area began to receive the unit 1. battalion. Companies B and C reached the road around 13:00 at the bivouac area in places where have already gone through " G " company. A few hours took the effort to clean up the surrounding trees from snajperů and by nightfall had advanced only about 300 meters further to the south. Company, And, which is worse getting to the cliffs, spent the morning fighting with kulometným's nest in the woods on the side of exit E-1, and to his battalion joined in during the afternoon.

18. infantry regiment landed near exit E-1, between 11:00 and 14:00 and so, as one after another the battalions were running inland, is a general Wyman rerouting of the original objectives for you, which should originally meet unit 16. infantry regiment. 2. the battalion advanced toward Colleville to help 2. battalion of the 16th RCT, along the way constantly harassed by small groups of enemies, whose firing has led to several victims. At 15:00 the battalion went through the west of company G, and by nightfall arrived at the high ground about 500 yards south and southeast of Colleville, without crashing into more resistance from the front - a charge he was mainly firing from the rear. 1. the battalion found itself directly in front of the two platoons of Germans defending the trenches near the mouth of the east E-1 and the fight he spent the rest of the afternoon, while the defenders tried to escape through the previously abandoned and cleaned position. 3. the battalion as a reserve, received at 16:15 order take targets 1. battalion of the 16th RCT - occupy Formigny and Surrain. At 18:00 was 3. battalion, harassed by snipers, still north of the coastal road and got a new task, conquer the heights south of the road and fill the gap between the units 1. infantry division and 29. infantry division. Even around midnight, the battalion couldn't road to cross. 1. the battalion, which meanwhile had dealt with resistance in the mouth of the east E-1, was given the task to proceed toward Surrain. At midnight, he was near the road connecting St. Laurent and Colleville.
1.5 kilometres to the east of Colleville, after a whole day alone, fought 3. battalion 16th RCT, without connection with the rest of the regiment. After the conquest of positions in the east of the F-1 is a mixed unit zreorganizovaly and moved inland. The group consisted of a total of 6 rot, but still not much more than a hundred men. The group sent ahead of the patrol, but one of them, sent to Cabourgu, she got directly into the German position and was captured. The enemy, who still held a position in the rear, even tried a counter-attack unit in the strength of the squad. During the afternoon, the Americans got to le Grand-Hameau, and because Cabourg held the large German crew, it wasn't about the impossibility of continuing the procedure no doubt. During the evening of the beaches were given the additional units, together with 17 tanks and 3. the battalion took a defensive position blocking the coastal road near le Grand-Hameau.

26. infantry regiment arrived at the assembly area at sea around 13:00 and received the order to disembark at 18:00 near exit E-3. The regiment got to the beach at 21:00 and more orders, he was required to place the 3. the battalion on the road south from St. Lauren in the direction of Formigny, 2. the battalion had to stay behind him and be ready first thing in the morning to go on the attack. The battalions marched to their targets during the night. 1. the battalion proceeded east from the east E-3, to protect the left flank of the 16th RCT.

General Huebner and the command section 1. infantry division landed in sector Easy Red at 1900 and joined general Wyman at his command post on the edge of the exit E-1. General Gerow, and the forward headquarters In. army corps left the USS Ancon at 20:30 and headed to shore.


the Situation on the beach - in the afternoon

After noon, the destroyers continued to fire on the enemy emplacements along the beach. Position to prevent the exit at Vierville was silenced by 13:00, shortly after that was a dangerous position on the side of the wide beach at Pointe de la Percée is literally blasted out with cliff. Both resulted in a significant improvement in the situation on the beach, but not stopping all resistance. Still found enough weapons, which were blocking the three main exits from Omaha beach. Exit at Vierville was relatively ready to open, as demonstrated walk general Coty, but the area still wasn't enough soldiers for the systematic treatment of the weakened positions. Resistance at the exits D-3 and E-3 neochaboval. The germans masterfully used the maze of tunnels and tangle trenches, to re-occupied the positions which already seemed cleaned, snipers again appeared on the cliffs, where already before passing a group of american soldiers. From the mainland still came sporadic artillery fire, which was particularly noticeable to the east of the sector Easy Green and reached its maximum in the afternoon. Order were still boats at sea and vehicles on the beach, and although the fire wasn't strong enough to cause heavy losses or to halt the landing, caused the least confusion and complicated the procedure of the Allies from the beaches. Observers or reconnaissance aircraft was not able to locate these German batteries, and so the navy couldn't effectively intervene. The destroyer Carmick, together with the artillery observer on the shore around 17:20 tried to locate the battery firing to the east E-1, but unsuccessfully. Despite the shelling, but the pioneers gradually cleaned the beach and organized the movement into the hinterland. With the tide again appeared underwater obstacles and the engineers so they can continue their disposal, even if they work complained about the snipers on the cliffs. Completed were the three passages begun in the morning, created 4 new ones, and extended some of the earlier. In the evening, so it was done 13 passes and about 35 percent of all obstacles on the beaches were destroyed. For the beaches, the engineers create passages in minefields, tunneling rocky embankment and breakwater, and tried to do everything they can in order to get the individual exits. On the beach poured more and more troops, but even they did not shy away from messes in the navigation, and so although he was a sector of the Fox ready, 336. sapper battalion, which had to land, landed about 4 km further on the opposite end of Omaha, and at 15:00 there was nothing left other than to embark on a tortuous journey east, F-1, while along the way, especially around the exits D-3 and E-3, postřelovalo German artillery. At the exit D-3 of the barrage was so strong that the men ran across the open ground in pairs. When they went through about half, was struck by a bulldozer that was working there on the stony wall, and the smoke from the burning machines cover the rest of the procedure. The engineers got to the exit F-1 around 17:00, on the beach left behind 6 men. A trailer full of explosives, pulled by a tractor, all the way survived unscathed.

The main task for the improvement of the situation in the whole sector was getting from the beaches of the vehicle. When the firing of destroyers and procedure 18. infantry regiment destroyed the lunch resistance of the defenders of the east E-1. Engineers 1., 37. and 149. the battalion could get to work. Bulldozers between 12:00 and 13:00, despite sniper fire, build the road on the western slope towards the St. Laurent and the vehicle is immediately put in motion. Disembarkation was resumed on Easy Red and Easy Green, the first group prepared DUKW landed at 14:00, and because the Germans lacked a forward artillery observer near the exit E-1, the barrage was inadequate and jeopardize the newly arriving reinforcements. At 15:00 but discovered a new problem - the vehicle could not continue, because the enemy still held the village of St. Laurent, the movement is stopped. The vehicle remained packed bumper to bumper. Around 16:00 but the engineers have completed a journey towards the coastal road, south of the originally planned trip. Vehicles once again to continue, and the movement did not stop for the rest of the day. At 17:00 all the remaining tanks 743. tank battalion received orders to proceed into the interior, and 4 of them subsequently participated in the failed attempt at the conquest of St. Laurent before nightfall.

At all the other exits are so well couldn't. East D-1 at Vierville was cleaned members 121. the combat engineer battalion, but the procedure was blocked by artillery fire, which she kissed the path of the debris. With the advent of the night with the right get up to the village, 121. the battalion built a gathering place and 743. tank battalion spent the night near Vierville. Exit D-3, les Moulins was still blocked by the enemy, although his strength gradually faltering. Work on the east E-3 were carried out in the intervals between the significant artillery and mortar fire, and when everything covered the night, so the engineers can finish the journey to the east after midnight could start pulling out tanks. 33. sapper battalion proceeded to clean the mines at the exit of the F-1 and built a new 4-metre wide path slope up. The landing plans were adjusted to have this chance used.

Company B 745. tank battalion, vyloděná at 16:30 in sector Fox Green, lost 3 tanks due to antitank mines, but managed to get her to 20:00 to get to the heights. In the area east E-1 began to disembark and artillery, which throughout the day didn't get to the beach and that mohdy suffered high losses even at sea. The only remaining howitzers 111th field artillery battalion was affiliated to 7. field the main artillery battalion, which itself came 6 works. Cannon landed after 13:00 and the first fire conducted in the 16:15 at the machine-gun nest near Colleville. Due to problems with communications and management of the fire also was their last event of the day. 6 self-propelled guns M7 62. armored field artillery battalion, which failed to get to the beach during the morning, they landed between 15:00 and 18:30, two more were lost. The battery has moved 200 feet inland, but so far has not opened fire. The rest of the battalion (8 M7) landed in sector Fox Green at dusk and proceeded towards Colleville. 58. armored field artillery battalion lost during the early attempts of landing 5 howitzers, the rest landed around noon, and around 18:00 supported 115. infantry battalion during the procedure by the St. Laurent. 32. battalion field artillery landed in the evening and took position to the northeast from St. Laurent. This unit lost 2 cannons on the sea and 25 vehicles during the landing (some of which was eventually saved), along with 28 men. With the upcoming nights were in the sector of Omaha part 5 artillery battalions, but their loss was composed of 26 works and a large part of the additional equipment. In addition to the one task ground artillery hit in the fighting in the outback. Similarly, two anti-aircraft battalions, which had to wait for the next dawn to begin my journey into the heart of France.

Organization of the beaches was still in its infancy. The main artery to the northeast from St. Laurent was thrombosed vehicles and equipment of all kinds. The beach in front of exit E-1 was přecpána equipment and messes that piled up in the morning still complicate the situation in many places. Paramedics could not build its facilities in the inland, supplies were waiting for the erection of warehouses and the "lost" groups of soldiers trying to find their services. Men with coming nights buried, where they could, some even in the sand and on the slopes above the beach. In the whole space of the shallow bridgehead, then a barrage sniping evoked a heated response from the Americans. Something like týlová area yet existed.

End of D-day at Omaha

The attack in the sector of OMAHA succeeded, but it was harder than expected. Small groups during the morning, reached from the beaches, not enough force to penetrate more inland. The delay in the disposal of the resistance around the exits from the beaches of the delay in reinforcements, the artillery and supplies. Tough resistance of the defenders of the restricted procedure of the Allies on the area no more than 2 km inland at Colleville and even less on the west by the St. Laurent. This area should be according to the original plans state the occipital areas, but during the night on the 7th. 6. it was a bridgehead in contact with the enemy. Disembarkation was continued under artillery fire from inland.

Infantry got to the beach, despite all the difficulties in the scale in which they were scheduled - to-dusk was in the area of 5 regiments. Artillery lags behind schedule, as well as the logistics - of the planned 2400 tons of supplies intended for the landing on D-day at the beach received only about 100 tons. The supply of ammunition was in critical condition and in operation to maintain only the fact that the beach got 90 out of 110 loaded DUKW. To the right of the beach was just beginning to organize, and it was noticeable that even here there will be further delays.

Records units of that day are sketchy and losses of men and equipment cannot be determined exactly. The first loss estimates were high because they included a number of "missing persons" who have landed in other parts of the beach, away from their units and stay away from them separated for the next two or three days. Losses In. the corps were estimated at 3,000 dead, wounded and missing. Two of the attacking regiments (the 16th RCT, and the 116th RCT) have lost each of about 1000 soldiers. The highest percentage of loss should the unit vyloďující in the early hours of the morning, including engineers, tank drivers and artillery.

Whether on the sea or on the beach, loss of equipment were high. 26 works, more than 50 tanks have been lost. Losses of trucks and the material they are incomplete - for example, the 4042nd Quartermaster Truck Company on the shore got only 13 of the original 35 dvouapůltunových trucks, but such the loss was higher than average.

The navy reported the loss of 50 landing barges, 10 larger vessels and damage to a much larger set of vessels.

The main cause of losses was the unexpectedly high strength of the defenders in sector - during the morning managed to capture the soldiers not only 726. infantry regiment, but also of all 3 regiments 352. infantry division (914., 915. and 916. the regiment). During may, when on the peninsula of the Cotentin moved 91. division and into the area of Caen 21. panzer division and the German 7. the army strengthened its defenses between the rivers Orne and Vire. 352. infantry division, moved from the area of St. Lo, took over the sector from Isigny after area east from Bayeux. Unit 726. infantry regiment apparently remained in their positions and were supplemented by the men 352. infantry division. Defensive positions were fully occupied, the backup teams were available for certain weapons and near the beach there were other units capable to engage in defense. Part 352. infantry division fought against the British at Bayeux and 915. infantry regiment during the D-day assigned to Caen. Artillery, which postřelovalo the beach, probably belonged to the divisional artillery 352. division - 4 battalions.

Even with regard to the strength of the German defense, it is surprising that the Germans during the day they come on the counter-attack, apparently due to loss of control and connection between the units, air and artillery bombardment of the Allies. In particular, during the morning of the beaches act only a small group of american soldiers without the aid of artillery would counter-attack unit in the strength of the battalion at Colleville or Vierville certainly pushed the Allies back to the beach. The German force is rozdrolila to the defense in small groups, which failed to make more than just slow down the american advance. German troops have been deployed gradually, often mixed (for example, unit 915. the regiment were identified on the Omaha, east of Bayeux and near Isigny) and there were no indications of the aggressive defense according to the German tactical doctrine. The more that 352. infantry division was the offensive department, whose strike was expected the second day of disembarkation. His commitment to the defense of the beach and the area just behind her though made it hard for the actual landing, but did not reach any of the defense's success. In. the choir then weathered a severe crisis, and its success can be measured differently, than just the size of the conquered territory. 352. infantry division was consumed in defense and the Germans lost the unit for a possible counter-attacks at a time when it was the american beachhead still vulnerable. The next few days should show whether it was a 352. the division used wisely, or not. The delay at Omaha without deployment of enemy reserves to the counterattack meant nothing in the end.

Another factor was the complete absence of the German air force over the area and complete allied air superiority. Of course, one can imagine what it would mean for the man on the beach, arriving boats and equipment, if above the beach appeared aircraft of the Luftwaffe. Nothing like this has happened. Evening air raid 22 bomber aircraft on the ships before the beaches not scored a single hit and the Germans on 3 machines here. But the Allies had the air force over the beaches throughout the day (and days following). 8. air army after the bombing prior to the landings focused on the isolation of the whole area, and the second mission of the day, made 1264 heavy bombers, took aim at transport hubs from Brittany after the Seine. Similarly, 9. air army dispatched during the day to air 1011 aircraft, some for the second time. Her fighter-bombers during the day they tried to eliminate the enemy artillery between Isigny and Bayeux, near Maisy and Gefosse-Fontenay. The british tactical air force has implemented 2489 take-offs.




Summary



Omaha has become a symbol of the entire landing and certainly in today's view into the history of the overshadowed combat in other sectors of the allied landing. The americans have landed in extremely difficult conditions, against a well prepared enemy, in a hail of machine gun fire, through booby-trapped obstacles, often in the wrong place and the first minutes on the beach were for those who managed to get out of the landing boats, hell on earth. Units lost half their men, of the many boats barely saved by a few individuals and it seemed that the american landing force in this sector will drown in the blood. Still shaken and tired, the men found the courage and fighting spirit, to let themselves be shot in the advancing tide, and within a few hours broke through the Hitler years, built the Atlantic wall. Today, quiet stretch of beach full of holiday cottages between Vierville and Colleville will forever remain registered under the name of Bloody Omaha. Omaha remains the subject of huge interest and media coverage, unfortunately, not always in a positive sense - the tendency to constantly dramatize and exaggerate is clearly evident - hence the need for the loss of Americans on that day to look with a certain passage - Omaha was the bloodiest battle in american history, another american procedure into the land of the living bushes towards St. Lo is the cost per day 1200 men, and the loss of so many did not differ from those that suffered the departments in Omaha.

Omaha so it will remain a monument of human determination and the gateway, which after a number of days streamed by the allied forces into Normandy, to engage in offensive against hitlerovskému Germany..
URL : https://www.valka.cz/Operace-Neptune-t125802#508977Version : 0
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5.5 UTAH BEACH[/heading:aaaaaa]


Planning, targets, terrain



In the context of planning the operations of the allied armies in France it was necessary to ensure adequate supply, and therefore one of the main objectives of the landing as part of operation Neptune was to ensure the port Cherbourg. The american amphibious landing party on the beach of UTAH and in air-dropped in the rear should ensure in addition to cover the side of the invading forces even the fastest possible progress towards the Cherbourg and cleanup of the peninsula of the Cotentin from the German units.

In addition to the soldiers of the German army were to stand vyloďujícím the armies of nature itself in the form of two flows - the river Douve and its main tributary, the river merderet River. Rivers and their wetlands during the high tide find themselves below sea level, and so if the open gates on the river at la Barquette north of Carentan, there would be flooding and the cutting off of the peninsula of the Cotentin from the rest of Normandy, with the exception of the routes through the Carentan and Pont l'abbe in the east and a narrow strip of country between Saint-Lô-d'Ourville and Saint-Sauveur-de-Pierrepont in the west. It was therefore necessary to occupy these areas, to ensure coverage of the left wing and the rear of the units advancing north towards the Cherbourg and at the same time ensure these key points as paths out of a cut of the peninsula.

The area of the eastern coast of the peninsula of the Cotentin between the mouth of the river Douve and the areas Quineville was artificially flooded with zahrazením the mouth of the streams in the areas of the beaches, so the whole area parallel with the beach to a depth of 2-3 km was up to a few narrow passages very poorly permeable, which recorded the defenders.

The actual Utah beach, east of the city Sainte-Mère-Église, is without significant field of inequalities, unlike neighboring OMAHA beach. In length of approximately 10 km along the beaches of UTAH pulls the wall at the rate of 1-2 meters, in many places buried windblown sand from the beach. The top of the wall was secured with barbed wire and passages in places where the wall intersect each path leading to the beach, were blocked. Behind the wall continued to the sandy dunes, 3-6 feet high, in width from 150 to 1000 meters. Behind them followed the flooded area.

The beach and its exits so she could defend relatively few sizeable force of defenders.

From the beginning of the year 1944 in connection with the visit of field marshal Erwin Rommel, responsible for the defense of the region, has increased dramatically building defense elements along this beach, so the attackers waited a number of obstacles towards the sea, from the stakes and barriers (usually mined) through the iron ("Czech") hedgehogs until after the "Belgian gates".


Field marshal Erwin Rommel in February 1944, for inspection in Normandy
Source : Bundesarchiv, Bild 101I-719-0206-13



Beyond the tide then was built a number of concrete forts, tank turrets mounted on concrete foundations, okopů for mortars, trenches, and underground shelters. Defensive position complement the barbed wire, mines and anti-tank ditches. Concrete strength often hid light artillery. The strongest fortified point was les Dunes de Varreville, directly against the planned beach "green" objectives 1. battalion 8. regiment of infantry. Yet they were the lynchpin of the infantry significantly weaker and less frequent, than their counterparts on OMAHA beach - here the defenders relied on the properties and impermeability of the terrain behind the beach. Along the roads to the beaches were buried infantry equipped with automatic weapons and approximately 3 km inland, were the batteries of the coastal and field artillery, in Crisbecqu and St. Martin-de-Varreville.


German units, commanders



The defense of UTAH beach fell within the sector of the German 7. army under the command was to hold Friedrich Dollmanna. According to initial information, allied to the survey should be on the peninsula of the Cotentin located units of two German divisions, and it 709. infantry division and 243. infantry division.

709. infantry division was deployed along the coast of the peninsula, the two regiments (729. infantry regiment and the 919. infantry regiment) formed the crew of the forts along the beaches. In June 1944 were two of the eleven battalions of the division occupied by the troops rekrutovanými of Russian prisoners (a total of 1784 men) and one battalion of Georgia (333 subjects). The division was in addition weakened and by recruiting from the ranks of the Poles from the occupied areas annexed in 1939 to Germany. The average age of men was 36 years and the martial value of such a division was also according to her commander, hardly worthy of the key deployment. Despite this, however, should the division of tabulating a high state with 12 360 men and filled all 11 infantry battalions, according to a new model of 1944 (compared to 9 earlier). The divisional artillery consisted of three battalions, one was equipped with a French and czechoslovakian guns, the second French, the third then by the soviet. The anti-tank defense of the division was to be available 12 towed 75-mm guns and 9 75mm self-propelled tank destroyers. Tank support to ensure the Tank section 101, a training unit of the weakly-armed tank destroyers Panzerjäger 35R - improvisation based on French chassis Renault R-35 and the czechoslovak 47mm anti-tank gun. The division was initially stationed along the coast in the length of almost 240 km, but with the advent of 243. infantry division in may 1944, this heavily guarded stretch of the shortened "only" at about 100 km from Utah beach to Cherbourg.

As summed up in his report general Marcks ' , "were these units equipped with weapons from all periods 20. century, some of the units barely dvoukilometrové line were equipped with mortars, 4 different calibers of German, French, Italian and Russian provenance. Number of units has not been fully armed, in the area of Carentan was not difficult to find artillery fortifications without artillery, ammunition dumps without ammunition, minefields without the mines and among the large number of men in uniform will hardly find a soldier."


243. infantry division has been deployed further away from the beaches, behind the troops 709. infantry division, and its aim was to defend the western part of the peninsula.

716. infantry division and 352. infantry division, located east and south of the Cotentinu, should not be according to reports of intelligence capable of hitting the offensive units of the us VII corps.

The allies on the basis of reports from reconnaissance and intelligence estimated that the enemy will be able to solid defense of the beaches, manning the coastal fortifications by units 709. infantry division and a number of artillery and anti-aircraft formations, further strengthening the 709. infantry division in the field of allied attack units 243. infantry division immediately upon the initiation of the attack, opotřebovávacích counter-attack force of 4 battalions during D-day and coordinated counter-attack with motorizovanými and armored reinforcements coming from areas outside the peninsula, at any time during the two days after D-day.

About ten days before the actual landings, the Allies found that the distribution of forces on the peninsula Cotentin even changed the arrival 91. (glider) infantry division into field Carentan - Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte - Valognes. The division should consist of two to three regiments and one battalion of tanks. 243. infantry division was to move more to the west, while 91. infantry division took up positions in the rear of 709. infantry division. Task 91. infantry division was apparently to strengthen the defense of the eastern part of the peninsula from the Carentan after Valognes. These three divisions were part of the * law lxxxiv. army corps, under which fall even more troops to the east of the peninsula of the Cotentin. The arrival of 91. the division was a surprise and disrupted the original plan VII. army corps, which forced them to change the target of the attack 82. airborne division.


Allied units, commanders




Plan of attack



The plan of operations of the us VII. army corps was issued 27. march 1944. Its main objective, derived from the tactical aspects of the terrain Cotentinu, it was cutting off the whole of the peninsula of the Cotentin as a prerequisite for the procedure to Cherbourg.

[map]8[/map]
Sectors of Utah beach and drop zone operations Albany and Boston - using the mouse you can enlarge and move around

The original plan počital with the fact that 101. airborne division the land southeast of the Sainte-Mère-Église, destroy the bridges in the vicinity of Carentan, and occupy the crossings over the river Douve at Pont l'abbe and Beuzeville-la Bastille and will cover the south wing of the VII. army corps east of the Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte

82. the airborne division had jumped to the west from Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte and block access to German reinforcements to the area Cotentinu in the western part of the peninsula.

This plan had to be redone, as soon as he was in the second half of may detected movement of the German 91. (glider) infantry division to the area. Reinforcements to the Germans to better face up to how the actual landing, so these new units Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte meant a threat for the allied airborne units in the area. Unit vyloďující on the beaches now had to as quickly as possible to occupy a secure bridgehead, to reflect the German counter-attacks. The same importance has the cast of Carentan and the prevention of the destruction of the gates on the river, cutting off the eastern approaches to the area of the landing and keeping of the Germans from the opportunity to drive a wedge between the VII. Utah and . army corps at Omaha.

Major general Joseph L. Collins a change in the situation on the peninsula learned 27. may 1944, when telephoned to the headquarters of general Omar Bradley in Bristol and he was advised to make changes in the plan of the attack of the two american airborne divisions.

82. 101. airborne division should be under the command of 1. army during the preparations the whole operation up to the moment when they find themselves in Normandy. Major general Matthew B. Ridgway and major general Maxwell D. Taylor, as the commanders of these divisions, therefore, have received initial information directly from the staff 1. army. But because both divisions should go under the command of the VII. army corps, general Bradley agreed to staff general Collins has worked closely in the detailed planning of the whole operation.

At a meeting in Bristol 27. 5. 1944 proposed staff 1. the army, that the two airborne divisions were planted east of the river merderet River - 101. airborne division south and east of the Sainte-Mère-Église, 82. the airborne division, then as close as possible to the city. After studying the documents suggested by general Collins less pronounced change of plan - 82. the airborne division should be dropped between the merderet River and the Douve, in essence, to the north of Pont l'abbe, while the plan 101. airborne division should remain unchanged. 82. the airborne division should be in a good position not only to capture the crossings over the river merderet River at la Fiere and Chef-du-Pont, but also the crossings over the river Douve more to the west in the near Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte and Sainte-Colombe.

After further study of the maps but it was found that because of the densely overgrown and wooded areas between the River and the Douve, and the lack of sections for the safe landing of the gliders will not be possible in areas west of the river merderet River to ship the whole 82. airborne division. The final decision therefore sounded, to split the away team into two parts, one airborne regiment was to jump off on the east side of the river, and two regiments then on the side of the west.

When these changes were completed, the soldiers of the infantry divisions already were on their way to shromaždištím to embark in the English ports. The amended plan touched them, even changed the overall goal VII. army corps. Field order no. 1, 28. may 1944 states : "VII. the army corps will attack at the beach Utah D-day at H-hour and without delay to occupy the port of Cherbourg". Emphasis was also placed on the security of the area north of the river Douve and east of the river merderet River, to the landing beach couldn't be compromised. The downside of the plan was leaving an open passage in the western part of the among the Saint-Lô-d'Ourville and Saint-Sauveur-de-Pierrepontwhich was necessary to eventually close down. Changes in the plan but should ensure the initial stage, and thus support the successful achievement of all other goals.

According to the revised plan had 82. airborne division to cover the western corner of the bridgehead using a cast Sainte-Mère-Église and creating a wide bridgehead over the river merderet River on the two main roads of the Sainte-Mère-Église, to facilitate the procedure towards Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte

101. airborne division should clear the way obojživelnému drop the cast of the western exits from the beaches - 4 roads leading through the floodplains. At the same time, should provide a defensive position along the northern and southern corner of the zone of landing and create a bridgehead over the river Douve for further progress in a southerly direction to Carentan, with the aim to connect with In. the army corps.

Target 4. infantry division, 90. infantry division and 9. infantry division remained nezměneny. 4. infantry division as the main unit of the amphibious landing on the beach of UTAH, has been extended by a number of affiliated units, inter alia, of the 87th Chemical Mortar Battalion (translate), 1106. engineer combat group, 801. a battalion of tank destroyers and one battery from the 980. field artillery battalion (155mm guns), then the units of anti-aircraft artillery and a section of the 13th Field Artillery Observation Battalion (translate). 4. infantry division had to land in the hour H, create a beachhead, and then proceed towards Cherbourg, in cooperation with the 90. infantry division, which was to land on D-day+1. 359. regimental combat team 90. infantry division was supposed to land on D-day as the affiliated to the 4. infantry division and operate in the northeast region of the landing, then again to switch back to 90. infantry division after the entry into force ashore. 9. infantry division should disembark on D-day+4 and create a backup of the corps in the field of Orglandes for towing to the northwest of the peninsula.

Modified field order of 28. may 1944 still counted with the temporary extension of VII. army corps of 79. infantry division, which should start landing on D-day+8 and as a further insurance policy contained a even speed up the landing of two battalions (188. and 951.) 155mm howitzers for three days. 1. special engineer brigade was entrusted with the organisation and implementation of all coastal installations on a landing beach to ensure a quick and organized the passage of the beaches for vyloďující units, security of supply, evacuation of wounded and the local security.

In time the H-2 hours should be section of the 4th Cavalry Group (translate) to land on the island of Iles St. Marcouf and to occupy and destroy any objects that could be used to breach the landing.

Landing VII. army corps should be preceded by intense naval and air bombardment of enemy positions on the landing beaches. The allied air force carried out a massive bombing of the railways and the bases of the German air force. Air strikes on the coastal fortifications were established on day D-4 to maximum security instead of the future of the landing, but in the end from them was ustoupeno and more raids were directed into the area of the Pas de Calais as the false direction. When during the D-day there has been massive attack in the area of UTAH beach, in order to destroy the fortifications, to demoralize the defenders and disrupt the possibility of a transfer and the connection of enemy units. Around midnight of 5. 6. June, bombers of the RAF attacked the known position of coastal batteries Crisbecq and Saint-Martin-de-Varrevilleshortly before the hour H, then the medium bombers 9. air army attacked the battery on the beach of UTAH and in the eastern direction. 9. army aviation at the same time provide cover to the ships of the přesouvajícím through the Channel, and one squadron of fighter-bombers was in the emergency room over the beaches of UTAH during the landing. After an hour, H was to support the vyloďujících to units during their advance inland ready Tactical Air Forces (translate).

Naval shelling ensures the Task Foce 125, divided into two groups - support and bombing. In the bomber group was 1 battleship, 5 cruisers, 8 destroyers and 3 fighters submarines, divided into 5 clusters. In class H-40 minutes should these ships open fire on enemy emplacements on the beach and installation, which could threaten ships in the landing party. Support group, consisting of 33 vessels equipped similarly, rocket launchers and artillery, should ensure close fire support from positions close to the landing beaches. In the hour H then had a marine firing move on to targets further inland on the basis of the requirements of the units of fire control.


Units are moving forward



Allied soldiers who passed through during April and may a series of exercises, from the second week in may 1944 started to move into assembly points in the south of England, where he added all the equipment, supplies, secure their vehicles against the water, and prepare to be boarded. 1-2. June 1944 then began the final phase, moving to ports in south Devon and Cornwall and embarkation. Due to the greater distance they had to offend the ships towards the beach of UTAH compared to the other beaches, with some parts out of a total of 12 convoys Task Force With embarked on a journey already 3. June, and a report on the displacement of the landing compared to the original term 5. June by one day it caught on the seas. The ship turned back into its ports, and nearly 250 landing craft and vessels, fire support has landed in the bay area of Weymouth Bay and the isle of Portland. 5. June in the morning then the dawning of a new formation of the convoys and without major problems the fleet arrived to the area about 22 km from the landing beaches. Minesweepers 14. and 16. the fleet have cleared the way zaminovanými the waters and called them the red and green buoys. In 2:29 in the morning 6. June 1944 launched the flagship of the Task Force At USS Bayfield (APA-33) anchor on učeném place, and more ships docked according to plan. USS Bayfield and USS Barnett (APA-5) were carrying troops for the beach, Uncle Red Beach, the USS Joseph T. Dickman (APA-13)and SS Empire Gauntlet then the soldiers for the beach Tare Green.

H-hour was set at 6:30 in the morning, 6. June 1944.

Landing



At 3:09 picked up the invasion fleet, the German radars, and the admiral Kranke gave the order to was attacked and bounced, but the German naval activity in the area remained at its minimum. Two of the fleet of torpedo boats out of Cherbourg had to return before dawn for the crews sea.

At 4:30 in the morning (the hour H-2) detachments of the 4th and 24th Cavalry Squadron under the command of lieutenant colonel E. C. Dunn landed on the island of St. Marcouf to occupy this outpost, but the island was empty, except for a dense minefield, which together with the German artillery fire claimed 2 dead and 17 injured. 132 soldiers completed the cast of the island at 5:30.

In the meantime, began the embarkation of the troops to the small boat, awaiting the instruction to sort and to attack.

At 5:05 began to fire the German batteries on the ships on the horizon. The battery of the Morsalines, because of the allied bombing moved on the open ground near Videcosville, equipped with the French houfnicemi of 155 mm caliber, attacked minolovku, for which she received the reply from the works of the destroyers HMS Black Prince. The battery of the Marcouf was shelling the destroyers USS Corry and USS Fitch. In an effort to avoid artillery fire drove the USS Corry on a mine, whose explosion it broke in two parts. The battery will gradually come under fire destroyers USS Fitch, USS Hobson, later then a cruiser USS Quincy battleship USS Nevada. The battery in the morning, lost the first gun, the second followed in 15:57 and the third at 18:30 on D-day.

At 5:50 (H-40 minutes) of combat ships of Task Force 125 opened fire on the coast. A few minutes (6:05-6:24) later joined by 269 bombers [url=https://www.valka.cz/topic/view/3005/9-letecka-armada-1942-1945]9. air army, dropped 525 tons of 250liberních pum on 7 goals at Utah in the area between the Dunes de Varreville, and Beau Guillot. About a third of the bombs fell in the area of beach between the highest and lowest tide. The pilots decided to descend which, under the prescribed flight level, and so the bombardment was much more effective than in the area of OMAHA beach, where the bombers remained above the clouds and bombed a blind date. The other 33 planes dropped 47 tons of bombs on the German artillery batteries near Grandcamp-Maisy and Géfosse-Fontenay.

As soon as the landing boats were in motion, 33 variously equipped with vessels began shelling the area of the beach. 17 boats equipped with missile launchers set off their rockets, while the landing boats close to 600 meters from the shore.

At 4:55 with the main and secondary control vessels for the beach Green and the main control vessel for the beach, Red broke away from the main union and headed towards the beach. Secondary control vessel for the beach, Red but damaged the propeller on the buoy and could not join the others. About an hour later, still nearly 7,000 yards from the shore and with nabraným a delay of 10-15 minutes compared to the plan, suddenly sank the main control vessel for the beach Red, probably after hitting a mine. Shortly thereafter, and LCT for central management by a vessel for the beach Green hit a mine and sunk. Procedure to the beaches is lagged against the plan, and the sinking of these ships other even more slowed down. Secondary control vessel for the beach Green then turned around and signalled to lead the dd tanks to a beach. Ships LCT carrying dd tanks had to plant 5000 meters from the shore, but to save time, the boundary was shifted at 3000 meters (another source lists the 1300 m) from the shore, there were also tanks running on water.

The first wave consisted of 20 LCVP's, each ship was carrying 30členný team 8. infantry regiment 4. infantry division. 10 vessels the right is supposed to land on Tare Green at the fortifications in les Dunes de Varreville. 10 vessels left then went to Uncle Red, about 1000 meters south. The whole operation was timed according to the landing of the first wave, which should occur at 6:30. 8 LCT ships, each carrying 4 tanks Sherman DD 70. tank battalion, should disembark at the same time, or in the shortest possible time thereafter. These tanks, however, the events on the beaches too failed to take action, on the beach were about 10 minutes after the disembarkation of infantry, 1 tank hit a mine and sank, a total of 4 of the 32 tanks made it ashore.

The second wave consisting of 32 LCVP carrying additional infantry, engineers and 8 teams for underwater demolition, which should clear the beach of underwater obstacles.

The third wave was to land in the hour H+15 minutes and included 8 LCT ships with tanks equipped with radlicemi.

In time H+17 should follow the fourth wave, consisting mainly of soldiers, 237. and 299. the engineer battalion, whose mission was to clear the beach between the highest and lowest tide.

The first wave arrived according to plan and while the supporting rules trying to fire from the machine guns hit the mines, LCVP boats about 300 meters from the beach, signaled, to support the vessel moved the fire further inland. Almost to the minute exactly then triggered the ramps and 600 men went waist-deep in water for the last 100 meters towards the beach. The German artillery fired several rounds at sea, but otherwise not to any significant resistance.

The first soldiers on the shore belonged to the 2. battalion 8. infantry regiment, 1. the battalion landed a few minutes later. Both battalions were on the beach further south than originally planned. 2. the battalion had to disembark at gate 3, 1. the battalion then directly against les Dunes de Varreville, but both found themselves at the exit 2, about 1800 metres in a southerly direction. Both control boats beach Red were discarded, one of the control vessels for the beach Green back to the LCT to us to go along the DD tanks, so that the whole landing was the only ship. The chance for error to increase as well as a strong current, smoke and explosions on the beaches after the allied shelling and bombing just before the landing of the first troops.


View of the beach, where they landed unit facing on Tare Green (Photo Admin 2014)

A shift in the site of the landing of the situation on the beach of UTAH too complicated, on the contrary - instead of two enemy fortified points against each other should the Allies only one, largely ruined inside the artillery and air bombardment. Brigadier general Theodore Roosevelt Jr., the oldest son of president Theodore Roosevelt, assistant commander of the 4. infantry division, present among the first men on the beach UTAH, volunteered to coordinate the initial phase of the attack on the various fortifications, than to invade regimental commander, colonel van Fleet. When he found out that there has been a shift in the area of the landing, itself carried out a survey of the area behind the beach and located the exits from the beach to progress into the outback. Then he returned to the beach, contacted the commander of the two battalions, lieutenant colonels Conrad C. Simmons and Carlton O. MacNeelyho, and coordinated the attack on the enemy positions. Famous became the general's statement We'll start the war from right here! - War, therefore, we start here !


View of the beach where disembarked units pointing to Uncle Red (Photo Admin 2014)

Cleaning beaches from the min and inhibition was the task of the special engineer group Beach Obstacle Task Force under the command of major Herschela E. Linna from 1106. engineer combat group. His men, members of 237. engineer combat battalion, were to land immediately with the soldiers of the 8. infantry regiment and start to clean four 50metrové stripes on the beaches from the locations of the highest tide further inland, while the marine engineers were supposed to clear the obstacles in the tidal zone and under water. On the shore helped with the removal of eight tanks with radlicemi from the 612th Light Equipment Company and 70. tank battalion.

The engineers, despite the shift in the area of the landing and the loss of land simultaneously with the infantry and from their LCVP and LCM wading through the meter deep water, each laden with 30 kilograms of explosives. Aerial reconnaissance showed three bands of underwater obstacles, and because the landing was scheduled for the beginning of the influx, which should assist in landing the boats in the approach to the beach, it was expected that the first band of obstacles will be on the edge of the water. It turns out, however, that all obstacles were high and dry. Maritime teams according to the original plan adopted to destroy the underwater obstacles, while ground engineers focused on cleaning up the warning on the landing beaches. Once this strip has been cleaned, it was decided that it would be cleaned the entire beach - landing vessels have trouble staying in defined corridors and obstacles were spaced much more sparsely, than expected.

Major Linn and the commander 237. engineer combat battalion, major R. P. Tabb had planned to drive the course of action of your M-29 Weasel, but because the vessel of major Linna was sunk and Weasel major Tabb sank when leaving the landing boat, they had to get the commanders to move to the beach, where they teamed up with general Roosevelt.

Bulldozers have helped to open the barriers on the beaches, hand-placed explosives to take care of the rest. On the beaches was found relatively few mines, most were attached to the obstacles. The belgian gate blocked the exits from the beaches and a few roads to the inland, but 4 backup teams of engineers from the beaches of Green is destroyed, and continue to create the passages in the wall along the beach.

While they did the cleaning of the beaches, part of the 87th Chemical Mortar Battalion, 3rd. battalion 8. infantry regiment and 3. battalion 22. infantry regiment is moving into the hinterland, the engineer unit on the beach then organise the disembarkation of the additional material and units.

The Beach Obstacle Task Force needed to accomplish a task only a few hours and around noon took place the reorganization and the preparation for other tasks. Unit during the landing lost 6 dead and 39 injured, out of 400 deployed soldiers.

Cleaning the beaches was not the only task of the royal engineers, one platoon of engineers was always assigned to each assault platoon 8. infantry regiment, their goal was to overcome obstacles of barbed wire and odminovávat trip to the outback. When these tasks are fulfilled, they continued the combat engineers to fight as infantry and advanced against the fortified points.

When the enemy artillery started shelling east of beach no. 2, the soldiers continued across the field towards the south and connected on the road parallel with the coast, head back to the exit 2 south of la Madeleine. The fields behind the beaches was often mined, but all had to be first explored by the engineers.



Procedure to the outback




While combat engineers prepared the beaches for the passage of additional equipment and troops, 1. and 2. battalion 8. infantry regiment continued in its amended mission. As soon as Roosevelt and the commanders of the battalion realized the mistake in the area of the landing, it was decided that it will be immediately launched the procedure into the interior to the original objectives.

Directly in front of the soldiers 1. the battalion was the fortification in and around la Madeleine, while about 1300 meters to the southeast, south of east no. 2, standing in the procedure 2. battalion of the other fortifications. This field fortification was usually gone unit about the size of a company, the resistance was weak and some of the defenders, demoralized preparatory bombing and bombardment, surrendered without firing a shot. Other soldiers then searched the houses along the road leading parallel to the beach.

Two to three hours were lost by the liquidation of resistance on the beaches and regrouping of units for advance into the interior. The way the two battalions then broke up - 1. the battalion had been moved to the north and into the hinterland of east no. 3, 2. the battalion continued down the coast to the east of no. 1. By the time they brought the next wave of infantry. Around 7:45 (hour H+75 minutes) landed 3. battalion 22. infantry regiment on the beach of the Green and started moving north along the coast with a view to dispose of the other support points. 3. battalion 8. infantry regiment landed at the same time on the beach Red and progressed into the hinterland of the east no. 2. At 8:00 were in the area of Utah already 4 battalions of infantry. Two more were to follow around 10:00 - 1. battalion 22. infantry regiment in the northern sector and 2. battalion 22. infantry regiment in the southern part. According to the plan should these two battalions to advance into the inland through gate 4. However, because he was the eastern end of the east still in range of German soldiers, and the exits to the south were clogged, had to some soldiers 22. infantry regiment wading through the almost 3 km through the flooded area. Unit 12. infantry regiment, which landed shortly after noon, also passed through the flooded area. The water was waist-deep, but the area was full of holes and trenches in which soldiers succumbing to, and often disappearing completely under the water. Because the targets 22. infantry regiment were located to the northeast in the direction of St. Germain-de-Varreville, had soldiers go through exit no. 3 and walk through the swamps. Along the way they met the rear vanguard 8. infantry regiment, which by this time was moving down the road towards the west.

That wasn't the only inconvenience in transport, caused by a shift in the area of the landing. The original traffic plan was for vehicles using exits 2 and 3. East no. 3 but could not be used, because it was still in range of enemy units to the north, so all vehicles tried to use exit no. 2. 3. battalion 8. infantry regiment, supported by tanks 70. tank battalion and the engineers 237. engineer combat battalion, started the procedure after the road east no. 2. Roughly in the middle of the road, the soldiers ran into an obstacle - the bridge across the creek was blown into the air and the road was postřelována anti-tank cannon from somewhere to the right. The first tank hit a mine, the second tank got hit with a antitank cannon, up to a third of the tank is managed to the enemy's nest silence and the soldiers could proceed. Major Tabb summoned a platoon of engineers to cross the creek they built a makeshift bridge.

Meanwhile, on the beaches began to collect a large amount of techniques, despite the German shelling. Around noon was east no 2 fully obstructed by freight cars fanning out to the hinterland. At noon, general Barton in fear before a German tank counter-attack ordered the road to release for anti-tank weapons, even if it means to squeeze out part of the technique to the swamps around the path.

After the conquest of the coastal fortifications to 1. battalion 8. infantry regiment moved north and west along the way to the exit no 3. Despite the enemy artillery fire, american troops crossed the flooded area and into the evening had progressed to Turqueville.

3. the battalion proceeded to the west from exit no. 2, without ran into significant resistance, to the area north of St. Marie-du-Mont, where he came across the German trenches, dugouts, and three or four 88mm cannons. After a short firefight with a hundred of the German defenders surrendered, the other fifty is rozuteklo. Night survived the battalion north of Les Forges. Company K took up positions further to the left, send one squad to the Chef-du-Pont make contact with 82. apa divisions.

2. the battalion set off to the south toward Pouppeville. His commander, colonel MacNeely, was to land at H+30 minutes, but decided to land earlier and at that time the soldiers of company F went forward. E company discovered a path through the minefield, and despite the artillery fire passed through without loss. Colonel MacNeely took control of his troops, and because F company was still occupied with the liquidation of enemy resistance in front of her, sent MacNeely E company further along the path along the eastern counties flooded areas. Company G is also simply pushed on south along the coastal breakwater. Both of the company after all the time face fire from small arms, close to the fortifications at Beau Guillot against G company joined and artillery fire. The company also found itself in a minefield, but continued to advance. The battalion was again assembled at the junction of the roads northeast of Pouppeville and started the procedure to the village where they made contact with troops of the 501st. paradesatního infantry regiment, specifically his 3. banner.

The banner that went around some other enemy positions on the southern tip of the area flooded, including the positions around the floodgates north of Grand Vey. This sluice was originally the objective of the company G-8. infantry regiment, but was finally occupied by the company And 49. engineer combat battalion, which during the occupation of captured 125 enemy soldiers.

2. battalion 8. infantry regiment of Pouppeville darted away to the west and on the night he buried the south from the crossroads at les Forges.

Units 8. infantry regiment managed to achieve the objectives for D-day. Connected with soldiers 101. airborne division in the Pouppeville and ensure the south west wing 4. infantry division. Only in the area north of les Forges in the area between the Fauville and Turqueville ran into significant resistance. The germans here were dug along the embankment, cut the road between les Forges and Sainte-Mère-Église and prevent contact between 8. infantry regiment and the main part of the 82. airborne division in Sainte-Mère-Église. The germans during the day under the pressure of attack 505. paradesatního infantry regiment withdrew and dug in around the Fauville.

In the late afternoon passed through the Exitem 2 the first units of the "Howell Force" (consisting of soldiers from 325. kluzákového infantry regiment and 746. tank battalion), associated to 82. airborne division, under the command of colonel E.D. Raffa along with them then 3. battalion 8. infantry regiment. The unit should meet with 82. apa divisions in Sainte-Mère-Église. When the soldiers of the 8. infantry regiment came under enemy fire, they asked for artillery support and the procedure is stopped. The colonel Raff but he decided to break through and accomplish the mission - he was worried about the fate of the artillery units, which were to transport gliders in the area at 21:00. The americans twice tried to storm the German positions. When the first attack came about one tank, in the second attack then the other two. The germans failed to push out, when according to the schedule at 21:00 appeared 60 aircraft with gliders in tow. Despite strong enemy fire most of the glider to release, a part of them landed directly on enemy positions, some more south, but most of them had a hard landing and the casualties were high. Colonel Raff was able to collect only a small group of soldiers and create the night's defense against enemy counterattacks. At les Forges then spent the night.

The other two regiments of the [url=https://www.valka.cz/topic/view/137/4-data-division-Ivy]4. infantry division
your goal did not meet. The soldiers of the 12. infantry battalion to pass a flood the territory, to found themselves to the left of 502. paradesatního infantry regiment south of Beuzeville-au-Plain, and there spend the night.

1. and 2. battalion 22. infantry regiment also had to go to the outback to ford and spent the entire seven hours in the boggy terrain, before he got on the dry ground nearby Saint-Martin-de-Varreville and started the procedure St. Germain-de-Varreville, where they spent the night. 3. battalion 22. infantry regiment was tasked with taking out enemy positions on the coast. The battalion proceeded north through les Dunes de Varreville and Exit 4, the evening moved on to the southern edge of Hamel de Cruttes.


Summary



Amphibious landings at Utah were due to a number reasons, probably the easiest of the events of D-day. Artillery and air bombardment effectively hit the positions of the defenders and broke even the last will to resist, which, perhaps, a number of non-German troops could have. The shift in the landings to direct american troops to another less defended sections of the beach. The biggest losses so the Americans have caused the mines (anti-personnel and sea) and artillery fire from the batteries in the outback. Even so, amounted to a loss of 8. and 22. infantry regiment only 118 soldiers, of which 12 of them were killed. The entire division had lost 197 men, of which 60 soldiers of battery B, 29. field artillery battalion, was lost at sea. No less positively, we need to evaluate the speed of the landing - with the exception of 20. field artillery battalion was a whole 4. infantry division disembarked within 15 hours, together with one battalion 359. infantry regiment, 87th Chemical Mortar Battalion, 899. battalion of tank destroyers (minus two platoons), 70. and 746. tank battalion, units 1. special engineer brigade and a number of other units. By the end of D-day so the beaches of Utah has passed for 20 thousand troops and 1700 vehicles of all kinds.

The headquarters of the VII. ward in on the action too nezapojovalo, with operations in Utah were managed by the in particular, the lower commander in the field. Vanguard headquarters under the command of major general Eugene M. Landruma has undergone Exitem 2 in the late afternoon, and around seven in the evening set up a command post in the Audouville-la-Hubert, just a few hundred metres from the headquarters of the 4. infantry division. Post had but little control over units in the field and command in battle remained decentralized. Corps commander general Collins remained aboard the USS Bayfield with most of its crew, because the ship had sufficient radio equipment to maintain contact with the headquarters In. corps on OMAHA beach and with general Bradley, whose ship was also closer to OMAHA beach. Bayfield also can receive messages from both airborne divisions and the 4th. infantry division. Collins also oversaw the smooth progress of the landing. When in the evening the admiral Moon decide, whether after the loss of several vessels not to stop the landing operations overnight, Collins convinced him that the landing was continued without interruption.

The situation of commanders on the ground wasn't so simple. Many had no information about other units and this lack of information influenced a number of decisions made that day. The hardest on the course were soldiers 82. and 101. airborne division, scattered in small groups throughout the area, without information about the progress of the landings and during the battle in other parts of the sector.

On board Bayfieldu, but began to miss the good news coming soon - in between 7:00 and 8:00 in the morning he received the Collins report that airborne 101. airborne division able to occupy the Saint-Martin-de-Varrevillearound noon then it occurred to the contact units 4. pedestrian and 101. airborne division, and that the exits from the beaches are secured. Danger the German battery of six 150mm guns for Saint-Martin-de-Varreville so has been avoided, fears of a large resistance at the exits of the beaches also failed to materialize. Perhaps just a lack of information from the 82. airborne division undermines the general belief in the positive development in the sector of UTAH beach. During the evening arrived at the headquarters of the 4. infantry division of the communication that the unit 82. airborne division under fire from the northeast and south, but the report failed to confirm and two-way communication with 82. apa divisions wasn't during the D-day established. The first message arrived to late in the night. Yet, on the basis of good reports from 101. airborne and 4. infantry division Collins felt the need to change the existing plans VII. corps. He was sure that the experienced commanders 82. airborne division copes, than will be the contact established..
URL : https://www.valka.cz/Operace-Neptune-t125802#508979Version : 0
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6.1 CONNECTION of the BEACHES TO ONE of the BRIDGEHEAD[/heading:aaaaaa]

6. June: the merger of the beaches of GOLD and JUNO


As the first to one of the bridgehead come together during the 6. June the area of the beaches of GOLD and JUNO. The british 69. infantry brigade landed on GOLD beach and its 7. green howardský regiment, without resistance, entered the Ver-sur-Mer. Afternoon with the support of artillery freed Crépon and after crossing the river Seulles occupied Creully and Lantheuil. Among the Créponem and Creully regiment Tierceville teamed up with the canadian Royal winnipegským rifle regiment.


Memorial to the Green Howards and Stanley Hollis, Crépon (Photo Admin 2014)

7. June: the connection to the beaches of JUNO and SWORD


Connect 6. June the beaches of JUNO and SWORD failed. During the afternoon, the 7th. June 46. section commandos conquered foothold Petit Enfer. 41. section commandos in the meantime, occupied the Luc-sur-Mer. Part 46. section then over the Luc-sur-Mer surged to La Delivrande that late in the evening after the marine bombing occupied. 8. June morning arrived the rest of the section and there was a cast of Douvres (without the radar station between Douvres and Basly). In the meantime, 7. June closer to the troops from the beaches of SWORD. Jiholancashirský regiment occupied Cresserons and 41. section commandos Lion-sur-Mer.


Monument 41. section commandos in Lion-sur-Mer in the tank Churchill AVRE (Photo Admin 2014)


8. June: the merger of the beaches of GOLD and OMAHA - operation AUBERY


A small harbour in the Port-en-Bessin-Huppain he didn't seem like a very important goal. But of the two reasons become one. First, one should join the invading forces of the beaches of GOLD and OMAHA, both here should be located the terminal of the underwater pipeline PLUTO, which should cross the Channel to flow fuel. The cast of the port was entrusted to 47. section commandos of the marine corps, which the port did not conduct a frontal attack, but to bypass from behind. The section consisted of 420 men. You with 3. June boarded in Solentu on the two ships and 5. June went to the French shore. The morning of the next day at five o'clock in the morning they switched into invasive boats and set off to attack. Battery at Le Hamel and Longues on them but opened fire. One boat was hit and sunk, all 12 men were killed. A further 11 were seriously injured, but they managed to get to shore. His victims claimed and mined underwater obstacles. The scars suffered most boats. When on the beach section grouped, had 28 dead, 21 wounded and 27 missing. Drowned there was also a lot of weapons and equipment, such as mortars or walkie-talkies. 340 men went forward on the 20 kilometers long march to the German rear to the intended destination. During the move to the hill at Escures, which lies not far from the port, section stumbled upon a few places of resistance. During the clashes, a man was killed and another 11 were injured. The british at least could take the German guns. On the hill at night indulged in a short rest and in the morning knocked out part of the section to the attacks. Here they had to first neutralize the outer defensive positions on the southern end of the village, on the road to the Bayeux tapestry, then occupy the two defended, more than 50 meters high ridges on both sides of the harbour and then to occupy the port itself. The first hurdle quickly overcome, but when you exit on the west ridge, during which on them the defenders were shooting from machine guns and throwing them grenades, was one of the detachment caught more of a hassle. In the port of unexpectedly appeared two anti-aircraft ships, that on them opened fire. To this is added the laid mines and the holes for the flame throwers. Soon she was killed half the attacking detachment, the rest had to download. To make matters worse, I managed to the Germans in the rear of the ambush part of the section at the command post. Part of the British was killed, part injured or captured. While part of the section tried to occupy the building in the port, part of the pulling back of the ridges and the rest was cut off in Escures. The situation didn't look well at all, the numbers of wounded grew, and the ammunition was running out. But the commandos never gave up. The survey found that on the eastern ridge leads in part wide open road, which can get up. When darkness fell, knocked out the captain of the Cousins set out at the head of the section on the attack against a numerically stronger enemy. Commandos overcome one defensive position to another and even during the night cliff conquered. But it wasn't free, one of the victims was even Cousins, who perished in the conquest of the concrete bunker. 8. June section conquered the western high ground and re-cast i Escures. 47. section commandos, therefore, the task with firm commitment to fulfill, although he has suffered no small loss. Then, when the port arrived members of the american 16. infantry regiment, there to link the two beaches.


Harbour Port-en-Bessin-Huppain, view from the west to the east (towards the british beaches of Gold) (Photo Admin 2014)


12. June: the connection to the beaches OMAHA and UTAH - battle for Carentan


Neither of the two american corps had not proceeded as quickly as planned. Mainly . choir was in a difficult situation on a small piece of territory. It was therefore very necessary to combine both the american beachhead and create a continuous line of defense. There were also concerns that the Germans might invade the area between the two beaches, which would be between the two councils hit a wedge. Eisenhower 7. June ordered, that there was a gap as soon as possible sealed. Bradley, subsequently ordered to . corps the attack towards the west through Isigny and VII. corps conquer Carentan. This task within the college, fell 101. airborne division. The first hurdle was Saint-Côme-du-Mont, which has thus far failed to occupy. Before five o'clock in the morning of the 8th. jun had to start the attack led by four battalions under the command of colonel Sinka. It is during the day succeeded, although they had to the Americans to repel several German counter-attack. Division so built a defensive line on the southern wing of the VII. corps from Chef-du-Pont through Saint-Côme-du-Mont after the mouth of the river Douve. A plan of further procedure envisaged crossing the river in two places and taking Carentan in the tongs. The right wing of the attack should be a shift after the embankment between the Saint-Côme-du-Mont and Carentan, the city bypass from the south and occupy a dimension of 30 southwest of the city. This would cut off the only escape route, because the east of the city was the channel Vire-Taute. To him should from the other side approach the left wing of the attack, which was to cross the river Douve at Brévands. A smaller part of the wing then should be heading to the bridge over the river Vire southwest of Isigny and thus help . corps, which is here approached OMAHA beach, while the main part of the wing should be heading to the southwest to Carentan. This should pliers to close.

The embankment between the Saint-Côme-du-Mont and Carentan was the straight and narrow. The high was two to three meters and topped the river Douve river Madeleine and two channels. It was good to see and it was clear that his transition will not be simple. Shortly after midnight of the 9th. 10. June the attack was launched, but had to be after a while suspended, as the engineers had a problem with the repair one of the bridges, which before the Germans fired into the air. Paratroopers from the III. battalion 502. parachute regiment managed with the support of 65. armored field artillery battalion and 907. kluzákového field artillery battalion to occupy the 11. June morning the farm between the end of the embankment and Carentan. Due to the high losses, which claimed the attack in an open and narrow terrain, but couldn't battalion to continue the attack on hill 30. To help was summoned And. the battalion, which is under fire got to the farm, but instead of the attack on had to stay in place and stiffen the here defense. The paratroopers here have been cut off at the forward position and the artillery fire was not too effective. 11. June morning the Germans attempted to counterattack, but american machine guns their efforts thwarted. Shortly after noon of the same day the Germans again launched a heavy fire from small arms and mortars and launched another counter-attack. The americans had to clear out some positions, but at the farm to keep it. In the evening managed to establish radio contact with the gunners and provide them with more accurate coordinates of the German position. Now launched a barrage of all available guns. A short, intense artillery ambush hit directly at the Germans. The targets were so close that there was even intervention of their own ranks. However, the Germans had retreated. Both battalions could be withdrawn and replaced by II. banner. Defense Carentan from this side was broken, but 502. the regiment he was too exhausted to go on in the procedure. To replace him he had to 506. the regiment.

In the meantime, set off 10. June to fight even kluzákoví pawns of the 327. the regiment on the left wing. In the early hours of the morning crossed the C company silently the river Douve and established a small bridgehead. The rest of the regiment then on the other hand transported under the protection of artillery and mortar fire. At six o'clock in the morning they Brévands. Got here i company And Even. battalion 401. the regiment, which went south-east toward Auville-sur-le-Vey. Ran into a strong German nest of resistance, but after a time he overcame and got to the river Vire, where it established links with the units 29. infantry division. With the platoon proceeded to the deputy operating officer 101. airborne division, who met the crew 29. infantry division with the situation across the river Vire. Meanwhile, the company And clean neighborhood, which brought together both the beach, and then turned west to join the fighting on the Carentan. The aim of 327. the regiment was to approach the city from the east and ensure the rail and road bridge across canal Vire-Taute, who was on the eastern edge of the city. During the afternoon the regiment moved forward, but in the evening ran into strong resistance about half a kilometer from the bridges. 327. regiment regrouped and sent Even. battalion south of the road and II. battalion north of it. Also. battalion 401. the regiment remained in the rear as a backup. At midnight, the battalions arrived close to the bridges, and near them are buried. The railway bridge was the Germans fired into the air, the road had the Americans on the firing range. The pedestrian bridge at the confluence of the canal with the river north from the Carentan was also destroyed, but could be easily repaired. And just to him in the morning went two the company Even. battalion 401. regiment and one company of the 327. regiment. The bridge was repaired and through mortar fire exceeded. Rota G 327. the regiment then attacked the right side of the water area of the Bassin à Flot and the company And the 401. the regiment along the side of the left. C company remained at the bridge as a backup. Both battalions 327. the regiment at that time led the way into the city to support fire. Americans here in the forest environment advanced towards the south to the city, but half a mile from the town is stopped by a strong German machine-gun fire.

Cast Carentan was critically important, and so the evening was drawn up a new plan. General McAuliffe the lead task force, composed of 501., 506., 327. regiment and part of the 401. the regiment, which was the city 12. June conquer. The first named regiment was to go from your backup checkpoint, cross the river Douve at Brévands, circled Carentan and attack from the east to the area of dimensions 30 in La Billonnerie. Here was from the northwest to attack and 506. the regiment. This would close the circle around the city. Bunting, 327. the regiment had to hold the position in the channel. 1. battalion 401. regiment and company G of 327. the regiment should continue to attack from the north. In the night from 11. 12. June made the Allies a strong artillery preparation, during which the Carentan shot guns, field artillery, naval guns, heavy mortars and cannon tank destroyers. At two in the morning set off 506. the regiment from the farm to the south-east to the dimension of 30, that without much resistance they occupied, but then brought moderate the struggle for its maintenance and expansion positions. His II. the battalion entered the city, where he met with the banner of the 401. the regiment, which entered the town from the northeast, along the water area of the Bassin à Flot. 501. the regiment crossed the river Douve and at daybreak and channel southeast of the Carentan, fought his way to the dimension of 30 and a connection with Even. banner 506. the regiment. Pliers are closed, but most of the Germans could at night from 11. 12. of city download. However, the main task has been met, the city was in american hands.

The cast Carentan gained VII. choir a vital link with the . choir. Now it was the need of the connection to ensure and expand to the next territory to the south of the city. 501. and 506. stormed into the area of the wetlands southwest of the city. 327. the regiment was to expand the occupied space to the southeast of Carentan, specifically have had to cross the rail element and to occupy the heights at the Montmartin-en-Graignes, which was south of the connections between the councils on the river Vire at Auville-sur-le-Vey. Battalion 401. the regiment remained in the city. 327. regiment 12. June crossed the track and proceeded to the south, but his battalions had been pledged with the Rouxeville and Lenauderie. Here but after a time managed to break through and establish a connection with the part of the 29. infantry division. Together then went to Montmartin-en-Graignes, which together with the heights occupied. The next, but had to download. 327. the regiment then 13. June took a defensive position at the rail of the body, where it remained until the 15th. June. 12. June was a flurry of activity on the opposite wing. 506. and 501. the regiment went from Carentan the southwest direction. 506. the regiment progressed along the road Carentan-Baupte, 501. the regiment along the road Carentan-Periers. 506. the regiment advanced to Douville, where he was stopped by German tankers and paratroopers. The fighting here took place the entire rest of the day. Even 501. the regiment had to after time to stop because of German resistance. 13. June was planned a new attack 506. the regiment, but before it could happen, it drove the Germans into a relatively strong counterattack along both roads. The infantry and the remnants of the 6. parachute regiment support of regiments of the panzer grenadiers of the SS 37 and 38 and also a tank battalion of the SS-17, which were components of the 17. the division of the panzer grenadiers of the SS. The germans wanted to re-occupy the Carentan. Headquarters of the american 1. the army recorded the German advance, which dangerously approached the city and that the supply of a battalion of 502. the regiment on the situation, much hasn't changed. Send therefore to Carentan to help the own tanks of the Combat command And the 2. armored division. The tanks were divided into two groups, each of them attacked with the support of the infantry 502. the regiment along one of the roads. Support provided 14. armored field artillery battalion. Coordinated vševojskový attack the Germans stopped and pushed back. Night was 506. the regiment withdrawn into the city and completely replaced by the 502. regiment. The following day the Americans had advanced to the southwest to La Compagne and in the south close to the Auverville. Subsequently, there was near Baupte to establish a connection with the units 82. airborne division. The connection of both the american bridgehead was established and secured..
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6.2 the BATTLE OF CAEN[/heading:aaaaaa]

D-Day


The city Caen was among one of the main objectives of operation NEPTUNE, and according to the plan of him the British had to occupy the right of the D-Day. However, the actions of the british 3. infantry division was stopped by the afternoon counter-attack the German 21. panzer division. The british, therefore, were about six kilometers from the city.

Operation PERCH


Second attempt at the conquest of the city was operation PERCH. According to the original plans was to bring swipe towards the southeast of the city. Due to the situation, when 9. June was Caen still in German hands, the plan was modified and he had to bring the conquest of the city. It now should not be occupied with a direct attack, but tong type bypass. The eastern arm should form a 51. (highland) infantry division from the assembly . corps. She had to pass through a bridgehead over the river Orne and attack in a southerly direction to the south on the Cagny, which was located ten kilometers southeast of the city. The west arm should form a unit XXX. corps. 7. armored division should advance to the east, cross the river Odon, occupy Évrecy and subsequently, the dimension 112. XXX. choir a few days trying to fight your way to the Tilly-sur-Seulles that prevented Tank instruction division and 12. panzer division SS, which skillfully exploit the options available to them to facilitate the defense had rendered the landscape bocage. . choir gained when moving to the position of the delay and attacked up to 12. June. 51. division but in an attempt to break through to the south ran into stiff resistance from the 21. panzer division and already the next day was her attack stopped. XXX. choir was more successful and managed to Germans to force them to retreat, thus opened a gap in the German defensive line. The Brits want to use and the commander of the 2. army Dempsey ordered the 7. armored division to set off to the south to Villers-Bocage, conquered the city and then attacked from the side on the wing Tank instruction division. But it failed, and the division had to after the two-day battle about the Villers-Bocage download the back. 7. armored division was then strengthened by 33. armoured brigade. Reinforced the division should once again attack, but the 19th. June over the Channel swept the strong storm, which disrupted supply and the attack was revoked.

the Battle of Le Mesnil-Patry


The canadians, meanwhile, 11. June attempted the conquest of the ridges at Cheux southwest of Caen. The attack set off, the Regiment de la Chaudière and the Queen's canadian personal rifle regiment with the support 6. canadian armored regiment (1. hussar) and 46. section commandos of the marine corps. The regiment de la Chaudière could advance to the Rots, but a swipe of the Queen's canadian personal rifle regiment ran into at the Le Mesnil-Patry the determined resistance of the troops 12. panzer division SS, that the regiment dealt so heavy losses, that the canadian attack completely stopped. Members of the SS when it committed war crimes in the form of the executions of several wounded or captured the canadian nationals. 3. canadian infantry division took up defensive position and remained in it until the beginning of the operation WINDSOR.

Operation MARTLET


Operation MARTLET, also known as operation DAUNTLESS was preparing for more extensive operation EPSOM. 49. (západoridingská) infantry division from the assembly XXX. corps surged 25. June to attack in the direction of the Fontenay-le-Pesnel and then Rauray, with the aim to occupy during the day the area between Rauray, Fontenay-le-Pesnel, Tesselem and Juvigny. It should allow VIII. corps attack into the valley along the river Odon, since it would cover the right flank. The division may reached during the day of partial success, but the entire space of her occupy failed, so had to continue the operation even in the following days, i.e. in parallel with the operation EPSOM. The area she'd managed to secure up to 1. July.

Operation EPSOM


Another attempt to bypass Caen was operation EPSOM, which made the british VIII. choir. Her goal was to go out in several stages over the Le Mesnil-Patry Cheux, then further to the river Odon, the exceed Mouen and Grainville-sur-Odon, continue to the river Orne, exceed it and stop up in the Bretteville-sur-Laize south from Caen. The event began 26. June. Encourage her to have several flanking attacks of the ground forces, air force and navy. The participation of the air force, but strongly limit the bad weather over England and most of the ground support attacks was also revoked. Division VIII. corps however, even so went forward. 15. (scottish) infantry division supported by tanks 31. tank brigade during the first day, pushed through the German defensive lines and during the other two days brought heavy fighting for the bridgehead over the river Odon. Attempt 43. (wessexské) infantry division to expand the breakthrough was stopped by a strong German counter-attack units . and II. the tank corps of the SS. The germans then tried to push the British back, but their attacks the British repelled. Operation EPSOM thus far not reached the planned objectives, as it stopped shortly before the river Odon, in Baron-sur-Odon. However, it should be added that at the beginning of the attack was not provided the expected support and that the british attack on himself struck up a fresh German panzer reinforcements, which could not be used in the planned large scale attack on the Bayeux. British in addition to keep the initiative and after a few days they launched a further offensive operations.

Operation WINDSOR


The aim of operation WINDSOR was cast heavily protected and sustained the airport in Carpiquet, which should be the same as the Caen busy right now in D-Day. Get it had a reinforced 8. canadian infantry brigade from the assembly 3. canadian infantry division. The brigade was reinforced by infantry from the 7. canadian infantry brigade and kulometnými and armour, including flame tanks. Available had two squadrons typhoonů and naval guns HMS Rodney. From resistance fighters should the allies information about the disposition of defense elements. The canadians set off 4. June to attack and the end of the day occupied the village Carpiquet and the northern part of the airport. The following day, repelled German attempts to counterattack, but the rest of the airport to occupy them failed. This occurred only in the context of following operation CHARNWOOD.

Operation CHARNWOOD


When the failed attempts to cast Caen klešťovými bypasses, ordered Montgomery frontal attack, which was to carry out . choir. The strategic importance of the city has significantly decreased, however, the British wanted to occupy the heights at the Bourguébus and secure a good position for a swipe at Falaise. Three infantry divisions and three armoured brigade during the attack to occupy the northern part of the city and if possible to secure in the town and bridgehead on the south side of the river Orne. The attack should be preceded by massive air strikes of the air force. Add and fire from naval guns and large amounts of artillery batteries. Available was the aircraft for direct air support. In the night from 7. to 8. July carried out the air force first air raid. At half past four in the morning moved ground troops into the attack. A few hours after came the second wave of bombers. In the evening, units . corps managed to reach the edge of the city, whereupon the Germans began withdrawing troops and equipment across the river to the south of the city. The retreat cover 12. panzer division SS, which like the last was cleaning up the already unsustainable position, inter alia, in the night left the south part of the airport in Carpiquet. That was this morning occupied by Canadians. At the time, started the British and Canadians to penetrate even into the city itself, and at noon reached the river Orne. The afternoon was the northern part firmly in allied hands. Several bridges across the river cost, however, either have been backfilled with debris, or well defended by the German forces. The city was very damaged and its streets full of debris, which make it impossible for tanks to maneuver and try to disrupt the line of retreating Germans. Operation CHARNWOOD that's why she was terminated.

Operation JUPITER


On the profits operation CHARNWOOD had to establish the attack VIII. corps in the direction of the dimension 112, Fontaine-Étoupefour and Éterville and Maltot. This would make the British even here close to the river Orne. Attack of the 10. July was preceded by a strong artillery preparation, but the unit 10. panzer division SS and 9. and 12. panzer division SS the attack were waiting in well prepared defensive positions. Available two heavy tank brigades, two companies of self-propelled assault guns and rocket launchers. This German formations did the attack stop and the surgery was already 11. July stopped. It was a setback, but the british operation has thwarted the German plans to withdraw these units and their regrouping.

the Second battle of the Odon, or operations GREENLINE and POMEGRANATE


In an effort to distract German attention from the preparations for the attack on the west wing, held the uk 2. army the two operations southeast of the Caen. The aim of operation GREENLINE, launched on the evening of 15. July attack units XII. corps was to convince the Germans that the upcoming big attack will occur in this area and at the same time bind the unit 9. and 10. panzer division SS, so they couldn't be deployed against operations GOODWOOD and COBRA. In the morning XII. choir occupied few a few points, including the dimensions 113. More important, the dimension 112 but remained under German control. Counter-attack 9. panzer division SS wiped part of british profit, however the dimension 113 the Germans back took. Other british attempts to attack went nowhere, so the operation was on the evening of 17. July terminated.

Operation POMEGRANATE started 16. July. The unit XXX. corps went ahead and recorded a number of achievements, but in the Noyers-Bocage ran into stiff resistance from parts of the 9. panzer division SS. The british have managed to occupy the railway station and the high ground above the village, but the village itself remained in German hands. The british during these two operations did not have any significant territorial gain. On the other hand, in the field of tied down 2. and 10. the tank division of the SS and even enforce přisunutí 9. panzer division SS from a backup.

Operation GOODWOOD


The last stages of the efforts on the conquest of the Caen was operation GOODWOOD, part of which was the canadian operation ATLANTIC. The aim was to attack in the direction from Escoville, which was located east of Caen, south to the line formed by the villages of Bras, Hubert-Folie, Verrières, Fontenay, Garcelles-Secqueville, Cagny and Vimont while the Canadians had to go on the right in the direction of the Fleury-sur-Orne and Ifs - partly through the southern part of Caen and partly through the Louvigny. After the British had with the Canadians together to dislodge the Germans from the ridges at Bourguébus and Verrières. At the same time was on the left flank, 3. infantry division go to Troarn and cover so the punch of armored divisions, which were to form the core of the attack. Before beginning the event was planned a strong artillery preparation and air raids of the RAF on the Colombelles-Mondeville, Toufreville-Émiéville and Cagny. At dawn 18. July carried out the RAF and the USAAF strong strike on selected targets, while strongly affected were mainly 21. panzer division and 16. the field division of the air force. Then moved an armored division forward. Their previous move over the river Orne and Caenský channel meant that the tanks were separated from infantry and other components of the divisions. In addition, it was necessary to pre-clean a few corridors for the passage of the recently laid minovými field. Corridors but again it wasn't so much that they can the division go at the same time, so that the entire assault force was planted in small portions. The germans also had observation posts on the chimneys of a steel plant in Colombelles, so the British could not count with the element of surprise, on the contrary, the Germans here have been waiting for. In addition, the artillery remained in the river and nedostřelilo on the targets on the ridge. Here on the contrary, lurked a well dug battery of German guns with a good view on the space battlefield. A problem caused that the armored brigade 11. armored division moved forward to the crest, while the brigade of motorized infantry ... occupy the village Cuverville and Démouville, so the tanks have lost their infantry support. The procedure VIII. corps was overall slow. When they reached the british troops railway tracks Caen-Vimont, the Germans are already fully recovered from the initial bombardment and began to fight the British substantial losses. Meanwhile, the Canadians liberated the rest of the Caen. The second day, the Allies managed to achieve a line of Louvigny, Fleury-sur-Orne, Ifs, Bras, Bourguébus, Cagny. 20. July then occurred to advance on the right flank on the line of Saint-Andre-sur-Orne-Bourguébus. Heights but occupy couldn't. Montgomery 20. July surgery stopped. The situation was a tactical failure, although from a strategic point of view it should be added that the British here your activities tied to the strong German grouping, which could be deployed against the american operation COBRA, which should soon start and brought the breakthrough from the normandy beachhead.


Prime minister Winston Churchill observes a destroyed Caen, together with general sir Bernard Montgomery and lieutenant general sir Miles Dempsey, 22.6.1944
Source : © IWM (B 7881).
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6.3 the SITUATION IN the MIDDLE of the BEACHHEAD[/heading:aaaaaa]

the Procedure in Bayeux


In the area of the beach GOLD to the british 50. division in the night stopped not far from the set goals. Counterattack Meyerovy battle group her brigade uncertain, and you therefore prefer to bury. 7. June, the division continued to advance, knowing that with her in the back began to disembark 7. armored division. 69. the brigade crossed at St. Leger road of the Bayeux by Caen and keep up with the Canadians. 8. the armoured brigade went to its position, attacked the Audrieu, and fifteen miles south of Bayeux occupied the heights in Tilly-sur-Seulles. Another advance to the south stopped the counter-attack of German tanks. 56. the brigade occupied the Bayeux and 151. brigade the heights between the rivers Seulles and by aure. 231. the brigade went out west and took over the German battery in the Longues-sur-Mer.


One of the works battery in Longues (Photo Admin 2004)

In the area of the beach of JUNO is the canadian troops were out for half of the anticipated procedure. 3. canadian division should get to the railway line Bayeux-Caen, but advanced only to the line Creully-Villons-les-Buissons, where in the dark buried and survive counter-attack the German 21. panzer division.


Monument to the Royal Dragoon Guards at Creully (Photo Admin 2007)

In the morning the division went into the next attack. Right at the beginning of the arisen difficulties. Swipe 9. brigade in the lead with 27. armoured regiment, bound for the airport in Carpiquet, crashed, Authie the accurate fire of the German artillery and stopped. The situation was exacerbated by a counterattack led by 12. tank divisions of the SS. The outcome of the engagement was tactically indecisive. The canadian procedure was stopped and fell as hopes for a quick encirclement of the Caen. The germans but couldn't the Allies fight off the back, which missed probably the last chance to dispose of their bridgehead in Normandy.

After a period of several other days there were other skirmishes along the entire length of the queue. The germans přisouvali other forces and would like to is to concentrate to a greater counterattack, but each incoming unit had to immediately deploy, to mend another hole, which the Allies have created in their defense. The british XXX. choir gradually increase your strength and at the same time south of the Bayeux pushed further south. 50. the division, together with the 7. armored division cede to Tilly, where to hit the Tank instruction division. Procedure south has stopped. The landscape here was very advantageous for a defensive battle and the Germans in it showed the championship.

Cast Douvres


While Canadians fighting forward, holding in their rear strongly fortified position, which protect a radar station in Douvres. She defended her determined mix of soldiers from different units. The canadian unit, which is the morning land, this position of the bypass and leave it 80. offensive eskadroně 79. armored division, which in cooperation with parts of the canadian corps to ensure the isolation of this point. In this role gradually changed several allied units. To attack the fortified complex took place on the 17th. June. From the south and from the west made the members 77. offensive eskadrony several support attacks, while the main strike carried out 22. dragounský regiment and 26. an assault regiment from the north machine Crab and AVRE. Several other Crabů provide fire support. When they managed to break through the defensive belt, made a raid inside members 41. section commandos of the marine corps, who began to clean the individual defensive elements. Two hundreds of the defenders finally surrendered.


Radar station in Douvres (Photo Admin 2014)


a Swipe at Caumont


American In. choir has reached 8. June its objectives for D-day and could go out into the assault of three divisions, to spread a beachhead and keep up with the procedure of british troops on the left flank. 2. infantry division major general Robertson, which began landing 7. June night, had in the noon 9. June on the banks of enough units for it to be declared operational and take over part of the front from the 1. infantry division north of Trévières. The main objective of the corps here was the cast of the forest at Cerisy. This strategic wooded heights always been in the plans of the corps of dominant position, as it served as a gathering place of German troops that can lead the counter-attack. To the east of the 2. infantry division should you proceed 1. infantry division, which should occupy three city - Agy, La Commune and Vaubadon, which lay on the high ground along the road Saint-Lô-Bayeux. On the other hand, 29. infantry division the advance to the river Elle La Communette and the confluence with the river Vire. Part of the division was to operate west of the river Vire, with a view to establish a connection with the VII. choir. All divisions should follow the forward force of the two regiments, while the third regiment, or part of it, was to serve as a reserve, which at the same time should, where appropriate, to defend the already achieved goals. The newly acquired targets should be covered with an in-depth defense.

9. June went to the american division in the attack. The German defence was first breached on the wings and then fell apart in the whole. Still, some units put it on a stiff resistance. 29. division in the morning cleared the Isigny and then headed south. 175. infantry regiment progressed to the right, 115. infantry regiment on the left. 175. the regiment encountered a greater resistance only in the German warehouse in La Forêt, otherwise the total of the calm by the evening stepped to the line Lison - La-Fotelaie. 115. the regiment in the morning crossed the u Canchy a flooded river by aure. It happened without any substantial resistance, since one platoon in the night, carried to the other shore and in the Colombières neutralize the German unit, however, muddy terrain of the regiment very slowed down. 1. the battalion then without much problem moved to the Bricqueville, 3. banner by La Folie. 2. the battalion after crossing the river on the contrary, veered to the right, to clean up the Calettský forest, from which the Germans were firing on the troops crossing the river across the road La Cambe-Douet. This is them after a time succeeded, the battalion then passed through the Vouilly and headed south to Le Carrefour. Due to an error in the orientation of the soldiers in the path greatly extended and to the village they arrived considerably exhausted, when at half past three in the morning 10. June. The regiment then delivered a civil defense - part of it was still on the road, part slept. In this situation, the arrived part of the German units retreating from the by aure. Infantry and self-propelled artillery have caused in the ranks of the battalion mess, the soldiers are dispersed. Fortunately, one of them the bazooka knocked out both guns. In the shootout killed and the commander of the battalion lieutenant colonel Warfield. In the morning the battalion was supplemented by a hundred men, and without much resistance advanced to the river Elle. On the left flank quickly advanced units 1. infantry division. 26. infantry regiment reached in the night, Agy and Dodigny. 18. infantry regiment bypassed the enemy's nest of resistance, which he left to clean up the advance, and 10. June has occupied the assigned position at the La Commune and Vaubadonu. More complicated than it should 2. infantry division. Hit on the core of the 352. infantry division, put in Trévières the whole 9. June the resistance, although his wings fell. Freshly vyloděná division also yet lacked their artillery, signal boosting, machine guns, mortars, suppliers and means of transportation. The allocation of company of tank destroyers and tank companies was only a partial refund. While 38. infantry regiment attacked the Trévières from the north, 9. infantry regiment headed to the east to dam road Trévières-Rubercy. Part of the regiment arrived at night to the Rubercy, but the regiment was at that moment stretched and did not form a compact whole. 39. the regiment ran north from the Trévières the strong resistance and without heavy weapons, although at one point it supported 38. field artillery battalion, with hard and slowly getting to the river by aure, which lay along the way. However, it managed to cross and proceed further south to the city. In the night, then into one of the battalion entered, and most of it occupied. The last outbreak of resistance has been cleaned up in the morning. This regiment allowed the decision of the Germans download 352. division from an unsustainable position and disperse it along the river Elle among the Bérigny and Airelem. Cleared out the territory of the can 10. jun occupy the american 2. division, which in the evening took position on the south and west of the Ceriského the forest. 11. June spent the 1. and 2. division might call it regrouping and preparing for another attack. The only exception were conflicts in the Haute-Littée.

American 1. and 2. infantry division now stood against the gap in the German defensive line, which was created as a result of breakage of the wings 716. infantry division and 352. infantry division. The gap stretched about fifteen miles between the Bérigny and Longraye where the German Tank instruction division attack against the British. Americans with an opportunity to occupy the Caumont and then possibly proceed to the wooded high in Bény-Bocage, whose cast would the american In. corps allowed to drive a nasty wedge into the lines of the German 7. army. From this position it to encircle the Caen or go to Avranches and lock all German troops north of the city. General Italia it was from morning 9. jun aware, however, * law lxxxiv. choir I did not have any units, which would gap clogged. The task then fell to II. airborne corps general Meindla. He had to focus on Balleroy and in synergy with the . the tank corps of the SS attack on the north. Existed but doubt whether this congregation will suffer. Meindlův corps at that time did not have 77. infantry division, which was sent to the Cotentin to the Montebourgu and could hence be withdrawn. Chorus so stay 17. the division of the panzer grenadiers of the SS and 3. paradesantní division. 9. on the evening of June 3. division was only about 15 miles east of Avranches. 37. a regiment of panzer grenadiers of the SS he was near her, and the second regiment of 17. division, 38. a regiment of panzer grenadiers of the SS, was located east of Lavalu. Transport of armored vehicles has been very difficult because of the problems on the railways and the constant threat of allied fighter-bombers. Balleroy so reached just the advance section of the division, which 10. June launched a survey on north from the Balleroy, to prepare the conditions for the attack of the whole division. But in the meantime, Rommel changed his plans. The weakness of the German forces in the Carentan him came more serious than the gap on the wing * law lxxxiv. corps. Meindlův corps and was sent to the position between the Carentan and Saint-Lô. 3. paradesantní division should take positions at the northern edge of Ceriského the forest. To the area Saint-Lô pointed and 353. infantry division of Brittany. Most of the 17. the division of the panzer grenadiers of the SS has been sent to the area southwest of the Carentan. The mobile part of the 275. infantry division, Heintzova battle group, has moved into the area Saint-Jean-de-Daye. Against the gap so in the end remained only the reconnaissance section 17. division. 1. division captured several prisoners from the sections and even had some reports about the movement of the medium tanks. So a concern about the forthcoming attack across the 17. division, which could occur as early as 11. June. In addition, there's a report on the movement 11. panzer division and 1. panzer division SS. At the headquarters of the In. corps began to worry the big tank counterattack, which was in the plans foreseen as a possible roughly from D-day+3. It was 9. June, at a time when still In. choir held Ceriský forest, and as has already been said, the Allies always feared that there may be in great danger. 10. June turned out that the tank grenadiers headed for the Carentan and against the units In the. the choir is still just the remnants of the 352. and 716. division. The unit 2. infantry division in addition, on that day all the forest is occupied. And now they offer way to Caumont and the gap defended the just-mentioned reconnaissance.

Plan has been developed supply 2. panzer division lieutenant general von Lüttwitze from assembly XLVII. tank corps general Funcka into this gap. The division with the move of Amiens started already in the night from 9. 10. June and its front units have reached Paris, but movements in the daytime were very slow and costly. 10. on the evening of June were some units that moved on its own axis, at Alençon, but the tanks only were running on the cars of the Amiens. Funck, who was aware of the inefficiency of the deployment of the panzer divisions after the parts, which is clearly demonstrated in the cases, 21. panzer division, 12. panzer division SS and Tank instruction division wanted to 2. division attacked until after assembly, which was estimated at 13. June. The recon platoon had by this time stick to the high ground alone. Partly helped him to one of the regiments, 3. paradesantní division, who took positions at the Saint-Georges-d'Elle. The gap was partly narrowed, however, she was still weakly defended. The germans 10. June also decided to perform a counterattack at the Caen. Since Tank instruction division has been deployed in defensive battles south of the Bayeux, counting on the general Geyr with the use of half of the 12. panzer division SS and half 21. panzer division. The aim was a limited action towards north from Caen into field Anisy- Anguerny. Geyr i Rommel would prefer to attack more to the northwest, but did not want to lose another part of the movement to the new positions. However, even this attack could not be carried out because the British in the afternoon pushed on the right wing Tank instruction division and the left wing of the 12. panzer division SS, where british XXX. choir sent 7. armoured division, which should take a ride through the Tilly-sur-Seulles to Villers-Bocage. Geyr, who realized the weakness of the instruction division, the attack called off. Shortly thereafter, at the headquarters of Geyrova headquarters attacked by fighter-bombers and decimated his crew. Geyr was no longer able to command the German forces in the Caen and responsibility then passed to the . SS panzer corps and 7. army. Headquarters 7. army to abandon the idea of the decisive counterstroke and began to focus on strengthening the defensive line.

After a relatively quiet 11. June started the unit In. corps the next day to a new attack. The biggest procedure she had scheduled 1. infantry division. The attack was mainly to support the british effort of encirclement Caen. The british 7. armored division hit on the turn 10. and 11. June, Tilly-sur-Seulles resistance Tank instruction division, however, the Americans found on the wing of the weakness in the German defense, the mentioned gap. 7. armored division therefore, should move from the original direction and get into the Villers-Bocage detour through the Livry. The procedure of the american 1. infantry division Caumont would thus cover the right flank of the attacking british armored division. The two remaining division In. corps, 2. walking and 29. walking, they also attack towards the south. The objectives of both divisions were rather of tactical nature, the main task was to rather reduce the pressure on the VII. choir, which operated on the Cotentinu. 1. division expected a rather less resistance, but had some concerns that her hips could attack Tank instruction division and 17. the division of the panzer grenadiers of the SS. Regiments, therefore, should move forward cautiously and be ready to shift quickly into defense. The procedure for each line should immediately report to and excluding the aggressive exploration should progress forward to the next line only after confirmation from the division headquarters.

1. infantry division in the morning went out and quite easily moves forward, so 18. the regiment the evening had reached the road Caumont-Saint-Lô. 26. the regiment arrived to the northern edge of Caumontu, where he ran into determined opposition from the exploratory section, 2. panzer division. The city was busy until the second day morning. To the right of the 1. infantry division occupied 9. infantry regiment 2. infantry division ridge with Litteau south of the Ceriského the forest. Even the british 7. armored division, which started in the afternoon, progressed rather rapidly to the south, and in front of 18. an hour ago I ran Livry, began to turn to the east and the morning drifted into the Villers-Bocage. The procedure of the armored division but failed to establish the british 50. infantry division, which was west of the Tilly-sur-Seulles attack Tank instruction division and advance to the Villers-Bocage from the north. 13. June on the battlefield has arrived 2. panzer division, with two regiments and two artillery battalions, but any of the tanks, which attacked toward the north in the space between the Cahagnes and Villers-Bocage. The division got up to the road from the Caumontu by Villers-Bocage. 7. armored division, without the support of 50. infantry division and under the pressure of 2. panzer division, she found herself in an unfavorable position, and as the afternoon withdrew to the west to the heights three miles away from the city and a connection with the american 1. infantry division that was in Caumontu. Even this peak was not under the continuing German pressure hájitelný, and so the british divisions withdrew still farther to the northeast to the Parfouru L Eclin, thereby the front line zaoblila. Another procedure of the German panzer division stopped the artillery In. corps that it was sufficiently concentrated and had a good view. In the German ranks while still was a gap between the 2. panzer division and 3. paradesantní divisions but the us 1. infantry division after the repulse of the british armored divisions have already tried for another advance to the south. Villers-Bocage then the Germans held for a period of about six weeks. In. choir is now more focused on the pressure towards the 352. infantry division and 3. paradesantní division in the direction of the Saint-Lô, which, indeed, began already during the fighting in Caumontu.

Americans here they're up against a deep defense. The germans resisted well in advance prepared positions and were in business less lunges. Mainly paratroopers represented a heavy opponent. 12. June surged 2. infantry division into the attack. As we have previously mentioned, 9. infantry regiment occupied the ridge at the Litteau in souvislsoti with the procedure 1. division. 23. infantry regiment in the meantime, attacked a south-westerly direction to Saint-Lô in connection with the procedure of the whole 29. infantry division on his right wing. The aim of the regiment was the dimension 192, which was located north of the road Bayeux-Saint-Lô, and constituted a distinct landmark on the way to Saint-Lô, which could play a key role in the attack on the city. The regiment came across the river Elle in the face of determined German resistance and had to stop. 13. June renewed the 38. infantry regiment the divisional attack, and with strong artillery support crossed the river Elle. Resistance but then still escalated and the regiment received orders to be passed, together with the 23. infantry regiment, to the defense. 29. infantry division attacked 12. June 115. infantry regiment while 175. infantry regiment held position north of the river Elle, and 116. infantry regiment formed, together with 747. tank battalion, a backup. 115. the regiment although he got across the river, but after a while had to go back, not to be cut off. The evening arrived 116. the regiment and this is the river managed to cross and with strong artillery support he managed to occupy the Saint-Clair-sur-l'elle and Couvains. At the end of the 13. June was the procedure In. corps towards the Saint-Lô stopped by order of general Bradley. The connection of congregations in the area Carentan-Isigny it was still too narrow and, moreover, there were fears of possible further counterattack 17. the division of the panzer grenadiers of the SS. In addition, in the area shaped XIX. choir, which should become operational, so it was necessary to regroup forces and allocated spaces. Another reason was the priority procedure on the Cotentinu, so Bradley wanted Saint-Lô extracting the sources. Due to the fact that the British were stopped at the Tilly-sur-Seulles, would be the next procedure In. corps dangerous, for he would uncovering his wings. It could use e.g. 2. panzer division. In. choir, therefore, went to the defense of the achieved positions.

the Direction of St. Lo


When In. choir he stopped his attack, it occupied the south line american 1. army between Caumontem and Carentan. Caumontský the bulge on the left wing, which held 1. infantry division, was substantially extended due to the stretch next to her, holding the 2. infantry division. 2. and 29. infantry division have been distributed on the line Cormolain-Ariel. Against them stood the right wing of the II. airborne corps, which was temporarily subordinated to the LXXIV. army corps that prevented Saint-Lô. To do this using a circular high ground north and northeast of the city, which was dominated by the dimension 192. 1. and 2. infantry division remained subordinate to the In. corps, which was reinforced by the greater part 2. armored division. XIX. choir, who had 30. infantry division, he was 13. June declared as operationally capable and from In. corps the following day took over the 29. infantry division. Both councils subsequently, the subordinate units have issued preliminary orders and plans to attack toward the city Saint-Lô. Division, except 1. walking, in the following week gained minor territorial gains, which improved their defensive positions, although their commanders had hoped for a greater success. Strikes began to 15. June, when XIX. choir darted into the attack. 30. infantry division, which have not yet been ashore the whole, the attack was initially only one regiment. The attack progressed very slowly, so 120. infantry regiment at the end of the day, cast only Montmartin-en-Graignes and the high ground north of canal Vire-Taute. Both sides then assumed that the other will attack. Between these rivers while there found a narrow muddy terrain přeťatý channel, so an attack there would have been neither for one side simple, but any victory would be significant. The germans would in case of success, cut off the communication between the two parts of the american 1. army. Americans, in turn, could achieve a breakthrough, aim at the Périers and split the German 7. army. Or one party but for such an extensive operation, not in this place strong enough. 30. infantry division therefore did not progress further, on the contrary, complement other units. In the meantime, 29. and 2. infantry division attack to the south to Saint-Lô.

The main objective of the attack was the dimension 192. Here, facing 38. infantry regiment advancing on the right wing 2. infantry division. To the left of her punch support your attack 29. infantry division, that push to the head of two regiments. Reinforced 115. infantry regiment should go to Saint-Andre-de-l'Epine and the dimension of 150 on the north end Martinvillského ridge. 175. infantry regiment pointing to dimensions of 90 and 97 northwest of Saint-Lô. 23. infantry regiment 2. infantry division should occupy the heights around the road to the Saint-Lô for La Croix Rouge. 9. infantry regiment should take the heights west of the Saint-Germain-d'elle and northwest of Montrabotu. After completion of the procedure 2. infantry division should you go 1. infantry division to line by La Lande-sur-Drôme to Cahagnes. At that time already was Caumontská gap zacpána units of the German 3. paradesantní division. She has completed a collection in the field to 17. June, however, from 16. June can talk about a biased defense. It wasn't for the american troops the good news. Paradesantní division actually arrived in quite compact form and without major losses due to the fact that moving only at night, avoiding the main roads, followed the marching plans, and also to ensure masking. In the attack 16. June morning america 2. division produced both the regimental wings minutely forward, however, the regiment advancing in the middle ran into strong resistance. The germans had well prepared defensive positions full machine-gun nests and the room had a good view from the heights west of the Saint-Germain-d'elle. The americans left little to advance and in exposed positions is a swathe through the devastating fire. 9. infantry regiment into the evening, lost 140 men and Saint-Germain-d'elle remained in German hands. On the right wing 2. division 3. battalion 38. infantry regiment managed to move on a distance of approximately 500 metres to the dimension of the 192, but the next unit after both sides failed to keep the same pace. 23. infantry regiment suffered heavy losses, but the whole day remained essentially in place. The division commander but he didn't want a convenient bulge to come, and so sent there by the divisional engineers in role of infantry, to increase the force 3. battalion.

Attack 29. division of 16. June initially proceeded quite well, but after lunch is the procedure 116. infantry regiment stopped to the east of Les Foulons, Saint-Andre-de-l'Epine and Villiers-Fossard. Night the unit dug with the fact that the attack will be renewed to the next day. 175. infantry regiment proceeded along the river Vire, crossed the river Elle, but 17. June ran into stiff resistance from Amy and Les Buteaux. Relatively quick procedure 175. the regiment provoked at the headquarters of the 29. division the impression that the enemy's defense fell apart. But in the field it looked different. 116. the regiment the attack early in the morning 17. June, but encountered a heavy fire of machine guns and mortars, Villiers-Fossard. Didn't even have artillery support. It was the same as on the other parts of the front over the Saint-Lô. Pressure 29. division of 16. and 17. June meant for the German 352. infantry division, which was in that point consists of basically just a combat group in the strength of the regiment, the loss of five hundred men and download a little to the south. Due to the advent of the troops 3. paradesantní division there has been to shorten the line held by the 352. divisions, that had the right wing on high, to the west of Saint-Andre-de-l'Epine and left wing by the river Vire. The division was also 16. on the evening of June strengthened by the arrival of Boehmovy battle group from the assembly 353. infantry division of Brittany. It was these fresh troops, which resist the Villiers-Fossard. Attack 18. June began the artillery preparation before the position of the 115. and 116. infantry regiment, which was carried out by eight battalions of artillery. But she had only a minimal effect and attack at noon, stopped because of strong German fire led by mortars and cannons of various calibers. The americans weren't because of the nature of the terrain able to accurately locate the source of the shooting, and those so could not be discarded protistřelbou american works. Much better not even 175. infantry regiment. The position, which reached 18. June, held In. choir, except for a minor correction, for a further period of two months. It was located about eight kilometers from the Saint-Lô. The city has entered 29. infantry division roughly a month after. It happened during one of the bloodiest and most complex battles throughout the normandy campaign..
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[nadpis]6.4 PROCEDURE AT CHERBOURG[/heading]

Ensure the north wing Utah



When 18. June In. choir crossed from St. Lô to the defense, not on the headquarters 1. army grieve. VII. choir achieved great success - dammed Cotentin, which broke the 7. army and sealed the fate of the Cherbourg, whose fall was now only a matter of time. It was a great and quick success, but began as a slow punch through the defense ring, which the Germans had created around the bridgehead achieved during the D-day. Some of the heaviest fighting of the first week of the invasion he led in the northern part of the area of the landing of UTAH beach, thus on the northern flank of VII. corps. Here 4. infantry division along with 505. paradesantním infantry regiment 82. airborne division tried to reach the ridge of the Le Ham-Montebourg-Quinéville, therefore, the line between the coast and the river merderet River, which was the original aim of D-day, as there were batteries with the range on UTAH beach. The enemy had the advantage of height and could make use of field fortifications and a series of hedges. There was also a heavily fortified defensive strong points in Azeville, Crisbecqu and Ozeville, and also along the coast. When she was in D+1 cleared area of the landing, performed VII. choir in D+2 attack to the north to reach the ridge, in order to be delisted referred to the battery and extended the occupied area before the lunge to the west. 505. paradesantní infantry regiment and 8. infantry regiment attacked west of the road from Sainte-Mère-Église by Montebourgu with a target line between the Le Ham and Montebourgem while 12. infantry regiment and 22. infantry regiment hanging out in the area to the east of the road with the finish line between Montebourgem and Quinéville. The first pair advanced slowly, but surely forward and into the evening progressed into Magneville. Before her was one of the tributaries of the Merderetu, who was in the area of Magneville-Hangar and Écausseville well defended. These positions were forward part of the defensive line that general Schlieben set up after the failed counterattack at the Sainte-Mère-Église and continue working out. The main perimeter was more to the north, along the railway line from Le Ham through Montebourgu to coast Lester. The germans concentrated quite a large amount of artillery, but his activity was limited the lack of ammunition and the continued activity of allied fighter-bombers. During 9. June 8. the regiment succeeded at the price of heavy losses to push the Germans out of the Hangar and Écausseville to the main line at the track. The regiment the following day quickly transferred to the road Le Ham-Montebourg, but when he tried to attack the railway line ran into stiff resistance, driven from the main line of defense. Individual battalions, therefore, withdrew and buried south of the road. 505. the regiment 1. June tried to fill a position called the Montebourg Station, and the Le Ham. Cast Montebourg Station 1. the battalion succeeded, but the attack 2. the battalion on the Le Ham along the road he was stopped by strong German defenses. The following day the attack involved 2. battalion 325. kluzákového infantry regiment, and after heavy fighting they managed to push the Germans out of Le Ham squeeze. Ensure was even a bridge across the river merderet River.

To the east of the road from Sainte-Mère-Église by Montebourgu attack 12. infantry regiment. The for the price of the hefty losses 8. June has occupied the Émondeville and then also Joganville, thus get to the same tributary as a pair of regiments to the west of him. The following day proceeded faster and almost reached the intended target line. Among the 12. infantry regiment and the coast progressed 22. infantry regiment. Among his primary objectives were support points in Azeville and Crisbecqu. Attempts to approach both items at first seemed successful, but eventually failed and the unit had to retreat back. The commander of the 22. the regiment colonel Tribolet therefore 9. jun concentrate forces and conducted a focused attack on the Azeville. The americans have once again managed to get up to the fortified position, but attempts to launch again failed. Finally, one soldier managed to use the flamethrower to blow up the ammunition supply. After the subsequent explosion the garrison surrendered. Salvage Azeville allowed the procedure to the north, although the Crisbecq was still in German hands. The commander of the 4. division general Barton but decided to bypass it and go on Quinéville to 22. the regiment too was behind the other regiments of the division. But attempts to lunge forward have failed. Three days of fighting 22. the regiment did not produce many profits. The commander of the VII. corps general Collins therefore decided to strengthen the here the front of another regiment, which was to advance along the coast. Part of the 39. infantry regiment colonel Flint 12. June hit the abandoned Crisbecq and continued on Dangueville. Another part of the clean coast between Taret de Ravenoville and Fort St. Marcouf. The last part of the regiment occupied after heavy fighting Fontenay-sur-Mer. This allowed the 22. the regiment attack on the German fortified position near the Ozeville, which support the navy fire on the battery at the Quinéville. The event was successful, Ozeville fall 12. June into allied hands. It wasn't without incident. The German garrison put up the white flag, but subsequently shot and killed one american officer. Members of one of the rot then on the foothold attacked with grenades and bayonets. After the attack left alive not a single German. When 22. the regiment cleared the Ozeville, could your procedure to finish i 12. the regiment that the target position almost has already reached 11. June, but because of the problems 22. the regiment he had to download to Saint-Floxel. 12. June afternoon, therefore, could cross the road from the Montebourgu by Quinéville and to occupy the heights of Les Fieffes Dancel.

The main objective of the american 4. the division now was the Montebourg. The but the Germans were planning to defend at any cost. When the Americans found out, an attack on the city was canceled and focus instead on the treatment of the right wing near the coast. 22. and 39. the regiment 13. June took off in the direction of the Quinéville. On that day, but too far away didn't get it. 14. June 22. the regiment has occupied the two hills west of the Quinéville. The unit 39. the regiment then the city is conquered. The north wing, VII. corps as was provided at the ridge on both sides of the Montebourgu. The germans at this position in the following days of the attack, rather concentrated on strengthening the defense of the Cherbourg and the reorganization of the intermingled units, which were in the fighting system after the parts immediately after arrival.

a Swipe at the west


Swipe to the north during the week of the fighting brought very little above the achieve of the positions defined for the D-day. The germans were able in time to move in reinforcements. A similar one-week delay in filling the objectives for D-day occurred on the west wing of the VII. corps on the merderet river. Here was the cause of the particular progress of the process of the jump and the landing of airborne divisions. German 91. infantry division although she had done from the west counter-attack, but was without its commander and skydiving skydivers it largely to bring it into a state of disorganization. However, to establish a bridgehead on the Merderetu was a problem even against the relatively weak forces. At the end of 7. June was at La Fière about six hundred men of the 507. and 508. parachute infantry regiment, along with several tanks and cannons and a flag 325. kluzákového infantry regiment, which arrived from the beach. To the west of the river there were three other isolated groups in strength from battalion after battalion. After the failure of establishing a beachhead on D-day there was a 82. airborne division exposed to a strong German counterattack, yet to maintain.


a Monument to paratroopers at La Fiere (Photo Admin, 2014)

In the evening 8. June was discovered crossing the river, which was already under water, but the structure. Daly to overcome the swamps north of La Fière. This way you could connect with groups of colonels Timmese and Milletta on the west bank. Then you could attack south and clear the area of the bridge at La Fière. In the meantime, was but Millettova a group of broken, and its parts engage in the fighting up to 10. June. 1. battalion 325. the regiment, therefore, the river crossed, and even without Millettovy support attacked the south to the western edge of the bridge. Hit but on the resistance and had to retreat back to the transition of the east from the Amfreville. General Ridgway then he ordered a frontal attack 3. battalion 325. regiment over the embankment and the bridge. But the Germans could also stop. At the bridge they accumulate the dead, the wounded and stressed soldiers. In addition, across the road there was a destroyed american tank and one German tank destroyer with the same fate. The next attempt still came out and the paras across the bridge fought their way to Cauquigny, and then in the field at Le Motey. Has also been able to establish a connection with the banner of the 325. the regiment in Amfreville. The northern wing of the bridgehead at Fière was provided. Now there was the southern part. Meanwhile, the american artillery bombarded the Le Motey, who just wanted to occupy their own unit, which then had to retreat to the east of the village, but not nearly so good a position, and faced the German firing. After a while, but managed to fight back once the officers stopped the spread of panic and regrouped the troops in the applicable formations. The west wing has also been finally stabilized. In the south managed to establish a connection with the Shanleyho group on the dimension 30 south of the Haute-Gueutteville, which until then had formed part of a considerable part of the German forces, and thus significantly help to the success of the bridge. Late in the evening 9. June was the bridgehead stiffened. Now was the time to use this success for a much larger operation - to damming Cotentinu.

It was a task for 90. infantry division general MacKelvieho. She had one regiment in 4. infantry division, so a swipe led their remaining forces - 357. and 358. infantry regiment. Their first objective was the river Douve between Terre-de-Beauval and Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte. 357. the regiment has passed through the position of the paratroopers at La Fière and attacked to the west, while 358. the regiment crossed the river with the Chef-du-Pont and attacked in the direction of the Picauville. 82. airborne division should adopt the bank of the river Douve on the southern flank of the attack. Attack 90. division started early in the morning 10. June and from the beginning everything went wrong. 357. the regiment came across for the Le Motey and u Amfreville the strong German defense units 91. infantry division. The regiment proved just a little to enlarge the bridgehead, the German defense has failed. 358. the regiment hit as well at the Picauville. Failed to even destroy the bridge, Beuzeville-la-Bastille, thus should be protected by a flank attack. In the back of the regiment in addition to stay the Germans, who were holding the Chateau d'isle Marie. 11. June both regiments renewed the attack, but the gains were meager. 357. the regiment has progressed to the Forest of the Landes and the 358. the regiment surrounded the Pont l'Abbé, without him but the conquered. 12. June arrived here i 359. infantry regiment and was deployed into the space between the 357. and 358. regiment. 12. June also set out to 508. the regiment across the river Douve to the area east of Prétotu to take after the procedure to the south connected with Baupte units 101. airborne division. The task of covering the shore for the Douve for advancing the 90. divisions was commissioned to 325. regiment. 508. the regiment reached in 8:00 Baupte, without having encountered significant resistance. The German tank battalion withdrew after the first contact, and even reported a much bigger attack than correspond to reality. The place was deployed battle group 265. infantry division, supplemented by a battalion from 77. infantry division.

90. infantry division 13. June has reached the line between the Gourbesville and Pont l'Abbé. With such slow progress was not satisfied, so MacKelvie he was dismissed and replaced by general Landrumem. The same fate met the commander of the two regiments. The commander of the corps in addition, transferred the brunt of the attack on the 9. infantry division general Eddy and 82. airborne division. 82. division was to attack south from the 90. division along the road from Pont l'abbe to the Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte while 9. division north from 90. division occupy Sainte-Colombe, 90. division should gradually stop attacking the west and gradually turn north and secure the northern wing of the procedure between Le Ham and Terre-de-Beauval. 14. June attack 358. the regiment to the west of Pont l'abbe and then left the attack 325. and 507. the regiment, which during the day had advanced about two kilometers. 359. the regiment opened the way to the Gottot, which then ran the 60. infantry regiment 9. division. 357. the regiment after two days occupied Gourbesville. The situation 90. infantry division was glory, which correspond to only small gains, but the Germans on this, as it seemed, weren't much better. The new chief * law lxxxiv. corps general Fahrmbacher reported that its units are broken down, shaken, exhausted and without ammunition. Still couldn't ensure the detention of an american sortie to the west. For the truth gave him the regiments of the 82. division 15. June speed up the process and come closer to the Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte and Reigneville. On the northern flank of the attack encountered 60. infantry regiment to a strong counterattack, which made him download back. The evening proved to part of the land to re-occupy. it already but it was the last gasp of German resistance. 60. the regiment a little bit different from the original direction, which allowed the plant 47. infantry regiment west of Orglandes. 16. June, the attack continued and by lunch 325. and 505. the regiment reached the river Douve, Saint-Sauveur-le-Vicomte. From him the Germans have already started to download and 505. and 508. the regiment to him for the support of the artillery relatively easy to occupy, and to create a decent beachhead across the river. Collins wanted to take advantage of the German retreat, and ordered the