Main Menu
User Menu

Military history website

5. tanková armáda [1942-1942]

5th Tank Army

5-я танковая армия (5 ТА) - I. формирование

5. tank army
Original title:
Original Name:
5-я танковая aрмия
Date of creation:
Date of termination:
Parent headquarters:
Higher Command:
05.06.1942-16.06.1942 headquarters of the supreme command

16.06.1942-17.07.1942 the Bryansk front
05.06.1942-16.06.1942 Chub
16.06.1942-17.07.1942 eastern european theater of war
05.06.1942-17.07.1942 Lizjukov, Alexander Ilyich (major general)
Chief of staff:
Chief of Staff:
05.06.1942-17.07.1942 Drugov, Pavel Ilyich (colonel)
Subordinate units:
Subordinated Units:
Automaticky vyplněné položky:
25.05.1942-15.07.1942 2. tankový sbor
26.05.1942-17.07.1942 11. tankový sbor

Ručně vyplněné položky:
Honorary title:
Honorary Name:
Drogovoz Igor Grigorjevič: Tankovyj sword of the party sovětov. Minsk, Charvest 2001.
Feskov, Vitaly Ivanovich - Golikov, Valery Ivanovich - the Kalashnikov, Konstantin Anatolyevich: Krasnaya Armija in pobědach even poraženijach 1941-1945 gg. Tomsk, ITU 2003.
Queue, flot, armii, flotilii pěrioda Vělikoj Otěčestvěnnoj war 1941-1945 gg. Spravočnik. Red. And. And. Kolťukov. Moscow, Kučkovo field 2003.
URL : : 0

5th Tank Army (first formation)

(5-я танковая армия[/i])

The 5th Panzer Army was formed on 5 June 1942, based on the Directive of the Main Tent of the High Command (hereafter referred to as the Main Tent) of 25 May 1942. In its composition from the beginning, the Army had 2nd and 11th Tank Corps, 340th Rifle Division, 19th Independent Tank Brigade, 66th Panzer Brigade[/url], 66th Panzer Brigade[/url], 340th Rifle Brigade, 66th Tank Brigade[/url Guards Mortar Regiment, 611th Light Artillery Regiment of the High Command Reserve, a separate Signal Battalion, a separate Anti-Aircraft Detachment, and an Army Headquarters Protection Company. In early July, the army was reinforced by the [url=/topic/view/44559]7th Tank Corps.

On 16 June 1942, the army was subordinated to the Bryansk Front. After the formation of the 5th Panzer Army, Headquarters planned an operation in which its troops were to counterattack the northern flank and rear XXXXVIII Panzer Corps of the Wehrmacht, which broke through towards the city of Voronezh, threatening to capture the crossings of the Don. To reinforce the 5th Panzer Army, the headquarters ordered the accelerated movement of 7th Panzer Corps under the command of P. A. Rotmistrov from the Kalinin Front.

However, the entire operation was "sewn with a hot needle", without thorough reconnaissance and knowledge of the enemy formations and their tasks, and was therefore doomed to failure essentially before it even began. On Sunday, 5 July, the 5th Panzer Army was ordered to attack in the direction of the villages of Zemlyansk (about 30 km from Voronezh) and Khokhol (about 35 km from Voronezh), thus cutting the communications of the enemy tank grouping that had broken through to the Don River and to Voronezh. At the same time, by fighting in the enemy's rear, the 5th Panzer Army was to disrupt the enemy's transports across the Don River. According to the wording of the order, the operation was to begin "no later than 15-16 hours" on the same day, but this was clearly an unrealistic deadline, since of the entire army, only the 7th Panzer Corps was near the area of the planned combat operations at the time, and even it did not manage to concentrate its units in the area of the troop advance in time.

Only a short time was allotted for the preparation and organization of the attack, so it was not possible to achieve a simultaneous strong strike of all army units. The 7th Panzer Corps was the first to enter the fray on Monday, 6 July 1942, to which the army commander A.I. Lizjukov added to reinforce the 19th Tank Brigade, the 611th Light Artillery Regiment, and the two motorized artillery brigades (the 2nd and the 12th). Due to the aforementioned shortness of time, as well as several hastily added reinforcements, the 7th Panzer Corps entered action without sufficient coordination with subordinate units, as well as without sufficient reconnaissance. Moreover, the entire 5th Panzer Army plan of attack was based on the mistaken assumption of the Soviet high command that the advancing German Panzer Corps would move further east across the Don and Voronezh. However, no such task was assigned to this corps. At the same time, the German XXIV Panzer Corps was deployed in the north, with the task of covering the main grouping of the 4th Panzer Army from the north. Thus, while the advance of the forward German 9th Panzer Division went unnoticed, the Soviet 5th Panzer Army advanced without reconnaissance, literally "blindly".

The German command was aware of the danger threatening from continuous Soviet attacks, i.e. the threat of breaking the front, and therefore decided to counterattack with the forces of the 9th and 11th Panzer Divisions. The aim was to allow the own infantry divisions to consolidate their defensive positions, and thus complete the replacement of the panzer divisions with infantry divisions. Which was, after all, one of the basic tenets of the German blitzkrieg[/i]-concentrated strikes by tank formations to break the enemy lines and fill the resulting gaps with motorized infantry, securing the conquered territories.

Towards the end of Tuesday, 7 July, units of the German 9th Panzer Division retreated south to a new defensive line along the Sukhaya Vereyka River, thus avoiding a direct confrontation with the main forces of the 7th Panzer Corps: 19th Tank and 7th Motorized Artillery Brigade, which crossed the Kobylja River to the south. During 7-9 July, the German 9th Panzer Division, which was approached by units of the 11th Panzer Division, managed to hold back the advance of the attacking Soviet troops. When the German infantry divisions then relieved the panzer divisions in their positions, the Soviet offensive was definitely halted. The 5th Panzer Army failed to even enter the operational area from where it was to develop an offensive in the direction of Zemlyansk.

On Sunday, 12 July, at 15.20, exactly one week after the Soviet 5th Panzer Army launched its attack, the German 11th Panzer Division, with 107 tanks, attacked the Soviet 11th Panzer Corps positions, with disastrous consequences for the 5th Panzer Army. Units of the 11th Panzer Corps hastily retreated under pressure from German troops without organizing a defense, exposing the right flank of the adjacent 7th Panzer Corps, which suffered heavy losses in both manpower and equipment as a result.

The 5th Panzer Army's offensive operation thus ended in complete failure. Not only did the army fail to accomplish the tasks assigned to it, but it also suffered heavy casualties at the same time. In their post-war memoirs, Soviet military leaders (A. M. Vasilevsky, M. I. Kazakov, P. A. Rotmistrov, I. G. Lazarev and others) shifted the responsibility for the failure of the operation to each other, but most often blamed it on the commander of the 5th Panzer Army A. I. Lizjukov. The latter could no longer defend himself against such accusations, as he was killed in action at the end of July 1942.

Large losses of manpower and equipment caused the 5th Panzer Army to lose its combat capability, and it was therefore disbanded on 17 July 1942 by Main Tent Directive No. 170511 of 15 July 1942.

5. tanková armáda [1942-1942] - nemecký vojak prechádza okolo zničeného sovietskeho ľahkého tanku T-60

nemecký vojak prechádza okolo zničeného sovietskeho ľahkého tanku T-60
URL : : 0