07.02.2023 - Rusko-ukrajinský konflikt

07.02.2023

Situace na bojišti dle ISW.





Situace na bojišti dle War Mapper.





Situace u Bachmutu.

Přehled ruských ztrát a porovnání jejich denního přírůstku dle ukrajinské strany k 7. únoru 2023.

Ukraine's armed forces have converted the archaic Tu-141 Stryzh into strike drones and occasionally use them to attack objects on the territory of the Russian Federation. Vladislav Shapsha (Владислав Шапша), the governor of the Kaluga region, announced that an unknown drone exploded over the city of Kaluga, damaging the city's infrastructure, but some Russian Internet sources claimed that the drone crash (explosion) occurred in the forest outside Kaluga.
The Russians reportedly found that the crashed drone, Stryzh, was equipped with a converted bomb OFAB-100-120.
Source:
defence.ua.com
nv.ua
otpboos.ru
https://ria.ru/20230206/kaluga-1849933332.html
www.gazeta.ru
www.redstar.gr
www.redstar.gr
www.thedrive.com

The new German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius visited Kiev, where he announced the delivery of more than 100 Leopard 1 tanks.

Interesting findings from the IKAR survey
Summary: Even if Russians are not enthusiastic about mobilization, they are willing to support the war in Kazakhstan and the Baltic states. This finding came out of the IKAR (Institute of Conflictology and Analysis of Russia, IKAR) polling action. 1,600 people were interviewed.
The main results of the second wave of the survey:
1.
In Russia, the number of people who have relatives or acquaintances conscripted into the war against Ukraine has increased, from 60% in December to 69% in January. As a result, the number of Russians whose relatives or acquaintances have died has also increased, from 29% in December to 36% in January.
2.
For 72% of respondents, the main event of 2022 was the Special Military Operation against Ukraine, and 47% of them consider it the main problem they face.
3.
In December 2022, a majority of Russians described the partial mobilization in the fall as the right step, so in January 2023, 60% were negative about the possible announcement of a second wave of mobilization. Respondents support increasing the army to 1.5 million people and support the (unspecified) involvement of prisoners of war and the Belarusian army in military operations against Ukraine.
4.
Three-quarters of Russian citizens believe they know the objectives of the Special Military Operation. However, none of the goals received a majority of votes: 39% cite the de-Nazification of Ukraine, 19% cite confrontation with the West, and the remaining (not specified here) goals receive less than 10% of the vote.
5.
A majority of Russian citizens would support a Russian special military operation against Kazakhstan or the Baltic states under certain conditions. 26% and 34%, respectively, believe that the conditions for conducting military operations against these states already exist.
6.
Russian citizens believe that the Special Military Operation in Ukraine has not achieved its goals and almost three quarters would support its "tomorrow's" end (probably meaning premature termination). An important change from the December poll is the sharp drop in support for an indefinite Special Military Operation from 48% to 12% and the increase in undecideds from 15% to 32%.
7.
70% of respondents do not know who they would vote for if Vladimir Putin did not participate in the presidential election. All other (not listed here) candidates achieved between 5% and 6% of the vote each
Source:
https://t.me/ikarthinktank/115