21.09.2022 - Rusko-ukrajinský konflikt

21.09.2022

Putin has declared a partial mobilization. They would like to call up about 300,000 reservists.

A few observations on mobilization


Russia has decided to do a partial mobilization, it should be reservists. It was a move that the hawks had been calling for for a long time and the administration was reluctant to make. In doing so, Russia is admitting that it has lost the strategic initiative on the battlefield, that it is losing, and that it is taking heavy casualties, even though it is quoting ridiculously low numbers. At the same time, the occupation regimes in the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia and Kherson regions have been ordered to hold so-called referendums, which are intended to be the basis for annexing these regions to Russia, along the lines of the annexation of Crimea. This will not be recognised by the world community in its majority, but it will be the legal basis for the Russian administration to ensure that Russian soldiers cannot refuse to be deployed on the front line in the Ukrainian theatre of war on the grounds that it is outside the borders of the Russian Federation, because from the Russian point of view it will already be Russian territory. These referendums were announced some time ago, but they were waiting for the conquest of the rest of the Donetsk region. This has not happened and, on the contrary, the Russian occupation forces have been pushed out of parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The current rushed implementation of the referendums is therefore further evidence of panic.


These two steps are therefore intended to prevent the outflow of troops from the front, or to increase their numbers in the field significantly, and thus to reverse the situation on the front. But it is rather doubtful whether this will be achieved. Why do the experts doubt it?


The Soviet army was a huge moloch. Not only did it have large numbers of men under arms, but it also maintained extensive peacetime excess capacity in the areas of enlistment records, education and training, officer cadre, accommodation, weapons and equipment. This was so that this army could absorb the civilian conscripts in the event of a mobilization being declared.


In the event of mobilization, it is necessary to provide personnel, material and capacity to inform the conscripts, to examine them medically and assign them to different units, to provide them with training, to provide them with arms and equipment, to accommodate them, to feed them. This requires sufficient space at the bases, sufficient officers and NCOs for the newly formed units, and sufficiently robust logistics and administration. But maintaining these capabilities and capacities in peacetime is very expensive.


In the first half of the 1990s, the Russian military tried to ignore economic realities and wanted to maintain these mobilization capabilities. But it did not have the money to do so, and the system was rapidly decaying and, moreover, being stolen. In the second half, the administration realized that changes needed to be made. Secretary of Defense Sergeyev had previously served in the Strategic Missile Forces, which is part of the reason he decided to make this the primary investment in this part of the armed forces. This component was to serve as a deterrent and the ground troops were to be more like a smaller expeditionary force for possible deployment outside Russia's borders. In the end, however, the money was only for the missiles. The condition of the ground troops continued to deteriorate. However, when the price of oil and gas began to rise, Russia began to have more money. Minister Serdyukov tried to improve the state of the military. The ground troops were still to be essentially a sort of expeditionary force, but better equipped, armed and trained. The inspiration came from the professional Western armies. He also wanted to buy from the West some of the equipment that Russian industry could not supply in sufficient quality. At that time, many educational and training institutions, barracks and also cadre units were abolished. These were units that had cadre assignments, equipment, a large number of officers and NCOs, but almost no men. This was to consist of mobilized civilians. Serdyukov alienated many officers and heads of arms companies by these actions, so he was dismissed relatively soon on corruption grounds. Minister Shoigu then partially reversed some of his reform steps, but the Russian military no longer has anywhere near the robust infrastructure it had in Soviet times.


If the Russian military does try to mobilize, it will have great difficulty implementing it. Acquisition capacity has been largely eliminated, and officers and NCOs of the peacetime army have largely been killed, maimed or captured. Troops at the front face acute shortages of men, NCOs and officers. Thus, there is little to take experienced soldiers to train the conscripts.


Already the troops at the front are facing problems with weapons and equipment. They are short of fully functional modern weapons and equipment, bulletproof vests, modern helmets, night vision sets, uniforms and rations. Because of inherent problems and heavy casualties, Russian logistics has a problem resupplying existing units, so there will be a problem of how to supply new units. If they send masses of poorly armed, equipped and untrained conscripts to the front, they will be a cannonfodder rather than a factor that could turn the tide of the war.


It is also highly questionable what the state of these new troops will be in terms of morale and motivation. Those who wanted to go to war because they thought it was the right thing to do, or were driven to do so by economic reasons, have already done so. Conscripts are expected to be less than glorious with morale. And it will be similar for their families. Getting these troops to the front may also be logistically challenging in itself. So there may be a situation where these troops with low morale will be stuck in Moscow waiting to be moved to the front. This has historically led to instability or even revolution.


For the above reasons, most analysts familiar with Russian military and historical realities expected the Russian administration to be reluctant to announce mobilization. And if it did, it would be a very risky move that could cause major problems for the military and provoke social instability.


Mobilisation and the continuation of the process of annexation of Ukrainian territories may also accelerate Western military and economic aid to Ukraine. Conscripts will also be missed in industry, with the Russian economy being hit hard by sanctions and likely to lose a number of markets for its key export products in the longer term. Speculation about mobilization alone has caused the stock values of a number of Russian companies to plummet, and people have bought up tickets on some flights from Russia abroad. Calls for protests have also begun to emerge.

Russian airlines have ordered a halt to the sale of tickets to Russian men aged 18 to 65.

Source: www.airlive.net

The Russian Federation released 10 foreigners captured in Ukraine, namely: 1 Moroccan, 1 Swede, 1 Croat, 2 Americans and 5 Britons. The release was due to the efforts of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.
Source:
www.reuters.com
www.ukrinform.ua

During the Russian-Ukrainian prisoner exchange, some of the Azovstal defenders were released. UkrinInform, a news site, wrote that no details have been announced, but all that is known is that the prisoner exchange took place today. There is no precise information on the number of Ukrainians released from captivity, although on 20 September tr. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan claimed that Ukraine and Russia had reached an agreement on the exchange of 200 prisoners.
Source:
https://t.me/informnapalm/12543
https://t.me/informnapalm/12544
https://t.me/operativnoZSU/43194
www.ukrinform.ua
Note:
The top photo shows a fighter from the 36th Marine Brigade, one of the defenders of Azovstal Azovstal(published 15.05.2022)[/url].
The remaining photographs show the return from captivity.
Attached is a list of Azovstal defenders released from captivity.

to Robot's analysis, I would just add that there is a clear parallel with the past, when the Soviet Union also tried to "arm" the Western world, and we all know how that turned out, we were recently reminded of it with the death of Gorbachev. Even yesterday's calls for increased armaments are leading to further economic disruption in a country where printer paper is worth more than the money that could be printed on it, and if Russia (with the exception of Moscow or St Petersburg) is not living completely "above its means", it will be difficult for Russian society to accept that mobile phones are gone, computers are gone, trips abroad to the sea are gone and so on. This, too, will add to society-wide pressure. We'll see how Putin's top brass handles it.